Crescent City Property Redevelopment Association, Llc v. Carmen G. Muniz; Des Capital, Llc; New Orleans Land Holdings, Llc; Richard Rachal Sdira, Llc; City Of New Orleans

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 01, 2021
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
CRESCENT CITY PROPERTY
REDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, LLC
VS.
CARMEN G. MUNIZ; DES CAPITAL, LLC;
NEW ORLEANS LAND HOLDINGS, LLC;
RICHARD RACHAL SDIRA, LLC; CITY OF
NEW ORLEANS
No. 2021-C-00371
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_ _ _ _ _
I
N RE: Crescent City Property Redevelopment Association, LLC - Applicant
Plaintiff; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari, Parish of Orleans Civil, Orleans Civil
District Court Number(s) 2015-09728, Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Number(s)
2020-CA-0421;
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 01, 2021
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
WJC
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
JBM
PDG
06/01/2021 "See News Release 024 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2021-C-00371
CRESCENT CITY PROPERTY REDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, LLC
VS.
CARMEN G. MUNIZ; DES CAPITAL, LLC; NEW ORLEANS LAND
HOLDINGS, LLC; RICHARD RACHAL SDIRA, LLC;
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
Parish of Orleans Civil
PER CURIAM.
Writ granted. The trial court erred in granting summary judgments finding
(1) the tax sale is absolutely null because of an insufficient delay for the legal
advertisement and lack of notice to owners of recorded interests in the property, and
(2) the absolutely null tax sale cannot serve as just title for purposes of ten-year
acquisitive prescription.
When two publications are required for a judicial sale, the first advertisement
must “be published at least thirty days before the date of the judicial sale.” See La.
R.S. 43:203(2). Only two days are excluded from th is delay: “neither the date of
such advertisement nor the date of the expiration of the delay, or the date of the
judicial sale, as the case may be, is included.” See La. R.S. 43:203(4). The
advertisement for the subject tax sale was published on October 1 8, 2002. The
thirty-day delay began the next day, October 19, 2002 , and ended thirty days later
on November 17, 2002, the day before the sale. This delay complies with the statute.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 5059 requires exclusion of a legal
holiday from the computation of a time period when the holiday is “the last day of
the period.” Here, the legal holiday, October 19, 2002, was the first day, not the last,
of the publication delay. Furthermore, Louisiana Revised Statutes 43:203 is the


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more specific provision applicable to advertising delays for judicial sales and thus
prevails over Article 5059. See State ex rel. Caldwell v. Molina Healthcare, Inc. ,
18-1768 (La. 5/8/19), 283 So. 3d 472, 479 (“A statute more specifically directed to
the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to a statute more general in
character.”) Section 43:203 does not require a legal holiday, regardless of where it
falls, be excluded from the thirty-day delay. The trial court erred in finding the first
advertisement failed to comply with the statutory delay in Louisiana Revised
Statutes 43:203.
The trial court found a lack of notice to all owners of recorded interests in the
property. Derrick Muse, a city official responsible for tax sales, attested in an
affidavit that “the City of New Orleans provided tax notices to all mortgagees and
all other parties with interests in the subject property recorded in the public records
of Orleans Parish prior to the . . . tax sale.” The trial court disregarded this affidavit,
finding it lacked specificity . The lack of specificity in the affidavit goes to the
weight, not the admissibility, of this evidence. In determining whether a factual
issue is genuine for purposes of summary judgment, a court should not consider the
merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony, or weigh evidence. See
Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 04 -1459 (La. 4/12/05) ,
907 So. 2d 37, 48. We find a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary
judgment as to whether necessary notice was provided to owners of recorded interest
in the property. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment declaring the
November 18, 2002 tax sale absolutely null, as a factual issue precludes that
determination.
Relative to the other summary judgment , we find the just-title determination
premature until the validity of the tax sale is properly adjudicated. Consequently,

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the court of appeal judgment is reversed, the July 17, 2020 summary judgments are
vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.
COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT REVERSED; SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
VACATED; CASE REMANDED.