State of Louisiana in the Interest of C.R. Vs.

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2021-CA-0209
THE INTEREST OF C.R.
*
COURT OF APPEAL
*
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2019-073-09-DQ-C, SECTION “C”
Honorable Candice Bates Anderson, Judge
******
Judge Daniel L. Dysart
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay, III, Judge Daniel L. Dysart,
Judge Paula A. Brown)

Jason Rogers Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
PARISH OF ORLEANS
G. Benjamin Cohen
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CHIEF OF APPEALS, PARISH OF ORLEANS
David B. LeBlanc
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA

Michael Henry Grey, Jr.
LOUISIANA CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
1100-B Milton Street
New Orleans, LA 70122

Haylie Jacobson
LOUISIANA CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
1100-B Milton Street
New Orleans, LA 70122

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

JUDGMENT AMENDED AND
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED
JULY 14, 2021

DLD
JFM This is a juvenile delinquency appeal. On September 17, 2019, C.R.1 was
PAB
adjudicated delinquent for the misdemeanor offense of negligent injuring, in

violation of La. R.S. 14:39.2 The juvenile court imposed a disposition of six

months in the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice (“OJJ”), suspended, placed

the juvenile on active probation for two years, and ordered restitution. The

juvenile court deferred fixing the amount of the restitution. Before the juvenile

court set the amount of the restitution, C.R. appealed his delinquency adjudication

and disposition, and this Court affirmed.3 On February 22, 2021, the juvenile court

ordered restitution in the amount of $10,236.15, payable in $200.00 monthly

installments. C.R. now appeals the judgment setting the amount of the restitution.

Upon careful review, we find that the juvenile court properly ordered and set

the amount of the restitution. However, the two-year probationary period imposed

at the disposition exceeded the statutory limits, and the judgment on appeal

improperly assessed restitution against C.R.’s mother. Accordingly, we amend the

1
C.R. was born on September 18, 2005. Pursuant to the confidentiality requirements set forth in
La. Ch.C. art. 412 regarding juvenile proceedings, we refer to the juvenile by his initials.
2
La. R.S. 14:39(A)(1) provides that negligent injuring is “[t]he inflicting of any injury upon the
person of another by criminal negligence.”
3
See State in Interest of C.R., 2019-0917 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 290 So.3d 220.

1

disposition to impose a probation term of one-year---the statutory maximum,

terminate supervised probation, and remove C.R.’s mother from the judgment

setting the amount of the restitution. In all other respects, the judgment fixing the

restitution amount is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

C.R.’s delinquency adjudication and disposition arose out of the shooting of

his cousin, also a minor.4 The underlying facts of the case are set forth in State in

Interest of C.R., 2019-0917 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 290 So.3d 330 (“C.R. I”). In

addition to other special conditions of probation, the juvenile court ordered

restitution at the September 17, 2019 delinquency adjudication and disposition

hearing. The juvenile court deferred fixing the amount of the restitution pending

the State’s submission of the victim’s documentation of expenditures attributable

to the shooting.

The disposition also referenced the juvenile court’s intent to transfer C.R.’s

probationary supervision to Plaquemines Parish and to otherwise retain the matter

in Orleans Parish for the sole purpose of restitution. 5 The juvenile court attempted

to transfer the case to Plaquemines Parish on September 30, 2019; however,

Plaquemines Parish denied the transfer on November 19, 2019.

The juvenile court acknowledged Plaquemines Parish’s denial of the transfer

at a January 28, 2020 pre-trial conference and set the matter for an OJJ sentence

review on April 28, 2020. The April sentence review was continued until July 24,

2020 because of Covid-19 related delays. At the July 24, 2020 sentence review,

4
C.R’s mother and the minor victim’s mother are sisters.
5
The record indicated that C.R.’s domicile was Plaquemines Parish.

2

the State submitted a letter and documentation from the victim’s family outlining

medical expenses and property damages approximating $200,000.00 resulting from

the victim’s shooting. The juvenile court held subsequent OJJ sentence reviews on

October 26, 2020 and January 25, 2021. At the January 25, 2021 sentence review,

the juvenile court received additional paperwork submitted by the State that

included itemization of expenditures paid by the victim’s various insurance

coverages and set a disposition/restitution status review for February 22, 2021.

