State Of Louisiana v. Bruce Lockwood Chappelle

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2020 KA 0062

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

BRUCE LOCKWOOD CHAPPELLE

Judgment Rendered: NOV 0 9 2020

On Appeal from the 32nd Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Terrebonne
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 769327

Honorable David W. Arceneaux, Judge Presiding

Joseph L. Waitz, Jr. Attorneys for Appellee,
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Ellen Daigle Doskey
Assistant District Attorney
Houma, Louisiana

Bertha M. Hillman Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
Covington, Louisiana Bruce Lockwood Chappelle

BEFORE: McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, AND PENZATO, JJ.

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PENZATO, I

The defendant, Bruce Lockwood Chappelle, was charged by an amended bill

of information with theft at a value of twenty- five thousand dollars or more, a

violation of La. R.S. 14: 67( B)( 1). He pled not guilty. After a trial by jury, he was

found guilty as charged. The trial court denied the defendant' s motions for post -

verdict judgment of acquittal and new trial. The State filed a habitual offender bill

of information, and the defendant was subsequently adjudicated a third -felony

habitual offender pursuant to La. R. S. 15: 529. 1 ( A)(3)( a). The trial court sentenced

the defendant to one hundred sixty months imprisonment at hard labor. The

defendant now appeals, assigning as error the trial court' s denial of his challenge for

cause of a prospective juror during voir dire. For the following reasons, we affirm

the conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 17, 2017, Ron Weimer, the general manager of Geri Lynn Nissan in

Houma, Louisiana, reviewed surveillance footage after realizing that a white 2017

Nissan Altima was missing from the lot. The surveillance footage showed the

vehicle being driven off of the lot around 6: 30 a.m., five days earlier, on June 12,

2017. Detective Lieutenant Billy Dupre, Jr. ofthe Terrebonne Parish Sheriff' s Office

TPSO) was assigned to investigate the theft. In addition to providing Detective

Dupre with a video clip of the surveillance footage that he recorded with his cell

phone, Mr. Weimer informed Detective Dupre that the stolen vehicle was equipped

with a GPS tracking system. Detective Dupre used the tracking system to locate the

vehicle at 321 Turtle Creek Road in St. Rose, Louisiana. After obtaining

confirmation of the vehicle' s whereabouts from the St. Charles Parish Sheriff' s

Office, Detective Dupre and Lieutenant Wilton Leon ( also with the TPSO) went to

the location and found the vehicle parked in the driveway of a residence.

2

While at the residence, Detective Dupre questioned potential witnesses,

including Brenda Thomas, who indicated that her friend Bruce Chappelle ( the

defendant) told her to go pick up his vehicle from a Valero gas station in Hammond

and bring it to the residence in St. Rose.' After Ms. Thomas went to the defendant' s

house to get the keys, her daughter gave her a ride to the gas station in Hammond,

where she was able to locate the vehicle. She then drove the vehicle to her brother' s

residence in St. Rose, as requested by the defendant. Detective Dupre obtained still

photographs taken from video surveillance footage from June 13, 2017, that showed

a subject who fit the body build and description of the defendant at the Valero gas

station with the vehicle at issue. Detective Dupre subsequently interviewed the

defendant at the sheriff' s office. After being advised of his Miranda' rights, the

defendant confessed to taking the vehicle and leaving it at the gas station where it

was retrieved by Ms. Thomas.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred

in denying his challenge for cause to excuse Kathleen Luke, a prospective juror on

panel one of the jury venire. The defendant notes that Ms. Luke is the wife of an

assistant district attorney working in the same office as the prosecuting attorney in

the instant case. The defendant further contends that Ms. Luke also had a

friendship" with Geri LeBlanc of Geri Lynn Nissan. The defendant argues that it

is unrealistic to conclude that Ms. Luke' s relationships with her husband and Geri

LeBlanc would not affect her during deliberations. The defendant notes that Ms.

Luke indicated that she would " like to say" that her mind would not be swayed but

1 Prior to the theft, Ms. Thomas went with the defendant when he looked at and test- drove vehicles
at Geri Lynn Nissan, including the vehicle at issue. Ms. Thomas testified that when she
subsequently went to pick up the vehicle at issue from the Hammond gas station, she did not
recognize it as being the vehicle from Geri Lynn Nissan. She stated that she believed the defendant
owned the vehicle at issue.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444- 45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 ( 1966).

3

did not outright deny that she would be swayed by her husband' s position. Finally,

the defendant contends that Ms. Luke may have been reluctant to admit to the trial

court judge, who was her next- door neighbor,' that she could not be fair and

impartial in his courtroom. The defendant concludes that Ms. Luke' s responses as

a whole during voir dire revealed facts for which bias, prejudice, or inability to

render judgment according to the law can be reasonably implied.

