State Of Louisiana v. Keith Trosclair

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

2020 KA 0187

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

KEITH A. TROSCLAIR

Decision Rendered:
DEC 2 12020

APPEALED FROM THE
17th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
LAFOURCHE PARISH, LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 573, 126

HONORABLE STEVEN M. MILLER, JUDGE

Prentice L. White Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Keith A. Trosclair

Kristine Russell Attorneys for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Joseph S. Soignet
Jason Chatagnier
Allie Fournet
Assistant District Attorneys
Thibodaux, Louisiana

BEFORE: McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, and PENZATO, 33.

tot ttAk

McDONALD, I

The grand jury indicted the defendant, Keith A. Trosclair, with second degree

murder, a violation of La. R. S. 14: 30. 1. After a hearing, the district court found him

competent to proceed. The defendant initially pled not guilty and not guilty by reason

of insanity. Thereafter, he changed his plea to not guilty. After a trial, the jury found

him guilty as charged, by a ten to two vote. He moved for a post -verdict judgment of

acquittal, for a new trial, and to declare Louisiana Constitution article I, § 17A and

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 782A unconstitutional. The district court

denied the motions and later sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard

labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. He moved for

reconsideration of sentence, and the district court denied the motion.

The defendant now appeals, raising four assignments of error: ( 1) the district

court committed reversible error in denying his motion for post -verdict judgment of

acquittal, because the evidence failed to establish specific intent to kill and the

defendant acted in self-defense; ( 2) the district court abused its discretion: ( a) in

overruling defense counsel' s objections to the State' s persistent references to the

defendant' s post -arrest silence; ( b) by excluding crucial evidence surrounding the

hostility between the victim and the defendant that supported the defendant' s claim of

self-defense; ( c) in refusing to allow defense counsel to play the 911 call before the

jury; and ( d) in overruling defense counsel' s objections to the State's extended use of

gruesome photographs of the scene of the shooting; ( 3) the district court failed to

acknowledge that accepting a non -unanimous verdict violated the defendant's rights

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and ( 4)

the district court committed reversible error in denying his motion to reconsider

sentence and refusing to modify his sentence to one that was more appropriate for a

defendant with severe mental deficiencies. For the following reasons, we vacate the

conviction and sentence and remand to the district court.

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FACTS

Stuart Reulet and the defendant lived directly across from one another on

Highway 20 in Thibodaux, Louisiana. Mr. Reulet had known the defendant for a long

time and considered him a good friend. On December 5, 2017, at around noon, Mr.

Reulet heard a loud noise like "[ a] gunshot, a tire exploding, or a crash. He looked

through the window and saw the defendant " coming out from his carport firing shots."

Mr. Reulet heard one shot and saw the defendant shoot two shots. The defendant was

firing at " an object lying on the ground." Mr. Reulet later learned the object was the

victim, Christopher Saunders, who was the defendant's next-door neighbor.

The victim died from multiple gunshot wounds. He was shot on the front of the

chest, with the bullet possibly passing through another object before striking his body.

He also had a re- entrance gunshot wound on the right side of his chest, most

commonly caused by the bullet passing through an arm before entering the torso. He

was also shot on the back of his right forearm, with the bullet then entering his chest.

Lastly, he had a gunshot wound to his right upper back with the bullet passing through

his right lung and heart. This last wound had ' very high potential to be fatal."

Tyronne Scott, a Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development

employee working in the area of the shooting, testified at trial. At the time of the

incident, Mr. Scott was driving down Highway 20, when he saw the defendant shoot the

victim two times; the victim fell to the ground after the first shot. Mr. Scott did not see

the victim with a gun or anything in his hands. Mr. Scott testified that the defendant

and the victim appeared to be having a conversation before the shooting, but he did

not see any argument or hand raising between the men. Mr. Scott described the

defendant's demeanor after the shooting as " calm or he didn't look like he was in [ a]

rage or anything."

The defendant also testified at trial. He encountered the victim at about noon on

the day of the incident. According to the defendant, he was outside when he saw the

victim walking down the driveway, which they shared with the landowner living behind

them, and the two men " made eye contact." The defendant told the victim, " I saw

what [ you] did to my cousin Kenneth." The defendant stated that the victim

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responded, "[ Y] ou motherf*** er[,] I' m going to kill you." In response to the victim' s

threat, the defendant " grabbed" his gun from his truck, walked around the truck, and

told the victim " don' t ever threaten me again." According to the defendant, the victim

then ' went for his gun," which he usually carried, and was then openly carrying, in a

holster on his right side. The defendant demonstrated in court how the victim allegedly

placed his hand near his midsection and reached down to the right side of his body.

The defendant testified that he then shot the victim three times, because he was scared

for his life.