At the February 22, 2021 status review,6 the juvenile court determined that

the victim’s out-of-pocket expenditures that were not subject to any insurance

coverages amounted to $10,236.15. The court ordered restitution in that amount

and orally advised that restitution had been assessed against the mother.

C.R. filed a motion and notice of appeal of the judgment ordering restitution,

which the juvenile court denied. C.R. sought writ review of the denial, and this

Court granted C.R.’s writ application. Finding that C.R. had a right to appeal the

restitution award judgment, this Court instructed the juvenile court to grant C.R.’s

motion and notice of appeal.7

This timely appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

C.R. alleges the following assignments of error:

1. The juvenile court imposed an illegal disposition when it ordered
probation beyond the statutory term;

2. The juvenile court erred by imposing restitution eighteen (18)
months after the adjudication hearing;

6
C.R.’s request to modify the disposition was continued.
7
See In Re C.R., 2021-0158 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/25/21) (unpub.).

3

3. The juvenile court erred by imposing restitution on C.R.’s mother
rather than on C.R., the child adjudicated delinquent; and

4. The juvenile court erred by imposing restitution without
consideration and in excess of C.R.’s ability to pay.

ERRORS PATENT

This Court has determined that an error patent review is warranted in

juvenile delinquency cases. See State in the Interest of A.H., 2011-1152, p. 9 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 12/21/11), 80 So.3d 1203, 1209 (citation omitted). An illegal

disposition constitutes an error patent. See State in Interest of J.T., 2011-1646, p.

24 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/16/12), 94 So.3d 847, 862. Here, in assigned errors one and

three, C.R. contends that the juvenile court imposed an illegal disposition in

assessing an active probation term beyond the statutory maximum and in ordering

his mother to pay restitution. Accordingly, this Court shall first conduct an error

patent review of these errors before addressing C.R.’s remaining assignments of

error contesting the juvenile court’s assessment of restitution.

Assigned Error No. 1: Illegal Probation Disposition

C.R. contends that the two-year probation disposition imposed is illegal as it

exceeds the permissible maximum sentence for a misdemeanor-grade adjudication

disposition pursuant to La. R.S.14:39(C) and La. Ch.C. art. 900(A). The State does

not contest the substance of C.R.’s argument on this issue. Instead, the State

maintains that this Court should not review the excessiveness of the two-year

probation term imposed because C.R. failed to timely file a motion to reconsider

sentence, did not object to the disposition at the time of his adjudication, and did

not raise the issue of excessiveness in his notice and motion for appeal. The State

relies on La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E) which provides:

4

Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a
specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be
based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or
the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging
any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

C.R. counters that he contests the legality, rather than the constitutional

excessiveness of the punishment imposed. In contrast to an excessive sentence

claim, La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) provides that “[a]n illegal sentence may be corrected

at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by the appellate court on

review.” Accordingly, the issue of the illegality of the sentence imposed is

properly before this Court.

La. R.S. 14:39(C) provides that “[w]hoever commits the crime of negligent

injuring shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not

more than six months, or both.” La. Ch.C. art. 900(A) provides, in pertinent part,

the following:

No judgment of disposition shall remain in force for a period
exceeding the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense which
forms the basis for the adjudication, except that if the child is placed
on probation, the term of probation may extend for a maximum of one
year, or for such longer period of time if the child is a full-time
participant in a juvenile drug court program operated by a court of this
state, if such participation has been ordered by the court as a condition
of the child’s probation.

Here, the record reflects that the juvenile court did not order C.R.’s

participation in a full-time juvenile drug court program as a condition of his

probation, an exception to the one-year statutory maximum for a misdemeanor

adjudication probation term. Nor did the disposition meet other exceptions to alter

the maximum probation term.8 Therefore, upon reviewing La. R.S. 14:39(C) in

8
La. Ch.C. art. 900(C) also provides that the maximums do not apply if:

5

pari materia with La. Ch.C. art. 900(A), the maximum probation term allowable at

the time of C.R.’s disposition was one year. Accordingly, we agree with C.R. that

the two-year active probation period imposed was illegal.

