Requel Lashay Compton v. Jeffrey Bernard Chatman

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

t% COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2020 CA 0874

CONSOLIDATED WITH—

2020 CA 0875

REQUEL LASHAY COMPTON

VERSUS

JEFFREY BERNARD CHATMAN

2021
JUDGMEN"I' RENDERED:

Appealed from The Family Court
In and for the East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
Docket Number F184863 c/ w 185175• Division " A"

The Honorable Pamela J. Baker, Judge Presiding

Veronica Jones ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Baton Rouge, Louisiana PLAINTIFF— Requel Lashay
Compton

Kathleen M. Wilson ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Baton Rouge, Louisiana DEFENDANT— Jeffrey Bernard
Chatman

Hillar C. Moore, III ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
District Attorney DEFENDANT— State of Louisiana,
Amanda Kinchen Gros Department of Children and
Assistant District Attorney Family Services & Child Support
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Enforcement

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ.

WELCH, J.

The defendant, Jeffrey Bernard Chatman, appeals a judgment denying his
motion to dissolve or modify a Protective Order issued against him under the

provisions of the Domestic Abuse Assistance Act, La. R. S. 46: 2131, et seq. For

reasons that follow, we dismiss this appeal and issue this opinion in compliance

with Uniform Rules— Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 16. 1( B).

Mr. Chatman and the plaintiff, Requel Lashay Compton, were previously
involved in a relationship, and two children were born as a result of that

relationship: J.L.C., born on October 21, 2009 and A.L. C., born July 18, 2013.

While there has been no final determination of child custody for these two minor
children, Mr.
Chatman is under a court order to pay a monthly child support
obligation to Ms. Compton for the support of J.L.C.'

In 2012, Ms. Compton filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse against Mr.

Chatman, which was subsequently dismissed because Ms. Compton failed to

appear at the hearing. On January 6, 2014, approximately six months after the

birth of A.L.C., Ms. Compton, on behalf of herself and on behalf of the parties'

minor children, filed another Petition for Protection Abuse against Mr. Chatman.

Following a hearing on February 12, 2014, a Protective Order was entered against

Mr. Chatman. The Protective Order issued and signed by the trial court on that

date ( February 12, 2014) does not reflect that it was a " Court Approved Consent

Agreement." However, the transcript of the hearing reflects that, at the end of the

hearing, Mr. Chatman agreed to the Protective Order, therefore, the trial court

grant[ ed] the Protective Order as requested ...." ( R163)

The Protective Order issued by the trial court restrained Mr. Chatman from

1 Pursuant to a judgment signed on June 8, 2012, Mr. Chatman was found to be the natural and
biological father of J. L.C. and was ordered to pay child support on a monthly basis. His monthly
child support obligation for J. L.C. was temporarily modified pursuant to a judgment signed by
the trial court on December 11, 2013 and that modification of child support was further extended
by a judgment signed on May 15, 2014.

2

committing further acts of abuse or threats of abuse, along with other "[ a] dditional
terms." The Protective Order set forth that it " shall be effective through 11: 59 PM

on 8/ 12/ 15" but that "[ s] ome of the provisions of this order MAY NOT EXPIRE"

referencing " paragraphs 1- 5." Paragraphs 1- 5 of the Protective Order, which were

initialed by the trial court as having been granted, enjoined Mr. Chatman from: ( 1)

abusing, harassing, stalking, following, or threatening Ms. Compton and the minor

children in any manner; ( 2) from contacting Ms. Compton and the minor children

personally, electronically, by phone, in writing, or through a third party, without
the express written permission of the court; ( 3) going within 100 yards of Ms.

Compton and the minor children without the express written permission of the

court; (
4) going within 100 yards of the residence of Ms. Compton and the minor

children; and ( 5) going to Ms. Compton' s place of employment or interfering with

her employment or going to or interfering with the children' s school. Under each
of these paragraphs, the option " Does not expire" was selected rather than the

option " Expires on date shown on pages 1 & 5." The record does not reveal that

Mr. Chatman either timely filed a motion for new trial or that he timely appealed
the February 12, 2014 Protective Order.