An accused in a criminal case is constitutionally entitled to a full and complete

voir dire examination and to the exercise of peremptory challenges. La. Const. art.

I, § 17( A); La. Code Crim. P. art. 786. The purpose of voir dire examination is to

determine prospective jurors' qualifications by testing their competency and

impartiality and discovering bases for intelligent exercise of cause and peremptory

challenges. State v. Mills, 2013- 0573 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 8/ 27/ 14), 153 So. 3d 481,

486, writs denied, 2014- 2027 ( La. 5/ 22/ 15), 170 So. 3d 982 & 2014- 2269 ( La.

9/ 18/ 15), 178 So. 3d 139. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797( 2)

provides that a prospective juror may be challenged for cause on the ground that the

juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. Further, the State or the

defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that the relationship,

whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity, between the juror

and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense

counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in

arriving at a verdict. La. Code Crim. P. art. 797( 3). When addressing whether a

challenge for cause should be granted, the district courtjudge must look at the juror' s

responses during his or her entire testimony, not just isolated answers. State v.

Sparks, 88- 0017 ( La. 5/ 11/ 11), 68 So. 3d 435, 461, cert. denied, 566 U.S. 908, 132

3 As indicated, Ms. Luke disclosed that the trial judge was her next -door -neighbor. She denied
that this would cause her any bias in any manner in this case. Ms. Luke was not questioned any
further in regards to living next door to the trial judge, nor does the defendant assert this as a source
of bias on appeal.

0

S. Ct. 1794, 182 L.Ed.2d 621 ( 2012); State v. Conklin, 2018- 0718 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.

2/ 28/ 19), 274 So. 3d 675, 684, writ denied, 2019- 00665 ( La. 10/ 8/ 19), 280 So. 3d

591.

When a juror expresses a predisposition as to the outcome of a trial, a

challenge for cause should be granted. However, if after further inquiry or

instruction, the prospective juror exhibits the ability and willingness to make an

impartial decision based on the law and evidence presented at trial, the challenge is

properly denied. See State v. Mischler, 2018- 1352 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 31/ 19),

So. 3d , 2019 WL 2334219, at * 14. A challenge for cause should be granted,

even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror' s

responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render

judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. State v. Bowie, 2017- 1762

La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 1/ 18), 2018 WL 2453480, at * 6, writ denied, 2018- 1099 ( La.

1/ 8/ 19), 260 So. 3d 1214. When a defendant is forced to utilize a peremptory

challenge to correct an error in denying a challenge for cause and thereafter exercises

all available peremptory challenges on other prospective jurors, a substantial right

of the defendant, guaranteed by the Louisiana constitution, is affected. State v.

Mickelson, 2012- 2539 ( La. 9/ 3/ 14), 149 So. 3d 178, 184- 85. In such cases, a

defendant need make only two showings to establish error warranting reversal of a

conviction and sentence: ( 1) the district court erred in refusing to sustain a challenge

for cause by the defendant; and ( 2) the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory

challenges. Id. at 185.

Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is denied erroneously by a

trial court and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. Bowie, 2018

WL 2453480, at * 6. However, a trial court is afforded broad discretion in

determining whether to strike a juror for cause because of the trial court' s ability to

form a first -person impression of prospective jurors during voir dire. State v. Brown,

5

2005- 1676 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 5/ 06), 935 So. 2d 211, 214, writ denied, 2006- 1586

La. 1/ 8/ 07), 948 So. 2d 121. The trial court has the benefit of seeing the facial

expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as

they respond to questioning, whereas the reviewing court reviews the matter only on

a transcript in a record. State v. Dorsey, 2010- 0216 (La. 9/ 7/ 11), 74 So. 3d 603, 627,

cert. denied, 566 U.S. 930, 132 S. Ct. 1859, 182 L.Ed.2d 658 ( 2012). Therefore, the

trial court' s rulings will not be disturbed unless a review of the voir dire as a whole

indicates an abuse of that discretion. State v. Folse, 2018- 0153 ( La. App. 1st Cir.

9/ 21/ 18), 258 So. 3d 188, 197, writ denied, 2018- 1743 ( La. 4/ 22/ 19), 268 So. 3d 300.

In this case, the defendant exhausted all six of his peremptory challenges and

used one of them to remove Ms. Luke .4 Therefore, we need only determine whether

the trial court erred or abused its discretion in denying the defendant' s challenge for

cause of Ms. Luke. At the outset, we note that as the defendant did not assert Ms.

