In Re: Arthur L. Harris, Sr.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 17, 2021
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: ARTHUR L. HARRIS, SR.
No. 2021-B-01301
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN RE: Disc
iplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 17, 2021
Permanent disbarment imposed. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and would grant and docket.
Genovese, J., dissents and would impose regular disbarment.
Crain, J., dissents and would impose regular disbarment.
JDH
SJC
JBM
PDG
11/17/2021 "See News Release 045 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
021-B-1301
I
N RE: ARTHUR L. HARRIS, SR.
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
Th
is disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Arthur L. Harris, Sr., an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently suspended from practice.
PRO
CEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2018, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent under
disciplinary board docket number 18-DB -047. In November 2018, the ODC filed
formal charges against respondent under disciplinary board docket number 18-DB-
083. I
n August 2019, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent under
disciplinary board docket number 19-DB-058. Respondent failed to answer all three
sets of formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were
deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3).
The formal charges in 18-DB-047 and 18 -DB-083 were consolidated and
considered by the same hearing committee. The formal charges in 19-DB-058 were
considered by a separate hearing committee. Neither hearing committee held a
formal hearing, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the committees
written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent
filed nothing for either committee’s consideration.
11/17/21

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Before being considered by the disciplinary board, all three matters were
consolidated. The board then filed a recommendation in this court encompassing
the three sets of formal charges.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1971. In 1987,
he received a private reprimand for neglecting a legal matter. In 1997, he received
an admonition for failing to communicate with a client.
In December 2013, we considered a joint petition for consent discipline in
which respondent admitted to neglecting two legal matters, failing to communicate
with his clients, fail ing to promptly refund unearned fees, and failing to cooperate
with the ODC in its investigation. After review, we accepted the petition and
suspended respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully
deferred, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions. In
re: Harris, 13-2368 (La. 12/6/13), 129 So. 3d 526 (“Harris I”).
In October 2016, respondent finally e xecuted a formal probation agreement
with the ODC. In April 2018, the ODC filed with the disciplinary board a motion
and rule to revoke respondent’s probation, alleging he failed to provide his probation
monitor with written reports as required by his probation plan. Additionally, the
ODC indicated that it had received three disciplinary complaints against respondent
during the probationary period, which complaints were later made the subject of the
formal charges in 18-DB-047. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the ODC’s
investigations of these complaints.
Following a hearing before an adjudicative panel of the disciplinary board, the
board determined the evidence demonstrated that respondent failed to comply with
the terms and conditions of his probation. The board further determined that
respondent engaged in additional misconduct during his probation. Based on these

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findings, the board recommended respondent’s probation be revoked and the
deferred one year and one day suspension imposed in Ha rris I be made executory.
We subsequently adopted the board’s recommendation, revoked respondent’s
probation, and made the previously deferred one year and one day suspension
immediately executory. In re: Harris, 18 -0847 (La. 6/15/18), 245 So. 3d 1027
(“Harris II”). Respondent has not yet sought reinstatement from this suspension and
remains suspended from the practice of law.

18-DB-047
FORMAL CHARGES
Count I – The Purvis Matter
In March 2016, Jon Purvis hired respondent to represent him in a criminal
matter. On March 8, 2016, Mr. Purvis signed respondent’s representation
agreement, which improperly provided that “NO PART OF THE FEE WILL BE
REFUNDED TO CLIENT(S).” Mr. Purvis paid respondent a total of $7,500 for the
representation.
According to Mr. P urvis, respondent advised him three months later that he
would be withdrawing from the representation unless Mr. Purvis fired the other two
attorneys on his legal team. In a June 24, 2016 letter to respondent, Mr. Purvis
confirmed the termination of respondent’s services and requested a full refund of the
fee he paid. After receiving no response, Mr. Purvis wrote to respondent again on
July 20, 2016. In this second letter, Mr. Purvis again requested a full refund but also
requested that respondent secure any amount of the fee he disputed as being
unearned in a client trust account. Respondent requested a meeting with Mr. Purvis
to discuss the status of the criminal case and resolution of the ir representation
agreement. However, Mr. Purvis told respondent he did not wish to meet. In a final
letter dated August 23, 2016, Mr. Purvis again requested that respondent provide