On November 13, 2019, Mr. Chatman filed a Motion to Dissolve Protective

Order. Therein, Mr.
Chatman asserted that it was his understanding that the

Protective Order issued on February 12, 2014, was set to expire eighteen months

after the issuance of the order, i.e. on August 12, 2015, and that the parties

reconciled and began living together again in October 2014, prior to the date that

the Protective Order purportedly expired. Mr. Chatman further asserted that the

parties continued to live together until February 2018 and thereafter, he discovered

that there was still an " active" Protective Order prohibiting him from seeing his

children.
Mr. Chatman claimed that he has been restricted from seeing the minor

children for more than two years because of the Protective Order that he was not

3

aware of and requested that the Protective Order be dissolved. The rule to show

cause attached to Mr. Chatman' s motion was " FILED UNSIGNED." The next

day, Mr. Chatman filed another motion seeking to dissolve the February 12, 2014
Protective Order, asserting that "[ t]he parties ... were under the presumption that

the current [ Protective Order] was for 18 [ months] as opposed to for a lifetime"

and that he "
would like to have the matter resolved by the court[] so he could visit

with his minor children whom he hadn' t seen in 2 years."

A hearing was scheduled for December 3, 20 192 ; however, the minutes of

the trial court reflect that Mr. Chatman failed to appear, and therefore, the trial

court dismissed the motion. Thereafter, another hearing was scheduled for

December 18, 2020. After evidence was introduced and the matter submitted, the

trial court denied the motion to modify the Protective Order. In accordance with

that ruling, on February 3, 2020, the trial court signed a judgment that provided

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion/Dissolve to Modify a Prior Louisiana Uniform

Abuse Prevention Order filed by JEFFREY CHATMAN be hereby DENIED."
From this judgment, Mr. Chatman has appealed.

Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua

sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Texas Gas Exploration

Corp. v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., 2011- 0520 — 2011- 0523 ( La. App. 1st Cir.

11/ 9/ 11), 79 So. 3d 1054, 1059, writ denied, 2012- 0360 ( La. 4/ 9/ 12), 85 So. 3d 698.

This Court' s appellate jurisdiction extends to " final judgments," which are those

that determine the merits in whole or in part. See La. C. C. P. art. 1841 and 2083.

A valid judgment must be " precise, definite, and certain." Laird v. St. Tammany

Parish Safe Harbor, 2002- 0045, 2002- 0046 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 12/ 20/ 02), 836

So. 2d 364, 365. Moreover, a final appealable judgment must contain decretal

2 Although the minutes of the trial court reflect that the hearing was scheduled for December 4,
2019, the judgment signed by the trial court on January 16, 2020 pursuant to that hearing reflects
that it was December 3, 2019.

M

language, and it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the
party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied.

See Carter v. Williamson Eye Center, 2001- 2016 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 27/ 02),

837 So. 2d 43, 44. Additionally, a final appealable judgment must contain

appropriate decretal language disposing of or dismissing claims in the case. See

Advocate Financial, L.L.C. v. Joseph F. Lahatte, Jr., L.L.C., 2009- 0609 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 10/ 23/ 09)( unpublished), 2009 WL 3452832, * 3. A judgment that

does not contain appropriate decretal language cannot be considered as a final

judgment for the purpose of an appeal, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review

such a judgment. See Johnson v. Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, 2005- 0337

La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 24/ 06), 934 So. 2d 66, 67.

In this case, while the February 3, 2020 judgment that Mr. Chatman sought

to appeal specifically denied his motion seeking to dissolve or modify the
Protective Order, we find the judgment is defective and not a final judgment for the

purpose of an appeal because it does not contain appropriate decretal language

dismissing the motion to modify or dissolve the February 12, 2014 Protective
Order. In addition, the judgment does not state in whose favor and against whom

the judgment was rendered. In the absence of a valid final judgment, this Court

lacks jurisdiction to review the matter, and we dismiss the appeal from the

February 3, 2020 judgment.'