Luke' s association with Geri LeBlanc as a basis for his challenge for cause below,

he is precluded from making such an assertion on appeal. The nature of an objection

to a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause and grounds therefor shall be

stated at the time of objection. La. Code Crim. P. arts. 800( A) & 841( A). Further,

a new basis for an objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. La. Code

Crim. P. art. 841; State v. Cheramie, 2008- 0703 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 12/ 08), 2008

WL 4190665, at * 2, writ denied, 2008- 2547 ( La. 8/ 12/ 09), 17 So. 3d 375.

Moreover, Ms. Luke did not use the term friend or friendship in describing

her association with Geri LeBlanc. When the assistant district attorney asked the

prospective jurors on panel one if there was anything she missed asking about, a few

4 In trials of offenses punishable by death or necessarily by imprisonment at hard labor, each
defendant shall have twelve peremptory challenges, and the State twelve for each defendant. In
all other cases, each defendant shall have six peremptory challenges, and the State six for each
defendant. La. Code Crim. P. art. 799. Based on the version of the applicable statute in effect at
the time of the offense, the instant offense was punishable by imprisonment with or without hard
labor. See La. R.S. 14: 67( B)( 1) ( prior to amendment by 2017 La. Acts, No. 281, § 1). Thus, the
defendant was entitled to six peremptory challenges in selecting the six -member jury.

2

of them, including Ms. Luke, stated that they knew members of the LeBlanc family.'

Specifically, Ms. Luke stated, " I know Geri fairly well." She later explained that

Geri LeBlanc was a sponsor for her basketball team when she coached at Vanderbilt

High School. Ms. Luke further stated, " And I would go meet with her and talk about

things other than business. Sometimes we would talk about the kids, and school,

and things of that nature." Ms. Luke denied ever socializing with the LeBlancs and

further denied that her association or dealings with Geri LeBlanc would cause her to

automatically find the defendant guilty. She also confirmed that she would be fair

and impartial. The defense attorney did not further question Ms. Luke regarding her

association with Geri LeBlanc. Considering the above, we are not persuaded by the

defendant' s attempt on appeal to assert Ms. Luke' s association with Geri LeBlanc

as a basis for partiality.

Ms. Luke, early on, during voir dire, upon providing her name and occupation,

disclosed the status of her husband, Jay Luke, as an assistant district attorney for

Terrebonne Parish. When the defense attorney questioned Ms. Luke in that regard,

the following pertinent colloquy took place:

MR. PELLEGRIN:
Okay. And, Ms. Luke, I am going to ask you a couple of
questions briefly .... You had said earlier that your husband was Mr.
Jay Luke; is that correct?

MS. LUKE:
Yes, sir.
MR. PELLEGRIN:

And he works for the Terrebonne Parish District Attorney' s
Office, correct?

MS. LUKE:
Yes. He is an assistant district attorney, yes, sir.

MR. PELLEGRIN:
And I' ve worked with Mr. Luke, I' m familiar with him. So I' m
sure he has come home a couple of times and kicked his shoes off and
y' all have sat down and kind of talked about his work day, right?

5
According to the record, at least two members of the LeBlanc family, Geri and Greg LeBlanc,
owned or were affiliated with local car dealerships, including Geri Lynn Nissan.

7

MS. LUKE:
No.

MR. PELLEGRIN:
Y' all don' t?

MS. LUKE:
You' re told in my house we don' t speak about his work or for
that matter discuss that.

MR. PELLEGRIN:
Okay. So having Mr. Luke who works for the same office as Ms.
Mustin' do you think that creates any kind of conflict in your mind for
this type of case right here?

MS. LUKE:
I don' t even know [ her] .

MR. PELLEGRIN:
But just the sense that they work together, does that -- having Mr.
Luke work at the district attorney' s office do you think that would sway
your mind one way or the other in this case?

MS. LUKE:
I' d like to say no.

I' d like to think that I am going to judge the information in a non -
partial way, look at things through a common-sense window.

MR. PELLEGRIN:
I appreciate -- I appreciate that ....

During additional questioning by the trial court, the following colloquy took

place:

THE COURT:
Ms. Luke, let me ask you a couple of questions. There was some
question about the relationship with you and your husband and the fact
that he is an assistant district attorney. If you are selected for the jury
in this case and after you hear all of the evidence you come to the
conclusion that the defendant is not guilty, would the fact that your
husband is an assistant district attorney cause you to return a verdict of
guilty instead?

MS. LUKE:
No, sir.

THE COURT:

Ms. Mustin was the assistant district attorney who prosecuted this case.

N.