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him with a full refund or place the disputed funds in a trust account. Respondent
never responded and never refunded any portion of the fee.
In October 2016, Mr. Purvis filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent.
The ODC sent notice of the complaint to both respondent’s primary and secondary
registration addresses on file with the Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”).
The notice to respondent’s secondary address was returned because respondent had
moved. Respondent failed to respond to the ODC’s notice of the complaint,
necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement. Despite
being personally served with the subpoena, respondent failed to appear for the sworn
statement scheduled for February 7, 2018.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c) (failure to pay bar dues, failure
to pay the disciplinary assessment, failure to timely provide change of address
information, or failure to submit trust account information), 1.5(a) (charging an
unreasonable fee), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 1.16(d) (obligations
upon termination of the representation), 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a
lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to
cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct).

Count II – The Vangure/Barker Matter
Respondent represented Wilford Vangure as trial counsel in a criminal matter.
Mr. Vangure was convicted in 2012. In 2016, Mr. Vangure hired attorney Edward
Marquet to handle his post -conviction relief. Mr. Marquet began efforts to obtain
Mr. Vangure’s client file from respondent, to no avail. On April 26, 2016, Mr.
Marquet filed a motion to issue a subpoena duces tecum seeking Mr. Vangure’s file
from respondent. The judge granted the motion, and respondent was ordered to

5

produce the file on or before June 1, 2016. On June 1, 2016, respondent’s attorney
filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The judge denied the motion and
ordered respondent to produce the file within five days. Respondent failed to comply
with the order.
Attorney Paul Barker then assumed the representation of Mr. Vangure in the
post-conviction relief proceeding. On January 10, 2018, Mr. Barker called
respondent, who requested two weeks to assemble the file. Respondent did not
respond to Mr. Barker’s text message confirmation the next day. On January 24,
2018, Mr. Barker emailed respondent at his LSBA registered email address to
remind him of their agreement. Respondent did not deliver the file but did call Mr.
Barker to advise that the file was forthcoming. On February 14, 2018, after still not
receiving the file from respondent, Mr. Barker filed a motion for contempt of court,
which was set for hearing on April 2, 2018. A citation was issued for respondent’s
appearance; however, respondent was not able to be served because he was not at
the address provided for personal service, which was the same address respondent
had registered with the LSBA as his primary/preferred address.
In January 2018, Mr. Barker filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent.
The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA primary
registration address via certified mail, but this notice was returned to the ODC as
“unable to forward.” In May 2018, the ODC sent the notice via certified mail to
respondent’s last known address, which he had not registered with the LSBA. The
certified mail green card indicated that the notice was received on May 19, 2018.
Nevertheless, respondent failed to respond to the complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c), 1.16(d), 3.4(c) (knowing
disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a),
and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

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Count III – The Pollard Matter
Bernell Pollard hired respondent to represent him in a criminal matter. At the
end of 2017, Mr. Pollard sought a copy of his client file, sending respondent two
written requests. Respondent failed to contact Mr. Pollard or provide him with his
file.
In January 2018, Mr. Pollard filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. Prior to opening a formal complaint, the ODC had its investigator
contact respondent to obta in Mr. Pollard’s file. The investigator made several
attempts to obtain the file from respondent, to no avail. Therefore, the ODC opened
a formal complaint and sent notice of the complaint to respondent at his LSBA
primary registration address via certified and regular mail. Both items were returned
to the ODC as “unable to forward.” The ODC also sent notice of the complaint to
respondent’s last known address, which was not registered with the LSBA. That
notice was not returned to the ODC, indicating r espondent received same.
Nevertheless, respondent failed to respond to the complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

18-DB-083
FORMAL CHARGES
The Ashley Matter
In October 2017, LaMarko Ashley hired respondent to represent him in a
pending criminal matter. Mr. Ashley’s mother paid respondent $3,000 toward the
agreed-upon $5,000 fee.
Respondent failed to appear at the November 17, 2017 arraignment, and the
matter was continued. Respondent also failed to appear at the second arraignment
set for November 20, 2017, and the matter was continued to the next day.

