In Re: Greta L. Wilson

Supreme Court of Louisiana
January 26, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: GRETA L. WILSON
No. 2021-B-01579
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
January 26, 2022
Permanent disbarment imposed. See per curiam.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., dissents and would impose regular disbarment.
Crain, J., dissents and would impose regular disbarment.
JDH
JLW
SJC
JBM
PDG
01/26/2022 "See News Release 004 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
021-B-1579
I
N RE: GRETA L. WILSON
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Greta L. Wilson, a disbarred
attorney.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of
law in Louisiana in 1989.
On June 5, 2017, we disbarred respondent in In re: Wilson, 17 -0622 (La.
6/5/17), 221 So. 3d 40 (“Wilson I”). In Wilson I, respondent engaged in misconduct
by filing suit and enrolling as counsel in another suit for the purpose of obtaining
funds, and then converting those funds to her own use. This misconduct occurred in
2013 and 2014.
On January 14, 2019, we adjudged respondent guilty of additional misconduct
warranting discipline, to be considered in the event she sought readmission to the
practice of law, and extended the time period in which she could seek readmission
by two years. In re: Wilson, 18-1800 (La. 1/14/19), 260 So. 3d 1203 (“Wilson II”).
The misconduct at issue in Wilson II took place over the period from 2012-2015 and
included respondent’s neglect of a legal matter, failure to communicate with a client,
01/26/22

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and failure to refund an unearned fee. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the
ODC in its investigation, which was opened in 2015.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a conside ration of the misconduct at
issue in the instant proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES
By letter dated June 5, 2013, respondent informed Bernadine Underwood
Johnson that she may be entitled to recover funds held in the registry of the Orleans
Civil District Court. In the letter, respondent instructed Ms. Johnson to call her for
further information.
Ms. Johnson telephoned respondent, as instructed. At that time, respondent
explained to Ms. Johnson that she would need to sign a representation agreement in
order to receive the money. Ms. Johnson signed the agreement on July 8, 2013 and
returned it to respondent. Thereafter, Ms. Johnson attempted to contact respondent
on multiple occasions, to no avail.
In 2020, Ms. Johnson researched the matter and learned that respondent had
been disbarred. Ms. Johnson also learned that on July 29, 201 3, the clerk of Civil
District Court issued a check in the amount of $14,829.64 payable to Ms. Johnson,
her former spouse, and respondent. The check was negotiated by respondent on July
31, 2013, but Ms. Johnson never received any portion of the funds.
In February 2021, Ms. Johnson filed a complaint against respondent with the
ODC.
1 In March 2021, the ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent’s
primary bar registration address via certified mail, but the notice was returned
“unable to forward.” In April 2021 , the ODC’s investigator left a note at
respondent’s secondary address advising her to contact the ODC. The ODC also

1 Ms. Johnson also filed a claim against respondent with the Louisiana State Bar Association’s
Client Assistance Fund.

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attempted to contact respondent at her registered telephone numbers. Despite all
these efforts, respondent has made no contact with the ODC.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In May 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
her conduct violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client),
1.15(d) (failure to timely remit funds to a client or third party) , 8.1(c) (failure to
cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) , 8.4(a)
(violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual
allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and
convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal
hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing
committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.
Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the ODC’s submission, the hearing committee determined
the factual allegations in the formal charges were deemed admitted and proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Based on those deemed admitted facts, the
committee determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as
alleged in the formal charges.
The committee determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed to
her client and the legal profession. Her misconduct resulted in significant actual

4

harm to Ms. Johnson, who has been deprived of a substantial amount of money for
over eight years. Furthermore, the record does not demonstrate that restitution has
been paid. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.
The committee found the following aggravating factors are present: a
dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the
rules or orders of the disciplinary agency , vulnerability of the victim, substantial
experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. In
mitigation, the committee determined that in light of its sanction analysis, Wilson I
and Wilson II should not be considered as prior misconduct.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee noted that the
instant misconduct occurred in 2013, while the misconduct in Wilson I and Wilson
II occurred between 2012 and 2015. Because the instant misconduct occurred within
the time period of the misconduct at issue in Wilson I and Wilson II, the committee
concluded that all three matters must be considered together pursuant to Louisiana
State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So. 2d 470 (La. 1991).
2
Taking the misconduct of Wilson I and Wilson II into consideration along with
the instant misconduct, the committee recognized an ongoing pattern of misconduct.
This is the third instance in which respondent has failed to disburse funds owed to a
client. Moreover, the factual pattern of the instant matter appears very similar to the
facts in Wilson I. The extent of the financial harm to respondent’s clients exceeds
$50,000.

2 In Chatelain, we held that when a second disciplinary proceeding against an attorney involves
misconduct which occurred during the same time period as the first proceeding, “the overall
discipline to be imposed should be determined as if both proceedings were before the c ourt
simultaneously.”

