Mindi Mapes and Donald Mapes, III, Individually and on Behalf of the Patient, Donald R. Mapes v. State of Louisiana, Through the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College on Behalf of Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division; Univeristy Medical Center Management Corporation

MINDI MAPES AND DONALD * NO. 2021-CA-0166
MAPES, III, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF THE *
DECEASED PATIENT, COURT OF APPEAL
DONALD R. MAPES *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
STATE OF LOUISIANA, *******
THROUGH THE BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS OF
LOUISIANA STATE
UNIVERSITY
AGRICULTURAL AND
MECHANICAL COLLEGE ON
BEHALF OF LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY HEALTH
CARE SERVICES DIVISION;
UNIVERISTY MEDICAL
CENTER MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2019-09159, DIVISION “G-11”
Honorable Robin M. Giarrusso, Judge
******
Judge Daniel L. Dysart
******
(Court composed of Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel
L. Dysart, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)

LOVE, C.J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT

R. Glenn Cater
Amanda C. Graeber
CATER & ASSOCIATES, LLC
631 St. Charles Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

L. David Adams
C. William Bradley, Jr.
Richard S. Crisler
BRADLEY MURCHISON KELLY & SHEA LLC
1100 Poydras Street, Suite 2700
New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

MARCH 2, 2022

DLD This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs-appellants,
RLB
SCJ Mindy Mapes and Donald Mapes, III, the children of the decedent, Donald Mapes,

appeal the district court’s November 20, 2020, judgment granting the motion for

summary judgment of defendant-appellee, University Medical Center Management

Corporation (“UMC”). For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s

judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The decedent, Mr. Mapes, had been an inmate at Elayn Hunt Correctional

Center (“EHCC”), with a history of medical conditions requiring treatment. On

September 8, 2015, Mr. Mapes’s deteriorating medical condition led to his transfer

from EHCC to UMC. His initial primary complaint was a kidney stone. He was

treated at UMC by UMC and LSU Health Science Center (“LSUHSC”) staff.

While at UMC, doctors ordered a Complete Blood Count (“CBC”) test, which

indicated Mr. Mapes’s platelet count was 25. This platelet level fell well below the

normally accepted range and triggered UMC’s protocol for critical value

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notification which requires that the laboratory verbally inform the nurse and that

the nurse verbally inform the doctor of the discrepancy. Mr. Mapes’s nurse was

notified of the platelet count at approximately 5:30 p.m. on September 8, 2015.

However, the record does not contain any indication that the UMC nurse then

verbally notified the doctor. Approximately twelve hours later, on September 9,

2015, Mr. Mapes was discharged back to EHCC. Mr. Mapes’s condition

worsened, which resulted in his transfer to St. Elizabeth Hospital, and thereafter to

Our Lady of the Lake Hospital. Test results at St. Elizabeth’s and Our Lady of the

Lake, respectively, showed multiple zones of brain hemorrhaging and petechial

hemorrhaging. Mr. Mapes died on September 11, 2015. The recording physician

noted several ailments, including intracerebral hemorrhage (bleeding of the brain),

hepatitis C virus, multisystem organ failure, and shock.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint before the Medical Review Panel (“MRP”)

against EHCC, LSUHSC, and UMC for medical malpractice in transferring and

failing to properly treat, assess, diagnose, and monitor Mr. Mapes. The MRP

convened on May 23, 2019, and issued the following findings:

As to University Medical Center Management Corp. d/b/a
University Medical Center:

The panel finds that the medical record reflects that a nurse was told
by the lab that the patient’s platelet was critically low. The nurse had
an obligation to verbally report to the attending physician about that
lab value, [sic] the nurse’s failure to do so constitutes a breach of the
standard of care. Otherwise, the nursing care was appropriate. It is
unlikely that a verbal report would have changed the patient’s
outcome.

2

As to Salvadore Suau, M.D.1:

The panel finds that he breached the standard of care. It appears from
his notes that he was not aware of the low platelet count meaning that
he had not checked the lab result prior to termination of his care and
recommendation for discharge. It was also a breach to not repeat the
CBC either at UMC or recommended [sic] it in the transfer order back
to the receiving facility. It is unlikely that followup [sic] would have
changed the patient’s ultimate outcome.

