Dr. Ralph Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

NO. 2020 CA 0881

DR. RALPH SLAUGHTER

VERSUS

LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Judgment Rendered: MAR 2 5 2021

jii 4r,
CAppealed from the
19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Case No. C612525

The Honorable Donald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding

Scott D. Wilson Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Dr. Ralph Slaughter

Tina Vicari Grant Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
R. Stephen Stark Louisiana State Employees'
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Retirement System

BEFORE: THERIOT, WOLFE, AND HESTER, JJ.

THERIOT, J.

Dr. Ralph Slaughter appeals the Nineteenth Judicial District Court' s June 15,

2020 judgment dismissing with prejudice his claims for a writ of mandamus,

mandatory injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter has a lengthy procedural history. The following is set forth in

the Supreme Court' s earlier opinion in Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees'

Retirement System, 2015- 0324 ( La. 10/ 14/ 15); 180 So. 3d 279, 280- 81 ( per curiam)

and in a subsequent appeal, Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement

System, 2019- 0977 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 1/ 20); 305 So. 3d 358.

In 2009, Dr. Ralph Slaughter (" plaintiff') retired as president of Southern

University System (" Southern") after thirty- five years of service. Upon retirement,

the Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System (" LASERS") began paying

plaintiff retirement benefits of $24,487 per month.

Plaintiff then filed suit against Southern for past due wages. The trial court

ruled that Southern had miscalculated plaintiff's income base by including

supplemental pay plaintiff had received from the Southern University Foundation,

and determined plaintiff's terminal pay ( 500 hours of unused leave) and retirement

should have been calculated on his $ 220, 000 annual base salary due from

Southern. The court of appeal affirmed, noting plaintiff "manipulated the system

and used his position for his own benefit." See Slaughter v. Bd. ofSupervisors of

Southern Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 2010- 1049 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 2/ 11), 76

So. 3d 438, writ denied, 11- 2110 ( La. 1/ 13/ 12), 77 So. 3d 970 (" SlaughterT ).

Meanwhile, on January 22, 2010, Southern sent a letter to LASERS advising

it had committed an error by including supplemental funds in plaintiff's earnings.

Because the Slaughter I suit was ongoing at the time, LASERS filed a concursus

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proceeding ( hereinafter referred to as " Slaughter IF) seeking to deposit the

disputed amount of plaintiff' s benefit in the registry of court pending resolution of
the Slaughter I litigation. Plaintiff filed an exception of no cause of action. The

trial court granted the exception and dismissed Slaughter II with prejudice.

LASERS did not appeal this judgment.

On April 27, 2012, after Slaughter I became final, LASERS sent

correspondence to plaintiff advising it intended to retroactively reduce his

retirement benefit starting June 1, 2012 " due to an error made by Southern

University in the reporting of [ his] earnings." Relying on La. R.S. 11: 192,

LASERS maintained it may adjust benefits and further reduce the corrected benefit

to recover overpayment within a reasonable number of months.

Plaintiff filed the instant suit against LASERS, seeking a writ of mandamus,

injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment confirming LASERS has no authority

or ability to reduce his retirement benefits. The petition alleged plaintiff' s

retirement benefits should be calculated based on the entirety of his earnings over

thirty-five years of employment, including salary supplements.

After a bench trial in 2013, the trial court granted plaintiff' s petition for

declaratory judgment. Without reaching the merits of plaintiff' s arguments

regarding the calculation of benefits, the court held LASERS was not entitled to

reduce plaintiff' s retirement benefits because it failed to follow the procedural

requirements set forth in La. R.S. 11: 407. Specifically, the court found LASERS

failed to introduce any evidence indicating it submitted documentation of the

administrative error to the LASERS board of trustees as required by La. R. S.

11: 407.

LASERS appealed this ruling. Plaintiff answered the appeal, asserting that

any attempt by LASERS to reduce his benefits was barred by res judicata and

prescription. On appeal, this court rejected plaintiff's res judicata and prescription

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arguments. However, this court affirmed the trial court' s judgment in favor of

plaintiff, finding LASERS failed to prove that it followed the proper procedure

before initiating action to reduce and recoup plaintiff' s retirement benefits. One

judge concurred and another judge dissented. See Slaughter v. Louisiana State

Employees' Retirement System, 2013- 2255 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 4/ 14), 2014 WL

6854536 ( unpublished) (" Slaughter III").

