In Re: Myles Julian Johnson

Supreme Court of Louisiana
January 26, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: MYLES JULIAN JOHNSON
No. 2021-B-01558
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
January 26, 2022
Suspension imposed. See per curiam.
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
WJC
JBM
PDG
01/26/2022 "See News Release 004 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 202
1-B-1558
I
N RE: MYLES JULIAN JOHNSON
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Myles Julian Johnson, an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana. He is currently ineligible to practice
in Louisiana for failing to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment and for
failing to comply with mandatory continuing legal education (“MCLE”)
requirements. Respondent is also licensed to practice law in the State of
Washington.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
Latracus Henry hired respondent to represent him in a criminal matter
involving a second degree murder charge and a felon in possession of a firearm
charge. Respondent charged a $10,000 fee for the representation. According to Mr.
Henry’s mother, she paid respondent’s $10,000 fee in full over time. Respondent
provided her with a receipt, indicating she had paid $3,400 toward the $10,000 as of
March 29, 2014. However, Mr. Henry’s mother had no other receipts or evidence
of any additional payments.
In August 2015, the district attorney’s office nolle prosequied the second
degree murder charge. Thereafter, Mr. Henry was tried and convicted of being a
felon in possession of a firearm. In November 2015, his conviction and sentence
01/26/22

2

were overturned on appeal. On March 24, 2016, this court remanded Mr. Henry’s
criminal matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.
Respondent appeared on Mr. Henry’s behalf for the evidentiary hearing on
July 14, 2016, September 26, 2016, and March 23, 2017. On August 22, 2017, the
trial judge set a deadline of October 2, 2017 for Mr. Henry to file a post-hearing brief
after respondent requested leave to file said brief.
In the meantime, on August 7, 2017, the Louisiana State Bar Association
(“LSBA”) mailed a notice of delinquency to respondent at his LSBA -registered
primary address, 10105 NE 125th Drive, Apartment 4, Kirkland, Washington 98034
(“the Apartment 4 address”). The notice cited respondent’s failure to pay his 2017-
2018 LSBA bar dues and the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinar y Board’s disciplinary
assessment, as well as his failure to submit his attorney registration statement.
On September 15, 2017, the LSBA mailed a certification of ineligibility to
respondent at his LSBA-registered primary address, which was still the Apar tment
4 address. The certification included notice that the LSBA was required to certify
to this court that respondent was “ineligible to practice law in Louisiana effective
September 11, 2017.” On September 19, 2017, this court issued to respondent a
certification of ineligibility effective September 11, 2017, which was also sent to the
Apartment 4 address.
Respondent did not notify Mr. Henry, his mother, or the trial court of his
ineligibility. Respondent also did not file the post-hearing brief on Mr. Henry’s
behalf. On October 17, 2017, the trial judge issued his ruling with written reasons,
which ruling was unfavorable to Mr. Henry. Because the trial court did not know
respondent was ineligible, it sent the ruling to respondent and not Mr. Henry . Mr.
Henry and his mother were unaware of the ruling, and Mr. Henry did not seek
review.

3

In April 2019, Mr. Henry filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent,
complaining that respondent abandoned his case without informing him. The ODC
made numerous attempts to notify respondent of the complaint so he could respond.
Initially, the ODC was unable to deliver notice of the complaint to respondent
because he failed to update his address with the LSBA. Eventually, the ODC located
respondent at his S tate of Washington law office located at 1105 Tacoma Avenue
South, Tacoma, Washington 98402, and sent notice of the complaint to that address
on May 16, 2019, June 10, 2019, and June 27, 2019. On August 28, 2019,
respondent contacted the ODC to confirm his response would be forthcoming within
a week. Nevertheless, respondent did not submit a response to the complaint. On
October 23, 2019, respondent changed his primary address registered with the LSBA
to his law office address in Tacoma, Washington.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In September 2019, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that he violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules
1.1(b) (failure to comply with MCLE requirements), 1.1(c) (failure to pay bar dues
or the disciplinary assessment, failure to provide timely change of address
information, or failure to submit trust account information), 1.3 (failure to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to
communicate with a client), 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the
representation), 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for
information from the disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the
ODC in its investigation), and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct). Respondent, through counsel, filed an answer to the formal charges,
denying that he violated or attempted to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