7

Respondent appeared with Mr. Ashley the next day, and Mr. Ashley entered his plea
of not guilty.
Respondent failed to appear at the next setting of January 3, 2018, and the
court issued a subpoena for respondent to appear on January 30, 2018. However,
service of the subpoena was not accomplished. Nevertheless, respo ndent appeared
with Mr. Ashley on January 30, 2018.
Respondent failed to appear on March 8, 2018, and the court again issued a
subpoena for respondent’s appearance on April 3, 2018. Although the subpoena
could not be served, respondent appeared on Apri l 3, 2018 and joined the State in
moving for a continuance. Respondent again failed to appear on May 29, 2018.
The next setting was July 16, 2018, which was after respondent’s probation
was revoked in Harris II. Respondent did not appear, and the trial court advised Mr.
Ashley that respondent would not be able to continue with the representation. When
Mr. Ashley’s mother contacted respondent by telephone, respondent told her that he
would no longer represent Mr. Ashley because his full fee had not been paid and
because he was ill. Respondent did not advise the Ashleys of his suspension imposed
in Harris II. Instead, the Ashleys later learned from another source that respondent
was suspended from the practice of law.
Respondent did not return any portion of the fee Mr. Ashley’s mother paid
him. Because Mr. Ashley did not have the funds to hire new counsel, a public
defender was appointed to represent him.
In August 2018, Mr. Ashley’s mother filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. The ODC sent notice of the complaint via certified mail to respondent’s
LSBA primary registration address, which item was returned to the ODC. The ODC
also sent the notice via certified mail to respondent’s last known address, which was
signed for on September 15, 2018. Respondent failed to respond to the complaint.

8

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a c lient), 1.16(d), 3.2 (failure to make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d).

18-DB-047 & 18-DB-083
HEARING COMMITTEE REPORT
The hearing committee found that the deemed admitted facts, as supplemented
and supporte d by the ODC’s documentary evidence, demonstrate clear and
convincing evidence of respondent’s violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct
as alleged in both sets of formal charges. The committee then determined respondent
knowingly, if not intentiona lly, violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the
legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent’s conduct harmed his clients by
depriving them of their funds when he failed to refund unearned fees, which the
committee determined amounts to co nversion of client funds. Specifically, the
committee determined respondent caused financial harm in the amount of $7,500 to
Mr. Purvis, who has sought relief through the LSBA Client Assistance Fund, and in
the amount of $3,000 to Mr. Ashley. His conduct also harmed Mr. Vangure and Mr.
Pollard when he failed to provide them with their files. Additionally, the committee
determined respondent’s conduct harmed the disciplinary system by forcing the
ODC to use its limited resources to investigate these complaints without his
cooperation. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found the following: a prior disciplinary record,
a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the
rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful

9

nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the
practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. Based on the evidence
presented, the committee determined that no mitigating factors are present.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for three years. The committee also recommended respondent be
ordered to return the client files addressed in the formal charges and account for and
refund unearned fees to his clients or the LSBA Client Assistance Fund, as
applicable.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report.

19-DB-058
FORMAL CHARGES
Count I – The Berry Matter
Aubrey Berry hired respondent to represent him in a criminal matter. Between
September 2017 and November 2018, Mr. Berry’s sister paid respondent a total of
$4,550. During a meeting with Mr. Berry in jail, respondent provided Mr. Berry
with an attorney-client representation agreement, which set forth a $5,000 fixed fee
if Mr. Berry’s matter was resolved before trial. On September 12, 2017, respondent
filed several pre -trial motions on Mr. Berry’s behalf, and he appeared in court on
Mr. Berry’s behalf on October 12, 2017.
On June 15, 2018, respondent’s probation was revoked and he was suspended
from the practice of law pursuant to Harris II . Nevertheless, respondent failed to
inform Mr. Berry of his inability to practice law, and he continued to collect legal
fees from Mr. Berry. In November 2018, after several continuances, the prosecutor
informed Mr. Berry of respondent’s suspension . Because Mr. Berry did not have
the fu nds to hire new counsel, he was appointed a public defender. Mr. Berry

10

requested a refund of the unearned fee, but respondent failed to provide same. Mr.
Berry also has not received a copy of his client file.
In June 2019, Mr. Berry filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent,
stating:
At no time did [respondent] make me aware that he lost
his license. Instead, after he was made aware of this
information in June, he continued to request money and
represent himself as a capable and licensed lawyer… . He
continued to make promises to appear in court and defend
me knowing that he would not be able to. I appeared July
9
th, September 10th, and November 26th after he was aware
he could no longer serve as a licensed attorney. I called
him after I learne d this information and he denied the
validity.

