Charles Higgins v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #013
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 24th day of March, 2021 are as follows:
BY Genovese, J.:
2020-CC-01094 CHARLES HIGGINS VS. LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY (Parish of East Baton Rouge)
REVERSED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2020-CC-01094
CHARLES HIGGINS
VS.
LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
On Writ of Certiorari to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, Parish of East Baton
Rouge
GENOVESE, J.
We granted writs in this case to determine whether the court of a ppeal
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Louisiana Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), where Farm Bureau argued
that the “regular use ” exclusion in its automobile insurance policy issued to the
plaintiff precluded uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, because the plaintiff was
operating a vehicle owned by his employer at the time of the accident . For the
reasons that follow, we find that the plaintiff plainly qualified as an insured for
purposes of UM coverage under the policy. Because we find that the policy’s
“regular u se” exclusion impermissibly derogated from the requirements of the
Louisiana uninsured motorist statute (the “UM statute”), La. R.S. 22:1295, we find
this exclusion inapplicable and reverse the decision of the court of appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff in this matter, Charles Higgins, was injured in an automobile
accident while operating a truck owned by his employer, AT&T. The other driver in
the accident was underinsured, and AT&T did not carry UM coverage on the truck.
Mr. Higgins subsequently filed the instant suit against his personal UM insurer, Farm
Bureau. In response, Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment pursuant to the
03/24/21

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“regular use” exclusion in the UM portion of the policy at issue, which provided, in
pertinent part:
The policy does not apply under Coverage U [UM coverage]:

…

(b) to any automobile or trailer owned by or furnished or available for
the regular use of the named insured or a resident of the named
insured’s household if that automobile is not described on the
Declarations.

Notably, the liability portion of the policy includes a similar exclusion:
(d)(1) the insuring agreement does not apply to any automobile owned
or furnished for regular use to either the named insured or a member of
the same household.

Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff used the AT&T vehicle regularly and
that the vehicle was not described on the declarations page of the plaintiff’s policy;
thus, under the plain language of the contract, UM coverage was excluded for the
accident in question. Nevertheless , the plaintiff opposed Farm Bureau’s motion,
arguing that the “regular use” exclusion impermissibly conflicts with the mandatory
requirements of the UM statute, which only allows UM coverage to be limited under
certain conditions, including the instance when the insur ed is occupying a vehicle
that he or she owns but has not been declared in his or her insurance policy. La. R.S.
22:1295(1)(e). After a hearing, the trial court agreed with plaintiff’s statutory
interpretation and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Farm Bureau applied to the First Circuit for supervisory writs, which that
court granted, reversing the trial court’s ruling in a 4 -1 decision. 1 Higgins v. La.
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 20-0179 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/10/20), 2020 WL 4582662.
The appellate court found La. R.S. 22:1295 did not mandate coverage for the
accident at issue, because the policy did not provide liability coverage for the
accident. In conducting its analysis, the court quoted Green ex rel. Peterson v.