Upon finding an error in the disposition, courts are instructed to correct the

disposition where the error has imposed restrictions beyond what is authorized in

the statutes. See State in Interest of M.S., 2020-0346 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/5/20), 306

So.3d 487, 493. Moreover, “[w]here the defect in [disposition] does not involve

the exercise of discretion, the [disposition] may be corrected on appeal by

amendment rather than remand.” State in Interest of M.S., 2020-0346 (La. App. 4

Cir. 10/05/20), 306 So.3d 487, 493 (quoting State in Interest of H.L.F., 1997-2651,

p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/98), 713 So.2d. 810, 813 (citation omitted).

The record establishes that C.R.’s active probation term has already

exceeded the statutory maximum of one-year.9 Accordingly, we amend the

disposition to remove the two-year active probation term, substitute a one-year

(1) A portion of an order of commitment was suspended, in which case the term
of parole shall end when the time period so suspended has elapsed.

(2) The child commits a felony after having been committed to the custody of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections or while on probation and is
tried as an adult and convicted or pleads guilty, in which case the judgment of
disposition in the juvenile court shall terminate as of the date of conviction.
The child shall earn no diminution of his felony sentence based upon time
served under the order of disposition.

(3) The judgment expires by its own term, is modified, or is vacated.

(4) The child reaches age twenty-one.
9
Based on the September 17, 2019 disposition, a one-year probation term would have expired on
September 17, 2020. However, the juvenile court extended C.R.’s probation for an additional
two years at the January 28, 2020 pre-trial conference. The court noted that no probation
services had been put into place since the September 2019 disposition inasmuch as Plaquemines
Parish had rejected the transfer of C.R.’s case. Nonetheless, even if the January 28, 2020 date is
applied to trigger the start of C.R.’s probation, a one-year probation term would have concluded
on January 28, 2021.

6

active probation term, and order the immediate termination of C.R.’s supervisory

probation.

Assignment of Error No. 3: Legality of Restitution Order Against Mother

C.R. maintains that the juvenile court lacked authority under La. Ch.C. art.

899B(2)(c) to order his mother, T.S.A.,10 to pay restitution inasmuch as the article

only permits assessment of restitution against the child adjudicated delinquent. We

agree.

La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c) allows the court to impose as a condition of

probation “[a] requirement that the child make reasonable restitution to any victim

for any personal or property damage caused by the child in the commission of a

delinquent act.” Well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence provides that where the

language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute should be applied as

written. See State of Louisiana v. Watts, 2009-0912, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/6/10),

41 So.3d 625, 635 (citation omitted). La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c) clearly and

unambiguously imposes the duty to make reasonable restitution on the delinquent

child. Had the legislature intended to allow courts to directly order parents to pay

restitution, it could have done so as it did when it placed other special probationary

10
This Court notes a discrepancy and/or an ambiguity involving the written disposition and the
transcript of the judgment fixing the restitution amount. The written disposition stated that “[t]he
Court assesses restitution in the amount of $10,236.15” and provides that “[t]he family can mail
the payment of $200.00 to the address of the victim.” On the other hand, the transcript reveals
that the juvenile court specifically instructed T.S.A. as follows: “[m]a’am, you’re going to need
to start making payments to your sister in the amount of $200.00 per month until those payments
are made.” After C.R.’s counsel objected, the juvenile court added, “I’ve assessed restitution
against the mother. You represent the mother now, Mr. Grey?”

Generally, when there is a discrepancy or lack of clarity between the minutes and the transcript,
the transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). In applying this
principle to the present matter, any reconciliation of the dispositions in the minutes and the
transcript necessarily requires this Court to include T.S.A, C.R.’s mother, as a party to the
juvenile court’s order that fixed the amount of restitution to be paid.

7

conditions under La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2) on both the child and parent.11

Accordingly, when we apply the restitution statute as written, the juvenile court

erred in directly assessing restitution against C.R.’s mother.

This Court reached a similar result in State in the Interest of D.M.G., 579

So.2d 525, 528 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991). In D.M.G., the trial court ordered the

mother, along with the child, to make restitution to the victim for 50% of the

victim’s damages. In deleting that portion of the judgment which ordered the

mother to pay restitution, the D.M.G. Court reasoned that the mother could not be

ordered to pay restitution as she was not a formal party to the proceedings, and she

could not be held financially responsible.12 As such, in accordance with our

jurisprudence, we order that restitution be assessed only against C.R. and order the

removal of C.R.’s mother’s name from the restitution order.

