In Re: Lane Norwood Bennett

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #013
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 25th day of March, 2022 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2021-B-01198 IN RE: LANE NORWOOD BENNETT
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
021-B-1198
I
N RE: LANE NORWOOD BENNETT
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Lane Norwood Bennett, an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
Count I – The Walters Matter
Respondent and Chadwick Travis Walters are first cousins. In 2002, Mr.
Walters loaned $80,000 to respondent. As security for the loan, respondent gave
Mr. Walters a debenture
1 in the amount of $80,000 executed on April 3, 2002 by
RealVest, LLC. Re spondent is the sole member and registered agent of RealVest
and the guarantor of the debenture.
In 2006, Mr. Walters purchased a house in Bogalusa, Louisiana (the
“Property”). Respondent, whose law practice is primarily confined to real estate
matters, was the closing attorney on the transaction.
In 2009, Mr. Walters received an offer from a third party to buy the Property,
but the offer was not high enough to allow Mr. Walters to pay off the two mortgages
encumbering the Property. Accordingly, Mr. Walters asked respondent to make a
$10,000 principal payment on the debenture. Respondent told Mr. Walters that he
1 A debenture is a type of debt-creating instrument, such as a promissory note, that is not secured
by a physical asset or other collateral. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/debenture
03/25/22

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could not repay, and that instead of selling the Property, Mr. Walters should rent it
out for a few years. Respondent offered to manage the rental and take care of repairs,
with the intent of buying the Property himself sometime in the future. Respondent
also recommended that the Property be transferred to a limited liability company to
shield Mr. Walters from personal liability for any claims or law suits that might be
brought by tenants or third parties. At no time did respondent inform Mr. Walters
that he should seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction.
Mr. Walters accepted respondent’s advice. On April 8, 2009, respondent
created and registered Chadwick Travis Walters, LLC (“Walters LLC”) with the
Louisiana Secretary of State. According to respondent, he named the limited
liability company in this fashion because he did not want the mortgagees to discover
the transfer of the Property to Walters LLC and accelerate repayment of the
mortgages by invoking the “due on sale” clause. The sole member of Walters LLC
is Louisiana Real Estate Portfolio, LLC (“LREP”). Respondent is LREP’s registered
agent, and LREP’s only members are Central Portfolio, LLC (“CPLLC”) and
Bogalusa Portfolio, LLC (“BPLLC”). Respondent is the sole member of BPLLC
and its registered agent; respondent’s real estate business partner, Harry O. Mills,
III, is the sole member and registered agent of CPLLC. Mr . Walters had no
ownership interest in Walters LLC, nor was he aware of the existence of LREP,
BPLLC, or CPLLC, although they were all created on April 8, 2009 for the purpose
of the transfer of the Property to Walters LLC.
Five days later, on April 13, 2009, Mr. Walters executed a “Cash Sale Subject
to Mortgage” by which he conveyed all of his right, title, and interest in the Property
to Walters LLC.
2 Respondent was the closing attorney on the transaction. Based

2 Under the terms of the sale, the mortgages encumbering the Property were not satisfied and Mr.
Walters remained personally liable for repayment. Mr. Walters understood this fact at the time of
the closing, thou gh he believed respondent would make the mortgage payments from the rental
proceeds. This arrangement was not reduced to writing.

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upon respondent’s advice, which was not reduced to writing, Mr. Walters believed
he (Walters) was the owner of Walters LLC. Mr. Walters did not know that after
the sale he would retain no ownership in the Property. Furthermore, Mr. Walters
was not aware that Walters LLC was named as it was for the purpose of preventing
the mortgagees from discovering the transfer and invoking the due on sale clause.
Mr. Walters testified that if respondent had advised him of any of these facts, he
would not have agreed to the sale.
For approximately five yea rs after the sale of the Property, respondent
collected rents on the Property and paid the mortgage notes and expenses, amounting
to approximately $40,000. However, in 2013, Mr. Walters began receiving notices
from the mortgage holders that payments were not being made timely. As a result,
Mr. Walters had to begin making payments on occasion because respondent had not
made them. Respondent’s habit of making late payments resulted in late fees and
charges imposed by the lenders and caused Mr. Walters to become concerned that
his credit might be impaired.
During 2013, Mr. Walters sent emails to respondent asking for information
and advice concerning the Property so that he could refinance it. Respondent did
not respond to the emails, but eventually he told Mr. Walters he could not refinance
the Property because he no longer owned it. Respondent also refused Mr. Walters’
request to repay the debenture in full.
3 After consulting with an attorney, Mr.
Walters confirmed that he had no ownership interest in Walters LLC or in any of the
several limited liability companies respondent had created. In April 2014, Mr.
Walters filed suit against respondent and his business entities seeking to rescind the
sale of the Property, for an accounting and damages, and for repayment of the
debenture.