1 Judge Chutz dissented without assigning reasons.

3

Johnson, 14-0292, p. 7 (La. 10/15/14), 149 So.3d 766, 772 (interpreting Magnon v.
Collins, 98-2822, p. 6 (La. 7/7/99), 73 9 So.2d 191, 196), for the proposition that,
“[I]n order for a tort victim to be entitled to statutory UM coverage, which would be
an implied amendment to an automobile liability policy not expressly containing
such coverage, the tort victim seeking UM cov erage must qualify as a liability
insured under the policy at issue." Because the “regular u se” exception was
contained in the liability coverage portion of the Farm Bureau policy as well as the
UM coverage portion, the court of appeal found that Mr. Higgins was not a liability
insured under the terms of the policy , and, thus, UM coverage was not provided.
Accordingly, the First Circuit reversed the trial court and granted Farm Bureau’s
motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. This
Court subsequently granted the plaintiff’s writ to determine whether, based on the
facts in this case, UM coverage is mandated for the accident at issue. Higgins v. La.
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 20-1094 (La. 11/18/20), 304 So.3d 72.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
As in Green and Magnon, this matter comes before us in a summary judgment
posture. Summary judgments are reviewed de novo on appeal. Magnon, p. 5, 739
So.2d at 195. An appellate court thus asks the same questions as the trial court in
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any genuine
issue of material fact, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id.; La. C.C.P. art. 966. In the present matter, the facts are undisputed, and the
issue is purely a legal one —namely, whether Farm Bureau is entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of the plaintiff’s UM coverage under the language of the
policy and the requirements of the UM statute.
Louisiana’s public policy strongly favors UM coverage and a liberal
construction of the UM statute . Magnon, p. 5, 739 So.2d at 196; Taylor v. Rowell,
98-2865, pp. 5-6 (La. 5/18/99), 736 So.2d 812, 816; Howell v. Balboa Ins. Co., 564

4

So.2d 298, 301 (La.1990) . As this Court stated in Taylor, p. 5, 736 So.2d at 816,
“The plain language of [the UM statute] requires UM coverage on policies of
automobile insurance issued in this state. However, UM coverage is not required
when an insured named in the policy makes a written rejection of UM coverage or
selects limits lower than the liability limits of the policy .” Here, plaintiff did not
reject UM coverage or select l ower limits; thus, we must analyze the policy to
determine whether the UM coverage provided therein complies with the
requirements of the UM statute.
The parties’ arguments regarding interpretation and application of the UM
statute turn heavily on this Court’s analysis in Green and Magnon. The plaintiff
argues that Green overruled Magnon’s holding that “a person who does not qualify
as a liability insured under a policy of insurance is not entitled to UM coverage under
the policy.” Magnon at p. 5, 739 So.2d at 196. However, we find that Green merely
clarified that Magnon is irrelevant in cases where the insurance policy at issue
contains UM provisions which expressly provide coverage to the insured.
In Green, pp. 1-2, 149 So.3d at 769, the plaintiff brought suit on behalf of her
two minor children whose father, Dave Peterson, died when a sport utility vehicle
collided with the motorcycle that he was riding, which he co-owned with Benjamin
Gibson. Gibson’s insurer, Allstate, was named as a party defendant on the allegation
that UM coverage was provided to Peterson under Gibson’s policy. Allstate moved
for summary judgment, arguing that policy did not provide UM coverage to
Peterson, because the policy definitions for “insured person” and “insured auto” as
set forth in the liability section of the policy were not met, relying on Magnon. Id. at
pp. 2-3, 149 So.3d at 770.
The Green Court articulated a two-step analysis to determine the existence of
UM coverage under a policy of automobile insurance: “(1) the automobile insurance
policy is first examined to determine whether UM coverage is contractually provided

5

under the express provisions of the policy; (2) if no UM coverage is found under the
policy provisions , then the UM statu te is applied to determine whether statutory
coverage is mandated.” Id. at p. 9, 149 So.3d at 774. In that case, the Green court’s
analysis stopped at the first step, as it found that UM coverage existed under the
“express contractual UM provisions.” Id. at pp. 9 -11, 149 So.3d at 774-75. Thus,
even though the defendant in that case contended that the policy definitions for
“insured person” and “insured auto” as set forth in the liability section of the policy
were not met, the Court found that this was irrelevant, because contractual coverage
existed for the accident under the terms of the UM section of the policy.
However, in the instant case , although there is UM coverage contractually
provided under the express provisions of the Farm Bureau policy, those provisions
include a “regular use ” exclusion, which excludes coverage when vehicles are
furnished for the insured’s regular use if those vehicles are not listed in the policy’s
declarations. It is undisputed that the work vehicle at issue here was furnished for
the plaintiff’s regular use and was not listed in the policy’s declarations. Therefore,
although UM coverage is expressly provided un der the contract, c overage in this
instance is excluded, and we must proceed to the second step of the analysis.
As articulated in Green, this second step involves determining whether
coverage is mandated under the terms of the UM statute, and it is at this step that an
examination of Magnon’s holding becomes necessary.2 In Magnon, p. 5, 739 So.2d
at 196, this C ourt held that, “a person who does not qualify as a liability insured
under a policy of insurance is not entitled to UM coverage u nder the policy.”
Because the liability portion of the plaintiff’s policy in this case also contains the
“regular use” exception, Farm Bureau urges this Court to rely on Magnon and find

