In Re: Devonna M. Ponthieu

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #049
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 10th day of December, 2021 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2021-B-01151 IN RE: DEVONNA M. PONTHIEU
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO.
2021-B-1151
IN
RE: DEVONNA M. PONTHIEU
ATT
ORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CU
RIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, DeVonna M. Ponthieu, an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDERL
YING FACTS
By way of background, A.B. and Craig Wheelis were in a dating relationship
while they both worked at Turner Industries. When their relationship ended, A. B.
filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Wheelis. She also obtained a criminal
protective order against Mr. Wheelis. When Mr. Wheelis lost his job because of the
protective order, he hired attorney William Robert Gill, who filed an exception to
the protective order. Consequently, A.B. hired respondent to represent her in the
proceeding.
Mr. Gill spoke to respondent about the possibility of having the criminal
protective order withdrawn and, in its place, imposing a mutual civil restraining
order or injunction prohibiting each party from harassing or communicating with the
other. When respondent advised A.B. of Mr. Gill’s suggestion, A.B. indicated she
would resolve the matter only if Mr. Wheelis paid her $100,000 in “damages,” in
exchange for which A.B. indicated she would withdraw the criminal charges and
have the matter replaced with a mutual civil restraining order. Respondent
transmitted A.B.’s offer to Mr. Gill via email on October 5, 2017, specifically stating
10/10/21

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that, in exchange for the $100,000 payment, A.B. “also said that she will not show
up at trial for the criminal matter.”

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In May 2019, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
her conduct violated Rule 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, the OD C alleged that respondent’s
offer of anything of value in exchange for not cooperating and/or refusing to show
up at a criminal trial is the criminal offense of extortion and/or bribery, pursuant to
In re: Sharp, 01-1117 (La. 12/7/01), 802 So. 2d 588. Respondent, through counsel,
answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct.
The parties subsequently entered into a stipulation that the factual allegations
set forth in the formal charges are true and correct. They further stipulated that
respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct), 8.4(b), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice). Finally, they stipulated to the following additional facts:
1. A.B. and Mr. Wheelis were in a dating and intimate relationship that lasted
more than one year;
2. A.B. alleges that, during the relationship, Mr. Wheelis engaged in conduct
that reasonably concerned and scared A.B.;
3. Because of Mr. Wheelis’ conduct, A.B. believed she had a reasonable basis to
fear for her safety and to discontinue further contact and communication with
him; and
4. The basis for A.B.’s concerns and fears are reflected in respondent’s exhibits,
to which the ODC has no objection.

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Hearing in Mitigation
Based on the parties’ stipulations, the formal hearing was converted into a
hearing in mitigation. Respondent testified on her own behalf and on cross-
examination by the ODC. She also called A.B. and Mr. Gill to testify before the
committee. Mr. Wheelis did not appear in person before the committee but a
transcript of his sworn statement was introduced into evidence.

CRAIG WHEELIS’ SWORN STATEMENT TESTIMONY
Mr. Wheelis testified that, prior to the end of his relationship with A.B., he
had given her his credit card to use during an emergency. Instead, she went on a
spending spree. When they broke up, she still had his credit card. On July 3, 2017,
his friend called him at home to tell him A.B. was claiming he was driving by her
house. Mr. Wheelis denied doing so and indicated he was at home twenty miles
away. However, he decided he should get his credit card back since A.B. was stirring
up trouble. He drove to A.B.’s house but claimed he never had contact with or saw
her; he did not even knock on her door.
Mr. Wheelis was subsequently arrested for stalking A.B., and A.B. obtained
a protective order against him. Because of the protective order, he was fired from
Turner Industries. Mr. Wheelis wanted the criminal matter concluded, so he pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor in November 2017 even though he denies doing anything
wrong.
In October 2017, just prior to his guilty plea, his attorney told him about
respondent’s email. When he read the email, he immediately thought respondent
and A.B. were trying to bribe and extort him. He wanted to take the issue to the
district attorney’s office to be entered into the record of his criminal case, but that
never happened. Mr. Wheelis also claimed A.B. had tried to extort money from
other men she had been in relationships with in the past and indicated none of the

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complaints A.B. had about him were true. Mr. Wheelis further indicated he was
fired by Turner Industries because A .B. told their employer he was convicted of a
felony and was sentenced to five years in prison, which was not true. Efforts were
made to help him resolve this matter with his former employer.

