I N Re: Justice Of The Peace Cody King, Ward 6, Morehouse Parish, State Of Louisiana J Udiciary Commission Of Louisiana Cri

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #045
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 19th day of November, 2020 are as follows:
BY Crichton, J.:
2020-O-01069 IN RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE CODY KING, WARD 6,
MOREHOUSE PARISH, STATE OF LOUISIANA
For reasons set forth herein, we agree with the Commission’s
recommendation and hereby order the removal of Justice of the Peace Cody
King of Ward 6, Morehouse Parish, from office, that he reimburse the
Commission the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the
case, and further that he pay restitution for an unearned filing fee he failed
to return
to Parish Leasing Company, LLC. Any rehearing from this order
shall be filed in this court no later than noon on Wednesday, November 25,
2020.
REMOVAL FROM JUDICIAL OFFICE ORDERED.
Retired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., heard this case as Justice pro tempore,
sitting in the vacant seat for District 4 of the Supreme Court. He is now
appearing as an ad hoc for Justice Jay B. McCallum.

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11/19/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-O-01069
I
N RE: JUSTICE OF THE PEACE CODY KING, WARD 6, MOREHOUSE
PARISH, STATE OF LOUISIANA
J
UDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
CRI
CHTON, J.*
Th
is is a disciplinary proceeding against Justice of the Peace Cody King
(“Respondent”) commenced by the filing of three complaints to the Judiciary
Commission of Louisiana (the “Commission”). The Commission filed a Notice of
Hearing in Case No. 0369, containing one count, on August 29, 2019, alleging
therein that Respondent violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(1), 3A(7), and 3B(1) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct (1996) and La. Const. Art. V, § 25(C). After a hearing on
these charges, the Commission filed a recommendation with this Court concluding
that the above violations had been proven. For reasons set forth herein, we agree
with the Commission’s recommendation and hereby order the removal of
Respondent from office, that he reimburse the Commission the costs incurred in the
investigation and prosecution of the case, and further that he pay restitution for an
unearned filing fee he failed to return to Parish Leasing Company, LLC.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
R espondent assumed the office of justice of the peace for Ward 6 in
Morehouse Parish on February 6, 2018. By September 19, 2018, the Attorney
General’s office filed the first of three complaints against Respondent with the
Office of Special Counsel (the “OSC”) of the Commission, asserting therein that he
* R etired Judge James H. Boddie, Jr., heard this case as Justice pro tempore , sitting in the vacant
seat for District 4 of the Supreme Court. He is now appearing as an ad hoc for Justice Jay B.
McCallum.

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had failed to respond to constituents in his district and likewise had not responded
to letters or calls from the Attorney General’s office. Next, on September 24, 2018,
Constable David Thomas from Respondent’s ward filed a complaint also asserting,
inter alia, that Respondent failed to respond to a citizen’s request to file an eviction
proceeding. Finally, on March 20, 2019, Hanna h Zaunbrecher filed a complaint,
asserting (1) Respondent was difficult to reach; (2) he overcharged Ms. Zaunbrecher
for an eviction she filed; (3) he did not set a court date in the eviction matter despite
repeated requests from Ms. Zaunbrecher after the eviction was filed; and (4)
Respondent failed to refund the unearned filing fee.
The OSC sent letters to Respondent notifying him of each complaint.
Respondent did not reply despite later acknowledging that he received them . The
Commission authorized an investigation and notified Respondent of the
investigation on June 25, 2019. During its investigation, the Commission obtained
sworn statements from Ms. Zaunbrecher, Constable Thomas, and Respondent.1
On August 29, 2019, the Commission filed a Notice of Hearing in Case No.
0369, alleging therein that Respondent failed to personally observe a high standard
of conduct so as to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary; failed
to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities; failed to act
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary; failed to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it;
failed to dispose of a judicial matter promptly, efficiently, and fairly; failed to
diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities and maintain professional
competence in judicial administration; engaged in willful misconduct relating to his
official duty; engaged in willful and persistent failure to perform his duty; and
engaged in persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice

