In Re: Matthew John Ungarino

Supreme Court of Louisiana
January 19, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: MATTHEW JOHN UNGARINO
No. 2021-B-01455
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Office of Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and
Recommendations (Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
January 19, 2022
Discipline imposed. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., would accept the recommendation of the Disciplinary Board.
WJC
JLW
SJC
JTG
JBM
PDG
01/19/2022 "See News Release 003 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2021
-B-1455
I
N RE: MATTHEW JOHN UNGARINO
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
T his disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Matthew John Ungarino, a n
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
B
ACKGROUND INFORMATION
By way of background, respondent and his law firm, Ungarino & Eckert, LLC
(“U&E”), represented one of the defendants in a Louisiana case that U&E removed
to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (hereinafter
referred to as “Hollier” or “the Hollier case”). Hollier was assigned to United States
District Judge Tucker Melancon.
On February 3, 2009, Judge Melancon ordered the Hollier case remanded to
state court. Judge Melancon then commented that he was not surprised by U&E’s
tactics in Hollier because the Hollier case “is but one in a long line of fraudulent and
improper removals that Ungarino & Eckert, and more specifically Matthew
Ungarino, have filed in this and other districts.” Citing more than 20 separate cases
involving improper removals by respondent and U&E, Judge Melancon declared ,
“[e]nough is enough.” Judge Melancon then found that, “[a]s warnings and lesser
sanctions in the past have failed to deter the firm of Ungarino & Eckert from its
vexatious practices, the Court is left to consider whether a more major sanction is
necessary to achieve the desired result.” Accordingly, h e granted the Hollier
01/19/22

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plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and set a
rule to show cause why the court: (1) should not impose sanctions of at least $25,000
against U&E, and (2) should not recommend to the District Judges of the Western
District of Louisiana that U&E be barred from practicing in the Western District.
Judge Melancon held the show cause hearing on May 1, 2009. During the
hearing, respondent apologized to Judge Melancon for the improper removal of the
Hollier case and accepted the $25,000 sanction. Respondent also informed Judge
Melancon that U&E had retained Professors Dane Ciolino and Mary Algero to
provide U&E’s attorneys with additional education and training on legal ethics and
removal procedures. Finally, respondent informed Judge Melancon that U&E had
established “a professional responsibility committee of equity partners who
coordinate in-house ethics and removal training, review the form and content of all
notices of removal and opposition to remand, and otherwise serve as a ready resource
for ethics and removal issues” (hereinafter referred to as “the U&E committee”). At
the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Melanco n found that respondent failed to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts supporting removal of the Hollier case to
federal court. However, based upon respondent’s assurances that he had brought his
firm “up to snuff” by creating the U&E committee, Judge Melancon declined to bar
U&E from practicing in the Western District of Louisiana.
On April 6, 2011, the disciplinary board admonished respondent for violating
Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 3.1
(meritorious claims and contentions), 5.1 (failure to reasonably supervise the work
of a subordinate lawyer), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to his
conduct in Hollier.

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UNDERLYING FACTS
In 2016, Michelle Nogess filed a wrongful death and survival action in the
Orleans Parish Civil District Court, naming several defendants. Through their
counsel, the defendants answered the plaintiff’s petition. Thereafter, the plaintiff
added Velocity Con sulting, Inc. (“Velocity”) as a defendant by an amended state
court petition, and Velocity was served on September 13, 2016. Velocity retained
respondent and U&E to defend its interests.
On October 5, 2016 , Velocity removed the plaintiff’s action to the U nited
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The case was assigned to
Judge Jay Zainey and Magistrate Judge Michael North. In its notice of removal,
Velocity alleged complete diversity between the plaintiff and the defendants. The
plaintiff then moved to remand, pointing out that Velocity failed to allege the
citizenship of the individual members of Poydras Center, LLC (“Poydras”), one of
its co-defendants, as required by Fifth Circuit precedent. See Harvey v. Grey Wolf
Drilling, 542 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir. 2008). Velocity, in turn, filed a motion for leave to
file an amended notice of removal , which correctly set forth the citizenship of the
members of Poydras.
The plaintiff opposed Velocity’s motion for leave to amend, and the
magistrate judge set the matter for hearing on December 21, 2016. The magistrate
judge also ordered respondent to personally attend the hearing because he had signed
Velocity’s pleadings. Respondent requested that he be excused from attending the
hearing becau se he had “no personal knowledge of the citizenship of the co-
defendants’ clients,” and his law partner, attorney David Bordelon, had solicited the
information on the citizenship of the co-defendants from their counsel. The
magistrate judge declined to excuse respondent, and he and Mr. Bordelon both
attended the December 21, 2016 hearing.