Upon the application of LASERS, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted

certiorari. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Slaughter v. Louisiana State

Employees' Retirement System, 2015- 0324 ( La. 10/ 14/ 15); 180 So. 3d 279 ( per

curiam) (" Slaughter IV") found that this court had properly rejected plaintiff's

arguments of res judicata and prescription. The Slaughter IV Court then stated that

as to the merits of this court' s decision in Slaughter III, "the narrow question

presented for our resolution is whether LASERS failed to follow the proper

procedure before initiating action to reduce and recoup plaintiff' s retirement

benefits." Slaughter IV, 180 So. 3d at 282. The Slaughter IV Court concluded that

this court and the trial court had erred in finding LASERS failed to prove that it

followed the proper procedure before initiating action to reduce and recoup

plaintiff' s benefits, and reversed this court' s judgment on that point. The

Slaughter IV Court affirmed this court' s judgment in all other respects and

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Slaughter IV, 180 So. 3d at 284.

Following the remand in Slaughter IV, plaintiff filed a motion for summary

judgment on September 20, 2017, seeking restoration of his retirement benefits in

the amount of $24,487. 95 per month, as originally calculated, and injunctive relief

preventing LASERS from interfering with payment of that amount. Plaintiff

argued that although LASERS may have followed the proper procedure to initiate

action to reduce and recoup benefits, no reduction or recoupment was appropriate.

G!

Plaintiff maintained that there was no genuine issue of material fact precluding

judgment in his favor on this point, and requested that the trial court:

R] equire LASERS to restore to Dr. Slaughter all retirement benefits
to which he is due, with interest, and award him attorney fees, costs,
and other legal, general, and equitable relief, including a declaration
that Dr. Slaughter is entitled to retirement benefits in the amount of
24, 487. 95 per month and injunctive relief preventing LASERS from
interfering with payment of this amount in retirement benefits to Dr.
Slaughter.

In response, LASERS filed an exception raising the objection of res judicata. The

trial court heard plaintiff' s motion for summary judgment and LASERS' exception

together on January 22, 2018, and executed a written judgment denying both on

February 14, 2018.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled " Motion for Declaratory

Judgment" on June 28, 2018, seeking " judgment that all earned compensation,

including the salary supplement paid to him by the Southern University System, be

found to be a part of his average monthly compensation for purposes of retirement

benefits...." Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of his motion for declaratory

judgment, in which he repeated the arguments and requests for relief set forth in

his September 20, 2017 motion for summary judgment. The record demonstrates

that neither the trial court nor the parties took any action on plaintiff's motion for

declaratory judgment.

On September 6, 2018, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled " Plaintiff' s Post -

Trial Brief on Remand in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Record"

motion for judgment on the record"). Plaintiff also sought an order from the trial

court directing LASERS to show cause " why plaintiff should not be awarded

judgment as prayed for in his lawsuit, on remand from the Louisiana Supreme

Court, based on the record already generated in this court." The motion for

judgment on the record again repeated the arguments and requests for relief made

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in plaintiff's September 20, 2017 motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not

submit any new evidence in support of the motion for judgment on the record.

The trial court heard plaintiff' s motion for judgment on the record on

February 11, 2019. On March 6, 2019, the trial court executed a written judgment'

denying the motion for judgment on the record, which provided in pertinent part:

Considering the pleadings, evidence, the memoranda, and the
argument of counsel:

It is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the plaintiff' s Motion for
Judgment on the Record be and is hereby DENIED at plaintiff' s costs.

Plaintiff appealed the March 6, 2019 judgment. See Slaughter v. Louisiana State

Employees Retirement System, 2019- 0977 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 1/ 20); 305 So. 3d 358

Slaughter r').In Slaughter V, this court found that the relief granted or denied

by the March 6, 2019 judgment was not evident from the language of the judgment

without reference to other documents in the record. This court further found that

the March 6, 2019 judgment did not contain appropriate decretal language

dismissing any claims or the petition. Accordingly, this court held that the March

6, 2019 judgment was not a valid final judgment and dismissed plaintiff' s appeal .2

Slaughter V, 305 So. 3d at 363- 64.