1 Respondent’s sworn statement was his only participation in this matter.

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that brought the judicial office into disrepute, because he was unavailable and
unresponsive to his constable and citizens in his jurisdiction includi ng at least one
litigant who filed an eviction; and because he accepted an eviction petition and filing
fee from Parish Leasing Company, LLC, but failed to take any action on the matter
or return the unearned filing fee. For the foregoing reasons, the Notice of Hearing
alleged Respondent violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(1), 3A(7), and 3B(1) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and violated La. Const. Art. V, § 25 (C).
A hearing was held before hearing officer and retired Judge Charles Porter
(the “Hearing Officer”) on December 10, 2019, during which tes timony was taken
from witnesses and exhibits were introduced into evidence. Respondent did not
appear at the hearing despite being properly served with notice of the hearing as well
as a hearing subpoena. In addition, Respondent failed to file an answer to the Notice
of Hearing, a witness list, or an exhibit list.
Constable Thomas
2 testified at the hearing that at least three citizens in
Respondent’s ward contact ed him because they could not reach Respondent,
including Ms. Zaunbrecher.3 While Constable Thomas attempted, unsuccessfully,
to reach Respondent multiple times, he stated that he did communicate with
Respondent at least once when he contacted Constable Thomas about serving a
notice to vacate. Constable Thomas testified that he informed Respondent he could
not serve a notice to vacate because the plaintiff was required to serve the notice.
Constable Thomas testified that he had not serve d a single filing for
Respondent or attended any proceedings in his court. In his 25 years as constable
for Ward 6, he explained – prior to Respondent’s taking office – that there had been

2 Constable Thomas is constable for Ward 6 in Morehouse Parish at the time of the events giving
rise to the complaints in this matter,
3 In addition to Ms. Zaunbrecher, Constable Thomas recalled the name of one other would-be
litigant, Charles Armitage, who had contacted him because he was unable to file an eviction with
Respondent. Constable Thomas testified he provided Mr. Armitage Respondent’s contact
information and advised that the police jury may also be able to provide contact information.

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a functioning court, that he had been active in serving papers, and that approximately
seven to eight cases were conducted annually.
Also testifying at the hearing, Ms. Zaunbrecher indicated that she manages
over four hundred properties as owner of Parish Leasing Company, LLC . Around
October 10, 2018, she began trying to contact Respondent about filing an eviction
due to a tenant’s failure to pay rent. Although he answered the first time she called,
Respondent thereafter stopped returning or answering her calls even though she was
calling “constantly.” She left him voicemails, sent text messages, and received no
response until finally Respondent began text messaging with her in January. At that
point, she began communicating with Respondent only by text messaging to
document his unresponsiveness in an effort to avoid losing her client, the property
owner.4
Respondent did not meet Ms. Zaunbrecher to accept the eviction filing and
$120 filing fee until February 4, 2019.5 Respondent informed Ms. Zaunbrecher at
their meeting that this was his first case. When Respondent advised it would be five
days until a co urt date could be set because he needed to post a five -day notice to
vacate, Ms. Zaunbrecher pointed out the provision of the lease containing a waiver
of the five -day notice. Respondent nonetheless insisted he would serve the notice
five days before providing a hearing date. After multiple failed attempts to obtain a
hearing date from Respondent, on February 19, 2019, Ms. Zaunbrecher advised
Respondent that the tenants moved out and asked for a refund of her filing fee since
nothing had been done in the case. She stated that Respondent said he would refund
the fee but still had not done so at the time of the hearing.

4 The text messages between Respondent and Ms. Zaunbrecher were among the documents
introduced into evidence at the hearing.
5 By the time Respondent and Ms. Zaunbrecher met , the tenant had failed to pay rent for six
consecutive months.

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Ms. Zaunbrecher testified that she w ould have filed other evictions had
Respondent been more responsive . This was the first she had filed only because it
was the first time he answered her calls. She also explained that his non -
responsiveness impacted her ability to collect rent from other tenants in the same
mobile home park where the relevant property was located because other tenants
stopped making payments when they learned she was not enforcing rent collection.
In order to manage the situation, she resorted to buying back keys, i.e. paying tenants
to move out. She testified that both Parish Leasing Company, LLC and the property
owner had lost thousands of dollars because of Respondent’s failure to perform his
duties. Finally, she testified that in her two and a half years’ experience as a property
manager she had always been able to obtain a hearing the same day of filing an
eviction.
In his sworn statement to the OSC, R espondent explained that he did not
attend the justice of the peace training in 2018, after he assumed office, because he
did not receive any information about it and did not know he needed to attend.
Because of that, he stated he did not know “what to do or how to do it.”6 In addition
to Ms. Zaunbrecher’s eviction matter, Respondent described a property dispute
where he had been contacted by a man claiming that two other persons bought and
sold property owned by him. Respondent explained that he tried to get the implicated
parties “just to figure it out” and that he “didn’t know what to do, honestly.” When
asked what happened in the case, he said “nothing.” Respondent also recalled
meeting with Charles Armitage about a potential legal matter. Mr. Armitage told
Respondent he had been trying to reach him, but Respondent recalled that Mr.
Armitage only left him one voicemail.