3 The balance due was disputed but ranged from $32,000 to $35,000.

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While the suit was pending, respondent unilaterally and without notice to Mr.
Walters or his counsel executed a “Transfer of Property with Vendor’s Lien” on
behalf of LREP. This act purported to transfer title of the Property to Mr. Walters
subject to a vendor’s lien of an undetermined amount in favor of LREP. 4 The
Property was also conveyed with a waiver of redhibitory defects. Mr. Walters did
not sign this act and was unaware it had been prepared and recorded until after a
copy was provided to his attorney in September 2014. After receiving the recorded
act, Mr. Walters inspected the Property and found it to be uninhabitable. The parties
settled the civil suit in February 2015 upon respondent’s agreement to pay Mr.
Walters $42,030 and to execute a release of the vendor’s lien.
The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a) (violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct) and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The ODC further alleges that respondent and Mr. Walters maintained a continuous
attorney-client relationship following Mr. Walters’ purchase of the Property in 2006,
and therefore that respondent represented a clie nt when there exists a concurrent
conflict of interest, in violation of Rule 1.7(a) (a lawyer shall not represent a client
if there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by a
personal interest of the lawyer), and engaged in a prohibited business transaction
with a client, in violation of Rule 1.8(a) (a lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security,
or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client).

4 LREP had apparently obtained ownership of the Property by way of a dation en paiement from
Walters LLC recorded in March 2014. Mr. Walters was unaware of this transaction.

5

Count II(a) – The Ashton Vidrine Matter
Vidrine Insurance Agency, LLC was registered with the Louisiana Secretary
of State on December 17, 2007. The limited liability company had one member,
Ashton Vidrine. Several years later, Ashton enrolled in graduate school and closed
the insurance agency. In February 2015, the Secretary of State revoked the articles
of organization of Vidrine Insurance Agency, LLC for failure to file an annual report
for three consecutive years.5
In June 2015, Ashton received a telephone call from his brother, Kyle Vidrine,
and respondent. Kyle and respondent asked Ashton to sign over ownership of
Vidrine Insurance Agency, LLC to them. Ashton did not immediately agree to this
request, but he ultimately told Kyle he would sell the company for $500. Ashton
did not hear anything from his brother or from respondent after this conversation.
A few months later, Ashton heard through family members that Kyle had
passed the casualty insurance exam. Out of curiosity, Ashton checked the website
of the Louisiana Secretary of State to find out whether Kyle had started his own
insurance company. Instead, Ashton discovered that documents had been filed with
the Secretary of State on February 15, 2016 to reinstate Vidrine Insurance Age ncy,
LLC, with Kyle as the manager and respondent as the member and registered agent.
This filing was made without Ashton’s knowledge or consent. On April 27, 2016, a
limited liability company was registered under the name of Vidrine Insurance, LLC.
The next day, and again without Ashton’s knowledge or consent, an affidavit was
submitted to the Secretary of State to dissolve Vidrine Insurance Agency, LLC.
According to Kyle, respondent was aware of these transactions and gave his
approval to affix his name on the filings with the Secretary of State.

5 Pursuant to La. R.S. 12:1308.2, the articles of organization could be reinstated within three years
upon the LLC’s compliance with the applicable filing requirements.

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The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b)
(commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) of the R ules of Professional
Conduct.

Count II(b) – The Glenda Vidrine Matter
Glenda Vidrine is the mother of Ashton Vidrine and Kyle Vidrine in Count
II(a). Respondent performed legal services for Ms. Vidrine, including drafting her
will and handling closings for her finance company. On April 15, 2015, respondent
created and registered Glenda Beth, LLC with the Louisiana Secretary of State. Ms.
Vidrine is the manager of the limited liability company, and the Bennett Law Firm,
LLC is Glenda Beth’s registered agent. Respondent is the sole member/manager
and registered agent for the Bennett Law Firm. On April 16, 2015, respondent filed
the organization documents for Storage Industrial, LLC. Storage Industrial has two
members/managers, Glenda Beth, LLC and Bogalusa Real Estate Portfolio, LLC
(“BREP”). Respondent is the sole member and registered agent of BREP.
In 2014, Ms. Vidrine obtained a $150,000 home equity line of credit from
Whitney Bank for the purpose of funding a used car dealership operated by her son
Kyle. Respondent was not involved in this venture, which soon failed. In 2015, Ms.
Vidrine agreed to obtain an advance on her line of credit in the amount of $55,000
so that Kyle and respondent could start a storage business. To evidence the debt,
BREP gave Ms. Vidrine a hand note in which it agreed to make the payments she
was required to make to the bank as a result of the advance. BREP also executed a
$150,000 collateral mortgage in favor of Ms. Vidrine which gave her a security
interest in commercial real estate owned by BREP in Baton Rouge. The collateral
mortgage note, which was prepared by respondent, was paraphed ne varietur with
the hand note, also prepared by respondent. BREP was the only obligor on the

