In Re: Robert M. Waterwall

Supreme Court of Louisiana
December 21, 2021
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: ROBERT M. WATERWALL
No. 2021-B-01443
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
December 21, 2021
Suspension imposed. See per curiam.
Crichton, J., dissents and would reject discipline as too lenient.
Genovese, J., dissents and would reject discipline as too lenient.
McCallum, J., dissents and would reject discipline as too lenient.
JLW
JDH
WJC
PDG
12/21/2021 "See News Release 051 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2021-B-1443
IN RE: ROBERT M. WATERWALL
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Robert M. Waterwall , an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently ineligible to practice.
FORMAL CHARGES
Count I
On August 13, 2019, the ODC received information from the Louisiana State
Bar Association (“LSBA”) that respondent had abandoned his law office located in
Ruston, Louisiana. He failed to pay his rent, failed to provide a forwarding address,
and left his client files in his office.
On August 30, 2019, the ODC’s investigator located and spoke with
respondent via telephone. Respondent informed the investigator that he was staying
with friends in Gretna, Louisiana but would return to his office in Ruston aro und
September 7, 2019. He further indicated that, at that time, he would make
arrangements to recover his client files. Nevertheless, he failed to do so. On June
15, 2020, the ODC’s investigator went to respondent’s office in Ruston, met with
the property manager, and verified that respondent had left client files, including
medical records, in the office.
In October 2019, the ODC opened a formal complaint against respondent.
Between October 28, 2019 and May 14, 2020, the ODC mailed notice of the
12/21/21

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complaint to respondent via certified mail and regular mail to three addresses he had
registered with the LSBA. All three notices were returned to the ODC as unclaimed
or undeliverable. On May 13, 2020, the ODC sent respondent an email to three
separate email addresses, one of which respondent had registered with the LSBA.
Respondent did not respond to any of the emails. Finally, on May 15, 2020, the
ODC mailed respondent notice of the complaint via regular mail to the address in
Gretna he had previously provided to the ODC’s investigator. This notice was not
returned to the ODC, indicating receipt. Nevertheless, respondent did not respond
to the complaint.
The ODC then issued a subpoena for respondent to provide a sworn statement
on August 13, 2020. The ODC’s investigator was unable to locate respondent to
personally serve him with the subpoena. Therefore, the ODC sent the subpoena to
the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office for service. The sheriff’s office tried five times
to serve respondent at the Gretna address but was unsuccessful.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c) (failure to pay bar dues, failure
to pay the disciplinary assessment, failure to timely provide change of address
information, or failure to submit trust account information), 1.6 (confidentiality of
information), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation), and 8.1(c)
(failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Count II
Respondent has been ineligible to practice law since September 16, 2019 for
failing to pay his bar dues, failing to pay the disciplinary assessment, and for failing
to submit his trust account disclosure statement. As of Ju ne 1, 2020, respondent is
also ineligible for failing to comply with mandatory continuing legal education
requirements.

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On October 17, 2019, the Pandit Law Firm, LLC hired respondent as an
independent contractor to prepare and defend plaintiff’s depositions for cases Pandit
was litigating in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.
Respondent has never been admitted to practice law in the Middle District. The
original contract ended on December 31, 2019 but was extended thr ough February
7, 2020. During his time working for Pandit, respondent participated in
approximately fourteen depositions in nine separate civil cases.
On January 31, 2020, attorney John Carter of Pandit learned that respondent
had been ineligible to practice law since September 16, 2019. Mr. Carter attempted
to contact respondent via telephone but received no response. Mr. Carter then
terminated respondent’s contract via email that same day but, again, received no
response.
In February 2020, Mr. Carter filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. Between March 3, 2020 and April 24, 2020, the ODC sent respondent
notice of the complaint via certified mail to two addresses respondent had registered
with the LSBA. Both notices were returned to the OD C. The ODC then issued a
subpoena for respondent to provide a sworn statement on August 13, 2020. The
ODC’s investigator was unable to locate respondent to personally serve him with the
subpoena. Therefore, the ODC sent the subpoena to the Jefferson Par ish Sheriff’s
Office for service. The sheriff’s office tried five times to serve respondent at an
address in Gretna, Louisiana he had previously provided to the ODC. However, the
sheriff’s office was unsuccessful.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c), 5.5 (engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law), 8.1(c), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct),
8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, f raud, deceit, or

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misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In November 2020, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent as set
forth above. Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the
factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and
convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal
hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportu nity to file with the hearing
committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.
Respondent filed nothing for the committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing
committee made factual findings consistent with the deemed admitted factual
allegations set forth in the formal charges. Based on those facts, the committee
determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the
formal charges.
The committee then determined respondent knowingly and intentionally
violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and the legal system. In Count I,
respondent caused actual harm to his clients in that he failed to take reasonable steps
to protect thei r interests and violated their confidentiality by abandoning and
refusing to retrieve their client files. In Count II, respondent caused actual and
potential harm to Pandit, Pandit’s clients, and the legal system when he accepted
money from Pandit in exch ange for providing legal services knowing that he was
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the baseline sanction is

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suspension. In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, a
pattern of misconduct, and multiple offenses. The committee determined that no
mitigating factors are present.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee r ecommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and one day. The committee also recommended
respondent be ordered to make restitution to his clients.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s
report. Therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G), the disciplinary
board submitted the committee’s report to the court for review.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations
contained in the formal c harges after those charges have
been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass
legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegatio ns. If the legal conclusion the
ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from
the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order
to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In
re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La. 1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.

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The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent
practiced law while ineligible to do so and abandoned his law practice and client
files. This conduct amounts to a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as
alleged in the formal charges.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis , 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to his clients,
the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent’s conduct caused actual harm
and the potential to cause significant harm. Therefore, the baseline sanction in this
matter is suspension.
Aggravating factors include a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of
misconduct, multiple offenses, and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or order s of the
disciplinary agency. The sole mitigating factor present is the absence of a prior
disciplinary record.
Case law further supports the imposition of a suspension. Regarding
respondent’s unauthorized practice of law while ineligible, we find In re: Gbalazeh,
17-1704 (La. 12/5/17), 231 So. 3d 21, to be instructive. In Gbalazeh, an attorney
practiced law after being declared ineligible to do so. She then failed to cooperate
with the ODC’s investigation. For this misconduct, we suspended the attorney from

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the practice of law for one year and one day. Regarding respondent’s abandonment
of his law practice, we find In re: Gaharan, 08-2829 (La. 4/2/09), 6 So. 3d 745, to
be instructive. In Gaharan, an attorney abandoned his law practice, which harmed
at least one client, and then failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation. For
this misconduct, we suspended the attorney from the practice of law for one year and
one day.
Under these circumstances, we will accept the committee’s recommendation
and suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing co mmittee,
and considering the record, it is ordered that Robert M. Waterwall, Louisiana Bar
Roll number 35370, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one
year and one day . All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against
respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest
to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.