State Of Louisiana v. Larry Earl Miles

Supreme Court of Louisiana
March 09, 2021
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF
LOUISIANA VS.
LARRY EARL MILES
No.2020-KK-01356
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IN RE: L
arry Earl Miles - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Number(s) 17-CR- 000054, 1st
Circuit Court of Appeal, Number(s) 2020 KW 0649;
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March 09, 2021
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Hughes, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Chief Justice Weimer.
JTG
SJC
WJC
JBM
PDG
03/09/2021 "See News Release 009 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2020-KK-01356
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
LARRY EARL MILES
On Supervisory Writ to the 23rd Judicial District Court, Parish of Assumption
PER CURIAM:
This case involves the lower courts’ denial of defendant’s “Motion to Enforce
Original Plea Agreement and/or Withdraw Plea and/or Reconsider Sentence,”
wherein the state entered into a plea agreement with the defendant, which contained
terms that the state knew or should have known it would be unable to enforce. Larry
Earl Miles, the defendant in this case, was arrested and charged with felony
possession of a firearm on December 8, 2016, in Assumption Parish. Two months
later, on February 8, 2017, defendant was indicted in the United States District
Court, Middle District of Louisiana, on drug conspiracy charges. Defendant entered
a guilty plea in the Assumption Parish state court for the firearm charge and was
sentenced to 18 years at hard labor with credit for time served. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, his 18-year sentence was to run concurrently with any sentence from
the unrelated federal case. The trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea. By the
time of his state court sentencing following the plea agreement, the federal court had
sentenced him to 68 months at hard labor (five years and seven months). Defendant’s
counsel, counsel for the state, and the trial judge at sentencing all informed defendant
that his sentences would run concurrently as specifically set forth and confirmed in
the text of the plea agreement. However, the Federal Bureau of Prisons refused to
allow the 18-year sentence to run concurrently with his federal sentence. Defendant
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asks this Court modify his sentence to conform to the intent of the plea agreement
or to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.
In this case, the state, defense counsel, and the trial court judge all assured
defendant, who has only attained an eighth grade education, that his sentences would
run concurrently. Neither the text of his plea agreement nor his Boykin colloquy with
the trial court alerted the defendant that the fulfilment of the terms of the plea
agreement were partially contingent on the decisions of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. “Implicit in the bargain is the fact that but for each element of the
sentence… [the] defendant would not have pled guilty.” State v. Hooper, 358 So.2d
916, 917 (La. 1978). Here, the state made a deal that it knew or should have known
that it could not uphold, and the defendant waived fundamental constitutional rights
in order to receive the terms of that deal. We find that, under facts of this case, the
inability of the state to enforce the terms of the agreement renders the agreement
constitutionally deficient.
Though defendant has already been sentenced, the trial court may vacate the
guilty plea in a factual scenario like this, where circumstances prevented defendant
from knowingly and voluntarily entering a guilty plea:
Beginning with State ex rel. Clark v. Marullo, 352 So.2d 223 (La.1977),
this court has held that the trial court could properly vacate a plea of
guilty even after sentence when it determined that the facts surrounding
a guilty plea rendered it “constitutionally deficient.” Also, in State v.
Galliano, 396 So.2d 1288 (La.1981), this court held that the Trial Judge
had authority to grant a motion to vacate the sentence and to allow the
withdrawal of a plea of guilty when the plea was not both voluntary and
intelligently entered. In that case the defendant had not been advised of
the statutory minimum sentence, his knowledge of the consequences of
the plea was questionable, and, therefore, the Boykin colloquy was
constitutionally deficient.

State v. Lewis, 421 So.2d 224, 225–26 (La. 1982). As in Lewis, defendant should
have the opportunity to have his sentence vacated. The terms of the agreement
included specific agreements about the length of the sentence to be imposed, and
how it would be served, with apparent agreement between the parties as to the net
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term of imprisonment defendant will serve. Accordingly, we grant defendant’s
application, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand this matter to the district court
with instructions that the district court allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea,
and for further proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

03/09/21