2021-B-01616 Precedential Processed

In Re: Travis Mitchell Hill

Louisiana Supreme Court · Filed February 8, 2022

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: TRAVIS MITCHELL HILL No. 2021-B-01616
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN RE: Office o f Di sciplinary C ounsel ( ODC) - Applican t Other; F indings a nd
Recommendations (Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
February 08, 2022
Discipline imposed. See per curiam.
PDG
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
WJC
McCallum, J., d
issents and assigns reasons.
Supreme Court of Louisiana
February 08, 2022
02/08/2022 "See News Release 007 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
21-B-1616
I
N RE: TRAVIS MITCHELL HILL
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
Thi
s disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Travis Mitchell Hill.
Respondent is not licensed to practice law in Louisiana; he is licensed to practice
law only in the State of Texas, under Texas Bar Card Number 24043293.
Nevertheless, the ODC asserts jurisdiction over him in this matter pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 6(A) and Rule 8.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 6(A) provides that “any lawyer not admitted in this state
who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this state” is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this court. Rule 8.5 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct provides:
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice
in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the
lawyer’s conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in this
jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority
of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to
provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A
lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of
both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the
same conduct.
(b
) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional
conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1
) for conduct in connection with a matter pending
before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in
which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the
tribunal provide otherwise; and
02/08/22

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(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the
jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct
occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the
conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules
of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the
conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to
discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to
the rules of a j urisdiction in which the lawyer
reasonably believes the predominant effect of
the lawyer’s conduct will occur.

FORMAL CHARGES
On April 22, 2020, respondent filed a Motion to Transfer to State of Texas
and a proposed Order Transferring Suit Affecting Par ent-Child Relationship on
behalf of Michelle Callais in the pending civil litigation matter captioned Michelle
Callais v. William James Hendrix, III, No. 772-167 on the docket of the 24
th Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Jefferson (“the Louisiana litigation”). The motion to
transfer, which did not identify respondent as a Louisiana lawyer, included a
certificate of service made “in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Respondent did not seek or otherwise obtain pro hac vice admission in the Louisiana
litigation.
On April 29, 2020, Ruben Bailey, the Domestic Commissioner for the 24 th
Judicial District Court, sent respondent a letter in which he requested respondent
provide proof that he is a member in good standing with the Louisiana State Bar
Association. In a May 18, 2020 response letter to Mr. Bailey, respondent indicated,
“You are correct. I am not a member of the Louisiana Bar. I am attempting to help
a lady in Texas get a name change for her child.”
In early August 2020, Mr. Bailey filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. In his September 6, 2020 written response to the complaint, respondent
stated:
As previously stated in my letter to Mr. Bailey, I am not a
member of the Louisiana Bar. I have never claimed to be

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a member of the Louisiana Bar nor have I appeared in any
court in the State of Louisiana holding myself out to be a
licensed attorney in the State of Louisiana.

The only contact I have ever had with a Louisiana State
Court was to file a motion with the 24
th District Court to
perform a purely ministerial task of transferring a case to
Texas so a name change can be done for a child.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions
of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law) and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
On November 16, 2020, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent.
The formal charges were mailed via certified mail to respondent at his primary
practice address in Texas. Respondent signed for the certified mail on November
24, 2020. However, he failed to file an answer to the formal charges. Accordingly,
the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear
and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No
formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the
hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of
sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report
After revi ewing the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing
committee made factual findings consistent with the deemed admitted factual
allegations set forth in the formal charges. Based on those facts, the committee
determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.

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The committee then determined respondent knowingly and “deliberately”
violated duties owed to his client, causing potential harm to said client. According
to the committee, the baseline sanction for respondent’s miscond uct is a public
reprimand.
In light of the above findings and determinations, the committee
recommended respondent be publicly reprimanded.
The ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report, arguing the
recommended sanction was too lenient.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board adopted the hearing committee’s factual
findings, which the board noted were based upon the deemed admitted factual
allegations set forth in the formal charges. The board also adopted the committee’s
findings regarding rule violations, which are supported by the deemed admitted
factual allegations and the evidence submitted in support of those allegations. In
determining respondent violated Rule 5.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
the board found that he made a formal appearance in the Louisiana litigation without
seeking temporary or pro hac vice admission in the case before he filed the motion
to transfer and proposed order. In determining respondent violated Rule 8.4(d), the
board found that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law was contrary to the
proper administration of justice and circumvented the rules and laws governing the
practice of law in Louisiana.
The board then determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his
client, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm to
the legal system because Mr. Bailey was forced to expend time and judicial resources
in discerning whether respondent was eligible to practice law in Loui siana and in
reporting respondent’s misconduct to the ODC. His conduct also caused potential