The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent’s LSBA primary registration
address, but the item was returned marked “unable to forward.” The ODC also sent
notice to respondent’s last known address, which is not registered with the LSBA,
and respondent signed for the item on July 12, 2019. Nevertheless, respondent failed
to respond to the complaint.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3, 1.4 (failure to communicate with a
client), 1.5(f)(5), 1.16(a)(1) (a lawyer shall withdraw from a representation if the
representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law), 1.16(c) (a lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or
permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation), 1.16(d), 5.5(a)
(engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 5.5(e)(4) (a suspended lawyer shall
not receive, disburse, or otherwise handle c lient funds), 8.1(b), 8.1(c), 8.4(a), and
8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation).

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Count II – The Hatcher Matter
In June 2016, Rodney Hatcher hired respondent to represent him in a pending
criminal matter. Thereafter, respondent missed several court appearances. On at
least one occasion, a subpoena was issued for respondent to appear.
Mr. Hatcher’s trial court matter concluded with his sentencing as a habitual
offender in August 2017. Since that time, Mr. Hatcher has made numerous attempts
to obtain his client file from respondent. In December 2017 and July 2019, Mr.
Hatcher sent letters to respondent at his LS BA primary registration address. Both
letters were returned to Mr. Hatcher as undeliverable.
Mr. Hatcher tried to challenge his sentence but was unsuccessful. On June
10, 2019, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal denied Mr. Hatcher’s writ
application “on the showing made,” citing certain documentation in respondent’s
client file.
In June 2019, Mr. Hatcher filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent.
The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent’s LSBA primary registration
address, but the item was returned marked “not deliverable as addressed.” The ODC
also sent notice to respondent’s last known address, which is not registered with the
LSBA, and this item was returned to the ODC marked “unclaimed.” Respondent
did not respond to Mr. Hatcher’s complaint and did not provide Mr. Hatcher with
his file.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c), 1.3, 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.1(c),
8.4(a), and 8.4(d).

HEARING COMMITTEE REPORT
The hearing committee found that the deemed admitted facts, as supplemented
and supported by the ODC’s documentary evidence, demonstrate clear and

12

convincing evidence of respondent’s violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Specifically regarding the Berry matter, the committee found that
respondent, while representing Mr. Berry, was suspended from the practice of law
pursuant to Harris II . He then concealed his suspension from Mr. Berry, ignored
Mr. Berry’s legal matter, and continued to collect legal fees from Mr. Berry. The
committee determined respondent’s acts of misrepresenting to Mr. Berry that he was
able to practice law when he was not, continuing to collect legal fees, failing to return
those fees even after his termination, neglecting Mr. Berry’s legal matter, and
blatantly and intentionally disregarding the rule governing the unauthorized practice
of law violated Rules 1.1(c), 1. 3, 1.4, 1.5(f)(5), 1.16(a)(1), 1.6(c), 1.16(d), 5.5(a),
5.5(e)(4), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c). Respondent also failed to cooperate with the ODC’s
investigation of this matter in violation of Rules 8.1(b) and 8.1(c). Specifically
regarding the Hatcher matter, the committee found that respondent missed several
court appearances, ignored a court order to appear on at least one occasion, and failed
to return his client’s file upon his termination as Mr. Hatcher’s attorney, despite
requests to do so. The committee determined respondent’s acts of failing to appear
in court on his client’s behalf, defying a court order, and absconding with his client’s
file violated Rules 1.1(c), 1.3, 1.16(d), 8.1(b), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d).
The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients,
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. He acted intentionally in
certain respects and knowingly, if not intentionally, in other respects. His conduct
caused substantial harm to his clients and the legal profession and also harmed the
disciplinary system. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the committee found the following: a prior disciplinary record,
a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the

13

rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the
practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. Based on the evidence
presented, the committee determined that no mitigating factors are present.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred.
The committee also recommended respondent be ordered to provide Mr. Berry with
an accounting and a refund of any unearned fees.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report.

