2020CA0089 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Troy D. Grimes v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit · Filed November 12, 2020

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

NO. 2020 CA 0089

TROY D. GRIMES

VERSUS

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND CORRECTIONS

r

Judgment Rendered:
NOV 1' 2 2020

Appealed from the
19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Case No. C675790

The Honorable William A. Morvant, Judge Presiding

Troy D. Grimes Plaintiff/Appellant
Cottonport, Louisiana Pro Se

Jonathan R. Vinning Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections

BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, THERIOT, AND WOLFE, JJ.

THERIOT, J.

Plaintiff, Troy D. Grimes, an inmate housed at the Raymond Laborde

Correctional Center, appeals a district court judgment dismissing his petition for

judicial review of the denial of his disciplinary appeal filed with the Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections (" DPSC") pursuant to the

Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (" CARP"), La. R. S. 15: 1171, et

seq. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 21, 2018, Grimes was written up for a violation of Disciplinary

Rule 30C ( General Prohibited Behaviors) for conspiring with a visitor, Jestina

Earls, to bring contraband into the institution.' Following a complete investigation,

which included the investigating officer' s certification of the testimony of two

consistently reliable confidential informants, it was determined that Grimes had

received contraband ( synthetic marijuana) from Earls during a visit on March 10,

2018, and distributed the synthetic marijuana to other offenders, causing them to

become highly intoxicated. A disciplinary board hearing was held on April 2,

2018. At the hearing, Grimes was found guilty of the Rule 30C violation and was

sentenced to a custody change to extended lockdown and ten days isolation.

Grimes was subsequently notified on April 5, 2018, that he was placed on the " loss

Disciplinary Rule 30C provides:

30. The following behaviors, which may impair or threaten the security or stability of the
unit or wellbeing of an employee, visitor, guest, offender or their families are prohibited:

C. threatening, planning, conspiring or attempting to commit a violation of the rules of
behavior for adult offenders or state and federal laws; aiding or abetting another offender
involved in committing a violation of the rules or state and federal laws[.]

LAC 22: 1. 341. I.30C.

Smuggling or attempting to smuggle drugs into or out of the prison facility is a violation of the
Disciplinary Rules. LAC 22: I. 341. I. 1.

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of visiting list" as a result of the offense.' Additionally, Earls' name was removed

from the list of approved visitors to the prison.

Grimes appealed the disciplinary board decision in accordance with LAC

22: I. 341( H), seeking to have the decision overturned and all privileges restored.

During the course of the disciplinary appeal process, the matter was remanded

back to the disciplinary board on two occasions for deliberation and sentencing due

to technical errors that resulted in an incomplete recording of the hearing.

Following the remands, Grimes' s appeal was denied by both the warden and the

Secretary of DPSC. The Secretary' s denial of Grimes' s appeal states that the

disciplinary report was clear, concise, and provided convincing evidence of the

violation as charged; Grimes did not provide any evidence to refute the charge or

to substantiate his claims regarding any procedural irregularities; and there was

sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt, including the properly

documented information provided by the two confidential informants. The

Secretary concluded that Grimes was provided a full hearing and afforded due

process in both the hearing and the sentencing phases of the proceeding, and the

sanctions imposed were appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offense.

Following the denial of his disciplinary appeal, Grimes filed a petition for

judicial review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, seeking reversal of the

disciplinary decision, expungement of the offense from his record, removal of all

sanctions, and reinstatement of all privileges, including visiting privileges with

Earls.

DPSC filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of

action, noting that Grimes' s petition for judicial review failed to allege a

substantial rights violation, as required for the district court to grant relief on

2 Suspension of an offender' s visiting privileges is not a disciplinary penalty; however, the rules
governing offender visitation require limitation or suspension of visiting privileges for offenders or
visitors under certain circumstances, such as when an offender is found guilty of a contraband charge or a
visitor fails to comply with the rules of the institution. LAC 22: I.316. R.

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judicial review. Since Grimes was only sentenced to a custody change and

isolation, DPSC argued that he had neither a vested property right nor a liberty

interest with regard to the penalty imposed.

The district court adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner and

rendered judgment, granting DPSC' s peremptory exception of no cause of action,

affirming the disciplinary decision, and dismissing Grimes' s petition for judicial

review with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. Grimes appealed.

Although his appellate brief did not contain assignments of error, Grimes

essentially argues on appeal that the conditions of his custody change to extended

lockdown are so harsh as to constitute a substantial rights violation and that he was

denied due process by the disciplinary board when it did not follow the procedures

set forth for disciplinary hearings.