6 The record indicates that Respondent did attend the training in 2019 around the time that he
accepted the filing documents from Ms. Zaunbrecher.

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Respondent explained he had difficulty finding time to communicate with the
potential litigants because of his non -judicial work schedule. From the time he
assumed office until approximately two months prior to his sworn statement,
Respondent traveled for work as a welder, working 60 to 70 hours a week and
traveling from one week to 50 days at a time .7 He acknowledged receipt of the
OSC’s inquiry letters in the three underlying file numbers. He failed to respond, he
explained, because he was away from home for work and was uncertain what to do.
After consideration of the evidence, the Hearing Officer submitted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Commission. Thereafter, the
Commission ordered Respondent to appear before the Commission via
videoconference on June 26, 2020. Respondent failed to appear and failed to file a
post-hearing brief with the Commission.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 14, the Commission filed a
recommendation with this Court on September 2, 2019. Therein, the Commission
adopted conclusions of fact, which briefly may be summarized as follows:
Respondent was unresponsive and unavailable to his constable and to citizens
within his jurisdiction, including at least one litigant who filed an eviction.
Respondent’s unavailability to perform his judicial duties was due in part to his work
schedule and the travel it required, which demonstrates that he placed his non-
judicial work duties ahead of his judicial duties.
For more than four months, Respondent failed to adequately respond to calls
and text messages from Ms. Zaunbrecher on behalf of Parish Le asing Company,
LLC, which sought to file an eviction. Thereafter, Respondent accepted an eviction
petition and filing fee from the company, but he failed to take any action in the matter

7 Although he stopped working for the company shortly before his statement to the OSC,
Respondent stated that he intended to go back to work as a welder for financial reasons.

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or return the unearned filing fee, despite repeated requests from Ms. Zaunbrecher
that he do so.
The Comm ission also voted to adopt the Hearing O fficer’s proposed
conclusions of law and made additional conclusions of law, which briefly may be
summarized as follows:
Implicit in the articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to
eviction procedure is the expectation that a rule to show cause be issued and served.
See C.C.P. art. 4731(A)
8; C.C.P. art. 4732(A)9. This was clearly not done in the case
of the eviction filed with Respondent by Parish Leasing Company , LLC .
Respondent’s acceptance of the filing and failure to take any action was a failure to
be faithful and competent in the law; a failure to dispose of judicial matters promptly,
efficiently, and fairly; and a failure to diligently discharge the administrative
responsibilities of the office of justice of the peace.
Respondent’s apparent ignorance of certain procedural requirements in
eviction proceedings is no excuse for failing to take appropriate action to move the
case along. “A justice of the pea ce is governed by the same constitution and laws
that govern all courts and judges of this state and is bound to apply the law as written
by the legislature and constructed by the various courts. ” In re: Justice of Peace
Cook, 2005-0783, p. 5 (La. 6/29/04), 906 So. 2d 420, 424. “That he is a layman
untrained in the law does not relieve him of his responsibility to follow the rule of
law.” Id.

8 C.C.P. art. 4731(A) provides:
If the lessee or occupant fails to comply with the notice to vacate required under
this Title, or if the lessee has waived his right to notice to vacate by written waiver
contained in the lease, and has lost his right of occupancy for any reason, the lessor
or owner, or agent thereof, may cause the lessee or occupant to be cited summarily
by a court of competent jurisdiction to show cause why he should not be ordered to
deliver possession of the premises t o the lessor or owner. The rule to show cause
shall state the grounds upon which eviction is sought.
9 C.C.P. art. 4731(A) provides: “The court shall make the rule returnable not earlier than the third
day after service thereof, at which time the court shall try the rule and hear any defense which is
made.”