In light of the MRP findings, Plaintiffs timely filed the present suit against

EHCC, LSUHSC, and UMC. In response, all the defendants, including UMC,

filed motions for summary judgment. Each Defendant alleged that Plaintiffs

would be unable to prove that the breach of the standard of care was the proximate

cause of Mr. Mapes’s death. The district court granted UMC’s motion and denied

the summary judgment motions of both EHCC and LSUHSC.

Plaintiffs timely appealed the judgment granting UMC’s motion, asserting

that the trial court “erred by granting summary judgment in favor of UMC where

UMC failed to meet its summary-judgment burdens with appropriate evidence

establishing no genuine issues of material fact remained disputed as to causation of

damages and that it was entitled to summary judgment under the substantive law.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Appellate courts review judgments granting or denying motions for

summary judgment de novo using the same criteria district courts consider when

determining if summary judgment is proper.” Fertitta v. Regions Bank, 20-0300, p.

9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/20), 311 So. 3d 445, 452.

DISCUSSION

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1
Dr. Suau is a LSUHSC emergency room physician who treated Decedent at UMC.

3

“The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article

969.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). “The procedure is favored and shall be construed

to accomplish these ends.” Id. “[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted

if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no

genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). “The only documents that may be filed

in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written

stipulations, and admissions.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4).

“The burden of proof rests with the mover.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

However, “if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is

before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden . . . does

not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action,

or defense.” Id. Instead, the moving party must “point out to the court the absence

of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim,

action, or defense.” Id. Then, “[t]he burden is on the adverse party to produce

factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

“A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if

reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on

that issue, and summary judgment is appropriate.” Maddox v. Howard Hughes

Corp., 19-0135, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/17/19), 268 So. 3d 333, 337. “̍A fact is

material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiffs [sic]

cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it

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potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or

determines the outcome of the legal dispute.” Id. (quoting Chapital v. Harry

Kelleher & Co., Inc., 13-1606, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/4/14), 144 So. 3d 75, 81).

“Whether a fact is material is a determination that must be made based on the

applicable substantive law.” Maddox, 19-0135, p. 5, 268 So. 3d at 337.

UMC’s Motion for Summary Judgment arose within the context of a

medical malpractice action. In order to recover in a medical malpractice claim, La.

R.S. 9:2794 requires that a plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (i)

the standard of care applicable to defendant; (ii) defendant’s breach of the standard

of care; and (iii) the existence of a causal connection between the breach and the

resulting injury. “Expert testimony is generally required to establish the applicable

standard of care and whether or not that standard was breached, except where the

negligence is so obvious that a lay person can infer negligence without the

guidance of expert testimony.” Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726, p. 5 (La. 2/26/08), 977

So. 2d 880, 884.

“A defendant-health care provider does not have the burden of disproving

medical malpractice; rather, a defendant-health care provider only must point out

that the plaintiff cannot support his claim.” Jordan v. Cmty. Care Hosp., 19-0039,

p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/24/19), 276 So. 3d 564, 576. “Once a defendant-health

care provider has established an absence of factual support for an essential element

of the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must come forth with evidence to preclude

summary judgment.” Id.

UMC’s Motion for Summary Judgement argues that Plaintiffs could not

support their claim as to the element of causation. To support this assertion, UMC

provided the medical review panel opinion and the affidavit of Robert Baudauin,

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the MRP attorney chairman, attesting to the authenticity of the medical review

panel opinion. In response to Plaintiffs’ opposition, UMC provided additional

portions of Dr. Jenna Jordan’s deposition.2 UMC avers that the evidence provided

in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment effectively shifted the burden of

proof to Plaintiffs; that Plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence of a material

factual dispute; and that the granting of summary judgment was mandated as a

result. We disagree.