4

Hearing Committee Report
Following the hearing, the hearing committee summarized the relevant
testimony as follows:
Respondent – Respondent testified that he was admitted to the practice of law
in Louisiana in 2005 and in the State of Washington in 2014. He stated that he has
moved several times and that there may have been problems notifying the LSBA of
his address changes due to “user error.” Since the summer of 2018, he has had an
office in Tacoma, Washington, and his law office website lists this address. He goes
to the office once or twice a week and receives mail there. Respondent further
testified that the notice of delinquency letter was sent to a prior primary LSBA -
registration address in Kirkland, Washington (the Apartment 4 address). This was
his residence for three or four years, but he did not recall receiving the notice of
delinquency.
Regarding his representation of Mr. Henry, respondent was adamant that he
represented Mr. Henry in a proper and competent manner. Respondent testified that
he participated in all status conferences leading up to the evidentiary hearing, and he
appeared at all of the evidentiary hearings. He also testified that he appeared each
time a lawyer’s presence was required, including at m otions, meetings with the
prosecutors, arguments, and other hearings. After the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearings, respondent indicated he met with Mr. Henry and his mother and clearly
told them that, “I see no way forward” and “I don’t believe there is anything else I
can do.” He told Mr. Henry and his mother they needed to seek help from the
Innocence Project or a similar organization. He repeatedly testified that he made it
clear to them that he was going to do no further work. In fact, he testified that he
had no good faith basis to argue anything else and that he felt it would be a violation
of his ethical obligations if he did. As such, he asserted that he fully complied with
withdrawal requirements.

5

However, respondent had no explanation for why he asked to file a brief
following the conclusion of the evidentiary hearings. He did not notify Mr. Henry
about the order allowing the brief or about the due date of the brief. He also
acknowledged that he did not file the brief and did not file a motion to withdraw.
He denied that Mr. Henry’s mother paid him $10,000; instead, he claimed he
only received $3,400. He also claimed he expended a large amount of time and
money on the representation, indicating that he personally financed Mr. Henry’s
appeal.
Regarding the various notices of Mr. Henry’s complaint the ODC sent him,
respondent testified that he does not recall receiving all of the notices because he
moved so many times. However, he did recall receiving at least two of the notices
sent to his law office address in Tacoma, Washington and acknowledged that he did
not timely respond to the complaint.
Latracus Henry – Mr. Henry testified that the last time he talked to respondent
was after the final evidentiary hearing when respondent told him to “be cool”
because he was going to take care of everything. He also believed respondent was
going to file a brief on his behalf. Respondent never told him that he would not
complete the representation, never complained about not being paid the full fee, and
never told him that he was ineligible to practice law in Louisiana. Mr. Henry further
claimed he tried to call respondent several times after the final evidentiary hearing.
He also wrote to respondent, but the letters were returned. Mr. Henry learned of the
adverse ruling when he wrote to the trial court on May 25, 2019 and asked what was
going on.
Sandra Henry – Mr. Henry’s mother testified that she did not have receipts for
the full $10,000 she claimed she paid. Instead, she kept track of her cash payments
on a calendar; however, she was unable to find the calendar.

