In Re: Lenise R. Williams

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 22, 2021
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: LENISE R. WILLIAMS
No. 2021-B-00613
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Office of Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Rule to Revoke Probation;
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 22, 2021
Probation revoked. See per curiam.
PDG
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
WJC
JBM
06/22/2021 "See News Release 026 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

06/22/21
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
021-B-0613
I
N RE: LENISE R. WILLIAMS
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
T he instant disciplinary proceeding arises from a motion and rule to revoke
probation filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent,
Lenise R. Williams, for her violation of additional Rules of Professional Conduct
while on court-ordered probation imposed in In re: Williams, 17-0906 (La. 6/29/17),
222 So. 3d 39 (“Williams I”), as well as for his failure to comply with her probation
agreement for that matter.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The record in Williams I demonstrated that respondent neglected a legal
matter, failed to communicate with a client, failed to properly withdraw from a
representation, and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. Following
the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC filed a joint petition for consent
discipline, proposing that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year and one day, with all but sixty days deferred, subject to two years of
unsupervised probation. This court accepted the petition for consent discipline in
Williams I on June 29, 2017.
1 The court’s order provides that “[a]ny failure of
respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during
1 Justices Clark, Crichton, and Genovese dissented and would have rejected the joint petition for
consent discipline.

2

the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the
suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.”
Respondent’s reinstatement to the practice of law was effective April 26,
2018. Her probation commenced on December 4, 2018, when she executed a formal
probation agreement with the ODC. In the agreement, respondent agreed that she
shall:
• Promptly respond to all requests by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel;
• Comply with all bar membership requirements, including: maintaining
current knowledge in the law by satisfying all mandatory continuing legal
education (“MCLE”) requirements and timely paying all Louisiana State Bar
Association membership dues and Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board
(“LADB”) annual disciplinary fee assessments;
• Timely provide any waivers of confidentiality to the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel as may be necessary to enable Disciplinary Counsel to monitor her
compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct and this Probation
Agreement;
• Acknowledge that any violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and/or
this Probation Agreement may result in revocation of her probation and
making the deferred portion of her suspension executory and/or such other
disciplinary action as may be appropriate under the Rules of Professional
Conduct and Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX; and
• Pay all costs and expenses assessed against her in these proceedings, including
legal interest.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Motion and Rule to Revoke Probation

3

On November 25, 2020, the ODC filed the instant motion and rule to revoke
respondent’s probation, alleging that respondent violated additional Rules of
Professional Conduct while on court-ordered probation imposed in Williams I, and
that she failed to comply with her probation agreement for that matter. Essentially,
the ODC alleged that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its efforts to
contact her, failed to comply with her bar membership requirements, and failed to
pay the costs assessed again st her in Williams I . The ODC also alleged that
respondent practiced law during her suspension in Williams I.
Regarding this final allegation, the ODC specifically alleged that during her
suspension in Williams I, which ran from June 29, 2017 through th e date of her
reinstatement on April 26, 2018, respondent had prepared and filed documents with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) in at least nineteen
trademark applications, approved at least five examiner’s amendments in trademark
applications, filed a notice of opposition in a trademark trial and appeal board
proceeding, and failed to inform all of her clients that she was ineligible to practice
before the USPTO.
2,3
Accordingly, the ODC prayed for revocation of respondent’s probatio n and
the imposition of the previously deferred portion of the one year and one day
suspension. Respondent did not file an answer to the ODC’s motion and rule to
revoke probation.

Hearing on Revocation of Probation

2 These violations are identified in the USPTO Final Order for Proceeding Number D2019- 23,
dated September 20, 2019, which the ODC filed into the record under seal.

3 The formal charges further indicate that on November 21, 2019, the ODC received notice that
respondent submitted an affidavit of resignation to the USPTO on September 13, 2019. The
director of the Office of Enrollment and Discipline (“OED Director”) had filed a disciplinary
complaint against respondent, alleging that she had violated the US PTO Rules of Professional
Conduct. The complaint specifically alleged that contrary USPTO trademark signature regulations
and guidance, she impermissibly entered ten electronic signatures of her clients. The associated
documents were considered to have been filed with false signatures.