WILLIAM ROBERT GILL’S TESTIMONY
Mr. Gill testified he knew re spondent professionally before he began
representing Mr. Wheelis. He indicated that he and respondent have a “really good
relationship” and that he respects her. He described her as professional, trustworthy,
and honest. He also indicated that judges like her and that she tries to help her clients
for the right reasons, even if she cannot collect much of a fee from them.
Regarding respondent’s October 2017 email, Mr. Gill testified the amount
requested did not bother him. However, the fact that respondent stated A.B. would
not show up for Mr. Wheelis’ trial in exchange for the $100,000 payment bothered
him. He addressed his concerns with respondent, and respondent told him A.B. had
insisted she send the email. Because Mr. Gill knows respondent so well, he did not
consider the email as an extortion or bribery attempt.

A.B.’
S TESTIMONY
A.B. testified that she obtained a protective order against Mr. Wheelis on her
own. When Mr. Wheelis hired an attorney to file an exception to the protective
order, A.B. hired respondent to represent her in the proceeding. Regarding the
October 2017 email, A.B. indicated she wanted to request $100,000 from Mr.
Wheelis so she could move out of state and start over far away from him. However,
she never thought he would re ally give her that much money. She acknowledged
respondent advised her she could not ask for that much money, but she still wanted
respondent to send the email. Her point in asking for that amount was to show Mr.

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Wheelis she was not going to drop the protective order against him. She never
intended to extort or bribe Mr. Wheelis, and she does not believe that is what she
did. Finally, A.B. opined that Mr. Wheelis filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent as a way to target and go after A.B. herself.

RESPONDENT’S TESTIMONY
Respondent testified that when she informed A.B. that Mr. Gill wanted to
convert the protective order to a reciprocal civil restraining order, A.B. said Mr.
Wheelis would have to pay her $100,000 to do so. Respondent told A.B. the amount
was “crazy,” and she needed to make a reasonable offer. She advised A.B. she could
not get punitive damages in this type of case, and $100,000 would be punitive.
However, A.B. insisted, indicating she would use the money to move far away and
would not even return for Mr. Wheelis’ trial. A.B.’s reasoning was that she wanted
to move out of state if Mr. Wheelis was still able to possess a firearm, which he
would be able to do if he had a civil restraining order against him instead of a
protective order.
Under Rule 1.2 (scope of the representation) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, respondent believed she had a duty to convey A.B.’s settlement offer to
Mr. Gill. A.B. was adamant about the amount. As such, respondent sent the
settlement offer to Mr. Gill in an email and included the last sentence about A.B.
saying she would not show up for the trial. A.B. was in respondent’s office when
she wrote and sent the email. In retrospect, respondent acknowledged she should
not have included the last sentence. However, the last sentence was not an effort at
extortion or bribery. It was just a way to reiterate A.B.’s wish to move far away. It
was not meant as a quid pro quo. No such agreement was ever drafted or signed,
and Mr. Wheelis only paid A.B. $1,500 total for respondent’s attorney’s fees and for
A.B.’s purchase of a gun, a concealed carry class, and self-defense classes.

