In Re: Michelle Andrica Charles
Also decided on this docket: La., September 19, 2023
In Re: Michelle Andrica Charles, No. 2021-B-01853 (La. May 13, 2022).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In Re Pardue 633 So. 2d 150
- Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Reis 513 So. 2d 1173
- Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Whittington 459 So. 2d 520
- In Re Richmond 996 So. 2d 282
- In re King 271 So. 3d 1253
- 296 So. 3d 1036 not in our corpus
- In re Swafford 238 So. 3d 957
- In Re: Charles L. Dirks, III 224 So. 3d 346
Opinion text
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #023
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of May, 2022 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2021-B-01853 IN RE: MICHELLE ANDRICA CHARLES
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
21-B-1853
I
N RE: MICHELLE ANDRICA CHARLES
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
T his disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Michelle Andrica Charles, an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
Count I
The following facts are not in dispute, having been stipulated to by the parties.
On July 20, 2018, respondent executed and filed a notice of candidacy to be a
candidate for Judge of Division B of the Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court. By
executing the notice of candidacy, respondent certified “that for each of the previous
five tax years, l have filed my federal and state income tax returns, have filed for an
extension of time for filing either my federal or state income tax return or both, or
was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both. ” The
Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”) could not confirm that respondent filed
a state income tax return for 2015.
Thereafter, Stephen Michael Petit, Jr. filed in the 24
th Judicial District Court
for the Parish of Jefferson a petition objecting to respondent’s candidacy. During a
July 30, 2018 hearing, respondent acknowledge that the signature on the notice of
candidacy was hers and that her signature had been notarized. Respondent testified
that she “had no knowledge that there was no 2015 state tax return.” When asked if
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she had proof of filing her 2015 state tax return, respondent indicated she did not “at
this time.” She also indicated she “never received any notification that [she] hadn’t
filed.” Later, respondent indicated she had “no rea son to think that a state income
tax wasn’t completed and filed.” An attorney with the policy services division of
the LDR confirmed that there was no 2015 state tax return under the names (or social
security number) provided by respondent. Based on this evidence, respondent was
disqualified as a candidate for public office, with
the judge stating “there is no
evidence that her 2015 state tax return was ever received by the [LDR].”
Count II
On September 13, 2018, Herbert Jones wrote a $750 check to respondent for
“legal fees.” According to Mr. Jones, he hired respondent “to file a contempt rule
against my ex-wife for failing to honor a court order of visitation and mishandling
of child support.” Mr. Jones also claimed that respondent’s fee included the cost of
various meals for respondent and her assistant, which Mr. Jones quantified at
approximately $250 to $300. According to respondent, the $750 fee she received
was for her to help Mr. Jones look into renegotiating his previous community
property settlement with his ex-wife and to assist Mr. Jones’ friend, Ocie Sherrod,
regarding a felony charge pending in Jefferson Parish.
Respondent did not file any pleadings in Mr. Jones’ divorce case and did not
produce any evidence regarding the representation of Mr. Sherrod. However, she
indicated she drove to the courthouse in St. Tammany Parish to examine Mr. Jones’
divorce case record and applied for St. Tammany Parish online records’ access to
complete her review. Although there is no written evidence of respondent’s research
efforts regarding renegotiation of Mr. Jones’ community property settlement,
respondent indicated she met with Mr. Jones to share her findings.
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On September 24, 2018, respondent appeared at a hearing with Mr. Jones in
a matter regarding his non-payment of child support. According to respondent, she
agreed to accompany Mr. Jones to the hearing as a “favor” and the representation
was not part of the $750 fee. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer
made a recommendation unfavorable to Mr. Jones. Respondent advised the hearing
officer and Mr. Jones that she would file an objection to the recommendation. After
the hearing, she again confirmed to Mr. Jones that she would file an objection.
According to respondent, her assistant prepared the objection, and she signed it and
then directed her assistant to file it. Nevertheless, respondent could produce no
documentary evidence of the objection. Respondent spoke with Mr. Jones several
times following the hearing and informed him the objection had been filed.
However, respondent did not follow up to verify the objection had been filed, and
the court record indicated no objection was filed.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In June 2019, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. The formal
charges alleged that, with respect to Count I, respondent violated Rules 3.3(a)(1)
(candor toward the tribunal), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct),
and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. With respect to Count II,
the formal charges alleged that respondent violated Rules 1.2(a)(c) (scope of the
representation), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(b) (fee
arrangements), 1.16(b)(d) (declining or terminating representation), 8.4(a), and
8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, and the m atter proceeded
to a formal hearing on the merits. Just prior to the hearing, respondent filed a
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stipulation of facts and rule violations with respect to Count I, in which she admitted
to the facts set forth above and to violating Rules 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. She did not file any stipulations regarding Count II.
Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the
committee accepted respondent’s stipulation of facts and rule violations with respect
to Count I. Based on those stipulations, the committee made factual findings
consistent with the underlying facts set forth above and determined respondent
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged. The committee then
determined respondent negligently and knowingly violated duties owed to the
public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Her conduct caused actual harm
to the public’s trust in individuals seeking an elected office, to the legal system, and
to the legal profession. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction with respect to Count I is
a public reprimand.