4

This matter proceeded to a hearing before an adjudicative panel of the
disciplinary board on April 22, 2021. The ODC was represented by Deputy
Disciplinary Counsel Paul E. Pendley. Respondent did not appear at the hearing.
The ODC introduced documentary evidence and called Deputy Disciplinary Counsel
Brianne Hemmans to testify at the hearing. Ms. Hemmans, an attorney employed
by the ODC, investigates and prosecutes disciplinary complaints, drafts probation
agreements, and monitors attorney compliance with probation agreements.
Ms. Hemmans testified that she sent an email to respondent on November 23,
2020, asking respondent to give her a call in regards to probation. The next day,
respondent replied that she would call her [Ms. Hemmans] the following day. When
respondent failed to do so, the ODC filed the motion to revoke probation. Then, on
December 8, 2020, respondent sent an email to Ms. Hemmans. In her email,
respondent stated: “I have no objection to the suspension that is being requested. Is
there a document that I can execute at this time?” In response, Ms. Hemmans
advised respondent to direct any questions concerning the revocation matter to Mr.
Pendley. Respondent never reached out again to Ms. Hemmans.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
disciplinary board made the following factual findings and determinations:
Respondent failed to comply with her bar membership requirements. On July
1, 2020, she was deemed ineligible to practice law for failing to complete her MCLE
requirements for 2019. She is also ineligible for failing to file her trust account
registration statement. 4 By failing to meet these requirements, respondent has
violated her probation agreement as well as Rules 1.1(b) (failure to comply with

4 The ODC also alleged that respondent failed to pay the disciplinary assessment for 2020, but the
LADB records show that the assessment was paid.

5

MCLE requirements) and 1.1(c) (a lawyer is required to comply with all of the
requirements of the Supreme Court’s rules regarding annual registration, including
timely notification of changes of address and proper disclosure of trust account
information or any changes therein) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
During her period of ineligibility, respondent filed at least one document
furthering the prosecution of a trademark application with the USPTO, despite the
fact that she was ineligible to practice before that office. As detailed in the Final
Order of the USPTO, respondent was ineligible to practice law in Louisiana and
before the USPTO on various dates, including from September 17, 2018 through
October 30, 2018. This period of ineligib ility fell after respondent’s suspension in
Williams I had ended on April 26, 2018, but before her probation agreement was
executed on December 4, 2018. By this misconduct, respondent has violated Rules
5.5(a)
(engaging in the unauthorized practice of law ) and 8.4(c) (engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.5
Additionally, respondent failed to communicate and cooperate with the ODC
concerning the resolution of its motion to revoke probation. Despite what appeared
to be her initial cooperation with the resolution of the ODC’s motion to revoke
probation, the ODC indicated that respondent “has taken no action to acknowledge
her intent to consent to, or cooperate with, the ODC’s revocation motion.”
Finally, respondent was deemed ineligible to practice law on September 21,
2020 for failing to pay the costs assessed against her in Williams I.

5 While this misconduct is a proper basis upon which to revoke probation, the board noted that the
dates of the misconduct are not given in the USPTO’s Final Order. Therefore, the ODC has not
established that the misconduct violated respondent’s probation agreement. In order to violate the
agreement, any additional misconduct would logically have to occur during the term of the
agreement. The board added that the ODC has not established that the mis conduct conclusively
occurred during the time period of respondent’s actual suspension. The USPTO’s Final Order
incorrectly lists her suspension as running from June 29, 2017 to May 2, 2018 and/or May 4, 2018.
According the LADB records her suspension ended on April 26, 2018. Therefore, the misconduct
could have occurred after that time period, when she was eligible to practice law (April 27, 2018
through May 4, 2018).

6

On May 3, 2021, the board filed its report with this court, recommending that
the ODC’s motion to revoke probation be granted. The board concluded that the
ODC has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that respondent has violated
the terms of her probation agreement and committed further violations of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, both of which are grounds for the revocation of her
probation. Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent’s probation be
revoked and that the deferred one year and one day suspension imposed in Williams
I be made executory. The board also recommended that she be assessed with all
costs and expenses of these proceedings.

DISCUSSION
A review of the record reveals that respondent violated additional Rules of
Professional Conduct while on court-ordered probation imposed in Williams I , and
that she has not complied with the requirements of her December 4, 2018 probation
agreement. Respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its efforts to contact
her, failed to comply with her bar membership requirements, and failed to pay the
costs assessed against her in Williams I . Respondent also practiced law while she
was ineligible to do so. To protect the public, we believe it is necessary to revoke
respondent’s probation and impose the previously-deferred suspension.
Accordingly, we will accept the board’s recommendation and grant the
motion to revoke respondent’s probation, making the previously-deferred portion of
her one year and one day suspension imposed in Williams I immediately executory.

DECREE
For the reasons assigned, respondent’ s probation is revoked and the
previously-deferred portion of the one year and one day suspension imposed in In
re: Williams, 17 -0906 (La. 6/29/17), 222 So. 3d 39 , is hereby made immediately

7

executory. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent,
Lenise R. Williams, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29706, in accordance with Supreme
Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date
of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.