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Respondent’s lack of responsiveness to his constable and citizens within his
jurisdiction and his failure to promptly respond to and refund a litigant of his court
was a failure to diligently discharge the administrative responsibilities of office,
damaged the public’s confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
was clearly improper and created an appearance of impropriety, and represented a
failure to respect and comply with the law. By his conduct, the Commission found
respondent violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(1), 3A(7), and 3B(1) of the Code and La.
Const. Art. V, § 25(C).
Respondent’s behavior was not simply negligent or the product of his
inexperience. Instead, his failure to perform virtually any of his duties negatively
impacted and harmed the litigants who tried to appear before him. Furthermore, his
repeated promises to take action instead of simply admitting that he never intended
to return the fee only add to the damage done to the victims.
By failing to refund the filing fee associated with the attempted eviction,
Respondent appears to have, at the very least, misappropriated the fee. Because he
did not appear before the Hearing Officer or the Commission, it is impossible to
know whether the fee was converted for Respondent’s personal use.
Respondent’s unresponsiveness extends not only to the v ictims in this case
but to the Hearing Officer and the Commission. Although the record indicates he
had adequate notice, he failed to respond to the Notice of Hearing, to participate in
the hearing, and to appear before the Commission. His lack of cooperation is
indicative of the lack of respect he has for his office, the judiciary, and the litigants
who appear before him. The Commission took this lack of cooperation into
consideration in deciding the severity of its recommended sanction.
Finally, based on the foregoing conclusions of fact and law, the Commission
recommended that Respondent be removed from office, that he reimburse Parish

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Leasing Company, LLC the unearned filing fee of $120, and also that he reimburse
the Commission for its costs, totaling $2,289.71.
In accordance with Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X XIII, Section 14, this
case was placed on the summary docket of this Court and set for argument.
Respondent once again failed to file a brief on his own behalf. The case was
ultimately submitted to this Court on the Commission’s brief.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Article V, Section 25(C) of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana (1974)
vests this Court with exclusive original jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary
proceedings, providing in pertinent part:
On recommendation of the judiciary commission, the supreme court
may censure, suspend with or without salary, remove from office, or
retire involuntarily a judge for willful misconduct relating to his official
duty, willful and persistent failure to perform his duty, persistent and
public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute, conduct while in office which would
constitute a felony, or conviction of a felony.
In addition to the foregoing grounds for disciplinary action and in accordance with
its Constitutional authority over judicial matters, this Court has adopted the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which is binding on all judge s. La. Const. Art. V, § 25(C) (“ The
supreme court shall make rules implementing this S ection and providing for
confidentiality and privilege of commission proceedings.”). Violations thereof may,
without more, serve as a basis for disciplinary action. In re: Hunter, 02-1975, p. 3
(La. 8/19/02), 823 So. 2d 325, 328.
The standard of proof in judicial cases is clear and convincing. In re: Free,
14-1828, p. 18 (La. 12/09/14), 158 So. 3d 771, 782. Clear and convincing evidence
is more than a mere preponderance but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. In accordance with its original jurisdiction in judicial proceedings, the Court has
the power to make determinations of fact based on the evidence and is not bound by,
nor required to give any weight to, the findings and recommendations of the

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Commission. In re: Quirk, 97-1143, p. 3 -4 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So. 2d 172 , 176.10
Nevertheless, we find the testimony of Respondent’s constable and Ms.
Zaunbrecher, the documentary evidence corroborating their testimony, and
Respondent’s own sworn statement support the Commission’s findings of fact and
hereby adopt the same.
Specifically, the OSC proved that Respondent was unavailable and
unresponsive to his constable and citizens in his jurisdiction, accepted an eviction
filing and failed to take any action thereon, and then failed to refun d the unearned
filing fee. Canon 1 provides in pertinent part that a judge “shall personally observe[]
high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may
be preserved.” Canon 2A provides: “A judge shall respect and comply with the law
and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.” Canon 3A(1) requires that a judge “be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence in it.”
11 Canon 3A(7) provides “[a]
judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly.” Finally,
Canon 3B(1) requires that a judge “diligently discharge [his or her] administrative
responsibilities without bias or prejudice and maintain professional competence in
judicial administration.”
Respondent’s lack of responsiveness to his constable and citizens within his
jurisdiction, some of whom sought to file claims in his court, his acceptance of the
eviction filing and failure to take any action,
12 and his failure to promptly respond

