In Re: Michael D. Cox

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #023
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of May, 2022 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2021-B-01487 IN RE: MICHAEL D. COX
DISBARMENT IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
021-B-1487
I
N RE: MICHAEL D. COX
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Michael D. Cox, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension for threat
of harm to the public. In re: Cox, 18-0059 (La. 1/24/18), 234 So. 3d 887.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
Count I
Respondent represented Andrew Davisson in a divorce and custody case.
Leigh Ann O’Brien, a licensed clinical social worker, was appointed by the trial
court to evaluate the parents and their son and advise the court in the custody case.
In January 2011, respondent filed a defamation lawsuit against Ms. O’Brien
on Andrew’s behalf, claiming that she defamed Andrew in her communications and
recommendations to the trial court. In December 2011, the trial court granted Ms.
O’Brien’s motion for summary judgment. Respondent filed an appeal with the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal, which affirmed the ruling. In its August 8, 2012
opinion, the Second Circuit stated:
This appeal is indeed frivolous and has certainly been
handled in an unprofession al and unduly confrontational
manner. Andrew and his attorney have made this
litigation painful and venomous. The residual scorched-
earth aftermath has done nothing constructive.

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We cannot ignore the reprehensible tactics and conduct of
Andrew’s attorney in these proceedings. This was a
frivolous and hurtful appeal. Accordingly, we assess
$2,500 in attorney fees, and all costs, in solido , against
Andrew and his lawyer.

In September 2012, respondent filed a petition for action of nullity, requesting
that the trial court annul the Second Circuit’s award of attorney’s fees in the
Davisson v. O’Brien case. Respondent alleged the Second Circuit did not have
subject matter or personal jurisdiction to sanction him because he was not a party to
the Davisson v. O’Brien litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment in Ms.
O’Brien’s favor and dismissed respondent’s nullity action. Respondent filed a notice
of appeal. However, he did not timely pay the costs of the appeal, and the appeal
was dismissed in June 2013.
In July 2013, respondent filed a second petition for action of nullity, again
requesting that the trial court annul the Second Circuit’s award of attorney’s fees
against him in Davisson v. O’Brien . Respondent again argued that the Second
Circuit did not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction over him because he was
not a party to Davisson v. O’Brien. In August 2013, Ms. O’Brien filed an exception
of res judicata. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the exception of res
judicata and dismissed respondent’s second nullity action. In a November 18, 2013
judgment, the trial court also sanctioned respondent $2,500 for “filing an Action of
Nullity for an improper purpose and/or asserting an Action of Nullity which is not
warranted by existing law.”
Respondent appealed the November 18, 2013 judgment. Although the Second
Circuit held that the trial court erred in maintaining the exception of res judicata, it
also held that respo ndent failed to state a cause of action. Therefore, t he Second
Circuit dismissed respondent’s appeal. The Second Circuit also found the appeal to
be frivolous, concluding that respondent’s actions continued to force Ms. O’Brien

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and her attorney into court for an issue that should have been resolved in 2012. The
Second Circuit awarded an additional $1,000 in attorney’s fees against respondent.
When respondent failed to pay the monetary sanctions, totaling approximately
$6,000, Ms. O’Brien filed a motion for contempt. Respondent was held in contempt
and jailed. After spending approximately six hours in jail, respondent paid $3,000
in sanctions. In February 2015, he paid the remaining $3,000.

Count II
On July 7, 1997, respondent pleaded guilty to the felony charge of obtaining
a controlled substance by fraud.1 He was sentenced to serve three years at hard labor,
suspended, and placed on probation for five years. One condition of respondent’s
probation required him to refrain from practicing law for one year and to notify “the
bar” regarding this voluntary surrender of his law license. However, respondent did
not notify the ODC about the criminal matter , and the ODC did not become aware
of his guilty plea until 2015.

Count III
In August 2015, the ODC received information that respondent routinely
notarized documents even though he has never been commissioned as a notary
public in the State of Louisiana. Respondent acknowledged this fact and contended
he made an honest mistake. He stated that he believed he was a licensed notary by
virtue of the fact that he was an attorney and that he notarized documents for many
years.