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Respondent admitted the email was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. She understands why it caused concern for Mr. Gill and Mr. Wheelis. She
also understands she cannot do something her client wants her to do if it will violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct. She expressed remorse for her conduct and stated
that in hindsight, she would have told A.B. that she could not send the email.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing in
mitigation, the hearing committee acknowledged the stipulations agreed upon by the
parties. These stipulations included facts and rule violations. Specifically, the
parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct, as set forth in the formal charges,
violated Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Based on these findings, the committee determined respondent violated duties
owed to the public and the legal system. According to the committee, respondent
acted knowingly by sending the email, even though she may not have fully
comprehended the consequences of sending the email at the time. Her misconduct
caused potential harm to Mr. Wheelis and to the legal system, although there was no
actual harm of any significance. Elaborating, the committee stated that respondent
made a mistake when she sent the email to Mr. Wheelis’ attorney and that she was
trying to convey the wishes of her client. Thus, the committee determined
respondent did not intentionally interfere with the administration of justice, although
she did knowingly send the email. Furthermore, during the mitigation hearing,
respondent expressed remorse and indicated she understood that she made a mistake
when she sent the email. According to the committee, it does not appear as if there
was a scheme beyond the sending of the email.
After then considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
the committee determined the baseline sanction is suspension. The committee also

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found the following mitigating factors to be present: absence of a prior disciplinary
record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, character or reputa tion, and
remorse. The committee did not indicate whether any aggravating factors are
present.
On the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee found guidance from
In re: Sharp, 01 -1117 (La. 12/7/01), 802 So. 2d 588, wherein an attorney assisted
his criminal client in a scheme to induce the minor victim in the underlying criminal
proceeding and the victim’s mother to drop the charges in exchange for money. Mr.
Sharp drafted an agreement to this effect. However, the victim and her mother never
signed the agreement, and Mr. Sharp’s client never paid the money. Nevertheless,
the victim and her mother still believed for a period of time that the agreement was
in force, even after being advised by their counsel it was unenforceable and possibly
illegal. For this misconduct, the court suspended Mr. Sharp from the practice of law
for one year and one day. Distinguishing respondent’s conduct from the conduct in
Sharp, the committee noted respondent never drafted a formal agreement; instead,
she only sent an email, which she believed was simply a settlement offer.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the committee recommended
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for nine months, with six months
deferred. The committee further recommended that any violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct during the deferral period should result in the deferred portion
of the suspension becoming executory.
The ODC objected to the hearing committee’s recommended sanction.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing
committee’s factual findings, which include the stipulations entered into by the
parties, are not manifestly erroneous and are supported by the record. Accordingly,

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the board adopted same. The board specifically emphasized the parties’ stipulation
that respondent’s exhibits reflect A.B.’s concerns and fears regarding Mr. Wheelis.
The board further noted that respondent stipulated to violating Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b),
and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Based on the stipulated facts and rule violations, the board determined
respondent violated duties owed to the public and the legal system. Like the
committee, the board determined respondent acted knowingly by sending the email
to Mr. Gill, even though she did not fully comprehend the consequences of sending
the email at the time. While respondent caused no actual harm of any significance,
her misconduct caused the potential for harm to Mr. Wheelis a nd the legal system.
The board also agreed with the committee that the baseline sanction is suspension
based upon the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
In aggravation, the board found only respondent’s substantial experience in
the practice of law (admitted 2002). In addition to the mitigating factors found by
the committee, the board found the mitigating factor of full and free disclosure to
the disciplinary board or a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings to be present.
In further m itigation, the board noted respondent’s convincing testimony at the
hearing that she was only attempting to convey her client’s settlement offer to Mr.
Gill and that she did not intend to commit bribery or extortion.
Like the committee, the board found guidance from Sharp in determining an
appropriate sanction. In particular, the board noted Mr. Sharp was never charged
with any criminal violations, but he conceded he made a mistake of judgment in
drafting the agreement. Mr. Sharp claimed his intent was only to resolve the matter
without a trial, not to engage in the illegal act of attempting to bribe a witness.
Furthermore, once the victims’ attorney indicated the agreement was improper, Mr.
Sharp believed the agreement was abandoned by the parties. In suspending Mr.
Sharp for one year and one day, the court concluded he was sincere, although