On June 15, 2020, the trial court rendered judgment denying plaintiff' s

motions for a writ of mandamus, mandatory injunctive relief, and declaratory

judgment, and dismissing with prejudice plaintiff' s claims for a writ of mandamus,

mandatory injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment. Plaintiff timely appealed.3

I An identical written judgment was executed on March 19, 2019. This court found the March 19, 2019 judgment to
be a nullity and without legal effect. See Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System, 2019- 0977
La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 1/ 20); 305 So. 3d 358, 361- 62 n. 1.

2 On September 13, 2019, while the appeal was pending, the trial court issued a " corrected judgment", which stated
in pertinent part:

Considering the pleadings, evidence, memoranda, and argument of counsel,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that final [ j] udgment be and it is hereby
granted in favor of defendant, LASERS, and against plaintiff, Dr. Slaughter, denying Dr.
Slaughter' s Motion for Judgment on the Record at Dr. Slaughter' s cost.

3 LASERS argues that the June 15, 2020 judgment is not a final appealable judgment. However, the trial court
denied all of plaintiff' s claims and the judgment appealed itemized each class of relief. It is well settled that a final

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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Plaintiff assigns the following as error:

1) Plaintiff did not and could not have manipulated his pay process.

2) The trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to rule that
earned compensation" as defined in La. R. S. 11: 403( 10) included his

salary supplements.

3)The trial court committed reversible error in finding that there was
any overpayment to plaintiff of retirement benefits, and in finding that
even a false or inaccurate report of overpayment triggered a

mandatory obligation for LASERS to reduce plaintiffs retirement
benefits and recoup alleged overpayments.

4) The trial court committed reversible error in finding that any
administrative error occurred during a reporting period that was
during the periods in which plaintiff received additional pay; there
was no evidence of such.

5) The trial court committed reversible error in failing to find that
plaintiffs monthly rate for retirement benefit calculation purposes
should be based on $ 39, 000 monthly.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court' s finding of fact in the

absence of " manifest error" or unless it is " clearly wrong." The issue to be

resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong,

but whether the factfinder' s conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State

through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993).

Questions of law, including the interpretation of a statute, are subject to de novo

review. See Benjamin v. Zeichner, 2012- 1763 ( La. 4/ 5/ 13); 113 So. 3d 197, 201;

see also Tanana v. Tanana, 2012- 1013 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 31/ 13); 140 So. 3d 738,

742.

judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. A final judgment must also contain decretal language. Generally, it
must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the
relief that is granted or denied. The specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment without
reference to an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons for judgment. Conley v. Plantation Management Co.,
L.L.C., 2012- 1510 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 6/ 13); 117 So. 3d 542, 546- 47. The June 15, 2020 judgment satisfies those
requirements and is thus a final appealable judgment.

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DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error # I

In his first assignment of error, plaintiff argues that he did not and could not

have manipulated his pay process. This argument is in response to the Supreme

Court' s statement in Slaughter IV that the trial court had not reached the merits of

plaintiff's arguments regarding the calculation of benefits, but had acknowledged

the court of appeal' s holding in Slaughter I that plaintiff was able to manipulate

how certain payments were made and show them as salary when they may not
have been. See Slaughter IV, 180 So. 3d at 281 n. 1.

Whether plaintiff did or did not manipulate his pay process is not before this

court. We will not disturb this court' s factual findings in a prior case. This

assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error #2

In his second assignment of error, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred as

a matter of law when it failed to rule that " earned compensation" as defined in La.

R.S. 11: 403( 10) included his salary supplements. LASERS argues that the issue of

whether plaintiff' s supplemental pay from the Southern University System

Foundation should have been included in the calculation of his retirement benefits

was the basis of plaintiff' s initial suit against LASERS. According to LASERS,

judgment has been rendered in its favor several times since the original filing in

2012. Thus, LASERS argues that the matter is barred by res judicata.

LASERS argument is essentially a law -of t-he -case argument. The law -of -

the -case doctrine embodies the principle that an appellate court generally does not

revisit its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. State ex rel.