1 On July 26, 1995, respondent posed as a Shreveport doctor and phoned in a prescription for 15
Lorcet pills to a Shreveport pharmacy. The pharmacist contacted the police, who were waiting
outside the pharmacy when respondent and his accomplice picked up t he prescription. When
respondent and his accomplice drove off, the police stopped them, located the Lorcet pills in their
possession, and arrested them.

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Between September 16, 2013 and May 23, 2016, the Bossier City District
Attorney’s office charged respondent with sixteen counts of unlawful exercise of
notarial powers. On March 6, 2018, respondent was tried and convicted of three
counts of unlawful exercise of notarial powers. The judge sentenced respondent to
serve two years in prison on each count, suspended, to run consecutively. The judge
placed respondent on two year s of active probation on each count, to run
concurrently, and fined him $500 on each count. Finally, the judge ordered the
transfer of respondent’s $160,000 cash bond to the district attorney’s office for the
payment of restitution to Jordon Davisson (see Count IV) in the amount of $150,000
and the payment of the remaining $10,000 to the district attorney for the cost of
prosecution.

Count IV
Respondent and his wife, Sharon Cox, became acquainted with Andrew
Davisson through Andrew’s mother, Benny Davisson. R espondent represented
Benny in numerous legal matters until her death on February 28, 2012. In the days
and weeks after Benny’s death, respondent assisted Andrew with the probate of the
wills of his mother and his maternal grandparents. Respondent also r epresented
Andrew in several other legal matters.
On March 7, 2012, only eight days after his mother’s death, Andrew went to
respondent’s home and executed an olographic will, leaving all of his possessions to
respondent’s wife and disinheriting his only heir, his son Jordon Davisson, who was
a minor at the time. Respondent notarized this will on Andrew’s behalf.
On February 16, 2014, Andrew passed away. On February 28, 2014,
respondent’s wife filed a petition to open Andrew’s succession and to proba te his
will. The record of the proceedings noted that the petition was originally filed by
respondent, as his wife’s attorney. However, the court issued an order on May 12,

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2014 disqualifying respondent from serving as his wife’s counsel after Andrew’s
former spouse contested the succession on behalf of their minor son, Jordon.
After a trial on the merits, Judge Jeff Cox (no relation to respondent) ruled
that the olographic will executed by Andrew in March 2012 was the product of
undue influence by respondent and/or respondent’s wife. Judge Cox also found that
Andrew lacked the mental or physical capacity to execute the will. Judge Cox stated
that respondent either “constructively or actually drafted [Andrew’s] olographic
will, an inapposite act in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
in Louisiana.” Judge Cox also noticed that respondent was never licensed as a notary
in this state, which affected the transfer of two pieces of immovable property.
Judge Cox ultimately declared Andrew’s olographic will to be null and void
and held that Jordon Davisson was a forced heir and entitled to receive the entirety
of Andrew’s estate. Judge Cox further found that the cash sale and deeds by which
respondent’s wife allegedly purchased two homes from Andrew for a total of $200
were null and void.
Following the release of Judge Cox’s opinion, on November 12, 2015,
respondent and his wife were arrested and charged with felony theft, money
laundering, and filing and maintaining false public records. On May 8, 2018,
respondent pleaded guilty to the amended charge of attempted felony theft. He was
sentenced to serve six months in jail, suspended, and placed on active probation for
one year.
Respondent and his wife then sued Andrew’s son, Jordon Davisson, alleging
breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court sustained Jordon’s
exceptions and dismissed respondent’s claims with prejudice. The Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal on May 23, 2018.

