State Of Louisiana v. Byrielle Hebert

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #020
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of May, 2021 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2020-KK-00671 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. BYRIELLE HEBERT (Parish of Orleans
Criminal)
REVERSED AND REMANDED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Hughes, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Crain.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

05/
13/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
N
o. 2020-KK-00671
S
TATE OF LOUISIANA
v
ersus
BY
RIELLE HEBERT
ON
SUPERVISORY WRIT TO THE CRIMINAL
DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS
P
ER CURIAM:
O
n May 8, 2019, two armed residents of New Orleans , Zelda and Danny
Townsend, confronted a young Black male, later identified as Emanuel Pipkins, who
was inside their vehicle. The Townsends blocked the suspect from leaving. As a gray
Acura drove by, a male voice shouted “just shoot ’em,” and Pipkins began shooting.
The Townsends returned fire. Zelda Townsend died . Danny Townsend sustained a
gunshot wound in an arm. Pipkins also sustained gunshot wounds but managed to flee.
Pipkins later arrived at Tulane Medical Center with injuries to his back and foot. His
girlfriend, defendant Byrielle Hebert, and his aunt accompanied him.
Police initially came into contact with defendant at Tulane Medical Center
around 10:50 p.m., and they eventually transported her to NOPD homicide
headquarters. She arrived at a holding room around 12:30 a.m. wearing handcuffs
behind her back. A few minutes later, Detective Marylou Agustin entered the room.
The detective released defendant’s hands from behind her back but then handcuffed
her left hand to a desk . Detective Agustin, who knew defendant from a prior
investigation, asked defendant about her job and promised to come visit defendant at

2

work. She also informed defendant that, just like in the prior investigation, defendant
could go home once she gave a statement.
Defendant was then left alone for approximately half an hour while handcuffed
to the desk. Another officer entered the room around 1:00 a.m. and advised defendant
that she was going to break her wrist if she kept pulling on the handcuffs and banging
on the table. He informed defendant that if she escaped the handcuffs, she would be
charged with a felony.
Detective Agustin entered the room again around 1:24 a.m. and spoke with
defendant for about five minutes, during which time defendant said she did not want to
talk to anyone at least six times. Detective Agustin repeatedly assured her that once she
gave her statement, she would be taken home or to Tulane Medical Center to see
Pipkins. Towards the end of this exchange, Detective Agustin made a final attempt at
securing defendant’s cooperation, and said “Ok… would you talk to me if, when I
finish [some paperwork]?” after which defendant nodded her head in the affirmative.
About an hour later, after defendant began banging on the desk and wall again,
Detective Agustin returned. Defendant indicated that she was tired and ready to leave,
and Detective Agustin apologized and said that it would be just five more minutes.
Eventually, at around 3:30 a.m., Detective Morton entered the interview room
with Detective Agustin. Detective Agustin again reminded defendant the she was
aware defendant did not want to be there, but that the sooner they get this over with,
the sooner defendant could leave. Defendant, whose head was down on the desk, did
not respond. Detective Morton then told defendant that she was “under investigation
for the crime of second degree murder [and] the possibility of your participation in
other crimes is also under investigation,” and proceeded to read defendant her Miranda
rights. Defendant verball y indicated that she understood, and then immediately

3

reiterated that she did not want to talk by stating, “Sir, I ain’t got nothing to speak to
y’all about.”1 Detective Morton again explained that she was under investigation and
that this was her opportunity to tell them exactly how involved or how uninvolved she
was. Defendant responded, “all I know is [Pipkins] was in the east and got shot.”
Detective Morton then gave defendant a waiver of rights form and told her to
sign it to indicate that she agreed to tell the detectives what she had just said. The
detectives continued to interview defendant for approximately 30 minutes, during
which time defendant ultimately admitted to being with Pipkins (and another male
whom she claimed she did not know) in the gray Acura . She admitted that sh e
witnessed the shootout with the Townsends. Defendant was placed under arrest at 5:05
a.m. pursuant to an open warrant and was not permitted to leave or visit Pipkins at
Tulane Medical Center. The record is unclear with regard to when police discovered
the open warrant.
The grand jury indicted defendant for first degree murder, attempted first degree
murder, and other felony offenses. The trial court found her not competent to proceed
to trial, and the court remanded her to the custody of the Department of Corrections to
receive mental health treatment. After she was restored to competency, defendant filed
a motion to suppress her pre-arrest statements, arguing that they flowed from an illegal
arrest; they were made after she invoked her right to remain silent; she did not waive
her Miranda rights; and her statements were made under duress and induced by false
promises.
The trial court, although noting its reservations about the tactics used by the
detectives, denied the motion because it found that defendant’s eventual Miranda
waiver was sufficiently attenuated from defendant’s earlier invocations of her right to