Regarding Count II, the committee made factual findings consistent with the
underlying facts set forth above. Based on those facts, the committee determined
respondent violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The committee specifically found that respondent agreed to file an objection to the
hearing officer’s recommendation but then failed to do so. She told Mr. Jones the
objection had been filed without verifying with the clerk of court’s office that it had
actually been submitted. The committee determined the ODC did not present clear
and convincing evidence to support the remaining alleged rule violations. The
committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to her client. She acted
grossly negligent and caused actual harm to her client. The committee again
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determined that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct in Count II is a
public reprimand.
In aggravation, the committee found multiple offenses and substantial
experience in the practice of la w (admitted 2007). In mitigation, the committee
found the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive, and full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative
attitude toward the proceedings.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for nine months, fully deferred, subject to one year of supervised
probation with the condition that she complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s
Ethics School.
The ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report, arguing the
recommended sanction was unduly lenient.
Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board de termined the hearing committee’s
factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same. The board also
determined that the committee’s conclusions regarding rule violations are correct
with one exception. The board determined respondent additionally violated Rule
8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to Count II when she
misrepresented to Mr. Jones that she had filed the objection to the hearing officer’s
recommendation.
The board agreed with the committee’s determinations reg arding duties
violated, respondent’s mental state, and the harm caused with respect to Count I.
Regarding Count II, the board determined respondent acted grossly negligent, if not
knowingly, in violating duties owed to her client and causing her client actual harm.
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After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the board
determined the baseline sanction is suspension.
The board agreed with the committee’s findings regarding aggravating
factors. Regarding mitigating factors, however, the board found only the absence of
a prior disciplinary record and full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and
a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings. Unlike the committee, the board
could not find that respondent acted without a self ish motive when she persisted in
misrepresenting to the trial court that her Louisiana tax return had been filed in order
to preserve her candidacy. Nevertheless, the board did not appear to consider a
dishonest or selfish motive in aggravation.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for nine months, with six months deferred, followed by two years of supervised
probation with the following conditions:
1. Within one year of the court’s imposition of discipline, respondent shall take
at least eight hours of her mandatory continuing legal education requirements
in the area of law office management, as approved by the Committee on
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education;
2. Within one year of the court’s imposition of discipline, respondent shall
successfully complete the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Ethics School;
and
3. Any failure of respondent to comply with the above conditions, or any
misconduct during the deferral or probationary periods will be grounds for
making the deferred suspension executory, or for imposing additional
discipline, as appropriate.
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The ODC filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly, the
case was doc keted for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(G)(1)(b).
DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
In this matter, the record supports a finding that respondent failed to file her
state income tax return for 2015, which resulted in her disqualification as a judicial
candidate. She also neglected a legal matter, failed to communicate with a client,
and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
This misconduct amounts to a violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as found by the disciplinary board.
Having found evid ence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
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mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent violated duties owed to her client, the public, the legal system,
and the legal profession. She acted negligently and knowingly, causing actual harm.
We agree with the board that the baseline sanction is suspension.
Case law suggests that the board’s recommended sanction is in the range of
appropriate sanctions. In re: Richmond, 08-0742 (La. 12/2/08), 996 So. 2d 282, and
In re: King, 19-0356 (La. 5/20/19), 271 So. 3d 1253, are instructive with respect to
Count I. In Richmond, an attorney filed a notice of candidacy for a seat on the New
Orleans City Council that contained a false statement regarding his domicile and
then made similar false statements in pleadings and testimony related to a lawsuit
challenging his candidacy. The court found that the attorney knowingly made false
statements in the context of qualifying for public office and suspended him from the
practice of law for six months, with all but sixty days deferred, followed by six
months of unsupervised probation. In King, an attorney made false representations
about her domicile when she qualified to run for judicial office. The attorney
ultimately pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation related to this conduct. For
this knowing and intentional misconduct, the court suspended the attorney from the
practice of law for one year.
Regarding Count II, In re: Hickman, 20-0292 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So. 3d 1036,
In re: Swafford, 17-2154 (La. 3/23/18), 238 So. 3d 957, and In re: Dirks, 17 -0067
(La. 6/29/17), 224 So. 3d 346, provide guidance. In Hickman , an attorney with a
prior disciplinary record neglected two legal matters, failed to communicate with
two clients, and misrepresented the status of a case to one client. The court
determined the attorney acted negligently an d knowingly and suspended him from
the practice of law for one year and one day, with all but three months deferred,
followed by one year of probation. In Swafford, an attorney neglected a succession
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matter, failed to respond to the client’s requests for information, and failed to timely
inform the client that he would not complete the representation. For this knowing
misconduct, the court suspended the attorney from the practice of law for six months,
with three months deferred, followed by one year of probation with conditions.
Finally, in Dirks, an attorney failed to properly communicate with his client
regarding the status of her case and provided false information to the client and to
the ODC. For this knowing misconduct, the court suspended the attorney from the
practice of law for sixty days.
Based on the above jurisprudence and considering the record, we will adopt
the board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for
nine months, with six months deferred, followed by two years of supervised
probation with the conditions recommended by the board.
DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Michelle
Andrica Charles, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30872, be and she hereby is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of nine months. Six months of this suspension
shall be deferred, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation, subject to
the conditions set forth by the disciplinary board. The probationary period shall
commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a
formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply the conditions of
probation, or any misconduct during the deferral or probationary periods, may be
grounds for making the deferred portion o f the suspension executory, or imposing
additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are
assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1,
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with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s
judgment until paid.