The MRP opinion does not establish an absence of factual support for the

element of causation. The opinion states that “it is unlikely that a verbal report

would have changed the patient’s outcome.” The plain language of that statement

is inconclusive as to causation. The MRP actually indicates that a verbal report

quite possibly could have changed Mr. Mapes’s result. The MRP also found that

UMC breached the standard of care when UMC’s nurse failed to verbally report

Mr. Mapes’s platelet level to the attending physician. But for this breach, the

physician would have been immediately prompted to re-order the Critical Blood

Count (CBC) lab test to further assess Mr. Mapes’ platelets and to develop a course

of necessary medical action. The MRP found that the physician’s failure to re-

administer the CBC constituted yet another breach of the standard of care, even

though the physician testified that he would not have altered the course of action

had a verbal notification been received. Therefore, we believe that the MRP

opinion fails to demonstrate that Plaintiffs lacked evidence of a causal relationship

between UMC’s breach and Mr. Mapes’s death, and the burden of proof was not

shifted to Plaintiffs based on the findings of the MRP.

2
Dr. Jordan served as a member of the MRP.

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Dr. Jordan’s deposition also fails to shift the burden of proof to Plaintiffs. In

fact, much of Dr. Jordan’s testimony supports the Plaintiffs’ theory of causation.

Dr. Jordan confirmed that the primary concern associated with a critically low

platelet level is the potential for spontaneous bleeding. Dr. Jordan continued by

explaining that a level less than ten could trigger such a bleed, and that even

though Mr. Mapes’s platelet level was twenty-five at the time the initial CBC test

was conducted at UMC, his abnormally low count should have triggered an

immediate investigation and an immediate repeat of the CBC, at the very least.

According to Dr. Jordan, the purpose of repeating the CBC is to determine whether

the platelet level is actively dropping and, if so, to determine how urgent the need

to act is going forward. The CBC lab test was never repeated at UMC, and the

subsequent CBC results from EHCC and St. Elizabeth’s returned platelet levels of

nine and eight, respectively, indicating that Mr. Mapes’ platelet level exhibited a

substantial downward trend. St. Elizabeth’s followed up with a CT scan which

showed Mr. Mapes sustained several small hemorrhages and one larger area of

bleeding in the right frontal region of his brain. Mr. Mapes’s death certificate lists

subarachnoid hemorrhage as the cause of death and Dr. Jordan concurred that in

this case the low platelet count was related to the hemorrhage. Given the foregoing

facts, we find that Dr. Jordan’s testimony failed to establish Plaintiffs’ lack of

factual support for the element of causation and that the burden of proof remained

with UMC.

However, even if this court were to find UMC’s Motion for Summary

Judgment sufficient to shift the burden of proof to Plaintiffs, we find that the

evidence Plaintiffs provided in support of their claim demonstrates that genuine

issues of material fact exist and that summary judgment was improper.

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Plaintiffs opposed the summary judgment with 1) UMC medical records, 2)

excerpts from Dr. Jenna Jordan’s deposition, 3) EHCC records, 4) St. Elizabeth

records, 5) Mr. Mapes’ death certificate, and 6) the affidavit of Dr. James

Lauridson. The district court concluded that this evidence was insufficient to

satisfy the Plaintiffs’ burden on summary judgment. We disagree. Taken as a

whole, these documents demonstrate that Plaintiffs will be able to meet their

evidentiary burden at trial. The UMC records indicate that Mapes’s initial lab test

returned a critically low platelet level. Dr. Jordan testified that such an abnormally

low platelet count should have triggered a verbal notification to the treating

physician to conduct a more thorough assessment and re-order the patient’s labs, at

a minimum. EHCC records show that Mapes’s condition continued to deteriorate

after he was discharged from UMC. Records from St. Elizabeth’s reveal that

Mapes’s platelet level declined drastically after the initial CBC was conducted at

UMC. Mr. Mapes’s cause of death was listed as intracerebral hemorrhage

(bleeding of the brain) on his death certificate. Finally, Dr. Lauridson’s affidavit

stated that “Mr. Mapes had documented thrombocytopenia and prolonged

coagulation issues [related to low platelet counts]… Had [he] received treatment

for these conditions, there was a greater chance than not, that he would not have

suffered fatal brain hemorrhage.” Thus, we find that Plaintiffs have sufficiently

established the existence of genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary

judgment.

DECREE

For the reasons expressed above, the judgment of the district court granting

summary judgment in favor of UMC is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded

to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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REVERSED AND REMANDED