2 This Court stated that “the Magnon holding, because it discussed statutorily -mandated UM
coverage, is not examined at the outset when the automobile insurance policy at issue contains
express contractual UM coverage, absent some contention that contractual coverage runs afoul of
the UM statute.” Green, p. 6, 149 So.3d 772 (emphasis added).

6

that UM coverage is not required because the plaintiff would not be covered for this
accident under the liability portion of this policy. However, we find that Magnon is
inapposite to the present matter.
In Magnon, the plaintiff sought UM coverage under his employer’s
commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policy (not a typical automobile
insurance policy), which included limited automobile liability coverage for non -
owned and hired vehicles. The plaintiff was an employee using his own vehicle at
the time of the accident, and this Court found that he “never achieved insured status
for auto liability coverage under the [employer’s] policy, and thus is not entitled to
UM coverage.” Id. at p. 10, 739 So.2d at 199 (emphasis added) . Analyzing the
Magnon Court’s holding that “it is well -settled that a person who does not q ualify
as a liability insured under a policy of insurance is not entitled to UM coverage under
the policy,” in light of these facts, the Green Court rightly concluded that the
Magnon holding “was intended to convey only that, in order for a tort victim to be
entitled to statutory UM coverage, which would be an implied amendment to an
automobile liability policy not expressly containing such coverage, the tort victim
seeking UM coverage must qualify as a liability insured under the policy at issue.”
Green, p. 6, 149 So.3d at 772 (emphasis in original). Put another way:
The [Green] court noted that, while language in prior cases indicates
that the injured person must be a liability insured in order to be entitled
to UM cove rage, that limitation does not apply when the policy
expressly extends UM coverage to the injured person; it applies only in
determining whether UM coverage is mandated for a person not
expressly entitled to UM [coverage] under the policy.

William Shelby McKenzie & H. Alston Johnson, III, § 4:4.Mandatory coverage —
Policies, 15 La. Civ. L. Treatise , Insurance Law & Practice (4th ed., Nov. 2020
Update).
Unlike the plaintiff in Magnon, Mr. Higgins is not claiming to meet the
definition of “insured” under his employer’s CGL policy (which, in Magnon,

7

specifically ex cluded coverage for employees operating their own automobiles) ;
rather, he merely seeks to enforce UM coverage under his personal automobile
insurance policy , under which he is clearly a n insured person and is expressly
entitled to UM coverage, though the policy’s terms purport to limit that coverage via
a vehicle -based “regular use” exclusion. We therefore distinguish Magnon and
related jurisprudence from cases such as the present one, where a plaintiff who
plainly holds the status of an insured person under a personal automobile policy that
expressly provides UM coverage seeks to enforce that UM cove rage.3 This
distinction does not conflict with our past jurisprudence applying Magnon’s holding
to find no UM coverage in cases which dealt with the issue of whether the plaintiff
met the definition of an insured under a personal automobile liability polic y. See
Filipski v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. , 09 -1013 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 742
(finding no UM coverage where plaintiff fell under the p olicy’s named driver
exclusion); Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co, 02-1637 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 57 7
(finding no UM coverage for foster child ren, who did not qualify as “relative” of
insured). Nor does it conflict with cases where Magnon was applied to find that an
employee did not qualify as an insured under his or her employer’s CGL insurance

3 Farm Bureau’s policy’s definitions of “insured” and “insured automobile” are found in “Part IV:
Protection against Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist, Coverage U, Uninsured Motorist (Damages
for bodily injury)”:

Definitions:

The Definitions under Part I, LIABILTY, except the definition of insured, apply to
Coverage U, and under Coverage U:

insured means:

(a) the named insured and any relative while a resident of the named insured’s
household;

***

insured automobile means:

(d) a non-owned automobile while being operated by the named insured.