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indebtedness; neither respondent nor Kyle was personally obligated to repay the debt
to Ms. Vidrine. Further, Ms. Vidrine was not protected against the foreclosure of
her home in the event that respondent, through BREP, failed to make the payments
due to the bank. At no time did respondent inform Ms. Vidrine that she should seek
the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction.
In 2019, respondent prepared a “replacement” hand note which contained
terms that were more favorable to Ms. Vidrine than those contained in the original
note. Respondent replaced the original $55,000 hand note with a hand note in the
amount of $87,284, bearing interest at 7% per annum from date until paid. The
mortgage on the commercial property remained in place but in addition, respondent
agreed to be personally liable on the note in solido with BREP. The replacement
note was not solicited by Ms. Vidrine; rather, respondent prepared and executed the
note following the filing of formal charges against him. Ms. Vidrine accepted the
replacement note after she consulted with an attorney concerning the matter.
The ODC alleges that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.7(a), 1.8(a),
8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In April 2014, the ODC received a complaint from Mr. Walters’ attorney. In
November 2016, Ashton Vidrine filed a complaint with the ODC. In December
2018, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent as set forth above.
Respondent answered the formal charges, essentially denying he engaged in any
misconduct. Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

8

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
as charged, and recommended he be disbarred.
The committee made findings of fact relating to Count I, including those set
forth in the underlying facts section above. The committee also found the following:
1. Respondent’s testimony is clear that deceiving the mortgagees was one of his
reasons for placing the Property into an LLC with the same name as Mr.
Walters, the named debtor on the mortgages. Respondent saw “no problem”
with doing this. He set up Walters LLC, registered it with the Secretary of
State, and recorded the sale of the Property from Mr. Walters to the LLC
which bore his name, but in which Mr. Walters had no ownership,
unbeknownst to him. Regardless of whether respondent’s conduct rose to the
level of fraud, the committe e found he knowingly engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation.
2. In April 2014, Mr. Walters, through his attorney James White, filed a
disciplinary complaint against respondent alleging that respondent had
conditioned rescission of the sale of the Property upon Mr. Walters’
agreement to forgive the debt represented by the debenture. Respondent
denied this claim at the hearing but acknowledged advising Mr. Walters that
he would consider rescinding the sale if Mr. Walters would “just reimburse us
our materials” that respondent and Mr. Mills put into the house. Regardless
of whether respondent conditioned the return of the Property on forgiveness
of the debenture or upon recovering the money he had invested, it is clear and
undisputed that respondent placed a condition of some sort upon returning the
Property to Mr. Walters. Further, it is clear that whether due to inability or

9

unwillingness to repay the debenture when Mr. Walters demanded it,
respondent failed to pay money that was clearly due and owing to Mr. Walters.
3. An attorney-client relationship existed between respondent and Mr. Walters.
Although respondent contended the mere closing of a real estate transaction
does not create such a relationship, the committee noted that pursuant to La.
R.S. 37:212, activities performed in connection with closings are in fact the
“practice of law.” Further, Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Bosworth, 481 So.
2d 567 (La. 1986), holds that the existence of an attorney -client relationship
“turns largely on the client’s subjective belief that it exists.” Here, Mr.
Walters repeatedly testified that he sought respondent’s assistance because he
is an attorney. Although Mr. Walters freely admitted that he did not consider
respondent to be acting as his attorney when respondent borrowed money
from him, he did consider respondent to be doing legal work for him when
respondent had him transfer the Property to an LLC, ostensibly to avoid
liability and to prevent the acceleration of the mortgages on the Pr operty by
invocation of the due on sale clause. In giving this advice and acting to carry
out his recommendation, the committee agreed that respondent became Mr.
Walters’ attorney. Later, when Mr. Walters wanted to unwind the transaction
and requested payment of the debt, respondent’s actions in resisting payment
of the debenture made the debt inextricably intertwined with the Property
scheme, such that these actions were performed in respondent’s role as Mr.
Walters’ attorney.
Based upon these factual findings, the committee determined that
respondent’s conduct in Count I violated Rules 1.7(a), 1.8(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent did not obtain Mr. Walters’
informed consent to the Walters LLC transaction and did not advise him to seek
independent counsel. Respondent also structured the transaction so as to deceive the

