Michel Jackson Miller, Individually And As Natural Tutrix Of Her Minor Son v. The State Of Louisiana, Department Of Corrections, Rodney Strain, Sheriff Of The Parish Of St. Tammany, Northshore Workplace, L.L.C., Victory Bible Church, A Lousiana Relig

Supreme Court of Louisiana
March 16, 2021
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
MICHEL JACKSON MILLER, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS NATURAL TUTRIX OF HER MINOR
SON
VS.
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, RODNEY STRAIN,
SHERIFF OF THE PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY,
NORTHSHORE WORKPLACE, L.L.C.,
VICTORY BIBLE CHURCH, A LOUSIANA
RELIGIOUS CORPORATION
No.2020-CC-01345
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Northshore Workforce, L.L.C. - Applicant Defendant; Applying For
Supervisory Writ, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Number(s)
2015-11850, 1st Circuit Court of Appeal, Number(s) 2020-CW-0772;
_ _ _ _ _ _
March 16, 2021
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
WJC
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
JBM
PDG
03/16/2021 "See News Release 010 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

03/16/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
20-CC-1345
M
ICHEL JACKSON MILLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NATURAL
TUTRIX OF HER MINOR SON
VS
.
TH
E STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
RODNEY STRAIN, SHERIFF OF THE PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY,
NORTHSHORE WORKPLACE, L.L.C., VICTORY BIBLE CHURCH, A
LOUSIANA RELIGIOUS CORPORATION
O
n Supervisory Writ to the 22nd Judicial District Court, Parish of St.
Tammany
P
ER CURIAM
J ames Miller was an inmate in the custody of t he Department of Corrections,
which approved his participation in a work release program operated by Northshore
Workforce, LLC (“Northshore”). As part of the program, Mr. Miller was scheduled
to work for Victory Bible Church (“Victory”) in Covington on Friday, April 19,
2013 from 9 a. m. to 9 p.m. At the end of the workday, neither Victory nor
Northshore could locate Mr. Miller. Northshore later learned that Mr. Miller had
been murdered earlier in the day while in New Orleans.
Subsequently, plaintiff, Michel Miller, both individually and on behalf of her
minor son, filed the instant wrongful death and survival action against several
defendants, including Northshore.
Northshore filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it did not have a
duty to protect an escapee from the criminal acts of an unrelated third party. The
district court initially granted Northshore’s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial, asserting she had located two additional
witnesses who intended to testify that Mr. Miller had not escaped but had permission

from Northshore to leave the work release program. The district court granted the
motion for new trial, stating, “I’m going to grant the motion for new trial, not based
on some new witness or anything, but on the fact that the C ourt may have been
wrong.”
Northshore applied for supervisory writs. The court of appeal denied the writ,
with one judge dissenting. Northshore then applied to this court.
While we have recognized prison authorities have a duty to prevent inmates
from escaping, we have made it clear that this duty is based on the potential for harm
to members of the public. See Wilson v. State through Dept. of Public Safety &
Corrections, 576 So.2d 490, 493 (La. 1991) (“[a]lthough prison authorities have a
duty to prevent inmates from escaping, that duty is intended to protect persons from
being harmed by escaping inmates while they are in the process of escaping.”). We
have not recognized any duty by the prison authorities to protect an escaping inmate
from the criminal acts of a third party. Therefore, any injury to Mr. Miller is clearly
outside of the scope of Northshore’s duty to prevent inmates from escaping.
We further find it is of no moment whether M r. Miller was injured while
escaping or whether, as plaintiff now argues, he left the worksite with Northshore’s
permission. Our jurisprudence has long recognized that absent special
circumstances, a penal institution is not the insurer of the safety of inmates in its
custody. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jackson v. Phelps, 95-2294 (La. 4/8/96), 672 So.2d
665, 667; Breaux v. State, 326 So.2d 481, 482 (La. 1976); Parker v. State, 282 So.2d
483, 487 (La. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550
(1973). These holdings are consistent with the well -settled principle that “there is
generally no duty to protect others from the criminal activities of third persons.”
Posecai v. Wal -Mart Stores, Inc. , 99-1222 (La. 11/30/99), 752 So. 2d 762, 766 .
Thus, even assuming Mr. Miller remained under Northshore’s custody, we find

Northshore had no duty to protect Mr. Miller from the criminal activities of third
parties.
Where no factual dispute exists and no credibility determinations are required,
the legal question of the existence of a duty is appropriately addressed by summary
judgment. Griffin v. Shelter Ins. Co., 02-2628 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03), 857 So.2d
603, 605, writ denied, 03-2992 (La. 1/16/04), 864 So.2d 635. Because there are no
facts in dispute and the law does not support the existence of a duty, summary
judgment in favor of Northshore is appropriate. The district court erred in granting
plaintiff’s motion for new trial.

DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district
court granting the motion for new trial is vacated and set aside. The judgment of the
district court granting summary judgment in favor of Northshore Workforce, LLC
is reinstated and affirmed.