8

policy. See Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 01-1355 (La. 1/15/02), 805
So.2d 113 4 (finding no UM coverage for passenger under a real estate agent’s
special purpose insurance policy); Carrier v. Reliance Ins. Co., 99-2573 (La.
4/11/00), 759 So.2d 37 (finding no UM coverage for an employee under his
employer’s commercial insurance policy). Significantly, the Carrier Court stated,
and the Green Court quoted with approval, that : “Plaintiff obviously would be
entitled to recovery against [the defendant/insurer] if he qualified under the ‘Who is
an Insured’ provision of the UM coverage.” Green, pp. 7 -8, 149 So.3d at 773,
quoting Carrier, p. 7, 759 So.2d at 41 (emphasis added). Here, the plaintiff is the
named insured in his personal automobile insurance policy—obviously an “insured”
person under the policy.4 Under these circumstances, we find that a vehicle-based
exclusion cannot be used to artificially limit the definition of the “insured” for
purposes of UM coverage in a personal automobile policy where that coverage has
not been declined, but is expressly provided.
To interpret Magnon in the manner in which the defendant requests would
allow insurers to write vehicle-based exclusions into the liability section of personal
automobile insurance policies and in turn limit UM coverage for the insured, so as
to render meaningless the limited exceptions to UM coverage allowed by the
legislature. We acknowledge that lower courts have at times broadly pronounced
that insurers “can exclude an insured from UM coverage in the same manner that the
insured would be excluded under liability insurance,” and have interpreted Magnon
as supporting this view. Melder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co ., 16-692, p. 3
(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/14/16), 208 So.3d 416, 420, writ granted, 17-0095 (La. 4/7/17),
218 So.3d 107 (citing Davenport v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins . Co., 03 -2593
(La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), 897 So.2d 98, writ denied, 04-2900 (La. 2/4/05), 893

4 See footnote 3.

9

So.2d 882; Mills v. Hubbs, 597 So.2d 87 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d
677 (La.1992); Kerner v. Laballe, 560 So.2d 571 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1990 ); Zanca v.
Breaux, 590 So.2d 821 (La.App. 4 Cir. 199 1)). However, as will be discussed in
detail below, this expansive jurisprudential principle is inconsistent with both the
UM statute and this Court’s jurisprudence interpreting that statute as requiring that
UM coverage follow the person, not the vehicle. Bernard v. Ellis, 11-2377, p. 6 (La.
7/2/12), 111 So.3d 995, 1000; Filipski, p. 5, 25 So.3d at 745; Howell, 564 So.2d at
301. Having found Magnon’s holding inapplicable to the present case , we must
complete the second step of the analysis required by Green and determine whether
statutory UM coverage is mandated in this case.
Here, both the liability and UM sections of the policy contain “regular use ”
exclusions which would exclude the plaintiff’s work vehicle from coverage.5 Absent
a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers are entitl ed to impose
and enforce reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations they contractually
assume. Magnon, p. 7, 739 So.2d at 196-97. We acknowledge that the “regular use”
exclusion serves a legitimate purpose in automobi le liability insurance policies —
namely, “to protect an insurance company against double coverage when a premium
has been paid on only on e vehicle.” Romano v. Girlinghouse, 385 So.2d 352, 355
(La.App. 1 Cir. 1980). However, courts have noted that UM coverage “embodies a
strong public policy, which is to provide full recovery for innocent automobile
accident victims who suffer damages caused by a tortfeasor who has no coverage or
who is not adequately covered by liability insurance.” Bernard, p. 10, 111 So.3d at
1002 (quoting Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607, p. 5 (La. 5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945, 949,
citing Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 06-0363, p. 4 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2 d 544,

5 The “regular use ” exception in Farm Bureau’s policy even incorp orates the term “named
insured,” stating that UM coverage shall not apply “to any automobile or trailer owned by or
furnished or available for the regular use of the named insured or a resident of the named insured’s
household if that automobile is not described on the Declarations.”