3 We recognize that this court has discretion to convert an appeal of a non -appealable judgment
to an application for supervisory writs. See Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005- 0074 ( La. 6/ 29/ 05), 914
So. 2d 34, 39. Generally, appellate courts have exercised that discretion when the motion for

appeal was filed within the thirty -day time period allowed for the filing of an application for
supervisory writs under Uniform Rules— Courts of Appeal, Rule 4- 3, and where reversal of the
trial court' s decision would terminate the litigation, or where clear error in the trial court' s
judgment, if not corrected, will create a grave injustice. However, when the jurisdictional defect
lies in the non -finality of a judgment, an appellate court will generally refrain from the exercise
of its supervisory jurisdiction when an adequate remedy exists by appeal, particularly when an
adequate remedy by appeal will exist upon the entry of the requisite precise, definite, and certain
decretal language necessary for appellate review. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our
discretion to convert this appeal of a judgment that is not final for lack of decretal language to an
application for supervisory writs. See Boyd Louisiana Racing, Inc. v. Bridges, 2015- 0393 –
2015- 0395 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12/ 23/ 15) ( unpublished, 2015 WL 9435285, * 2- 4. We also note

5

CONCLUSION

For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the appeal of the February 3,
2020 judgment is dismissed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant,

Jeffrey Bernard Chatman.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

that the denial of the motion for modification or dissolution, without a dismissal of the claims
therein, renders the judgment interlocutory, and therefore it is neither appealable nor susceptible
of being certified for immediate appeal. See La. C. C. P. art. 1841, 1911, 1915, and 2083.

n

REQUEL LASHAY COMPTON FIRST CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA

JEFFREY BERNARD CHATMAN NO. 2020 CA 0874

CH Z, J., dissenting.

Appellate courts generally refrain from exercising supervisory jurisdiction

when the jurisdictional defect in a judgment lies in a lack of decretal language.

However, this court possesses broad discretion to convert an appeal of a non -final

judgment to an application for supervisory writs where the trial court' s judgment is

arguably incorrect and, if not corrected, will create a grave injustice. See MAPP

Const.,
LLC v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company, 13- 1074 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
3/ 24/ 14), 143 So. 3d 520, 528. Because this situation appears to exist in the present

case, I believe this court should exercise its plenary supervisory jurisdiction to reach
the merits of this appeal.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 46: 2136 provides, in pertinent part:

F. ( 1) Except as provided in Paragraph ( 2) of this Subsection, any
final protective order or approved consent agreement shall be for a
fixed period of time, not to exceed eighteen months, and may be
extended by the court, after a contradictory hearing, in its discretion.

2)( a)
For any protective order granted by the court which directs the
defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, or interfering with the
person as provided in R.S. 46: 2135( A)( 1), the court may grant the
order to be effective for an indefinite period of time as provided by
the provisions of this Paragraph on its own motion or by motion of the
petitioner. The indefinite period shall be limited to the portion of the
protective order which directs the defendant to refrain from
abusing, harassing, or interfering with the person as provided in
R.S. 46: 2135( A)( 1). l' 1

1 Louisiana Revised Statutes 46: 2135( A)( 1) provides, in pertinent part:

Upon good cause shown in an ex parte proceeding, the court may enter a temporary
restraining order, without bond, as it deems necessary to protect from abuse the
petitioner, any minor children, or any person alleged to be an incompetent.... The
order may include but is not limited to the following:

Thus, this provision limits the duration of a protective order or approved consent

agreement to eighteen months, with the limited exception of allowing the portion of a

protective order directing the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, or

interfering with the protective person( s) to be for an indefinite period. The protective

order issued in this case contains several portions that do not fall within this limited

exception.
By providing that those portions of the protective order ( other than the

portion directing the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, or interfering with
the protective person( s)) did not expire, which is a duration far in excess of eighteen

months, the trial court appears to have exceeded its statutory authority.

Furthermore, I believe that failing to correct this legal error would constitute a

grave injustice.
By permanently prohibiting Mr. Chatman from approaching near to

or contacting his children under any circumstances, the protective order is akin to a

de facto termination of his parental rights, which is one of the most fundamental of

rights. Moreover, the evidence presented against Mr. Chatman at the two hearings

held before the trial court was clearly insufficient to rise to the level of clear and

convincing evidence necessary for a termination of parental rights. It is particularly

relevant in this regard that Ms. Compton apparently did not consider Mr. Chatman to

be a risk to the children during the extended period that she reconciled with him after

the issuance of the protective order.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority' s dismissal of this

appeal without reaching the merits of the trial court' s denial of Mr. Chatman' s

request to dissolve or modify the protective order.

1) Directing the defendant to refrain from abusing, harassing, or interfering with the
person or employment or going near the residence or place of employment of the
petitioner, the minor children, or any person alleged to be incompetent, on whose
behalf a petition was filed under this Part.

2