18-DB-047, 18-DB-083, & 19-DB-058
DISCIPLINARY BOARD RECOMMENDATION
After reviewing the three consolidated matters, the disc iplinary board noted
that the hearing committees made factual findings based on the deemed admitted
facts. The board determined that the committees’ factual findings are not manifestly
erroneous and, thus, adopted same. The board also determined that the committees’
findings regarding rule violations are supported by the deemed admitted facts and
evidence. Regarding each rule violation, the board found the following:
Rule 1.1(c) – Respondent failed to timely update his primary and/or secondary
registration address(es) with the LSBA in the Purvis, Vangure/Barker, Pollard,
Berry, and Hatcher matters.
Rule 1.3 – Respondent neglected his clients’ legal cases by failing to appear
for scheduled court dates in the Ashley, Berry, and Hatcher matters.
Rule 1.4 – Respondent failed to adequately communicate with his client in the
Berry matter when he failed to advise his client of his suspension from the practice
of law imposed in Harris II.

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Rule 1.5(a) – Respondent charged and collected a $7,500 fee in the Purvi s
matter. Respondent then withdrew from the representation before completing the
agreed-upon work and without providing his client with an accounting, which
resulted in him charging his client an unreasonable fee.
Rule 1.5(f)(5) – In the Purvis matter, r espondent’s client requested a refund
of the $7,500 fee. Respondent failed to provide his client with an accounting or a
refund of any portion of the fee despite withdrawing from the representation before
completing the work. In the Berry matter, respondent was paid $4,550 and then was
suspended from the practice of law before completing his client’s legal matter.
Despite the fact that his client requested a refund, respondent failed to provide an
accounting or a refund of any portion of the fee.
Rule 1.16(a)(1) – In the Berry matter, respondent continued to represent his
client after he was suspended from the practice of law.
Rule 1.16(d) – In the Purvis matter, respondent withdrew from the
representation but failed to provide his client with an accoun ting or refund any
portion of the fee. In the Vangure/Barker matter, respondent failed to return his
client’s file despite a court order to do so. In the Pollard matter, respondent failed
to return his client’s file despite requests from his client and the ODC to do so. In
the Ashley matter, respondent failed to inform his client when he was suspended
from the practice of law. In fact, he lied to his client’s mother, claiming the reason
he could not continue with the representation was because he had not been paid the
full fee and because he was ill. He also failed to provide his client with an accounting
or refund of the unearned fee. In the Berry matter, respondent failed to inform his
client of his suspension. When his client finally learned of the suspension and
confronted respondent, respondent claimed it was a misunderstanding and
temporary. Respondent also failed to refund the unearned fee and failed to return

15

his client’s file. Finally, in the Hatcher matter, respondent failed to return his client’s
file when he was suspended.
Rule 3.2 – In the Ashley matter, respondent failed to appear in court on his
client’s behalf on five occasions and, later, failed to inform his client of his
suspension from the practice of law. Respondent’s actions ne edlessly delayed the
case while his client was in jail awaiting trial.
Rule 3.4(c) – In the Vangure/Baker matter, respondent failed to comply with
a court order to produce his client’s file.
Rules 5.5(a) and 5.5(e)(4) – In the Berry matter, respondent misrepresented to
his client that he was able to continue with the representation and collected a fee
from his client on three occasions after he was suspended from the practice of law.
Rules 8.1(b) and 8.1(c) – In the Purvis, Vangure/Barker, Pollard, Ashley, and
Berry matters, respondent failed to respond to the disciplinary complaint after
receiving notice of same. In the Hatcher matter, respondent refused to claim the
certified mail containing notice of the disciplinary complaint despite previously
claiming mail sent to the same address.
In addition to the foregoing misconduct, respondent failed to appear for a
sworn statement in the Purvis matter despite being served with a subpoena. In the
Pollard matter, respondent also failed to contact the ODC to r eschedule his sworn
statement and failed to update his address with the LSBA despite receiving the
ODC’s request to do so.
Rule 8.4(c) – In the Berry matter, respondent misrepresented to his client that
he was able to continue with the representation following his suspension from the
practice of law. He also continued to collect fees from his client after he was
suspended.
Rule 8.4(d) – In the Vangure/Barker matter, respondent failed to comply with
a court order to produce his client’s file. In the Ashley matter, respondent repeatedly