Notwithstanding our agreement with the findings of the D.M.G. case, we

clarify that C.R’s mother may still be found financially responsible for any

restitution assessed against C.R. This Court explained in State v. Portie, 2008-

1580, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/09), 22 So.3d 213, 222 that a restitution order is a

civil money judgment that may be enforced in the same manner as a money

judgment in a civil case in accordance with La. C.Cr. P. art. 895.1(A)(2)(a).13

11
See, e.g., La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(b) which permits a court to impose a “requirement that the
child or his parent or his legal guardian perform court-approved community service activities[;]”
or La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(g) which provides, in part, that “[t]he court may order a parent, tutor,
guardian, or other person who is financially responsible for the care of the child to be responsible
for payment of all or part of any supervision fee imposed.”
12
See also State in Interest R.L.K., 1995-1277, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/95/95), 666 So.2d 427,
432, which vacated an order for the mother to pay restitution, finding that if restitution was
ordered, only the juvenile should be ordered to pay the restitution.
13
La.C.Cr. P. art. 895(A)(2)(a) states, in relevant part, that “[t]he order to pay restitution . . . is
deemed a civil money judgment in favor of the person to whom restitution, costs, or fines are
owed. . .” In addition to proceedings by the court which orders the restitution . . ., the judgment
may be enforced in the same manner as a money judgment.

8

Here, we note that C.R. was a minor at the time of his offense. La. C.C. art.

2318 provides that the father and the mother are responsible for the damage caused

by their minor children.14 Hence, although we remove the mother’s name from the

restitution order, the victim still retains all other civil remedies permitted under

statutory and jurisprudential authority to execute on the restitution order as a civil

money judgment against C.R.’s mother or father in the event C.R. defaults on his

restitution obligation.

We now return to address C.R.’s remaining assignments of error.

Timeliness of Restitution Disposition

C.R.’s arguments regarding the timeliness of the restitution disposition falls

primarily in two categories: (1) the juvenile court’s imposition of restitution

eighteen months after the adjudication hearing, which C.R. contends violated La.

Ch.C. art. 892, and (2) the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution

in February 2021 because the statutory maximum one-year probation term it could

impose had already expired. In this error, C.R. conflates the disposition ordering

restitution and the disposition fixing the amount of the restitution. Hence, our

review shall separately address the timeliness of each disposition.

As to the order of restitution, the written record and the transcript in C.R. I

show that the juvenile court imposed restitution as a part of C.R.’s disposition on

September 17, 2019, the same date as the delinquency adjudication. The juvenile

court discussed restitution as follows:

14
La. C.C. art. 2318 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he father and mother are responsible for the
damage occasioned by their minor child, who resides with them or who has been placed by them
under the care of other persons . . . .”

9

And then obviously we never talked about restitution - - hey,
but you know, one issue we have not - - excuse me. So one issue that
we have not resolved is restitution. Obviously, he has been
adjudicated delinquent. Obviously this child was injured. Obviously
he has had to have five injuries [sic]. Obviously that has cost money,
there has been money associated with, I’m sure, deductibles for
insurance, care, damage to your home, I would suggest that, so you
need to obviously put that together for the District Attorney if you all
are going to request restitution. Obviously that restitution will be due
and owing by Mr. R[]s’ family so I’m not certain whether or not you
had to make any type of claims in order to get your house fixed, or to
get your house repaired, or if there was any money that was out of
pocket, but most certainly you need to give that information to the
District Attorney as restitution would be assessed in this case, okay.

Okay, so do you have - - so what we can do is we can come
back in about 30 days when you can get documentation together.
Obviously all the families do not need to be present the attorneys
could be here, but so that you-all are aware that there would be
restitution due and owing.

The written record also indicates that “[t]his matter will remain in Orleans Parish

for the sole purpose of restitution. State is to provide any and all receipts in

regards to restitution.” Additionally, the juvenile court encouraged the parties to

talk amongst themselves to arrive at a restitution number.