10 The Commission is required pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 11 to make
written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nevertheless, the Commission is not an
adjudicatory body and its recommendation does not bind this Court. In re: Whitaker, 463 So. 2d
1291 (La. 2/25/85).
11 Regardless of whether he is a layman untrained in the law, “[a] Justice of the Peace is governed
by the same constitutions and laws that govern all courts and judges of this state, and is bound to
apply the law as written by the legislature and construed by the various courts.” In re: Justice of
Peace Cook, 2005-0783, p. 5 (La. 6/29/05), 906 So. 2d 420, 424.
12 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 4731(A) sets for that a rule to show cause for an eviction
“shall state the grounds upon which it is sought.” “The Court shall make the rule returnable not
earlier than the third day after service thereof, at which time the court shall try the rule and hear

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to and refund a litigant of his court, damaged the public’s confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of Canon 1; was clearly improper and
created an appearance of impropriety in violation of Canons 2 and 2A;13 represented
a failure to respect and be competent in the law in violation of 3A(1); was a failure
to dispose of judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly in violation of 3A(7);
was a failure to diligently discharge the administrative responsibilities of his office
and to maintain professional competence in judicial administration in violation of
3B(1).
Moreover, Respondent’s failure to perform his judicial duties and
misappropriation of the filing fee constituted “willful misconduct relating to his
official duty, willful and persistent failure to perform his duty, [and] persistent and
public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute” in violation of La. Const. Art. V, § 25(C).
For the foregoing reasons, we find the evidence clearly and convincingly
establishes that Respondent’s conduct, or in many cases failure to act, violated
Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(1), 3A(7), and 3B(1) and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C), as charged.
DISCIPLINE
Article V, Section 25 of the Louisiana Constitution authorizes this Court to
censure, suspend, or remove a judge from office for the violations thereof. La. Const.
Art. V, § 25(C). The pertinent question is whether Respondent’s misconduct, which
was proven by clear and convincing evidence, falls within the standards of conduct
for which discipline may be imposed, including removal from office.

any defense which is made.” Implicit in the above articles regarding eviction procedure is the
expectation that a rule to show cause be issued and served, which was not done in Parish Leasing
Company’s eviction matter.
13 The Notice of Hearing and the Commission’s recommendation list Canons 2 and 2A separately
as though there are two violations. The only section of Canon 2 violated by Respondent is Canon
2A. Since a violation of Canon 2A is a violation of Canon 2, Respondent has violated Canon 2.

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This Court has recognized the following non-exclusive list of the types of
ethical misconduct for which a recommendation of removal is warranted:
The most severe discipline should be reserved for judges who use their
office improperly for personal gain; judges who are consistently
abusive and insensitive to parties, witnesses, jurors and attorneys;
judges who because of laziness or indifference fail to perform their
judicial duties to the best of their ability; and judges who engage in
felonious criminal conduct.
In re: Whitaker, 463 So. 2d 1291, 1303 (La. 1985) (emphasis added). See also In re:
King, 2003-1412, p. 20 (La. 10/21/03), 857 So. 2d 432, 466 (“Although the [ In re:
Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259, 266 (La. 1989)] factors are used in considering the
appropriate sanction in non-removal cases . . . in cases wherein the judge was
removed from office, we have cited the guidelines noted in [ Whitaker].”); In re:
Benge, 09-1617, p. 38 (La. 11/6/09), 24 So. 3d 822, 845 (the Court “has clearly stated
that the aforementioned four types of conduct recognized in Whitaker as warranting
removal were not intended as an exclusive list of the types of conduct for which a
judge can be removed from office.”) (internal citations omitted); In re: Huckaby, 95-
0041 (La. 5/22/95), 656 So. 292, 296 -97 (adding to the list of conduct in Whitaker
that removal may be warranted where a judge’s conduct violates the Canons of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and is “persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.”).
We have recognized that removal of a duly -elected judge is the most severe
sanction this Court may impose and is an “extremely serious undertaking that should
be carried out with the utmost care because it disrupts the public’s choice for service
in the judiciary.” In re: Jefferson, 99-1313, p. 17 (La. 1/19/00), 753 So. 2d 181, 194;
In re: Hunter, 823 So. 2d at 333. However, the Court is vested by the Constitution
with “the duty to preserve the integrity of the bench for the benefit of the public.” In
re: Jefferson, 753 So. 2d at 194. As we recognized in In re: Hughes, 03-3408, p. 62
(La. 4/22/04), 874 So. 2d 746, 788:

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While removal of a judge elected to office by the citizenry is a grave
responsibility, and one we would prefer never to have to exercise, that
preference must yield when conduct demonstrates, clearly and
convincingly, that there has been a complete failure to discharge and
perform the duties incumbent on one holding judicial office.
(Emphasis added).
Respondent is the epitome of a judge “who because of laziness or indifference
fail[s] to perform [his] judicial duties to the best of [his] ability.” Whitaker, 463 So.
2d at 1303. His unavailability and unresponsiveness to citizens seeking to access
his court is an utter failure to perform the most basic and essential duties of his office.
See Hughes, 874 So. 2d at 788. Respondent’s conduct, as well as his inaction, not
only violates the Canons cited above but unquestionably, whether due to his
incompetence or failure to prioritize his judicial duties, is prejudicial to the
administration of justice and brings the judiciary into disrepute, as it casts doubt on
the institution’s ability to protect the public. See In re: Huckaby, 656 So. at 296-97.
In addition to failing to perform his duties and bringing disrepute to the
judiciary, the possibility cannot be discounted that by failing to return an unearned
fee, Respondent improperly used his office for personal gain, providing additional
grounds for his removal from office. See In re: Justice of Peace Laiche, 15-1691,
pp. 32-34 (La. 3/15/16), 198 So. 3d 87, 105-107 (removing a justice of the peace for
misconduct including, inter alia, overcharging and double -charging litigants and
failing to timely refund the money). Although the failure to return the unearned filing
fee happened only once, it was in connection with the first and evidently only filing
fee Respondent ever received.
Finally, Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII , Section 10 states in pertinent
part:
The failure or refusal of a judge to cooperate in an investigation . . .
may be considered by the Commission in determining whether or not
to recommend discipline to this Court and may bear on the severity of
discipline actually recommended.

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The record shows that Respondent failed to cooperate within the meaning of
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 10 by failing to answer the Notice of
Hearing or participate in any meaningful way in the hearing of this matter, failing to
respond to communicat ions regarding post -hearing proceedings, failing to appear
before the Commission post- hearing, and failing to file a brief with this Court.
Respondent had more than adequate notice of the se proceedings and made a
deliberate choice not to participate . We th us consider Respondent’s lack of
cooperation when determining the appropriate sanction.
By his own admission, Respondent was unavailable to perform his judicial
duties for a substantial period of time, at least in part due to his work schedule and
the travel it required, essentially demonstrating that Respondent put his non-judicial
work ahead of his judicial duties. He intentionally and willfully avoided the duties
and obligations of his office and has shown a blatant disregard not only for the
Commission but also for the litigants who sought access to his court, the constable
and citizens of his jurisdiction, and the justice system as a whole. Respondent’s utter
disregard for the integrity of the judiciary, his apparent failure to perform any duties
he owed through his office, and his failure to return a litigant’s unearned filing fee
together constitute conduct so wanton and willfully disrespectful for the office he
holds that anything short of removal would be inadequate to protect the citizens in
his Ward and the integrity of the judiciary . His similar disregard for the
Commission’s proceedings is further proof that his behavior is systemic and unlikely
to cease if any lesser sanction is imposed.
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII , Section 22 provides the Commission
the right to recover costs, subject to this Court’s review. See In re: Boothe, 12-1821,
p. 38; 110 So. 3d at 1026. The Commission asserts that the OSC incurred $1,484.96
in costs, the Hearing Officer incurred $718.25 in costs, and the Commission incurred
$86.50 in costs. We find these costs supported by the record and properly awardable.

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Accordingly, we o rder Respondent to reimburse the Commission $2,289.71.
Finally, per the recommendation of the Commission, we order Respondent to pay
restitution to Parish Leasing Company, LLC, in the amount of $120.00 for the filing
fee that he accepted and deposited but did not earn or, alternatively, to provide proof
that he previously made such restitution.

DECREE

For reasons set forth herein, we agree with the Commission’s
recommendation and hereby order the removal of Justice of the Peace Cody King of
Ward 6, Morehouse Parish, from office, that he reimburse the Commission the costs
incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the case, and further that he pay
restitution for an unearned filing fee he failed to return to Parish Leasing Company,
LLC. Any rehearing from this order shall be filed in this court no later than noon on
Wednesday, November 25, 2020.
REMOVAL FROM JUDICIAL OFFICE ORDERED.