16

failed to appear in court and failed to inform his client of his suspension from the
practice of law, which resulted in the needless delay of his client’s criminal case. In
the Hatcher matter, respondent failed to appear in court and failed to return his
client’s file so his client could pursue post-conviction relief.
Rule 8.4(a) – By violating the Rules of Professional Conduct as detailed
above, respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a).
The board then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the
public, the legal system, and the legal profession. He acted knowingly, if not
intentionally, in certain respects and intentionally in other respects. His conduct
caused substantial harm to his clients and the disciplinary system. After reviewing
the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the board determined the
baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the board found the following: a prior disciplinary record, a
dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the
rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience in the
practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. The board determined that
no mitigating factors are present.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprude nce addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The
board also recommended respondent be ordered to provide Mr. Vangure, Mr.
Pollard, Mr. Berry, and Mr. Hatcher with their client files. Finally, the board
recommended that respondent be ordered to account for and refund any unearned
fees to Mr. Ashley, Mr. Purvis, and Mr. Berry or to the LSBA Client Assistance
Fund, as applicable.

17

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’s
recommendation.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supr eme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations
contained in the formal charges after those cha rges have been deemed admitted.
However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow
from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a
violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts,
additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions
that flow from the admitte d factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01 -3058 (La.
1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.
The records of these three deemed admitted matters support a finding that
respondent failed to timely update his addresses with the LSBA, neglected legal
matters, failed to communicate with a client, failed to account for or refund unearned
fees, failed to provide his clients with their files upon request, failed to comply with
court orders and subpoenas, practiced law after being suspended, engaged in
dishonest conduct, engaged i n conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
and failed to cooperate with the ODC in several investigations. Based on these facts,

18

respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as detailed by the disciplinary
board.
Having found evidenc e of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients,
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing significant harm.
Disbarment is the baseline sanction for his misconduct, and the record s upports the
board’s findings regarding the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, respondent’s conduct falls
under Guideline 8 of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme
Court Rule XIX, Appendix D. Guideline 8 states that permanent disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer, “[f]ollowing notice, engag[es] in the unauthorized practice
of law subsequent to resigning from the Bar Association, or during the period of time
in which the lawyer is suspended from the practice of law or disbarred.” After his
suspension pursuant to Harris II , respondent continued to collect fees from Mr.
Berry and lied to Mr. Berry that he was still able to practice law, all while neglecting
his legal matter and failing to withdraw from the representation or provide Mr. Berry
with a refund of the unearned fees. Mr. Ashley learned from the trial court that
respondent would be unable to continue to represent him. When Mr. Ashley’s
mother contacted respondent, he failed to inform her of his suspension and, instead,

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lied to her that the reason he would not be able to continue the representation was
because his full fee had not been paid and because he was ill.
Case law further supports the imposition of permanent disbarment here. In
the case of In re: Gilbert , 17-0524 (La. 9/22/17), 232 So. 3d 1221, we imposed
permanent disbarment under Guidelines 8 and 9 after finding that a disbarred
attorney neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with a client, failed to
account for or refund an unearned fee, failed to properly withdraw from a
representation, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by appearing in court
following her disbarment, engaged in dishonest conduct, and failed to cooperate with
the ODC in its investigation.
In light of the permanent disbarment guidelines, the relevant case law, and the
numerous aggravating factors present, we find permanent disbarment is the
appropriate sanction in this matter . Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s
recommendation and permanently disbar respondent. We will also order respondent
to provide Mr. Vangure, Mr. Pollard, Mr. Berry, and Mr. Hatcher with their client
files. Finally, we will order respondent to account for and refund any unearned fees
owed to Mr. Ashley, Mr. Purvis, and Mr. Berry or to the LSBA Client Assistance
Fund, as applicable.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Arthur L. Harris,
Sr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 6608, be and he hereby is permanently disbarred.
His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law
in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from be ing
readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that respondent

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shall provide Wilford Vangure, Bernell Pollard, Aubrey Berry, and Rodney Hatcher
with their client files. It is further ordered that respondent shall account for a nd
refund any unearned fees owed to LaMarko Ashley, Jon Purvis, and Ashley Berry
or to the LSBA Client Assistance Fund, as applicable. All costs and expenses in the
matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX,
§ 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this
court’s judgment until paid.