State Of Louisiana v. Elizabeth Trahan A/k/a Elizebeth Trahan

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #049
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 10th day of December, 2021 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2020-K-01233 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. ELIZABETH TRAHAN A/K/A
ELIZEBETH TRAHAN (PARISH OF VERMILION)
REVERSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Crichton, J., dissents.

SUPRE
ME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No.
2020-K-01233
ST
ATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
ELIZABETH TRAHAN A/K/A ELIZEBETH TRAHAN
On W
rit of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Vermilion
PER CURIAM:
In 2015, a pplicant was involved in a tragic automobile accident, which
resulted in a fatality. Applicant and her boyfriend Victor Guilamo were in a Dodge
Charger, which was traveling north at 72 mph in the left lane on Highway 167
between Maurice and Abbeville. Motorcyclist Carl Johnson passed them on the
right, switched into the left lane in front of them , and then braked, apparently
intending to turn left across the highway median. Skid marks showed that the driver
of the Charger attempted to stop. The Charger collided with the motorcycle and Mr.
Johnson was killed.
Applicant was charged with vehicular homicide, La. R.S. 14:32.1. 1 A
Vermilion Parish jury found her guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced her to
serve 15 years imprisonment at hard labor, with all but six years of the sentence
suspended, and with three years of active supervised probation. 2 At present,
applicant has been released from custody and is under parole supervision.
1 Defendant was also charged with reckless operation of a vehicle, La. R.S. 14:99; obstruction of
justice, La. R.S. 14:130.1; injuring public records, La. R.S. 14:132; and failure to give notice of
her change of address, La. R.S. 32:406. She was acquitted of the charge of obstruction of justice.
The State dismissed the remaining charges.
2 Applicant faced a sentencing range of not less than five years nor more than thirty years, with or
without hard labor, and with at least three years of the sentence to be imposed without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:32.1(B).
10/10/21

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The court of appeal affirmed. State v. Trahan , 2019 -873 (La. App. 3 Cir.
9/23/20), 304 So.3d 966. The court of appeal found that the evidence was sufficient
to prove that applicant (rather than Mr. Guilamo) was the driver, and that defendant
was impaired by drugs she had consumed and her impairment was a contributing
factor to the accident. Applicant no longer contends that the State presented
insufficient evidence that she was the driver, and therefore we do not describe that
evidence or address that portion of the court of appeal’s opinion.
Regarding whether the State proved that applicant’ s impairment was a
contributing factor, the court of appeal acknowledged that metabolites detected in
applicant’s blood and urine , standing alone, did “not allow the jury to assume the
defendant was impaired or that the presence of those substances was a contributing
factor in the accident.” Trahan , 2019-873, p. 24, 304 So.3d at 978. However, the
court of appeal found that the jury could consider additional circumstances, such as
the fact that applicant exceeded the speed limit and was unable to stop in time to
avoid the accident, to conclude that drugs impaired her driving and thus contributed
to the accident. Id., 2019-873, pp. 24–25, 304 So.3d at 978.
Judge Saunders dissented. Trahan, 2019-873, pp. 1–4, 304 So.3d at 979–981
(Saunders, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that expert testimony in conjunction
with evidence of behavioral manifestations of intoxication is ordinar ily used to
establish that a driver is impaired, and no such evidence was offered by the State in
the present case:
In cases where intoxication or drug induced impairment are a required
element, expert testimony is generally used to establish the amount of
a substance the defendant has in his or her system and how that amount
would influence the defendant. This expert testimony is then
corroborated by evidence of failed sobriety tests, slurred speech, or
other visible signs of intoxication. See State v. Dock, 49,784 (La. App.
2 Cir. 6/3/15), 167 So. 3d 1097, 1101; State v. Kestle, 2007-1573 (La.
12/2/08), 996 So. 2d 275, 281.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n some instances,
the state likely would have to introduce expert testimony concer ning

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the probable physiological effects of the intoxicant ingested by the
defendant, especially in a case involving a prohibited substance other
than alcohol.” State v. Leger, 2017-2084 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609,
616. Here, we have the type of case sin gled out by the Court in Leger
(“a case involving a prohibited substance other than alcohol”). As such,
I feel that the state need have introduced expert testimony on the effects
of the substances in Defendant’s system. This was not done. Rather, the
state’s expert could only testify that Defendant had detectible amounts
of four types of drugs, including at least a threshold amount of THC.
Further, the state’s expert testified that she was unable to tell whether
Defendant was under the influence of any the substances found in the
test nor could she testify with certainty as to when Defendant had
ingested the substances. This testimony does not carry the state ’s
burden.