Div. of Admin., Office of Risk Management v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of

Louisiana, 2013- 0375 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1/ 8/ 14); 146 So. 3d 556, 562. Although the

issue of whether LASERS followed the applicable procedural requirements was

decided by the Supreme Court in Slaughter IV, the merits of plaintiff's argument in

his lawsuit against LASERS have not been addressed by this court. Accordingly,

the law -of t-he -case doctrine is not applicable to this issue.'

We now turn to plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred as a matter of

law when it failed to rule that " earned compensation" as defined in La. R.S.

11: 403( 10) included his salary supplements. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 444

governs the computation of retirement benefits and states in pertinent part:

A.( 1)( a)( i) A member who retires effective on or after July 1, 1973,
shall receive a maximum retirement allowance equal to two and one-
half percent of average compensation, as determined under R.S.
11: 231, for every year of creditable service, plus three hundred
dollars. ( Emphasis added.)

La. R.S. 11: 231( B) provides:

For purposes of retirement benefit computation, average

compensation, or its equivalent, shall be based on the thirty- six
highest successive months of employment, or on the highest thirty-six
successive joined months of employment where interruption of
service occurred. The earnings to be considered for the thirteenth
through the twenty- fourth month shall not exceed one hundred
twenty- five percent of the earnings of the first through the twelfth
month. The earnings to be considered for the final twelve months shall
not exceed one hundred twenty-five percent of the earnings of the
thirteenth through the twenty- fourth month. Nothing in this
Subsection, however, shall change the method of determining the
amount of earned compensation received.s ( Emphasis added.)

Further, La. R.S. 11: 403( 5)( a)( i) states:

Average compensation", for a member whose first employment
making him eligible for membership in the system began on or before
June 30, 2006, and for any person who receives an additional benefit
pursuant to R.S. 11: 444( A)(2)( b) or ( c), 557, 582, or 602 or R. S.

24: 36 whose first employment making him eligible for membership in
one of the state systems occurred on or before December 31, 2010,
means the average annual earned compensation of a state employee

for the thirty- six highest months of successive employment, or for the

4 We further note that the Slaughter I suit was between plaintiff and the Board of Supervisors of Southern
University, not plaintiff and LASERS. Thus, this matter is not barred by res judicata as a result of Slaughter L
Burguieres v. Pollingue, 2002- 1385 ( La. 2125/ 03); 843 So. 2d 1049, 1053 ( res judicata bars a second action when all
of the following are satisfied: ( 1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; ( 3) the parties are the same; ( 4) the
cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and
5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the
subject matter of the first litigation).

5 Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 231 was amended effective January 1, 2011, 2010 La. Acts 992, § 1, but the text of
La. R.S. 11: 231( B) was not substantially changed.

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highest thirty-six successive joined months of employment where
interruption of service occurred; however, average compensation for
part-time employees who do not use thirty- six months of full-time
employment for average compensation purposes shall be based on the
base pay the part-time employee would have received had he been
employed on a full-time basis. ( Emphasis added.)

Earned compensation is defined by La. R. S. 11: 403( 10), which states:

Earned Compensation" means the base pay earned by an employee

foraiven pay period as reported to the system on a monthly basis by
thea encu which shall include the cash value of any emolument of
office in the form of paid compensation in lieu of salary which is
subject to federal and state payroll taxes and includes the full amount
earned by an employee, overtime, and per diem earned by an
employee of the House of Representatives, the Senate, or an agency of
the legislature, and expense allowances and per diem paid to members
of the legislature, the clerk, or sergeant at arms of the House of

Representatives and president and secretary or sergeant at arms of the
Senate. ( Emphasis added.)

Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 403( 6) defines " base pay," stating:

Base pay" means prescribed compensation for a specific position on
a full-time basis, but does not include overtime, per diem, differential
pay, payment in kind, premium pay, or any other allowance for
expense authorized and incurred as an incident to employment, except
supplemental pay for certain members as provided by Article X,
Section 1 O( A)( 1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. 6 Employees
who work biweekly eighty -hour schedules shall have their earned
compensation for such regularly scheduled work considered as part of
base pay even if some of these hours are defined as overtime for the
purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act. ( Emphasis added; footnote
added.)