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Based on the history of faulty removals by respondent and U&E as set forth
by Judge Melancon in the Hollier case, as well as several inconsistent statements by
respondent at the December 21, 2016 hearing (dealing with the issue of respondent’s
efforts to obtain jurisdictional facts related to members of Poydras, which are
explained in more detail below ), the magistrate judge became concerned that
respondent had made misrepresentations to the court. Therefore, at the end of the
hearing, the magistrate judge set another hearing, ordering Velocity and its counsel
to show cause why they should not be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), 28
U.S.C. § 1927, and/or Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for filing the
deficient notice of removal. The magistrate judge also ordered U&E and counsel
for Poydras to produce for in camera inspection certain emails that were exchanged
between them in connection with the drafting of the notice of removal, “including
all efforts to ascertain jurisdictional facts pertaining to the members of each LLC.”
Upon being told in open court that the rule to show cause would be set, respondent
repeatedly stated that he believed it was “unfair” for the court to issue the rule before
reviewing the emails. The magistrate judge disagreed.
Later in the day on December 21, 2016, before the rule to show cause was
entered into the record by the clerk’s office, respondent telephoned the chambers of
Judge Zainey and spoke with Judge Zainey’s law clerk regarding the impending rule
to show cause . The law clerk responded by sending an email to respondent, all
counsel in the case, and the magistrate judge advising respondent of the proper
procedure for objecting to the issuance of the rule to show cause, stating:
In response to your phone call today, I am informing you
that the proper procedure of this court is for Judge North
to first issue a ruling on the Rule to Show Cause on the
Rule 11 motion. Then, should you disagree with Judge
North’s ruling, you may appeal to Judge Zainey. A t this
point in the process, however, it would be premature for
Judge Zainey to intervene.

Shortly thereafter, respondent “replied all” to that email, stating:

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I am requesting a status conference before a rule to show
cause is issued. The emails with [codefendant’s attorneys]
indicate that we requested that [codefendant’s] counsel on
October 4 confirm the domicile of defendants.
[Codefendant’s] counsel signed the consent to remove
subsequent to that email, and the removal was filed. This
is unfair. The emails should be reviewed before a rule to
[show] cause is issued.

Despite respondent’s efforts to have Judge Zainey intervene, t he magistrate
judge held the show cause hear ing on January 18, 2017. On January 27, 2017, the
magistrate judge issued an Order and Reasons with respect to the show cause
hearing, focusing on three issues.
Issue One – Whether respondent misrepresented material facts regarding the
timing of U&E’s investigation of the identities and citizenship of Poydras’ members.
During the December 21, 2016 hearing, the magistrate judge verified that
U&E still utilizes the U&E committee to review all notices of removal prior to filing.
Respondent then identified himself, Mr. Bordelon, and two additional equity
partners at U&E as the four members of the U&E committee, and he verified that
the U&E committee reviewed Velocity’s notice of removal before it was filed.
When the magistrate judge asked respondent whether t he U&E committee realized
that the citizenship of Poydras’ members was missing, respondent stated, “No. I had
no knowledge as to any LLC or memberships – members that were missing.”
However, respondent also indicated that the members of the U&E committee knew
Fifth Circuit precedent holds that an LLC’s citizenship for diversity purposes is
determined by the citizenship of all of its members. When the magistrate judge
asked respondent why U&E removed the case without including this information for
Poydras’ members, respondent first stated that U&E asked for the information from
Poydras’ counsel “way in advance” but was not getting the information. Respondent
then stated, “Well, frankly, Judge, we were unaware that the LLC membership was
a problem.”