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Count V
In December 2016, Judge Jeff Cox filed a complaint against respondent with
the ODC. Judge Cox’s complaint arose from a petition for defamation filed by
respondent in Caddo Parish against Christopher Broussard. Mr. Broussard was
opposing counsel in the Succession of Andrew Davisson matter, and Judge Cox was
the presiding judge.
In the defamation lawsuit against Mr. Broussard, respondent made several
allegations about Judge Cox regarding his handling of the succession that Judge Cox
felt were frivolous and questioned his integrity as a judge. For example, respondent
alleged that Judge Cox told “numerous lies … to fabricate ongoing false criminal
charges of crimes that never happened without witnesses and without evidence”
against respondent and his wife. Respondent further alleged that, at the time he and
his wife were arrested, Judge Cox was running for a seat on the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal and that the arrests “were made to silence both Sharon Cox and Michael
Cox” because they “represented a threat to the election chances of the said judge.”
In his response to the complaint, respondent stated that the complaint itself
supported the statements made in his petition about Judge Cox. He maintained that
the petition was truthful and accurate.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In September 2019, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that he violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules
3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an
obligation under the rules of the tribunal), 8.2(a) (a lawyer shall not make a statement
that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules
of Profe ssional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects

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adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and
8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent
filed an answer in which he essentially denied engaging in any misconduct.
Accordingly, the matter was set for a formal hearing on the merits.
Prior to the hearing, respondent filed a m otion to dismiss the formal charges
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because (1) his name was spelled with all
capital letters in the caption of the pleadings filed with the disciplinary board; and
(2) Louisiana courthouses display fringed flags, wh ich represent admiralty,
maritime, or military jurisdiction. Respondent also argued that the judges and
district attorney of the 26
th JDC have engaged in misconduct and, upon respondent’s
complaints about such misconduct, worked with the Louisiana State Bar Association
(“LSBA”) to have his law license interimly suspended. The hearing committee chair
denied this motion on September 17, 2020, and the matter proceeded to hearing.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence present ed at the hearing, the
hearing committee determined respondent had no remorse for any of his conduct.
The committee also concluded that respondent will do anything to win, whether it is
filing frivolous and harassing lawsuits under the guise of being a ze alous advocate
for his clients or being nonchalant about not being licensed as a notary public.
Although respondent admitted to not completing the necessary documents to become
a notary, he testified that none of his former clients had complained about hi s lack
of proper registration. The committee further concluded that respondent has a habit
of operating and holding himself above the law. Based on these findings, the
committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as
charged.

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The committee then determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed
to the public. Respondent’s conduct caused actual harm to several people who
incurred thousands of dollars in legal fees to defend themselves against his frivolous
lawsuits. He a lso caused actual harm to Judge Cox by falsely alleging that Judge
Cox was trying to silence him while campaigning for a seat on the Second Circuit.
Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee
determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the committee found the following factors present: a prior
disciplinary record,2 a pattern of misconduct, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of the conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted
1990). The committee did not mention the presence of any mitigating factors.
Under these circumstances, the committee recommended respondent be
permanently disbarred.
Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
Prior to oral argument before the disciplinary board, respondent filed an
exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, again complaining about the spelling
of his name in all ca pital letters and the display of fringed flags in Louisiana
courthouses. He also argued that this court has exclusive original jurisdiction in
attorney disciplinary matters pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution; however, this
court gave that jurisdiction over to the LSBA through the ODC, the hearing
committee, a nd the disciplinary board. The disciplinary board’s adjudicative
committee chair denied respondent’s exception on March 9, 2021.

2 In 2007, the disciplinary board admonished respondent and ordered him to attend Trust
Accounting School for commingling client and personal funds. In 2008, the board admonished
respondent for engaging in a conflict of interest.