DISCUSSION

CARP authorized DPSC to adopt and implement an administrative remedy

procedure for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and all inmate complaints

and grievances. La. R.S. 15: 1171- 72. As provided in CARP, an offender

aggrieved by an adverse decision rendered pursuant to any administrative remedy

procedure can institute proceedings for judicial review by filing a petition for

judicial review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. La. R. S. 15: 1177. On

review of the agency' s decision, the district court functions as an appellate court.

Its review is confined to the record and limited to the issues presented in the

petition for review and the administrative remedy request filed at the agency level.

La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(5). The court may affirm the decision of the agency or

remand the case for further proceedings or order that additional evidence be taken.

La. R. S. 15: 1177( A)( 8). The court may reverse or modify the administrative

decision only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the

administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: ( 1) in violation

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of constitutional or statutory provisions, ( 2) in excess of the statutory authority of

the agency, ( 3) made upon unlawful procedure, ( 4) affected by other error of law,

5) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly

unwarranted exercise of discretion, or ( 6) manifestly erroneous in view of the

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. La. R. S.

15: 1177( A)(9); Edwards v. Bunch, 2007- 1421, p. 4 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 3/ 26/ 08), 985

So. 2d 149, 152.

On review of the district court' s judgment in a suit for judicial review under

La. R.S. 15: 1177, no deference is owed by the court of appeal to the factual

findings or legal conclusions of the district court, just as no deference is owed by

the Louisiana Supreme Court to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the

court of appeal. Williams v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2014-

0643, p. 4 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 7/ 7/ 15), 180 So. 3d 351, 353.

The Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of

confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner. Giles v. Cain,

99- 1201, p. 5 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 6/ 23/ 00), 762 So. 2d 734, 738 ( citing, Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297, 132 L.Ed. 2d 418 ( 1995)).

Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many

privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our

penal system. Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of

misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a

court of law. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S. Ct. at 2301. Thus, for Grimes' s

petition to state a cognizable claim for judicial review of a disciplinary matter, it

must allege facts demonstrating that the agency' s decision prejudiced his

substantial rights." See Wilson v. Leblanc, 2019- 1358, p. 3 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

5/ 11/ 20), -- So. 3d --, rehearing denied (July 6, 2020).

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It is well settled that a change of custody status is not atypical nor a

significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and does not

prejudice an inmate' s substantial rights. Dorsey v. Louisiana Department ofPublic

Safety & Corrections, 2018- 0416, p. 3 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 9/ 24/ 18), 259 So. 3d 369,

371; Boudreaux v. Cain, 2012- 0910, p. 2( La.App. 1 Cir. 2/ 15/ 13),

2013WL595794, * 1 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2013- 0928 ( La. 10/ 11/ 13), 123

So. 3d 1219. Furthermore, although La. R. S. 15: 833( A)( 1)( a) authorizes DPSC to

allow visits and correspondence under reasonable conditions between inmates and

approved friends, relatives, and other persons, any such offender visitation is a

privilege and not a right, and violation of the visiting rules may result in

termination of the visit, loss of the offender' s visiting privileges, banning of the

visitor from entering the institution or its grounds, and/ or criminal charges, as

circumstances warrant. LAC 22: I.316. K. 1. a. Safety and security are primary

considerations in allowing offender visitation, and any restrictions placed on

visiting privileges pursuant to LAC 22: I.316 are rationally related to legitimate

penological interests. LAC 22: I. 316. Because an inmate does not have a right to

visitation, loss of visiting privileges in accordance with the visiting rules does not

rise to the level of a substantial rights violation, and therefore cannot form the basis

for judicial review. See Greenhouse v. Louisiana Dep' t of Public Safety &

Corrections, 2017- 0316, p. 5 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 11/ 1/ 17), 2017WL4946864, * 2

unpublished), writ denied, 2017- 2122 ( La. 1/ 8/ 19), 259 So. 3d 1021; Williams,

2014- 0643 at p. 6, 180 So. 3d at 354.

Because Grimes' s petition for judicial review does not allege a substantial

rights violation, the district court did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to

state a cause of action.

Cel

DECREE

For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the district court dismissing

Grimes' s petition for judicial review with prejudice for failure to state a cause of

action and affirming the agency decision is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to plaintiff-appellant, Troy Grimes.

AFFIRMED.

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