Moreover, Trooper Prejean never testifies that Defendant was impaired.
Trooper Prejean did testify that Ms. Trahan’s eyes were dilated when
he saw her at the hospital. However, he did not testify that this
suggested impairment nor did the state attempt to qualify Trooper
Prejean as an expert. Finally, the state did not establish that Trooper
Prejean had requisite knowledge, training, or experience to give a lay
opinion on whether Ms. Trahan was impaired based on his
observations. State v. Friday, 10-2309 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/17/11), 73 So.
3d 913, writ denied, 11 -1456 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1258 ; State v.
Stewart, 357 So. 2d 1111 (La.1978).

Trahan, 2019-873, pp. 1–2, 304 So.3d at 979–980 (Saunders, J., dissenting). Based
on lack of evidence introduced by the State, the dissent “would reverse Defendant’s
conviction because the state failed to car ry its burden to prove that Defendant was
impaired at the time of the accident and failed to prove that Defendant’s impairment
was a contributing factor to the victim ’s death.” Id., 2019-873, p. 4 , 304 So.3d at
981 (Saunders, J., dissenting).
We agree with the dissent that a jury could not reasonably conclude from the
evidence presented at trial that applicant was impaired or that her impairment was a
contributing factor to the fatal accident, and therefore the conviction cannot survive
appellate review under the due process s tandard of Jackson v. Virginia . “In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court
in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)…
[T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most

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favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that
all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984).
In addition, the Jackson standard of review does not allow a jury to speculate
on the probabilities of guilt where rational jurors would necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt. State v. Mussall , 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La. 1988) (citing 2 C.
Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, Criminal 2d, § 467). The requirement that
jurors reasonably reject the hypothesis of innocence advanced by the defendant in a
case of circumstantial evidence presupposes that a rational rejection of that
hypothesis is based on the evidence presented, not m ere speculation. See State v.
Schwander, 345 So.2d 1173, 1175 (La. 1978). Nonetheless, the Jackson standard
“leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence
presented at trial, requiring only that jurors ‘draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts. ’” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655, 132 S.Ct. 2060,
2064, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012).
Applicant was charged with, and found guilty of, a violation of La. R.S.
14:32.1(A):
Vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being caused proximately
or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in
actual physical control of, any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or
other means of conveyance, whether or not the offender had the intent
to cause death or great bodily harm, whenever any of the following
conditions exist and such condition was a contributing factor to the
killing:

. . .

(7) The operator’s blood has any detectable amount of any controlled
dangerous substance listed in Schedule I, I I, III, or IV as set forth in
R.S. 40:964, or a metabolite of such controlled dangerous substance,
that has not been medically ordered or prescribed for the individual.

While there are six other conditions under which the crime may be committed,
applicant was charged under Part (A)(7) and the State’s theory of the case relied on