1 Detective Morton sought clarification, and defendant again stated, “I ain’t got nothing to speak

4

remain silent. The court of appeal denied defendant’s application for supervisory writs
without substantive comment. State v. Hebert , 2020-0153 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/6/20)
(unpub’d). Judge Belsome dissented. Judge Belsome observed that defendant was in
custody and handcuffed to a table for the duration of her time in pre-arrest custody, all
while being promised she would be released in exchange for he r statement. Judge
Belsome therefore found that, although defendant was informed of and waived her
Miranda rights, detectives had already coerced her cooperation before the waiver.
Defendant argues that her statements should be suppressed because they are the
product of an illegal arrest, her invocation of her right to remain sile nt was not
honored, and her statements were induced by false promises. The State responds that
the arrest was valid based on the open attachment , and that the totality of the
circumstances show that defendant’s post-Miranda statements were made freely and
voluntarily.
We first briefly address defendant’s argument that her statements should be
suppressed because they are the product of an illegal arrest in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court held in Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,
95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), that statements given during a period of illegal
detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the
illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will. See also Florida
v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) .
Nonetheless, the discovery of the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant gives an
officer probable cause to arrest, and may constitute an intervening circumstance, which
may dissipate the taint caused by prior police misconduct. State v. Hill, 97-2551, p. 8

to y’all about.”

5

(La. 11/6/98), 725 So. 2d 1282, 1286. Here, while the record is unclear as to when the
outstanding warrant was discovered, we believe it sufficed to dissipate any taint that
may have been caused by defendant’s prior detention and transportation from the
hospital to the police station, where it is clear that she was restrained and not free to
leave.
We now turn to defendant’s contentions that her statements should be
suppressed because her invocation of her right to remain silent was not scrupulously
honored, and because her statements were induced by false promises in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court instructed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), “If the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease. ” In addition, that Court imposed the
requirement that any exercise of the right to remain silent must be scrupulously
honored. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630; see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“We therefore conclude that
the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to
remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was
‘scrupulously honored.’”).
Here, even before she was read the Miranda rights, defendant repeatedly stated
that she did not want to talk to police and that she wanted to leave. She told an officer
or detective at least eleven times that she did not w ant to talk to anyone ; and she
repeated that several more times while she was left alone in the room. After Detective
Morton eventually arrived and started the interview, beginning by reading defendant
the Miranda rights, defendant confirmed that she understood her rights and told him
again, “Sir, I ain’t got nothing to speak to y’all about.” In response to the detective’s

6

request for clarification, she repeated herself, “I ain’t got nothing to speak t o y’all
about.” Detective Morton responded by immediately by telling her that she was under
investigation for murder and informing her that this was her opportunity to tell police
what she knew. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that defendant’s
attempts to exercise her right to remain silent were scrupulously honored as required.
In addition, the State has failed to carry its burden of proving that defendant’s
statements were not obtained by inducements or promises. “[B]efore a confession or
inculpatory statement made during a custodial interrogation may be introduced into
evidence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was first
advised of his Miranda rights, that he voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights,
and that the statement was made freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of
fear, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducement, or promises.” State v. Hunt, 09-1589,
p. 11 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 754; see also State v. Glover, 343 So.2d 118, 128
(La. 1976).
To be clear, Miranda holds that in order to waive the rights conveyed in the
Miranda advisements, such waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421; 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140–41,
89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Furthermore, this State mandates by statute that “[b]efore what
purports to be a confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively
shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress,
intimidation, menaces, threat s, inducements or promises.” La. R.S. 15:451. If a
confession is obtained as the result of promises or inducements, it is not admissible.
State v. Serrato, 424 So.2d 214, 222 (La. 1982).
Here, defendant was told several times that if she gave a statement she could go
home and/or visit her wounded boyfriend in the hospital (i.e. that she could leave).

7

Specifically, Detective Agustin told her this seven different times, beginning when she
made contact with defendant in the interview room. Indeed, when defendant first
indicated that she would talk by nodding her head in agreement, Detective Agustin had
just promised her that she would be taken home or to the hospital once she gave a
statement.
This court summarized the fram ework for evaluating the voluntariness of a
confession in light of alleged improper inducements in State v. Turner, 16-1841 (La.
12/5/18), 263 So.3d 337:
The analytical framework for evaluating the voluntariness of defendant’s
confession is well settled. The Supreme Court previously adhered to the
view that any inducement “however slight” taints a confession. Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897).
However, under current standards, voluntariness is determined by the
totality of the circumstances, with the ultimate focus on whether “the
statement was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice
or the result of an overborne will.” State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199, 1205
(La. 1989) (internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). See also
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d
854 (1973) (“In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in
a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation.”).