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Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be
permanently disbarred. The committee also recommended respondent be ordered to
pay restitution to Ms. Johnson and be assessed with the costs and expenses of this
proceeding.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s
report. Therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G), the disciplinary
board submitted the committee’s report to the court for review.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct a n
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supr eme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations
contained in the formal charges after those cha rges have been deemed admitted.
However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow
from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a
violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts,
additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions
that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01 -3058 (La.
1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.
The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent
neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with a client, and failed to remit
funds to a client. She also failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. As

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such, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the
formal charges.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent violated duties owed to her client and the legal system, causing
actual harm . Her conduct was intentional. The applicable baseline sanction is
disbarment. The aggravating factors found by the hearing committee are supported
by the record. No mitigating factors are present.
In Chatelain, supra, we were concerned that it would be potentially unfair for
a lawyer to receive a greater sanction simply because of the timing of the
prosecution. However, as the jurisprudence has evolved, we have also recognized
that the lawyer should not benefit in case s where it is obvious that the cumulative
effect of the newly-charged misconduct and the prior misconduct would have caused
the court to impose a greater sanction had it been aware of that misconduct at the
time the court rendered its initial judgment. Se e, e.g., In re: Holley , 03-1366 (La.
10/3/03), 856 So. 2d 1197 (“[h]ad we considered the instant misconduct together
with the misconduct in Holley I , it is likely we would have imposed a more severe
sanction, probably in the range of eighteen months, with some period of deferral and
probation.”). In short, the court’s overriding consideration has been to determine

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the appropriate overall sanction for the lawyer’s misconduct, ignoring any
distortions which may be caused by the timing of the filing of formal charges.
Applying that reasoning to the instant case, it is evident that the substantive
misconduct in the instant formal charge is part of the continuing series of
professional breaches by respondent spanning the period from 2012 to 2015 that we
first addressed in Wilson I and Wilson II. To consider this matter in isolation from
the similar charges in the prior cases would prevent us from recognizing
respondent’s pattern of serious misconduct. Accordingly, we will consider the
instant matter together with the charges at issue in Wilson I and Wilson II and
determine an appropriate sanction as if all three cases were before the court
simultaneously.
Wilson I involved two client matters. In the Gates matter, respondent filed
suit on behalf of Lawrence Gates, Jr., without his consent or authorization, regarding
funds recovered from the sale of property. Thereafter, respondent received a check
in the amount of $20,141. She endorsed the check with Mr. Gates’ signature and
deposited the funds into her clie nt trust account. Respondent did not disburse any
funds to Mr. Gates, who had to hire an attorney to recover the funds. Although Mr.
Gates was able to recover the money owed to him with the assistance of his new
attorney, the balance in respondent’s trus t account dropped below the amount in
question during the time she held the funds, which was over eight months. The
refund to Mr. Gates did not come from respondent’s trust account.
In the Pittman matter, respondent enrolled as counsel for Harry Lee Pittman
for the purpose of recovering funds held in the registry of the Orleans Civil District
Court on his behalf. Respondent did not have Mr. Pittman’s consent or authorization
to enroll as counsel. She subsequently received a check in the amount of $33,220.81.
Respondent endorsed the check with Mr. Pittman’s signature and negotiated the
check. Mr. Pittman had never met respondent and, upon learning of her actions, had

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to hire an attorney to recover his funds. He was not able to do so. We disbarred
respondent for her misconduct in Wilson I and ordered that she pay restitution to Mr.
Pittman.
In Wilson II, Kim Richardson hired respondent to represent him in a contract
dispute. Mr. Richardson paid respondent a $5,000 retainer fee. Respondent failed
to perform any substantive work on the matter and failed to refund the unearned fee.
Because this misconduct occurred during the same time period as the misconduct in
Wilson I, we adjudged her guilty of additional violations pursuant to Chatelain. For
her failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaint filed by
Mr. Richardson, we extended by two years the time in which respondent could apply
for readmission.
In the instant matter, respondent solicited Ms. Johnson to recover funds he ld
in the registry of the court on her behalf. After being hired, respondent received a
check payable to Ms. Johnson in the amount of $14,829.64. Respondent endorsed
the check with Ms. Johnson’s signature but did not remit any portion of the funds to
Ms. Johnson.
In Appendix D to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines
illustrating the types of conduct which might warrant permanent disbarment.
Guideline 1 applies to “re peated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of
client funds with substantial harm. ” Taken as a whole, respondent’s conduct here
and in Wilson I and Wilson II falls within Guideline 1. R espondent engaged in a
pattern of converting client funds, causing harm to her clients. With the exception
of Mr. Gates, she has not paid restitution to any of her clients. Numerous
aggravating factors are present, with no factors in mitigation. Had we been aware
of the instant misconduct at the time of Wilson I and Wilson II, respondent would
have been permanently disbarred.

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Accordingly, we will adopt the hearing committee’s recommendation and
permanently disbar respondent. We will further order respondent to pay restitution
to Ms. Johnson and/or to the Client Assistance Fund, as appropriate, as well as pay
all costs of this proceeding.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee,
and considering the record, it is ordered that Greta L. Wilson, Louisiana Bar Roll
number 19834, be and she hereby is permanently disbarred. Her name shall be
stricken from the roll of attorneys and her license to practice law in the State of
Louisiana shall be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is
further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to
the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that respondent shall make
restitution to Bernadine Underwood Johnson and/or repay to the Louisiana State Bar
Association’s Client Assistance Fund any amounts paid to Ms. Johnson on her
behalf. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence
thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.