5
harm to his client by delaying the Louisiana litigation with an inappropriate filing.
After consulting the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the boa rd
determined the baseline sanction is suspension. In aggravation, the board found a
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct and substantial
experience in the practice of law (admitted in Texas in 2006). The board found no
mitigating factors present.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board concluded that
respondent’s conduct is analogous to a Louisiana attorney who practices law while
ineligible to do so. In In re: Hardy, 03-0443 (La. 5/2/03), 848 So. 2d 511, In re:
Goudeau, 18-0638 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So. 3d 393, and In re: Smothers, 20-1412 (La.
3/16/21), 312 So. 3d 577, we held that the baseline sanction for practicing law while
ineligible is a suspension from the practice of law for one year and one day.
Additionally, the board found In re: Cortigene, 13 -2022 (La. 2/14/14), 144 So. 3d
915
, reh'g denied (5/2/14), to be instructive. In Cortigene , one of the respondents,
Newton B. Schwartz, Sr., was licensed to practice law only in Texas and
Pennsylvania. Mr. Schwartz participated in a deposition in New Orleans in litigation
filed in federal court even though he was not licensed or admitted to practice pro hac
vice in Louisiana at any time during the litigation. We concluded that Mr. Schwartz
had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and, because he was a non-
Louisiana lawyer, ordered that he be enjoined for a period of three years from
seeking full admission to the Louisiana bar or seeking admission to practice in
Louisiana on any temporary or limited basis, including but not limited to seeking
pro hac vice admission before a Louisiana court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
XVII, § 13 or seeking limited admission as an in- house counsel pursuant to Rule
XVII, § 14.
In light of this case law, the board recommended respondent be enjoined for
one year and one day from seeking admission to the Louisiana bar or seeking

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admission to practice in Louisiana on a temporary or limited basis, including but not
limited to see king pro hac vice admission before a Louisiana court pursuant to
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 13 or seeking limited admission as an in-
house counsel pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 14.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s
recommendation.
DI
SCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So.3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations
contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted.
However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow
from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC s eeks to prove (i.e., a
violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts,
additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions
that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01 -3058 (La.
1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.
The record of this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent,
a non-Louisiana attorney, filed a motion in a Louisiana court case without seeking
or obtaining pro hac vice admission in the litigation. Based on this fact, respondent

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has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged by the ODC and found by
the hearing committee and the disciplinary board.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a
sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high
standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and
deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass ’n v. Reis , 513 So.2d 1173 (La.
1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the
seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520
(La. 1984).
The record further supports a finding that respondent knowingly violated
duties owed to his client, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing actual
and potential harm. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension.
The aggravating factors found by the disciplinary board are supported by the record,
and we agree with the board that no mitigating factors are present.
In addition to the cases cited by the board, we find the case of In re: Nguyen,
17-0214 (La. 4/13/17), 215 So. 3d 668, provides guidance. In Nguyen, a non -
Louisiana attorney, while admitted pro hac vice in the Western District of Louisiana,
inappropriately communicated with a criminal defendant without the permission of
the defendant’s counsel and then failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation
into his conduct. We determined that this misconduct would w arrant a one -year
suspension from the practice of law if the attorney were a member of the Louisiana
bar. Because the attorney was not a member of the bar, we instead ordered that he
be enjoined for a period of one year from seeking full admission to the Louisiana
bar or seeking admission to practice in Louisiana on any temporary or limited basis,
including but not limited to seeking pro hac vice admission before a Louisiana court

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pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 13 or seeking limited admission as an in-
house counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 14.
In light of this case law addressing misconduct by non-Louisiana attorneys,
we will adopt the board’s recommendation and enjoin respondent for a period of one
year and one day from the date of this order from seeking full admission to the
Louisiana bar or seeking admission to practice in Louisiana on a ny temporary or
limited basis, including but not limited to seeking pro hac vice admission before a
Louisiana court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 13 or seeking limited
admission as an in-house counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 14. We
will further direct the ODC to report our judgment to all jurisdictions in which
respondent is currently admitted.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Travis
Mitchell Hill shall be enjoined for a period of one year and one day from seeking
admission to the Louisiana bar or seeking admission to practice in Louisiana on a
temporary or limited basis, including but not limited to seeking pro hac vice
admission before a Louisiana court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII , § 13 or
seeking limited admission as an in- house counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
XVII, § 14. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is directed to report this judgment
to all jurisdictions in which Mr. Hill is currently admitted.
All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence
thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.