This court addressed these statutes in plaintiff's lawsuit against the Board of

Supervisors of Southern University. See Slaughter I, 76 So. 3d at 453- 54. We

agree with this court' s findings in that case. Relevantly, this court summarized:

6 Article X, Section 10( A)( 1) of the Louisiana Constitution provides that, in certain circumstances, the legislature
may supplement the uniform pay plans for sworn, commissioned law enforcement officers employed by a bona fide
police agency of the state or its political subdivisions and for fire protection officers employed by a port authority.

In Slaughter I, the question of whether plaintiffs supplemental pay should be included in plaintiff' s retirement
benefit calculation arose, despite not being directly at issue. This court wrote in Slaughter I, 76 So.3d at 453:

Herein, the issue is not one of the calculation of LASERS benefits or an interpretation of the
retirement statutes for purposes of determining those benefits. Our analysis on the issue of
determining the amount due ( and the hourly rate) is limited solely to the facts and the issues in this
case and does not address Dr. Slaughter' s retirement benefit calculation. Nevertheless, because
there is a lack of jurisprudence addressing the method of calculating an amount due under the
Wage Payment Law, the parties have presented argument based on the meaning of certain terms,
such as compensation, in Louisiana' s retirement statutes.

10

Retirement provisions in Title 11 of the Revised Statutes, applicable
to LASERS and other retirement systems, also provide that retirement
benefits are based on " average earned compensation." The " earned
compensation"
as defined in La. R. S. 11: 403( 10) means " the base pay
earned by an employee for a given pay period as reported to the
system on a monthly basis by the agency which shall include the cash
value of any emolument of office in the form of paid compensation in
lieu of salary which is subject to federal and state payroll taxes." .. .
As defined in La. R.S. 11: 403( 6), " base pay" means, " prescribed
compensation for a specific position on a full-time basis, but does not
include overtime, per diem, differential pay, payment in kind,

premium pay, or any other allowance for expense authorized and
incurred as an incident to employment." The definition of base pay
includes an exception for supplemental pay of sworn, commissioned
law enforcement and fire protection officers, from any available funds
of the state. See La. Const. art. X, § 10( A)( 1)( b). From our reading of
these particular retirement statutes, it is clear that the legislature did
not intend for supplemental pay or expense allowances to be included
in the calculation of compensation for employees who were not law
enforcement officers or firefighters and did not fall within the
exception. ( Footnote omitted.)

Thus, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that " earned compensation"

as defined in La. R. S. 11: 403( 10) does not include plaintiff' s salary supplements.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error #3

In his third assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court

committed reversible error in finding that there was any overpayment to plaintiff of

retirement benefits, and in finding that even a false or inaccurate report of

overpayment triggered a mandatory obligation for LASERS to reduce plaintiff's

retirement benefits and recoup alleged overpayments.

On January 22, 2010, Tracie Woods, Executive Counsel of Southern, sent a

letter to Cynthia Rougeou, Executive Director of LASERS. The letter stated in

relevant part:

It has come to our attention from court testimony in December, 2009,
that Southern University —Baton Rouge miscalculated the retirement
income basis for Dr. Ralph Slaughter.

We accidentally included special/ supplemental pay from the SU
Foundation which our research indicates; we should not have included
in his retirement calculation.

11

On December 3, 2009, Judge Kelly, 19th Judicial Court, ruled the
retirement should have been calculated on the 220k base salary and
should not have included any supplemental pay. It appears we
provided an inflated salary amount to LASERS. Southern University
asks that LASERS recalculates the retirement benefit on the 220k base
salary with any additional calculations that may be required.

On April 27, 2012, after Slaughter I had concluded,' LASERS sent a letter to

plaintiff stating the following:

Your monthly retirement benefit has been recalculated due to an error
made by Southern University in the reporting of your earnings. Your
adjusted benefit is $ 17, 909. 19. As a result of this recalculation, there
is an amount due LASERS by you for the overpayment of benefits
since your retirement in 2009. The total amount of overpayment is
227, 651. 07. There is a credit due to you for the amount of
contributions you made on the erroneous earnings in the amount of
30, 000. 01. We have applied the credit to the amount due LASERS
and this leaves a balance of $197, 651. 06 remaining due and owing to
LASERS.