6

Based on the above testimony and the other evidence presented at the hearing,
the committee made factual findings consistent with the underlying facts sets forth
above. Additionally, the committee found that respondent was hired on March 29,
2014 to represent Mr. Henry in a pending criminal matter for $10,000 but was only
paid $3,400. Between April 21, 2016 and February 2, 2017, the trial court held
various status conferences concerning the evidentiary hearing, some of which were
via telephone. Respondent participated in all of these conferences. Respondent also
participated in the evidentiary hearing on the three dates it was held.
The committee further found that, on August 7, 2017, respondent’s LSBA-
registered primary, secondary, and preferred mailing address was the Apartment 4
address in Kirkland, Washington. The LSBA’s August 7, 2017 notice of
delinquency letter was sent to respondent at the Apartment 4 address. The LSBA’s
September 15, 2017 letter to respondent notifying him of his ineligibility effective
September 11, 2017 was sent to the Apartment 4 address. On September 19, 2017,
this court’s certificate of ineligibility was also sent to respondent at the Apartment 4
address. On May 8, 2019, the ODC sent notice of Mr. Henry’s complaint to the
Apartment 4 address, but the correspondence was returned undelivered on May 16,
2019. On May 16, 2019, the ODC resent the letter to respondent at his law office
address in Tacoma, Was hington. This correspondence was delivered on May 20,
2019. On October 23, 2019, respondent changed his LSBA- registered primary
address to his law office address in Tacoma, Washington. On that date, respondent
also changed his LSBA -registered secondary and preferred mailing addresses to
11934 NE 162
nd Place, Bothell, Washington 90811.
The committee then specifically found that respondent effectively
communicated his withdrawal to Mr. Henry. However, after asking for leave to file
a post-hearing brief, r espondent failed to complete his withdrawal obligations by
filing a formal motion to withdraw and providing the court, the LSBA, or Mr. Henry

7

(in the absence of another attorney representing Mr. Henry) with his address so the
ruling on the motion to file a post-hearing brief and briefing schedule could be sent
to the appropriate person and place. As a result, Mr. Henry did not know about the
briefing schedule, and no brief was filed. Since respondent had requested the
opportunity to file a post-hearing brief, he had an ethical obligation to file a motion
to withdraw, to determine if his request to file the brief had been granted and
whatever deadlines for briefing were set, and to communicate this information to
Mr. Henry or an attorney hired by Mr. Henry to continue the representation.
Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.4,
1.16(d), and 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Regarding the Rule 1.4
violation, the committee specifically determined that respondent failed to
communicate “only insofar as notifying the LSBA of address changes promptly.”
Regarding the Rule 1.16(d) violation, the committee specifically determined that
respondent failed to fulfill his obligations upon termination “only insofar as his post
withdrawal obligations are concerned and failing to file a Motion to Withdraw with
the court.”
The committee then determined respondent negligently violated duties owed
to his client and the legal system. Respondent’s failure to cooperate with the ODC
caused a minimal, unnecessary expenditure of the ODC’s resources, and the
potential for harm to Mr. Henry existed. In aggravation, the committee noted the
vulnerability of the victim and respondent’s substantial experience in the practice of
law (admitted 2005). In mitigation, the committee found the absence of a prior
disciplinary record, personal or emotional problems (divorce and his father’s
illness), full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or a cooperative attitude
toward the proceedings, and remorse. In additional mitigation, the committee noted
that respondent obtained a dismissal of the second degree murder charge against Mr.

8

Henry, he collected a reduced fee for the services rendered, and he provided honest
and forthcoming testimony.
Under these circumstances, the committee recommended respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six months, fully deferred. The committee
also recommended that any finding of an ethical violation during the six-month
deferral period should result in the deferred suspension being made executory.
The ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board generally accepted the hearing
committee’s factual findings. However, the board clarified that respondent
acknowledged living at the Apartment 4 address from 2015 through 2018, and this
address was respondent’s LSBA-registered address from August 7, 2017 to October
23, 2019. The trial court mailed the August 22, 2017 post-hearing briefing schedule
to respondent at the Apartment 4 address, and respondent acknowledged being aware
of the briefing schedule. Respondent also indicated that he probably received the
trial court’s October 17, 2017 ruling with written reasons, which were mailed to the
Apartment 4 address.
Based on these facts and the other evidence in the record, the board
determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
Regarding Rule 1.1(b), the board noted that respondent admitted he was MCLE
ineligible in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. Regarding Rule 1.1(c), the board noted
that, even after the formal charges were filed, respondent did not correct his LSBA-
registration address until a month later in October 2019, and he did no t correct his
bar dues, disciplinary assessment, and registration statement delinquencies until
shortly before the formal hearing in January 2020. Regarding Rule 1.3, the board
noted that respondent, in the very last stage of Mr. Henry’s legal matter, did not act