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mistaken, in believing he was not engaging in an illegal act by drafting the
agreement. The court further stated that, “while [Mr. Sharp’s] state of mind does
not excuse his actions, it serves to mitigate the sanction.”
The board also found guidance from In re: Pryor, 15-0243 (La. 9/1/15), 179
So. 3d 566. In Pryor, an attorney represented a defendant in a criminal matter. The
attorney offered the victim $300 to execute an affidavit dropping the charges against
his client and later upped the offer to $500 for the witness not to show up in court
for his client’s trial. The court found the attorney knowingly, if not intentionally,
violated duties owed to the public and the legal system. The court also noted that,
although no harm actually occurred, a significant potential for harm existed. Relying
largely on Sharp to determine the sanction, the court noted that “Sharp suggests the
intent of the lawyer is critical in determining the severity of the sanction to be
imposed.” The court also noted that a significant factor in determining the sanction
is the manner in which other individuals perceive the attorney’s conduct. Under
these circumstances, the court imposed a suspension for one year and one day for
the attorney’s attempted bribery.
In comparing respondent’s conduct to Sharp, the board determined that she,
like Mr. Sharp, did not believe she was engaging in an illegal act when she sent the
email to Mr. Gill. She believed she was only transmitting her client’s settlement
offer, and she never intended to extort or bribe anyone. However, like both attorneys
in Sharp and Pryor, respondent’s conduct could have been interpreted by others to
be bribery and/or extortion. In fact, Mr. Wheelis testified at his sworn statement that
he believed respondent’s email to Mr. Gill constituted bribery and extortion.
Overall, the board determined respondent’s actions were not as egregious as those
found in Sharp and Pryor, explaining that, after respondent sent the email, Mr. Gill
counseled her that the offer could be interpreted as extortion, and she did not pursue
the offer any further. She also did not take affirmative steps to formalize the

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settlement offer into a formal agreement or affidavit as did the attorneys in Sharp
and Pryor.
In light of the above findings, the board recommended respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for nine months, with six months deferred. The
board further recommended that any violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
during the deferral period may result in the deferred period becoming executory, or
the imposition of additional discipline, as appropriate.
The ODC filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the
case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and con duct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96 ), 683 So. 2d 714; In re : Pardue, 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute, having been stipulated
to by the parties. Essentially, respondent, at her client’s insistence, conveyed a
$100,000 settlement offer to opposing counsel, in exchange for which the client
indicated that she would not appear at the opposing party’s criminal trial.
Respondent admitted that by her conduct, she violated Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and

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8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The record supports the stipulated facts
and rule violations.
Disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct,
protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future
misconduct. In re: Hingel, 20-0992 (La. 11/10/20), 303 So. 3d 1029. The discipline
to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses
involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In re:
Smothers, 20 -0244 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So. 3d 743. The purpose of lawyer
disciplinary proceedings is not so much to punish the attorney as it is to maintain
appropriate standards of professional conduct in order to protect the public and the
administration of justice. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Powell, 439 So. 2d 415 (La.
1983).
Respondent violated duties owed to the public and the legal system. She
acted knowingly by sending the email to opposing counsel; however, we agree with
the committee and the board that she did not fully comprehend the consequences of
her conduct at the time. Respondent caused no actual harm but clearly the potential
existed for harm to the opposing party and the legal system. The baseline sanction
for this misconduct is suspension. The record supp orts the disciplinary board’s
findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we have in the past not
hesitated to deal harshly with lawyers who give or offer to give anything of value to
a witness with the intent to influence their conduct as witnesses in criminal
proceedings. In In re: Hingle, 98-0774 (La. 9/18/98), 717 So. 2d 636, we disbarred
an attorney who was convicted of the crime of public bribery stemming from his
payment of a witness’s debts in exchange for the witness’s agreement not to testify
against his clients. The lawyer in Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Pitard, 462 So. 2d
178 (La. 1985), was likewise convicted of public bribery after he offered financial