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that section alone. Thus, the State was required to establish a causal link between the
metabolites of controlled dangerous substances in the applicant’s system and the
killing. Specifically, the State was required to present evidence that applicant’s
ingestion of controlled dangerous substances (as evidenced by their metabolites) was
a contributing factor to the fatal accident.
This court recently addressed the “contributing factor” element of vehicular
homicide in State v. Leger , 2017-2084 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So.3d 609. In Leger , the
defendant became embroiled in a high- speed road rage altercation with another
driver on the I -10. Over several miles, the two cars weaved between traffic while
defendant attempted to pass the othe r driver. Ultimately, the defendant struck the
other vehicle as defendant attempted to pass on the right, causing the defendant to
lose control of his car. He spun out into the oncoming lane of traffic, and five people
were killed in the resulting collision. A blood sample drawn about two hours after
the crash showed defendant’s BAC was over the legal limit at 0.1 percent.
In evaluating whether the State proved that the defendant’s intoxication
contributed to the fatal accident, this court emphasized that the S tate must prove
“every element of vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt,” including the link
between the defendant’s intoxication and the victim’s death:
[T]he exact nature of the proof the state is required to submit will vary
on a case-by-case basis. In some instances, the state likely would have
to introduce expert testimony concerning the probable physiological
effects of the intoxicant ingested by the defendant, especially in a case
involving a prohibited substance other than alcohol. In other
situations— perhaps where a defendant has an exorbitant BAC, loses
consciousness while driving, and causes an accident as a result—proof
of the BAC and associated acts would almost certainly prove sufficient.

Leger, 2017-2084, p. 11, 284 So.3d at 616.
This court ultimately concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the
vehicular homicide conviction in Leger because the evidence showed that the
defendant had a BAC of .1 percent, proving he was intoxicated, and the fatal accident

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resulted directly from the intoxicated defendant’s aggressive driving behavior.
Under the circumstances presented in Leger, it was reasonable for the jury to infer
that the defendant’s intoxication was a contributing factor in the fatal accident, given
the common knowledge that alcohol impairs judgment and tends to increase
aggressive behavior. Leger, 2017-2084, pp. 14–15, 284 So.3d at 618.
In the present case, c hemical testing revealed the presence of amphetamine
and a metabolite of marijuana in applicant’s blood. It also revealed a metabolite of
marijuana, a metabolite of c lonazepam, and amphetamine in applicant’s urine.
However, the toxicologist testified that the tests only revealed the presence of these
substances and not their quantities , and that it was impossible to determine how
much of the substances applicant had ingested, when she had ingested them, or
whether she was impaired at the time of the accident based on the chemical tests.
According to applicant, she took clonazepam, which she is prescribed, the evening
before the accident, s he smoked marijuana at around 5 a.m. on the morning of the
accident, and she had taken Mr. Guilamo’s Adderall at an unspecified time earlier
that day. The accident occurred at around 2:30 p.m. There was no expert testimony
concerning the probable physiological effects of the substances ingested by
applicant. In contrast with Leger , there is also no indication applicant was driving
erratically or aggressively before the accident, or that she exhibited any behavioral
manifestations of impairment after the accident.
The State contends that the following is compelling evidence that applicant’s
drug ingestion caused her to become impair ed and that her impairment was a
contributing factor. Specifically, applicant exceeded the posted speed limit by 7 mph
and her pupils were dilated. However, as noted above, there was no testimony that
applicant exhibited any behavioral signs of intoxication. Noteworthy is that the state
trooper investigating the accident did not perform a field sobriety test on the
defendant at the time of the accident or at any time thereafter. Furthermore, the State

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presented no evidence from which impaired driving could reasonably b e inferred
from dilated pupils, and the manner in which applicant was driving was not unusual.
Therefore, we agree with Judge Saunders that the State failed to carry its burden to
prove that applicant was impaired at the time of the accident and failed to prove that
applicant’s impairment was a contributing factor to the victim’s death.
Based on the evidence presented by the State at this trial, the jury could only
speculate—from metabolites detected in applicant’s blood and urine—that she was
impaired or that her ingestion of controlled dangerous substances was a contributing
factor in the tragic accident. Therefore, due process requires reversal of this
vehicular homicide conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 314, 99 S.Ct. at
2786 (“a conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any relevant evidence of
a crucial element of the offense charged is constitutionally infirm ”). Because a
rational trier of fact could not reasonably conclude, without speculating, that
applicant’s ingestion of controlled dangerous substances was a contributing factor
to the fatal accident, applicant is entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). Accordingly, we reverse the
ruling of the court of appeal, vacate applicant’s conviction and sentence for vehicular
homicide, and enter a judgment of acquittal.
REVERSED