Would the fact that your husband is an assistant district attorney
influence you in [ any way] on any decision you might have to make as
a juror in this case?

MS. LUKE:
No, sir.

THE COURT:

If you are selected for this jury and the jury finds the defendant
not guilty would that cause you any discomfort, embarrassment or
difficulty with your husband?

MS. LUKE:
No, sir.

THE COURT:
Would you let it cause you any difficulty, embarrassment or
difficulty with your husband?

MS. LUKE:
No, sir.

THE COURT:
All right. Do you think if you are selected as a juror in this case
you could make a decision based on the evidence presented and without
regard to the fact that your husband is an assistant district attorney?

MS. LUKE:
Yes, sir.

In challenging Ms. Luke for cause, the defense attorney only noted her

relationship with an assistant district attorney in the same parish of the instant case,

but he conceded that she further stated that she would like to think that she could be

fair and impartial in this case. As the defendant now argues on appeal, the defense

attorney argued that " I would like to think so" was not a satisfactory response. In

opposing the challenge for cause, the assistant district attorney, Amanda Mustin,

noted that Mr. Luke was not involved in the instant case. Ms. Mustin further stated

that, to her knowledge, Mr. Luke had no knowledge of the instant case. Ms. Mustin

argued that Ms. Luke made it abundantly clear that she was capable of remaining

unbiased in this matter. In denying the challenge for cause, the trial court stated in

part, " Ms. Luke is a high school basketball coach and if there is one thing that is

abundantly clear from the questioning of Ms. Luke is that she is a very decisive

Z

person.
There is no meekness, or shyness, or hesitation by her in response to the

questions that she was asked." After acknowledging the language of La. Code Crim.

P. art. 797( 3), the trial court reiterated that Ms. Luke made it very clear that her

marriage would not present a problem for her. The defense attorney generally

objected to the trial court' s denial of the challenge for cause.

The law in Louisiana is clear that a relationship between a prospective juror

and a district attorney does not automatically disqualify the prospective juror from

service. State v. Juniors, 2003- 2425 ( La. 6/ 29/ 05), 915 So. 2d 291, 306, cert. denied,

547 U.S. 1115, 126 S. Ct. 19405 164 L.Ed.2d 669 ( 2006). The existence of a

relationship, even one by blood or marriage, is not sufficient to disqualify a juror

unless the facts reveal that the nature of the relationship is such that it is reasonable

to conclude it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. La. Code Crim. P.

art. 797( 3). The law does not require that a jury be composed of individuals who are

totally unacquainted with the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the

district attorney, or defense counsel. It requires that jurors be fair and unbiased.

Juniors, 915 So. 2d at 306. Thus, the mere existence of a relationship is not alone

grounds for a challenge for cause. Rather, the question presented is whether the

prospective juror could assess the credibility of each witness independent of his

relationship with an assistant district attorney. Bowie, 2018 WL 2453480, at * 7.

We find that the trial court' s denial of the challenge for cause at issue, based

on its observation of Ms. Luke during voir dire, was within its great discretion. The

trial court was in a superior position to observe her as a prospective juror.

Additionally, the voir dire record in this case as a whole supports the trial court' s

finding that Ms. Luke could be fair and impartial. Accordingly, we find no merit in

the sole assignment of error.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL

BRUCE LOCKWOOD CHAPPELLE FIRST CIRCUIT

NO. 2020 KA 0062

HOLDRIDGE, J., Concurring

I respectfully concur in the result. At issue is whether a prospective juror,

who is married to an assistant district attorney who works in the same office as the

prosecuting assistant district attorney, should be dismissed as a prospective juror

for cause. In this case, the answers elicited from the juror in voir dire examination

indicate that the prospective juror stated that " I' d like to think that I am going to

judge the information in a non -partial way." Similarly, upon rehabilitation

questions by the trial judge, the juror indicated that her relationship with her

husband, who was an assistant district attorney, would not influence her in any

way. From these answers, it was within the " great discretion" of the trial judge to

deny the cause challenge as to this juror. However, in the administration of justice

in a fair and equitable criminal system, it would appear that the better practice

would have been to remove the questioned juror for cause. Under both the

criminal ( La. C. Cr.P. art 797) and civil (La. C. C. P. art. 1765) articles dealing with

challenges for cause, the relationship by marriage between a prospective juror and

an attorney employed by the district attorney ( or an attorney in the same firm that

is representing a party in a civil action), the question is whether a reasonable

person would conclude ( or believe) that the relationship would influence that juror

in arriving at a verdict. Clearly, the reasonable perception in a criminal case is that

the spouse of an assistant district attorney would be influenced and would not be a

proper juror to serve on a criminal jury.