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Based on these conflicting statements, the magistrate judge set the show cause
hearing and requested that U&E and Poydras’ counsel submit all relevant emails for
in camera inspection. The magistrate judge’s inspection of the emails revealed that
U&E did not request the citizenship information on Poydras’ members until
November 7, 2016, four days after the plaintiff filed her motion to remand.
Respondent, Mr. Bordelon, and U&E obtained counsel to represent them at
the show cause hearing, and their counsel filed a brief in advance of the hearing.
Twice, the brief indicated that all four members of the U&E committee knew of the
Fifth Circuit precedent regarding LLC member citizenship, just as respondent had
stated at the December 21, 2016 hearing. Nevertheless, during the show cause
hearing U&E’s counsel stated that Mr. Bordelon did not know the “specificity”
required by the Fifth Circuit.
The brief also claimed that respondent did not state during the December 21,
2016 hearing that he had requested citizenship inf ormation of Poydras’ members
prior to filing the notice of removal. However, during the show cause hearing,
U&E’s counsel conceded that respondent had made the statement but only because
he “misspoke and misunderstood the facts at the time…” At the end of the hearing,
however, respondent refuted his counsel’s explanation. Instead, respondent
indicated it was not clear to him during the December 21, 2016 hearing that the
magistrate judge wanted to know if U&E had asked Poydras’ counsel about Poydras’
member information before filing the notice of removal. Therefore, according to
respondent, the magistrate judge had misunderstood what he had been trying to
explain at the December 21, 2016 hearing. The magistrate judge specifically found
that “that is not what happened [during the December 21, 2016 hearing].”
Given these circumstances, the magistrate judge determined respondent
“knowingly misrepresented” the facts regarding the timing of U&E’s investigation
of the identities and citizenship of Poydras’ members.

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Issue Two – Whether respondent engaged in an ex parte communication with
Judge Zainey’s chambers in an attempt to prevent or delay the issuance of the show
cause order.
Based on the emails exchanged between Judge Zainey’s law clerk and
respondent, the magistrate judge determined the ex parte communication was
improper. More specifically, the magistrate judge found that the emails depicted an
attempt by respondent to have Judge Zainey “intervene to prevent or delay the
issuance” of the rule to show cause.
Issue Three – Whether respondent misrepresented the purpose and content of
the ex parte communication with Judge Zainey’s chambers.
In the brief filed ahead of the show cause hearing, respondent’s counsel stated
that respondent did not contact Judge Zainey’s chambers until after the magistrate
judge had issued the rule to show cause. However, the magistrate judge found this
not to be true based on the emails exchanged between Judge Zainey’s law clerk and
respondent, elaborating that the reason respondent contacted Judge Zainey’s
chambers was to try to prevent the magistrate judge from issuing the rule to show
cause. During the show ca use hearing, respondent conceded that the brief was
incorrect about the timing of the ex parte communication.
The brief also stated that respondent did not discuss the issuance of the rule to
show cause with Judge Zainey’s law clerk, which also contradicte d the emails.
During the hearing, when the magistrate judge asked respondent if he had discussed
the issuance of the rule to show cause with the law clerk, respondent stated, “Judge,
honestly I don’t remember.” Later, respondent told the magistrate judge that he did
discuss the rule to show cause with the law clerk but could not remember if he talked
to the law clerk about having Judge Zainey intervene to stop the issuance of the rule
to show cause. The magistrate judge concluded that, “[t]o describe [re spondent’s]

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responses to this Court’s rather direct questions as ‘evasive’ would be far too
generous.”
Given these circumstances, the magistrate judge found that respondent
“compounded his ethical lapse” of engaging in an improper ex parte communication
“by grossly mischaracterizing the contents of that conversation in brief and then by
evading the truth when questioned directly about the matter at the show cause
hearing.” The magistrate judge further found that respondent’s denial that the
purpose of the ex parte communication was to try to get Judge Zainey to intervene
in the matter “is not to be believed.”
Based on these findings and reasons, the magistrate judge determined that
U&E violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to conduct
a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances prior to removing the case to federal
court, which the magistrate judge found to be “objectively unreasonable” in light of
U&E’s “lengthy history of improvident removals.” U&E was ordered to pay a
sanction of $4,500 to the clerk of court, which it promptly paid. The magistrate
judge further determined respondent’s conduct in the matter established that he
violated “one or more” of the following provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct: Rules 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), 3.4 (fairness to opposing parties
and counsel), 3.5 (engaging in ex parte communications), and 8.4 (misconduct).
In his January 27, 2017 Order and Reasons, the magistrate judge also finally
ruled on Velocity’s motion for leave to file an amended notice of removal, which
correctly detailed the citizenship of the members of Poydras. In granting Velocity
leave to file the amended notice, the magistrate judge cautioned Velocity that no
additional amendments would be allowed.
1

1 On April 21, 2017, Judge Zainey denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand. On June 13, 2018,
Judge Zainey dismissed Velocity with prejudice from the litigation through summary judgment.