State v. Turner, 16-1841, pp. 96–97, 263 So.3d at 399.
In Turner, the interrogating officer referred to himself as a “lifeline” for
defendant. This court found that such a statement was not a promise of immunity from
the death penalty. In looking at the totality of the circumstances, this court also found
that it was not the death penalty that ultimately swayed Turner to confess—it was the
fact that Turner was presented with increasingly incriminating evidence linking him to
the two murders that ultimately broke his prior denials of any involvement.
Here, at the time defendant first began giving her statement, defendant had not
been presented with increasingly incriminating facts. Defendant had been presented
with very few facts, if any, at that point. Instead, the preceding circumstances were that

8

defendant had been handcuffed to a desk in a room at the police station in the middle
of the night for several hours. Throughout that time, she had shouted, cried, and beat
on the desk, repeatedly exclaiming that she did not want to talk to anyone and that she
wanted to go home. She was promised that if she gave a statement, she could go home,
and this promise was reiterat ed by Detective Agustin immediately before Detective
Morton began the interview.
The State relies on cases that turn on a defendant’s own subjective belief,
without more, regarding release. For example, in State v. Lilly, 12-0008 (La. App. 1
Cir. 9/21/12), 111 So. 3d 45, writ denied, 12-2277 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So. 3d 386, a
detective testified that he did not make any promises to the defendant and that the
defendant may have subjectively believed his co operation would lead to release.
Likewise, in State v. Gregory, 05-628 (La. App. 5 Ci r. 3/28/06), 927 So. 2d 479, a
detective testified that he did not make any promises to defendant. In contrast,
defendant here was repeatedly told she could go home once she gave a statement.
Thus, the issue does not turn on defendant’s subjective belief when the video clearly
shows that defendant was promised that she would be able to leave once she gave a
statement.
A “heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self -incrimination and his
right to retained or appointed counsel.” Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470, 100
S.Ct. 652, 653, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). While the State asks us to view the Miranda
waiver in a vacuum and ignore the preceding hours defendant spent handcuffed to a
desk shouting that she did not want to talk to anyone, the jurisprudence makes clear
that the validity of a waiver and the voluntariness of a statement must be analyzed
under the totality of the circumstances. Unde r the totality of the circumstances

9
presented here, the State failed to carry its heavy burden in proving the voluntariness of
the defendant’s statements, which were induced by the promise of release.
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal, and we vacate the trial
court’s ruling, which denied defendant’s motion to suppress. We grant defendant’s
motion to suppress her statements, and we remand to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2020-KK-00671
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
BYRIELLE HEBERT
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal
CRAIN, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
I believe the statement made by the defendant was voluntary. The
circumstances of the interrogation did not render the statement involuntary, nor was
the statement the result of an improper inducement or coercion . I additionally
disagree that the defendant’s right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored.
The test for voluntariness is whether the statement is the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker. Voluntariness is assessed
case-by-case under a totality of the circumstances standa rd. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); State v.
Manning, 03-1982 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So. 2d 1044, cert denied, 544 U.S. 967, 125
S. Ct. 1745, 161 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2005). In Schneckloth, the United States Supreme
Court discussed application of the totality of the circumstances standard:
In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular
case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances—both the characteristics of t he accused and the details
of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have
included the youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low
intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional
rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation
of food or sleep. In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual
circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the p sychological
impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the
accused reacted.
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2

412 U.S. at 225 –26, 93 S. Ct. at 2046 –47 (citations omitted) (quoting Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)).
When deciding whether a confession is knowing and voluntary, i nducement
is merely one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis. State v. Blank ,
2004-0204, p. 10 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So. 2d 90, 103. In this case, with the exception
of age, the Schneckloth factors (length of the custodial interrogation, environment,
and treatment by the police) weigh against suppression. 1 The duration was five
hours,2 the defendant was allowed visits to the restroom, food, drink, and sleep,3 and
interaction with the police was benign and non -threatening. While the defendant
was clearly in custody, being handcuffed, custody was justified by both her having
obstructed justice (threw away the suspect’s jacket) and an outstanding warrant. 4
Thus, the more vexing issue is whether the officers’ suggestion that the defendant
could go home or to the hospital once she made a statement was an improper
inducement.
In Bram v. United States , 168 U.S. 532, 542 -43, 18S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568
(1897), the court declared a confession “obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight,” is not voluntary. While this language suggests all confessions

1 Factual findings on motions to suppress are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of
review. State v. Wells, 2008-2262 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So. 3d 577, 581. Because the trial court denied
the motion to suppress on attenuation grounds and not upon a review of the totality of the
circumstances, it made no factual findings relevant to the Schneckloth factors. Consequently, no
deference is owed.

2 In State v. Platt, 43,708 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/3/08), 998 So. 2d 864, 870, writ denied sub nom. State
ex rel. Platt v. State , 2009 -0265 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 305, the court found a five -hour
interrogation did not render the confession involuntary.