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“settlements” to the families of three victims in exchange for affidavits exonerating
his client of wrongdoing. However, in both Hingle and Pitard, the evidence
established not only a conviction of a serious felony but also that the lawyer had
knowingly pursued an inappropriate course of action.
In a similar vein, but without evidence of payment of money or a criminal
conviction, we addressed In re: Sharp, 01-1117 (La. 12/7/01), 802 So. 2d 588. In
Sharp, the respondent lawyer represented a criminal defendant charged with carnal
knowledge of a juvenile . Based upon representations made by his client, the
respondent was convinced that the mother of the four teen-year old victim would
accept $10,000 in exchange for requesting that the criminal charges be dropped. The
respondent met with the mother and extended the $10,000 offer, which she accepted.
Thereafter, the respondent drafted a formal written agreement between his client and
the child’s mother memorializing the offer, and he recommended that she seek the
advice of independent counsel to review it. She did so and counsel contacted
respondent to advise that the agreement was unenforceable and perhaps illegal. The
respondent then told his client the deal would not work, and the agreement was never
signed, and no payment was made.
Later, the mother of the minor child brought the agreement to the attention of
the district attorney’s office, which in turn filed a complaint against the respondent
with the ODC. The ODC filed formal charges alleging that the respondent’s conduct
amounted to public bribery, even though the respondent was never criminally
charged. The respondent acknowledged his involvement, b ut denied criminal
misconduct or intent. He conceded making a mistake in judgment in drafting the
agreement.
In reviewing the matter, we found the respondent assisted his client in a
scheme to induce the victim in the underlying criminal proceeding to drop the
criminal charges in exchange for the payment of money. We commented that such

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conduct by a lawyer eroded public confidence in the criminal justice system and
called the entire legal profession into disrepute. Nevertheless, we recognized
significant mitigating factors in the respondent’s favor, in particular the fact that he
sincerely did not believe he was engaging in an illegal act by drafting the agreement
and that he abandoned the agreement once he learned from other counsel that it was
improper. Concluding that these factors did not excuse the respondent’s actions, but
served to mitigate the sanction, we suspended him from the practice of law for one
year and one day.
We find the instant case is distinguishable from Sharp. Mr. Sharp, the
attorney for a criminal defendant, drafted a formal written agreement offering money
to the victim in exchange for her request that the criminal charges be dropped. This
conduct was absolutely improper and resulted in an erosion of public confidence in
the criminal justice system . On the other hand, respondent, the attorney for the
victim of a criminal offense, sent an email to opposing counsel offering a settlement
demand to the defendant. While there was potentially a basis for a civil claim by the
victim against the defendant, respondent erred in adding – at the request of her client
– that if the settlement were paid, the client would not appear at the defendant’s trial
to testify against him. These facts, coupled with respondent’s convincing testimony
that she conveyed the offer only because she thought she was ethically bound to
comply with her client’s instructions, lead us to the conclusion that respondent’s
conduct is not as egregious as that which we previously considered in Sharp.
Under these circumstances, we find the appropriate sanction for respondent’s
misconduct is a nine-month suspension, with six months deferred, followed by one
year of probation during which respondent must attend and successfully complete
Ethics School . This sanction will give respondent an opportunity to correct the
problems which caused the misconduct, while at the same time protecting the public
from future misconduct.

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DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is
ordered that DeVonna M. Ponthieu, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27855, be suspended
from the practice of law for nine months. It is further ordered that six months of the
suspension shall be deferred. Following the active portion of the suspension,
respondent shall be placed on un supervised probation for one year , during which
time she must attend and successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar
Association’s Ethics School. The probationary period shall commence from the date
respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent
to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the
probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the
suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs
and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from
the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.