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mortgage lenders. Accordingly, he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as
charged.
The committee made findings of fact relating to Count II(a ), including the
following:
1. Respondent knew of the transaction with Ashton Vidrine and that he and Kyle
Vidrine were taking Ashton’s business from him without compensation, and
despite having knowledge that Ashton either did not want to sell his business
or wanted to be compensated for selling the business.
2. Respondent authorized Kyle to sign his name electronically on documents
filed with the Secretary of State’s office.
Based upon these factual findings, the committee determined that
respondent’s conduct in Count II(a) violated Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent’s actions furthered Kyle’s wrongful
attempt to deprive Ashton of his interest in Vidrine Insurance Agency, LLC.
Accordingly, he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee made findings of fact relating to Count II(b), including those
set forth in the underlying facts section above. The committee also found the
following:
1. Respondent did not recommend to Ms. Vidrine that she obtain independent
counsel to review the original hand note. Respondent’s failure to pay Ms.
Vidrine’s mortgage could have led to the foreclosure of her home. The loan
from Ms. Vidrine personally benefitted respondent, as a portion of the money
was being spent to benefit his business operations and those of the LLC he
operated and controlled. Nevertheless, respondent did not advise Ms. Vidrine,
orally or in writing, of his conflict of interest.
2. Respondent was insulated from personal liability on the original note. In
addition, the original note did not include any provision whereby Ms. Vidrine

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was compensated for loaning the money to BREP. Although Ms. Vidrine may
not have wanted to earn interest on the loan, she waived her rights
unknowingly and without receiving unbiased legal counsel about the terms of
the agreement she executed with respondent.
3. The terms of the replacement hand note were more favorable to Ms. Vidrine,
thereby revealing the inequities of the original note. Respondent prepared the
replacement hand note after the filing of formal charges in an effort to
influence a future review of the evidence, and not in an attempt to mitigate
damages to Ms. Vidrine.
4. Ms. Vidrine sought legal counsel from another law firm to review the
replacement hand note.
Based upon these factual findings, the committee determined that
respondent’s conduct in Count II(b) violated Rules 1.7, 1.8(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent did not obtain Ms. Vidrine’s
informed consent to the loan transaction and did not advise her to seek independent
counsel. Respondent also structured the transaction in such a way that he was not
personally obligated to repay the loan and Ms. Vidrine was deprived of fair interest
on the loan. Accordingly, he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee further determined that respondent violated duties owed to his
clients, the public, and the legal profession. His conduct was intentional and
knowing. He caused actual and seri ous harm to Mr. Walters and potential harm to
Ms. Vidrine. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the
committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the committee found the following: a dishonest or selfish
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience
in the practice of law (admitted 1999), and indifference to making restitution. In

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mitigation, the committee acknowledged that respondent has no prior disciplinary
record.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred.
Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board adopted most of the hearing committee’s
factual findings, and agreed with its findings of rule violations. The board agreed
that respondent intentionally and knowingly violated duties owed to his clients, the
public, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm to Mr. Walters,
Ms. Vidrine, and Ashton Vidrine. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline sanction is disbarment. The
board agreed with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the committee.
Like the committee, after further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence
addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended respondent be disbarred.
Respondent filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly,
the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the

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manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
Although the underlying facts of this matter are complex, respondent does not
dispute the allegation that he engaged in dishonest conduct and conduct constituting
a conflict of interest, in violation of Rules 1.7(a), 1.8(a), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, the only issue before us is a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions.
In considering the sanction issue, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings
are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the
integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n
v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173 (La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the
facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of
any aggravating a nd mitigating circumstance s. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v.
Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520 (La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients,
the public, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm to Mr. Walters,
Ms. Vidrine, and Ashton Vidrine. The applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.
The record supports the following aggravating factors: a dishonest or selfish
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victims, and
substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, respondent has no prior
disciplinary record. W e also note that respondent has made substantial efforts to
make Mr. Walters and Ms. Vidrine whole.
Under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that the sanction of
disbarment recommended by the board is too harsh. Accordingly, we will reject the
recommendation and impose a three-year suspension from the practice of law.

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DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the recor d, briefs, and oral argument, it is
ordered that Lane Norwood Bennett, Louisiana Bar Roll number 25982, be and he
hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. All costs
and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from
the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2021-B-01198
I
N RE: LANE NORWOOD BENNETT
At
torney Disciplinary Proceeding
C
richton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
I agree with the per curiam. I write separately to note that the Court’s
departure from the disciplinary board’s recommendation results from several unique
circumstances, including respondent’s lack of prior disciplinary history and his
substantial efforts to make restitution, as highlighted by respondent’s attorney during
argument. See, e.g., La. State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520 (La. 1984)
(discipline imposed in each matter depends upon “the facts and circumstances of
each case”); La. State Bar Ass’n v. Elbert, 512 So. 2d 398 (La. 1987) (“Since each
case is unique, the discipline imposed depends upon the seriousness of the alleged
offense and the circumstances surrounding it.”).

03/25/22