3 See Blank, supra, where the defendant was allowed food, drink, sleep, and bathroom visits,
rendering the length of the interrogation permissible.

4 See relatedly Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 195 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2016), where the officer’s
discovery of a valid, pre -existing arrest warrant attenuated the connection between an unlawful
stop and drug-related evidence seized from the defendant during a search incident to arrest, making
the evidence admissible.

05/13/21

3

following a promise to the defendant are involuntary, in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 285, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1251, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991), the Supreme Court
clarified that the Bram passage “does not state the standard for determining th e
voluntariness of a confession.” Rather, the promise must be sufficiently compelling
to overbear the suspect’s will in light of all attendant circumstances. (“The question
in each case is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed.”
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)); see also State v. Turner, 2016-1841
(La. 12/5/18), 263 So. 3d 337.
Part of this determination is whether the police intended to elicit an admission.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297
(1980). “The state of mind of the defendant and the interrogating officer are highly
relevant to resolution of the issue whether the inducement or promise
was calculated, under the circumstances of the particular case, to induce a
confession.” State v. Harper, 485 So.2d 224, 225 (La. App. 2d Cir.1986). [emphasis
in original.]
Here, when the defendant was initially taken into custody, she was not a
suspect in the homicide that had occurred just hours before. Rather, s he was being
held for questioning as part of an active investigation of that homicide. Viewed as a
potential witness, Detective Agustin told the defendant she would be able to leave
once her statement was obtained from the lead detective. Detective Agustin repeated
this while waiting for the lead detective , Detective Morton, who was gathering
information and following developments in the case. Detective Agustin’s statements
that she could leave once the lead detective got her statement were n ever
“calculated” to elicit a confession.5 In fact, Detective Agustin’s statements were not
even made during the interrogation, as no questions were asked.

5 Moreover, when Detective Agustin asked the defendant if she would talk to her, she nodded
affirmatively; accordingly, Detective Agustin did not overbear the defendant’s will or coerce her
to speak.
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4

By the time Detective Morton started interrogating the defendant hours later,
after more information was gathered, he explained she was then being investigated
for homicide and Mirandized her. While he told her “the sooner we get this over, the
sooner you can get out of here,” he also stated, “you’re under investigation for
second degree murder. Now you can go sit in jail tonight, or you can . . . tell the truth
about what happened.” Detective Morton testified he did not promise the defendant
anything for making a statement, and that his reference to her leaving after the
interview meant she would leave to go to jail. The statement “you can go to jail
tonight” corroborates this.
Nor was it reasonable for the defendant to subjectively believe she would be
released, since she had been informed she was now a suspect for murder , had an
open arrest warrant on an unrelated charge, and, in any event, was properly detained
on probable cause for o bstructing justice.6 So, even if the defendant subjectively
believed she could leave after her statement, that belief was not reasonable and does
not render her statement involuntary. See State v. Lilly, 2012-0008 (La. App. 1 Cir.
9/21/12), 111 So. 3d 45, 56, writ denied, 2012-2277 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So. 3d 386.
Next, the majority finds the officers did not scrupulously honor the
defendant’s right to remain silent . I disagree. The defendant never expressed the
desire to not talk in response to questioning. While she did tell police she did not
want to talk during the early period of her custodial detainment, those comments
were not part of her interrogation. No questions were asked before the 3:30 a.m.
colloquy. Immediately b efore Detective Mor ton informed her she was under

6 “A mild exhortation to tell the truth, or a remark that if the defendant cooperates the officer will
‘do what he can’ or ‘things will go easier,’ will not negate the voluntary nature of a
confession.” State v. Blank, 955 So.2d at 108. Statements of this sort are not considered improper
promises or inducement s because they “are more likely musings not much beyond what this
defendant might well have concluded for himself.” State v. Petterway, 403 So.2d 1157, 1160
(La.1981). Here, the defendant, after being informed she was a suspect for murder, must have
known any inculpatory statement she made would only secure her release from the interrogation
room to jail. Thus, Detective Morton’s remark to “get her out of here” was more likely a “musing
not much beyond what [she] might well have concluded for [herself].” Id.
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5

investigation for murder, the defendant said “I ain’t got nothing to speak to y’all
about.” That statement did not clearly invoke the defendant’s right to remain silent.
Having nothing to say is not the same as expressing an unwillingness to speak. But,
even if this statement did invoke her right to remain silent, Detective Morton’s next
statement only informed her of her status as a suspect and invited her to explain her
involvement, if any, in the crime. She was read her Miranda rights and a waiver
was signed. Only then did the defendant permissibly change her mind and make a
statement. I do not believe this exchange dishonored her right to silence, induced a
confession with an improper promise of release which overbore her will, or rendered
her statement involuntary. I dissent.

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