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On January 30, 2017, the magistrate judge referred respondent to the Eastern
District of Louisiana Lawyers’ Disciplinary Enforcement Committee for further
investigation, proceedings, and discipline, if warranted, concerning his knowing
misstatements at th e December 21, 2016 hearing, his improper ex parte
communication with Judge Zainey’s chambers, and his misstatements concerning
the ex parte communication. In his complaint, the magistrate judge indicated that,
for the reasons set forth in his January 27, 2017 Order and Reasons, he believed
respondent had violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct: Rules 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct),
8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, frau d, deceit, or
misrepresentation), and 8.4(d).
On July 11, 2018, without setting forth any factual findings or determinations
of rule violations, Chief Judge Nanette Jolivette Brown of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana issued an order suspending respondent
from the practice of law before the United States District Court in the Eastern District
of Louisiana for one year, deferred in its entirety, and requiring respondent to take
ten hours of ethics and professionalism training over the next two years. Previously
on July 5, 2018, respondent had consented to this discipline.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In February 2020, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that his conduct as set forth above violated Rules 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 8.4 of the Rules
of Professional Conduct. Respondent, through counsel, answered the formal
charges, essentially denying any misconduct. Accordingly, the matter proceeded to
a formal hearing on the merits.

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Formal Hearing
Respondent was the only witness to testify at the hearing. In his testimony,
respondent indicated the members of the U&E committee knew that the citizenship
of the members of Poydras had to be considered; however, none of them knew the
member information had to be listed in the notice of removal. He could not
remember ever having an LLC party in any of the removals he filed before the
Velocity case. He also stated that he did not understand how his answers at the
December 21, 2016 hearing were misleading.
Regarding the ex parte communication, respondent denied contacting Judge
Zainey’s law clerk because he did not want the rule to show cause to be issued by
the magistrate judge. Instead, he thought a status conference before the rule to show
cause would help everyone understand the sequence of events and, perhaps, prevent
the need for the rule to show cause. He could not understand why his communication
with Judge Zainey’s law clerk was a problem for the magistrate judge.
Finally, respondent claimed that, after the magistrate judge issued his Order
and Reasons, the majority of U&E’s clients fired the firm, causing the majority of
U&E’s attorneys to leave the firm. He claimed the fallout was devastating to his
wife and children. However, respondent also indicated that he apologized numerous
times to the magistrate judge and expressed his remorse.

Hearing Committee Report
The hearing committee issued a report which made no factual findings or
determinations of rule violations, reasoning that such was unnecessary in light of the
findings of the federal court.
2 The committee also declined to recommend

2 In declining to make any findings, the committee stated it was “ unnecessary … to parrot the
findings of the Federal Court.” However, as discussed in the underlying facts sec tion above, the
Eastern District of Louisiana’s disciplinary case against respondent does not detail any factual
findings or determinations of rule violations.

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“additional” sanctions for respondent’s conduct, but concluded that a fully deferred
one-month suspension was appropriate “to the extent that such prior findings warrant
any imposition of discipline” by this court.
The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board adopted the findings of fact detailed in
the magistrate judge’s January 27, 2017 Order and Reasons, which facts the board
determined are supported by the record and were proven by the ODC by clear and
convincing evidence. Based on those facts, the board determined respondent
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as follows:
Rule 3.3 – The record shows that r espondent made false statements to the
magistrate judge during the December 21, 2016 hearing about why he did not
properly include information identifying the members of Poydras and their
citizenship in the ori ginal notice of removal. Respondent falsely attributed his
failure to include this information to a lack of cooperation from Poydras’ counsel.
However, the emails reviewed by the magistrate judge show that Poydras’ counsel
was not asked for Poydras’ member/citizenship information until November 7, 2016,
which was after the filing of the original notice of removal and the plaintiff’s motion
to remand.
Then at the January 18, 2017 show cause hearing, respondent denied ever
telling the magistrate judge at the December 21, 2016 hearing that he had asked
Poydras’ counsel for the member/citizenship information before filing the notice of
removal. Respondent claimed that his statements during the December 21, 2016
hearing were mistakes based upon his misunderstanding of the magistrate judge’s
inquiry. However, both the magistrate judge and the board found respondent’s claim
to lack credibility because the entire purpose of the December 21, 2016 hearing was