10

547). Therefore, it is well settled that the UM statute is liberally construed, and
statutory e xceptions to coverage must be interpreted strictly. Cutsinger, p. 6, 12
So.3d at 949; Duncan, p. 4, 950 So.2d at 547; Roger v. Estate of Moulton, 513 So.2d
1126, 1130 (La.1987).
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1295(emphasis added) contains provisions that
“shall govern the issuance of uninsured motorist coverage,” with the fundamental
requirement being that every automobile liability insurance policy also include UM
coverage of persons insured under the policy unless such coverage is expressly
rejected:
(1)(a)(i) No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor
vehicle designed for use on public highways and r equired to be
registered in this state or as provided in this Section unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits of
bodily injury liability provided by the policy, under provisions filed with
and approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
nonpunitive damages from owners or operators of uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or
disease, including death resulting therefrom; however, the coverage
required under this Section is not applicable when any insured named in
the policy either rejects coverage, selects lower limits, or selects
economic-only coverage, in the manner provided in Item (1)(a) (ii) of
this Section….

Accordingly, UM coverage is an implied amendment to any automobile
liability policy made “for the protection of persons insured thereunder” and will be
read into the policy unless validly rejected. Id.(emphasis added); Duncan, p. 4, 950
So.2d at 547. In keeping with the strong public policy favoring UM coverage, the
statute provides that rejection or modification of UM coverage limits “shall be made
only on a form provided by the commissioner of insurance” which complies with
the statutory requirements provided in La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii)(emphasis added).
In Howell, 564 So.2d at 301-02 (emphasis added), this Court explained:
UM coverage attaches to the person of the insured, not the vehicle, and
that any provision of UM coverage purporting to limit insured status to

11

instances involving a relationship to an insured vehicle contravenes
LSA-R.S. 22:1406(D). In other words, any person who enjoys the status
of insured under a Louisiana motor vehicle p olicy whic h includes
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage enjoys coverage protection
simply by reason of having sustained injur y by an
uninsured/underinsured motorist.[6]

The Howell Court noted, “The courts of this state have recognized, both
impliedly and explicitly, that this coverage cannot be qualified by a requirement of
relationship with an insured vehicle.” Id.(citations omitted) . However, the UM
statute does contain one limited exception to this general rule, La. R.S.
22:1295(1)(e), which provides:
The uninsured motorist coverage does not apply to bodily injury,
sickness, or disease, including the resulting death of an insured, while
occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured if such motor vehicle
is not described in the policy under which a cla im is made, or is not a
newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms
of the policy. This provision shall not apply to uninsured motorist
coverage provided in a policy that does not describe specific motor
vehicles.[7]

This Court has recognized that the legislative intent of this limited exception
was “to keep vehicle owners from carrying UM coverage on only one of two or more
owned vehicles, thus obtaining the benefit of UM coverage regardless of which
vehicle they occupied, at the cost of only one UM policy.” Mayo v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 03-1801, p. 6 (La. 2/25/04), 869 So.2d 96, 101 (emphasis in original),
(quoting Haltom v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 588 So.2d 792, 795 (La.App. 2
Cir. 1991)). This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of this statute ,
which only excludes coverage in certain instances where an insured is “occupying a
motor vehicle owned by the insured…. ” La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(e) (emphasis added).

6 Helpfully, the Howell Court review ed other states’ jurisprudence and concluded that, “[t]he
rationale that UM coverage cannot be made dependent upon a relationship with an insured vehicle
has been followed almost uniformly by those courts of the various states with UM provisions not
significantly different from our own.” 564 So.2d at 301.