By law, specifically La. R.S. 11: 192, LASERS may adjust your
benefit and may further reduce the corrected benefit to recover the
overpayment within a reasonable number of months. We plan to
recover the balance over a 60 month period. As a result, your

corrected benefit will be reduced in the amount of $3, 294. 18. Thus,
your monthly gross benefit will be $ 14, 615. 91 for 60 months. At the
expiration of 60 months, your gross monthly benefit will be
17, 909. 19. The correct/ reduced benefit will begin June 1, 2012.

As discussed in our analysis of plaintiff' s second assignment of error, the trial

court correctly concluded that " earned compensation" as defined in La. R.S.

11: 403( 10) does not include plaintiff' s salary supplements. Thus, Southern' s

inclusion of plaintiff' s salary supplements was an error that caused an

overpayment. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error #4

In his fourth assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court

committed reversible error in finding that any administrative error occurred during

a reporting period that was during the periods in which plaintiff received additional

8 Cynthia Rougeou testified at the 2013 trial that, out of an abundance of caution, LASERS waited over two years
after receiving Ms. Woods' letter before reducing plaintiff' s benefits in case LASERS was brought into plaintiffs
ongoing litigation with Southern.

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pay; there was no evidence of such. Plaintiff refers to a May 11, 2012 letter sent

from Wretha Carpenter, Deputy Fiscal Officer of LASERS, to Rosie Taylor of

Southern. The May 11, 2012 letter informs Ms. Taylor that plaintiff' s retirement

benefit was recently recalculated due to an error in the reporting of his earnings by

Southern. According to the letter, the error occurred during the reporting periods

of February 2005 through July 2007. Plaintiff argues that he received the

supplemental pay at issue from July 1, 2007 until June 30, 2009, not during the

reporting periods of February 2005 through July 2007. Thus, he argues that any

error that occurred during the reporting periods of February 2005 through July
2007 should not affect his retirement benefits.

Cynthia Rougeou testified at the 2013 trial that she was only aware of one

administrative error with respect to plaintiff' s benefit calculation. She does not

know why the May 11, 2012 letter specifically referenced the reporting periods of

February 2005 through July 2007, nor does she know whether Wretha Carpenter' s

letter provided the correct dates.

Tracie Woods testified that she believed that the overpayment was

discovered while Southern was looking at payroll records during the litigation of

plaintiff' s 2009 wage claim case. She did not recall the particular dates of the

administrative error.

Plaintiff' s employment contract with Southern commenced on July 1, 2007
and ended June 30, 2009. He received a base salary of $220, 000 per annum, a

vehicle allowance, a housing allowance unless living on the university' s campus,

and a salary supplement from Southern University System Foundation funds in the

amount of $
200,000 per year ( such salary supplement being contingent upon the

funds being provided by the foundation.) Thus, it is clear from the record that the

salary supplement at issue occurred from July 1, 2007 until June 30, 2009. The

administrative error was the inclusion of that salary supplement in the calculation

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of plaintiff's retirement benefits. Considering plaintiff' s employment contract and

the testimony at trial, the dates of February 2006 through July 2007 in Wretha

Carpenter' s letter were likely inaccurate. Regardless, there is no doubt that the

salary supplement from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2009 should not have been

included in the calculation of plaintiff' s retirement benefits. This assignment of

error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error #5

In his fifth assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court committed

reversible error in failing to find that plaintiff's monthly rate for retirement benefit

calculation purposes should be based on the $ 39, 000 he received monthly.

However, the $ 39, 000 includes his supplemental pay which, as explained in our

analysis of his second assignment of error, should not have been included in the

calculation of his retirement benefits. This assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, the Nineteenth Judicial District Court' s

June 15, 2020 judgment dismissing with prejudice Dr. Ralph Slaughter' s claims for

a writ of mandamus,
mandatory injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment is

affirmed. Costs are assessed to Appellant, Dr. Ralph Slaughter.

AFFIRMED.

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