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to discuss the information missing from the original notice of removal, and the only
information that was missing was Poydras’ member/citizenship information. The
board also agreed with the magistrate judge that respondent knowingly attempted to
mislead the magistrate judge during the December 21, 2016 hearing.
To summarize, the board found that the emails between respondent and
Poydras’ counsel, along with respondent’s admissions during the January 18, 2017
show cause hearing, indicate he knowingly made false statements at the December
21, 2016 hearing, in violation of Rule 3.3.
Rule 3.4 – By contacting Judge Zainey’s law clerk and seeking to have Judge
Zainey intervene before the rule to show cause was issued, respondent disobeyed his
obligation under the local rules of the Eastern District of Louisiana. Respondent
should have waited until the magistrate judge had held the show cause hearing and
issued his Order and Reasons before filing a motion or objection for Judge Zainey’s
consideration. Instead, respondent improperly sought to prevent the magistrate
judge from holding the show cause hearing and deciding the sanction issues, in
violation of Rule 3.4.
Rule 3.5 – Respondent’s ex parte communication with Judge Zainey’s law
clerk was clearly an attempt to address the merits of the magistrate judge’s rule to
show cause and have Judge Zainey intervene. The purpose of the communication
was to have Judge Zainey conduct a status conference on the issue of whet her the
rule to show cause should be ordered by the magistrate judge. It is highly unlikely
that the law clerk would have told respondent that it was premature for Judge Zainey
to intervene if respondent had not requested that Judge Zainey do so and if he had
not addressed the substance of the rule to show cause. Based on this reasoning, the
board determined respondent violated Rule 3.5.
Rule 8.4 – Respondent’s misleading statements during the December 21, 2016
hearing violated Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). H is ex parte communication with Judge

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Zainey’s law clerk also violated Rule 8.4(d). Finally, by violating these provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a).
The board then determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to the
legal system. His conduct caused actual harm in the form of additional time and
resources expended by the parties. His conduct also caused potential harm to the
integrity of the legal system and the administration of justice. Relying on the ABA’s
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the board determined the baseline
sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the board found a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest or
selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience in the practice of
law (admitted 1985). The sole mitigating factor found by the board was the
imposition of other penalties or sanctions.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to respondent’s attendance at
the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School. The board also recommended
that any misconduct by respondent during the deferra l period may be grounds for
making the deferred suspension executory or for imposing additional discipline, as
appropriate.
Although neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’ s
recommendation, on December 15, 2021, we ordered briefing addressing the issue
of an appropriate sanction. Both parties filed briefs in response to the court’s order.
3

3 Respondent also filed a motion for oral argument. Finding no benefit to oral argument in this
matter, we deny the motion.

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DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93 -2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.
The record supports a finding that respondent filed a defective notice of
removal, misled the magistra te judge regarding the issue during the December 21,
2016 hearing, engaged in an ex parte communication with Judge Zainey’s law clerk
in an attempt to prevent or delay the show cause hearing, and then lied to the
magistrate judge about the true intent of the ex parte communication. Based on these
findings, respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as detailed by the
disciplinary board. The record also reflects that respondent additionally violated
Rules 3.3 and 8.4(c) by lying about the true intent of the ex parte communication he
engaged in with Judge Zainey’s law clerk. The email exchange between respondent
and the law clerk clearly proves that respondent’s intent was to delay or prevent the
show cause hearing. Therefore, respondent’s claims to the contrary were attempts
to mislead the magistrate judge, in violation of Rules 3.3 and 8.4(c).
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173

15

(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client, the legal system,
and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual and potential harm. The baseline
sanction here is suspension. Aggravating factors include a prior disciplinary record
(for the same misconduct at issue in this matter), a dishonest or selfish motive, a
pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature
of the conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law. We agree with the
board that the sole mitigating factor present is the imposition of other penalties or
sanctions.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we must reject any suggestion
that respondent’s conduct warrants a fully deferred suspension. Respondent has a
long history of filing improper removals, as two judicial officers in separate federal
district courts have observed. Moreover, warnings and monetary sanctions have not
deterred respondent from continuing to engage in this misconduct. Therefore, we
find that an actual period of suspension is necessary to impress upon respondent the
importance of taking seriously his obligations as an officer of the court and to ensure
his compliance in the future.
Based on this reasoning, we will impose a suspension of one year and one
day, with all but forty-five days deferred, followed by a one-year period of probation.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record and the briefs filed by the parties,
it is ordered that Matthew John Ungarino, Louisiana Bar Roll number 15061, be and

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he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day.
It is further ordered that all but forty-five days of this suspension shall be deferred.
Following the active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on
unsupervised probation for a period of one year . The probationary period shall
commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan.
Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any
misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred
portion of the suspens ion executory, or imposing additional discipline, as
appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence
thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.