9

diligently because he failed to promptly file a motion to withdraw as counsel, failed
to advise Mr. Henry of the August 2017 post- hearing brief scheduling order, failed
to submit a brief or explicitly inform Mr. Henry and the court that he would n ot be
filing said brief after requesting that he be allowed to do so, and failed to provide
Mr. Henry with a copy of the court’s October 2017 ruling with written reasons.
Regarding Rule 1.4, the board noted that respondent failed to advise Mr. Henry of
the briefing order issued in August 2017, failed to communicate to Mr. Henry that
he did not intend to file a post-hearing brief in accordance with that order, and failed
to advise Mr. Henry of the trial court’s ultimate ruling. Respondent also failed to
communicate his ineligibility to Mr. Henry, and Mr. Henry and his mother both
testified to their repeated attempts to contact respondent to no avail. Regarding Rule
1.16(d), the board noted that, while respondent may have told Mr. Henry and his
mother there was nothing more he could do after the final evidentiary hearing, he
did not take the required steps to withdraw as counsel. Even if respondent believed
he had verbally ended the representation, he remained obligated to provide Mr.
Henry with the briefing order and the ruling with written reasons when he received
them. Regarding Rules 8.1(b) and 8.1(c), the board noted that respondent failed to
provide a response to Mr. Henry’s complaint despite the numerous notices of the
complaint and requests for a response sent to him by ODC over a period of several
months. Finally, regarding Rule 8.4(a), the board noted that respondent’s multiple
rule violations, as discussed above, established this derivative rule violation.
The board then determined respondent violated duties owed to his client, the
legal system, and the legal profession. According to the board, his conduct was
knowing and perhaps, in part, negligent. His conduct caused potential harm to Mr.
Henry. His conduct also caused a delay in the ODC’s investigation and caused the
ODC to expend some additional resources. Moreover, respondent’s failure to fulfill
his professional obligations harmed the legal profession. After co nsidering the

10

ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline
sanction is suspension.
The board further determined that the following aggravating factors are
present: multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in
the practice of law. In mitigation, the board found the absence of a prior disciplinary
record, personal or emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary
board or a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and remorse.
After also considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six months.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’s report or
recommendation.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alle ged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record in this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected a legal
matter, failed to communicate with a client, failed to properly withdraw from a
representation, failed to fulfill his professional obligations, and failed to cooperate

11

with the ODC in its investigation. This conduct amounts to a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct as found by the disciplinary board.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client, the legal system,
and the legal profession, causing actual and potential harm. We agree with the board
that suspension is the baseline sanction. We also agree with the board’s
determination of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find guidance from two
cases cited by the board, In re: Gaharan, 08-2829 (La. 4/2/09), 6 So. 3d 745, and In
re: Swafford, 17 -2154 (La. 3/23/18), 238 So. 3d 957. In Gaharan , an attorney
withdrew from the representation of a bankruptcy client when he assumed inactive
status but failed to communicate that fact to the client. The attorney also failed to
file a motion to withdraw with the bankruptcy cour t. As a result, the client was
unaware he was without counsel while his creditors were attempting to collect their
debts and foreclose on his home. When the client complained to the ODC, the
attorney failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation, going so far as to inform
the ODC he did not want to be bothered by them again. For this knowing and
intentional misconduct, we imposed a suspension from the practice of law for one
year and one day. The board determined that the misconduct in Gaharan was more

12

egregious than respondent’s misconduct; thus respondent should receive a lesser
sanction. We agree. In Swafford, an attorney failed to complete a succession for a
client, failed to respond to the client’s several requests for information, and failed to
timely inform the client that he would not complete the representation. For this
knowing misconduct, we imposed a suspension from the practice of law for six
months, with three months deferred, followed by one year of probation with the
condition that the attorney attend the LSBA’s Ethics School. Given that the attorney
in Swafford fully cooperated with the ODC’s investigation, we find respondent’s
misconduct was more egregious; thus respondent should receive a harsher sanction.
Under these circumstances, we will accept the board’s recommendation and
suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Myles Julian
Johnson, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29921, be and he hereby is suspended from the
practice of law for six months. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed
against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal
interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment
until paid.