7 This exception was added to the UM statute by 1988 La. Acts No. 203, two years before Howell
was decided. Thus, it was in existence at the time of the Howell decision, although it was not
relevant to the facts of this case.

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Here, we find that the statutory exclusion unambiguously applies only to “vehicle[s]
owned by the insured.” A s stated above, any statutory exception to coverage
provisions of the UM statute must be construed strictly. Duncan, p. 4, 950 So.2d at
547. Thus, we hold that Farm Bureau’s policy impermissibly expanded the
categories of vehicles excluded from UM coverage beyond that which the UM
statute allows.
We acknowledge the existence of appellate jurisprudence which has reached
a different conclusion when presented with similar facts , including a recent Third
Circuit opinion upholding Farm Bureau’s “regular use” exclusion under nearly
identical circumstances. Melder, 208 So.3d 416; see also Davenport, 897 So.2d 98
(finding employee’s personal UM coverage was barred by the “regular use ”
exclusion); Gray v. Am. Nat. Property & Cas. Co., 07-0415 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07),
966 So.2d 1237 (finding employee’s personal UM coverage was barred by the
“regular use” exclusion); Peyton v. Bseis , 96-0309 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/96), 680
So.2d 81 (finding employee’s personal UM coverage was barred by the “regular use”
exclusion); Kerner, 560 So.2d 571 (finding “regular use” exclusion barred UM
coverage).8 Because we find that the language of the UM statute only allows the
“regular use” exclusion with respect to owned vehicles, we overrule this
jurisprudence to the extent that it conflicts with our holding herein.
Finally, we note that the plaintiff requests penalt ies and attorney fees. This
Court has stated that, “The statutory penalties are inappropriate when the insurer has
a reasonable basis to de fend the claim and acts in good -faith reliance on that
defense.” Reed v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 03-0107, p. 15 (La. 10/21/03), 857
So.2d 1012, 1021 (citation omitted). In light of the prior appellate jurisprudence
permitting “regular use” exclusions to UM coverage in simil ar cases, we find that

8 Notably, this Court granted writs in Melder, but the parties settled shortly after the record was
lodged, and the case was dismissed.

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Farm Bureau had a reasonable basis to defend the claim. As there is no evidence of
bad faith, an award of penalties and attorney fees is not appropriate in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court of a ppeal’s grant of Farm
Bureau’s motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of Mr. Higgin’s claims.
Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment is hereby denied, and this matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

03/24/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-CC-01094
C
HARLES HIGGINS
VS.
LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
O
N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE FIRST CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEAL, PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
C
richton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons:
U
nder the circumstances of this case , and based on the strong public policy
expressed by our legislature and reflected in jurisprudence favoring
uninsured/under-insured motorist coverage, I agree with the majority opinion in all
respects. See Magnon v. Collins, 98-2822, p. 5 (La. 7/7/99), 739 So.2d 191, 196. I
write separately to highlight the untenable practical effect on the insured of the
position taken by the insurer in this case. Under the insurer’s position, this plaintiff,
mandated to use a company truck on a regular basis, would not have the benefit of
UM coverage, notwithstanding the fact that UM coverage follows the person, not
the vehicle. Bernard v. Ellis, 11-2377, p. 6 (La. 7 7/2/12), 111 So.3d 995, 1000. For
an employee who has paid for UM coverage, what are his options? Refuse to use the
company’s truck as instructed by his employer unless his company secures UM
coverage? Incur the expense of adding the company truck to his personal automobile
policy? These choices are both impractical and unjust.
By choosing not to reject UM coverage or selecting lower limits, the plaintiff
elected to pay a higher premium for an extra layer of protection in the unfortunate
event he was to suffer damages caused by a tortfeasor not adequately covered by
liability insurance. In my view, the position taken by the insurer here runs afoul of
this state’s public policy favoring UM coverage.