Based on the above, clearly, the adjudication and disposition hearing which

took place on September 17, 2019 timely ordered restitution within the thirty day

time delays afforded by La. Ch.C. art. 892.15 Moreover, in C.R. I, this Court

affirmed the disposition imposing the special condition of restitution. That

notwithstanding, the juvenile court delayed completion of the disposition terms

when it deferred setting the amount of restitution pending receipt of the

documentation establishing the sum owed. Accordingly, in addressing the

15
La. Ch.C. art. 892 provides that “[p]rior to entering a judgment of disposition, the court shall
conduct a disposition hearing. The disposition may be conducted immediately after the
adjudication and shall be conducted within thirty days after the adjudication. Such period may
be extended for good cause.”

10

timeliness of the disposition based on the eighteen-month delay between the

timely-ordered restitution disposition and the hearing fixing the amount of the

restitution, the issue this Court must resolve is whether the delay constituted an

unreasonable delay in sentencing. We determine that it was not.

This Court discussed the parameters to determine unreasonable sentencing

delays in juvenile matters in State in Interest of T.W., 2013-1564, p. 10 (La. App. 4

Cir. 5/14/14), 141 So.3d 822, 828-29 as follows:

Louisiana Children’s Code article 892 does not provide a
remedy for a violation of the time limitation. When procedural
matters are not addressed by the Children’s Code, the juvenile court
proceeds under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. La.
Ch.C. art. 104. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 874
provides that “[s]entences shall be imposed without unreasonable
delay. If the defendant claims the sentence has been unreasonably
delayed, he may invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the appellate
court.” The sanction for an unreasonable delay is to divest the court
of the power to impose the sentence. State v. McQueen, 308 So.2d
752, 755 (La. 1975).

To determine whether the sentence delay is unreasonable, the
court will apply the four factors developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33
L.Ed. 104 (1972): the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice
the defendant has suffered.

In applying the Barker factors, this Court acknowledges that the length of

the delay between the order to pay restitution and setting the amount (eighteen

months) was significant. However, in reviewing the other factors and

circumstances of this case ---- the reasons for the delay, C.R.’s failure to assert his

right to a speedy trial and/or disposition, and the lack of prejudice----we conclude

that the eighteen-month delay in setting the restitution amount was not

unreasonable.

11

In considering the reasons for the delay, the record shows that the juvenile court

deferred fixing the amount of the restitution pending receipt of documentation

from the victim and his family. Court-ordered restitution shall not exceed the

actual pecuniary loss to the victim. See State of Louisiana v. Walker, 2015-1026,

p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/16), 192 So.3d 813, 818. Therefore, the juvenile court

appropriately deferred fixing the restitution amount to give the victim and his

family time to document their pecuniary losses and for the court to evaluate that

evidence. See State in the Interest of J.C.O., (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/2/04), 877 So.2d

1020, 1025 n.3, where the Second Circuit observed that a disposition hearing not

conducted within the statutory delays was extended for good cause where the delay

was caused, in part, by preparation of reports to aid in disposition.

Here, the victim’s family did not submit restitution expenditures to the State

until July 2020. Upon submission, an additional delay occurred when the juvenile

court further asked the victim’s family to itemize expenditures not covered by

insurance policies. The family explained in its victim impact statement that any

delay in gathering the restitution documentation resulted from the fact that the

family was still accumulating expenditures as the victim had undergone multiple

surgeries, faced future surgeries and extensive physical therapy, was required to

purchase medical equipment, and had other ongoing medical care. Indeed, on the

day of the hearing fixing restitution, the victim’s mother indicated the victim had

another procedure scheduled in the upcoming weeks.

The record also reflects that Covid-19 concerns caused delays in scheduling

status conferences and disposition hearings. We also note potential delays

resulting from the juvenile court’s aborted attempt to transfer C.R.’s case to

12

Plaquemines Parish and C.R.’s appeal of the September 17, 2019 delinquency

adjudication and order of restitution.16

The third Barker factor, a defendant’s request for a speedy trial, does not

apply to the present matter. Although C.R. did object to the disposition fixing the

restitution amount, C.R. never filed a motion for a speedy trial or a related motion

urging the juvenile court to timely fix the restitution amount.