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On the merits, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s
factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and are supported by the record. The
board adopted the committee’s findings and made additional findings consistent with
the underlying facts set forth above in Counts I, III, and IV. Based on these factual
findings, the board determined that respondent vi olated the Rules of Professional
Conduct as follows: (1) Rule 3.1 in Counts I, IV, and V by filing frivolous pleadings;
(2) Rule 3.4(c) in Count I by knowingly disobeying court orders to pay attorney’s
fees to Ms. O’Brien; (3) Rule 8.2(a) in Count V by making statements about Judge
Cox’s integrity with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity; (4) Rule 8.4(b) in
Counts II, III, and IV by engaging in criminal conduct; (5) Rules 8.4(c) and 8.4(d)
in all five counts by making frivolous allegations and engaging in criminal conduct,
which is conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and (6) Rule 8.4(a) by violating
the other Rules of Professional Conduct.
The board then dete rmined respondent intentionally violated duties owed to
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual
harm to Ms. O’Brien and her professional liability insurer, to Jordon Davisson and
his mother, and to Judge Cox. The board agreed with the committee that disbarment
is the baseline sanction.
In aggravation, the board found the following: a prior disciplinary record, a
dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to
acknowledge the wr ongful nature of the conduct, substantial experience in the
practice of law, and illegal conduct. The board determined the sole mitigating factor
is the imposition of other penalties or sanctions.
Based on these findings, and in light of the severity of the misconduct, the
board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred.

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The board filed its recommendation with the court on October 15, 2021.
Thereafter, respondent filed a pleading styled as “Respondent’s Exception of Lack
of Original Subject Matte r Jurisdiction and Lack of Standing on the Part of the
British Accreditation Registry (A.K.A. Louisiana State Bar Association) and
Exception of Lack of Original Subject Matter Jurisdiction on the Part of the 26 th
Judicial District Court.” In this pleading, respondent made essentially the same
arguments he made to the board prior to oral argument. Additionally, respondent
argued that his conviction of three counts of unlawful exercise of notarial powers
was improper because the 26
th JDC does not have jurisdiction to discipline attorneys.
After consideration, we determined that respondent’s exceptions should be treated
as a timely objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the case was
docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION
Respondent has filed various pleadings in this court in which he raises
arguments concerning jurisdiction and the constitutionality of Rule XIX. These
include “Respondent’s Exception of Lack of Original Subject Matter Jurisdiction
and Lack of Standing on the Part of the British Accreditation Registry (A.K.A.
Louisiana State Bar Association) and Exception of Lack of Original Subject Matter
Jurisdiction on the Part of the 26
th Judicial District Court”; “Exception of Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standing”; “Respondent’s Motion to Strike All
Pleadings Filed by the British Accreditation Registry (A.K.A. Louisiana State Bar
Association or Office of Disciplinary Counsel) For Failure to Affirmatively
Establish Original Jurisdiction and for Failure to Affirmatively Establish Standing
AND Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the British Accreditation Registry (A.K.A.
Louisiana State Bar Association or Office of Disciplinary Counsel) With Prejudice
for Failure to Affirmatively Establish Original Jurisdiction and for Failure to

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Affirmatively Establish Standing Herein”; “Respondent’s Final Brief Concerning
His Exception as to the Lack of Exclusive Original Jurisdiction Relative to Attorney
Discipline Which Has Been Unlawfully Asse rted by the British Accreditation
Registry (A.K.A. Louisiana State Bar Association – A Legal Fiction) In Violation
of Article V Sections 5A & 5B of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 ”; and
“Respondent’s Post-Hearing Motion Supporting Respondent’s Prior Mot ions to
Strike All Pleadings Filed by the British Accreditation Registry Herein (A.K.A.
Louisiana State Bar Association or Office of Disciplinary Counsel) for Failure to
Affirmatively Establish Original Jurisdiction and for Failure to Affirmatively
Establish Standing.” Respondent’s exceptions and motions can be summarized as
follows: (1) a lack of original subject matter jurisdiction exists because this court has
inappropriately reassigned its constitutionally -mandated exclusive original
jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary matters to the LSBA, the ODC, the hearing
committee, and the disciplinary board; and (2) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
exists because respondent’s unlawful notary criminal case was tried as an attorney
disciplinary case in the 26
th JDC, which does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over attorney discipline.
Regarding respondent’s first exception, despite his arguments to the contrary,
the LSBA is not a party to this attorney disciplinary proceeding. Nor has it asserted
any jurisdiction over respondent in this proceeding. Furthermore, the ODC , the
hearing committee, and the disciplinary board are not employees of the LSBA.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 2(A), the ODC , the committee, and the
board are all agencies of t he Louisiana Supreme Court, and their involvement in
attorney disciplinary matters is not a violation of the Louisiana Constitution. See In
re: Laudumiey, 03-0234 (La. 6/27/03), 849 So. 2d 515, wherein we held:
…Supreme Court Rule XIX does not delegate our original
jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings to the hearing
committees and the disciplinary board. Regardless of the