The defendant acknowledged that he usually kept the rifle he used to shoot the

victim on " safe" when it was loaded and had to take the weapon off "safe" and aim it at

the victim before shooting him the first time. And, to shoot the victim a second and

third time, the defendant had to " work the mechanism of the bolt."

The defendant conceded the victim was standing on the shared driveway at the

time of the shooting. He also conceded that he was closer to his own carport door than

to the victim at the time of the incident. The defendant acknowledged that police

officers found the victim' s gun still in its holster after the incident. Although he claimed

he shot the victim three times, the defendant did not dispute that police officers

recovered four shell casings from his property.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the evidence was

insufficient to support the conviction because he acted in " direct response to the imminent

threat that [ the victim] posed when [ the victim] reached for his firearm after threatening

the defendant] with bodily harm."

When issues are raised on appeal contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and

alleging one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency

of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 ( La. 1992); State v. Duhon, 18-

0593 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 28/ 18), 270 So. 3d 597, 609. The reason for reviewing sufficiency

first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450

U. S. 40, 101 S. Ct. 970, 67 L. Ed. 2d 30 ( 1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the

evidence in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d

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560 ( 1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude

that all of the essential elements of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 734; Duhon, 270 So. 3d at 609. When the entirety of the

evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to

that crime, and any discussion of trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta

since those issues are moot. However, when the entirety of the evidence is sufficient to

support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court

must then consider the other assignments of error to determine whether the accused is

entitled to a new trial. If the reviewing court determines that there has been trial error

which was not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to

support the conviction, then the accused will be granted a new trial, but is not entitled to

an acquittal. See Hearold, 603 So. 2d at 734; Duhon, 270 So. 3d at 609.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates due process.

See U. S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The constitutional standard for testing

the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson, requires that a conviction be

based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 8216; State v. Ordodl, 06- 0207 ( La. 11/ 29/ 06), 946

So. 2d 654, 660. In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of

Louisiana' s circumstantial evidence test, which states in part, ' assuming every fact to be

proved that the evidence tends to prove," every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is

excluded. La. R. S. 15: 438; Duhon, 270 So. 3d at 610.

In finding the defendant guilty, the jury rejected the claim of self-defense and

concluded that the use of deadly force under the particular facts of this case was neither

reasonable nor necessary. A rational juror could have reasonably concluded that the

killing was not necessary to save the defendant from the danger envisioned by La. R. S.

14: 20( 1) and/ or that the defendant had abandoned the role of defender and taken on the

role of an aggressor and, as such, was not entitled to claim self-defense. See La. R. S.

14: 21; State v. Tran, 98- 2812 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 5/ 99), 743 So. 2d 1275, 1291.

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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we decline to discuss all of the

evidence in detail. Because this case must be retried, as discussed in the next section,

discussing the evidence in detail here would be tantamount to giving an impermissible

advisory opinion. See Louisiana State Bd. of Nursing v. Gautreaux, 09- 1758 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 6/ 11/ 10), 39 So. 3d 806, 811. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the jury's

determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See

Ordodi, 946 So. 2d at 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the

evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning

a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and

rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 07- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417,

418 ( per curiam). To otherwise accept a hypothesis of innocence that was not

unreasonably rejected by the fact finder, a court of appeal impinges on a fact finder's

discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due

process of law. See State v. Mire, 14- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16), 269 So. 3d 698, 703 ( per

curiam). This assignment of error is without merit.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NON -UNANIMOUS VERDICT

In assignment of error number three, the defendant argues the district court

committed reversible error in denying his motion to declare La. Const. art. I, § 17A and

La. C. Cr. P. art. 782A unconstitutional.

The district court conducted a written jury poll following the rendering of the

verdict. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 812. Ten of twelve jurors voted to convict the defendant of

second degree murder.

After the district court' s adverse ruling on the motion challenging the

constitutionality of La. Const. art. I, § 17A and La. C. Cr. P. art. 782A, the United States

Supreme Court overruled Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L. Ed. 2d 184

1972), and held that the right to a jury trial under the United States Constitution Sixth

Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous

verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. _, ,

140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397, 206 L. Ed. 2d 583 ( 2020). The Ramos Court further noted that its

ruling may require retrial of those defendants convicted of felonies by non -unanimous

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verdicts whose cases are still pending on direct appeal. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1406. Thus,

where the defendant's conviction was not final when Ramos was decided, the holding of

Ramos applies. State v. Bueso, 19- 01675 ( La. 6/ 22/ 20), 297 So. 3d 719 ( per curiam).

Accordingly, we determine assignment of error number three has merit. We vacate

the conviction and sentence and remand this case to the district court.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.

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