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recommendation of the disciplinary board, “it is the
ultimate duty of this court to determine under the b road
discretion vested i n it what action, if any is to be taken
against an attorney charged with misconduct....”
Louisiana State Bar Ass ’n v. Wheeler, 243 La. 618, 145
So. 2d 774, 777 (1962). When we consider a disciplinary
case, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent
review of the record to determine whether the alleged
misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.
2d 343, 348; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.
2d 444, 445 (La. 1992). Accordingly, we find nothing in
Supreme Court Rule XIX which contradicts the
constitutional grant of original jurisdiction in bar
disciplinary cases to this court.

Therefore, contrary to respondent’s arguments, it was proper for the ODC to file
formal charges against respondent and for the committee and the board to consider
the matter.
Regarding respondent’s second exception, his unlawful exercise of notarial
powers is not solely attorney misconduct; it is also a criminal offense under La. R.S.
35:601.3 While respondent is correct that the Louisiana Supreme Court has original

3 La. R.S. 35:601 provides:
A. A person, who has not first been duly authorized to exercise
notarial powers in this state or wh ose authority to exercise notarial
powers in this state has been judicially revoked, shall not perform
any of the following actions:
(1) Exercise or purport to exercise any notarial function.
(2) Hold himself out to the public as being entitled to exercise
notarial functions.
(3) Render or furnish notarial services.
(4) Take any acknowledgment, administer any oath, or execute any
instrument purportedly as a notary public or as a person purportedly
authorized to exercise notarial power and authority.
(5) Assume to be a notary public or to be authorized to exercise
notarial functions.
(6) Assume, use, or advertise the title of notary public or ex officio
notary or equivalent terms in any language, or any similar title in
such a manner as to convey the impressi on that he is authorized to
exercise notarial powers.
B. (1) Any person who violates any provision of this Section shall
be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned for not
more than two years, or both.
(2) In addition to the penalties provided by Paragraph (1) of this
Subsection, the person shall be required to make full restitution for
all costs required to authenticate, confirm, or ratify any instruments
that fail to qualify as notarial acts due to the lack of proper authority
of the notary or purported notary, including all costs of recordation
and all damages each affected party may suffer.

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jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings, it does not have original
jurisdiction over criminal matters. Therefore, the 26th JDC was the proper venue in
which to prosecute respondent for his criminal conduct.
Based on this reasoning, we will deny each of respondent’s exceptions and
motions.
Turning to the merits of this matter , t he record supports a finding that
respondent’s misconduct is very serious. He filed meritless and frivolous pleadings
on numerous occasions, pleaded guilty to the felony charge of obtaining a controlled
substance by fraud, was tried and convicted of three counts of unlawful exercise of
notarial powers, pleaded guilty to attempted felony theft, and made statements about
a judge that were frivolous and questioned the judge’s integrity. Based on these
facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct a s found by the
disciplinary board.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent intentionally violated duties owed to his clients, the public, the
legal system, and the leg al profession, causing significant actual harm. We agree
with the hearing committee and the board that the baseline sanction is disbarment.
We also agree with the board’s determination of aggravating and mitigating factors.

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Notwithstanding the seriousness of respondent’s conduct, we do not find that
the record establishes respondent has a fundamental lack of moral character and
fitness which would warrant his permanent exclusion from the profession.
Therefore, we find the recommendation of permanent disbarment is not appropriate,
and we will instead impose ordinary disbarment. In doing so, however, we caution
respondent that we will scrutinize any application for readmission with a careful eye
to determine if he has taken genuine steps to reform his conduct.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it
is ordered that Michael D. Cox, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20453, be and he hereby
is disbarred, retroactive to January 24, 2018, the date of his interim suspension. His
name shall be stricken fr om the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in
the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are
assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1,
with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s
judgment until paid.