C.R. also does not meet the fourth Barker factor. C.R. has not shown any

prejudice from the delay in setting the restitution amount. As noted by the State,

C.R. was not incarcerated; he was not forced to make any payments; and his active

probation was not extended. The juvenile court also made C.R. aware at the initial

adjudication and disposition that he would have to make restitution. Therefore, the

record contradicts C.R.’s claim that “there was no indication restitution would be

imposed beyond the thirty day time period.” In State ex rel. A.M., 2007-1228, pp.

13-14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/08), 983 So.2d 176, 185, this Court reasoned that where

the juvenile could not prove he was prejudiced by the delay in sentencing, any

error in the delay was harmless. Likewise, in the present matter, any error

associated with the deferred disposition amounts to harmless error as C.R. has not

demonstrated he was prejudiced by the delay.

When we apply the Barker factors, the eighteen-month sentencing delay was

not so unreasonable as to divest the juvenile court of the power to order the

restitution amount.17 Therefore, we find this assigned error is without merit.

16
This Court affirmed the adjudication and disposition on January 29, 2020. See n.3.
17
Relatedly, La. Ch.C. art. 892 permits a disposition hearing to be continued for good cause
shown. Although there was no hearing to show good cause, based on the totality of the
circumstances, good cause existed for the delay in fixing the restitution amount.

13

The second part of C.R.’s claim challenging the timeliness of the restitution

award argues the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to set a restitution amount after

C.R.’s one-year maximum probation term had expired. La. Ch.C. art. 313(A)

specifies a juvenile court’s duration of jurisdiction over proceedings ends when

any of the following conditions are met:

(1) Declination of jurisdiction.

(2) Transfer of the proceeding.

(3) Expiration or satisfaction of an informal adjustment agreement.

(4) Expiration or satisfaction of an informal adjustment plan.

(5) Expiration, satisfaction, or vacation of a juvenile disposition or
adult sentence.

(6) Dismissal of the proceeding.

Thus, pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 313(A)(5), the juvenile court retains

jurisdiction until the expiration, satisfaction, or vacation of C.R.’s disposition.

Inasmuch as C.R. was ordered to pay restitution as a condition of his probation at

the initial disposition and that condition had not been satisfied at the time

restitution was fixed, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction necessarily continued beyond

the conclusion of any supervised probation, regardless of the term. As we decline

to vacate the disposition fixing the restitution for the reasons discussed herein, the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction over C.R. remains uninterrupted. Thus, C.R.’s

timeliness arguments lack merit.

Excessive Restitution Amount

C.R.’s final assignment of error contends that the juvenile court’s restitution

order of $10,236.15, in monthly installments of $200.00, is in excess of his ability

to pay. C.R. argues he is indigent and thus, the restitution amount contravenes the

14

requirement under La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c) for “reasonable” restitution and La.

C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(A)(1) which requires the court to base restitution on the earning

capacity and assets of the defendant.18

As discussed herein, only the child can be included in the order to pay

restitution in a juvenile proceeding. Nevertheless, there is no statutory prohibition

against consideration of the parents’ assets in evaluating the juvenile’s capacity to

pay, especially in light of La. C.C. art. 2318 that subjects the parents to liability for

the damages caused by their minor child. At the restitution hearing, the juvenile

court established that C.R.’s mother was employed as a bus driver and his

stepfather was also gainfully employed. The evidence also documented that the

victim and his family had incurred expenses in excess of $200,000.00 and actual

out-of-pocket expenses of $10,236.15, and the losses were still accruing.

C.R. maintains that because he is indigent, restitution serves no rehabilitative

purpose. As noted, however, the record shows C.R. may have access to resources

to satisfy the restitution order. Moreover, Louisiana jurisprudence establishes that

a juvenile court’s order of restitution requiring the juvenile to bear accountability

for his actions is a reasonable form of rehabilitation. See State in the Interest of

D.B., 2013-1364, p. 10 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/23/14), 137 So.3d 1282, 1288. “Ordering

a child to make partial restitution to the victim not only serves the public interest

but is also in the interest of the child by teaching him that he will be held not only

morally but also financially responsible for his acts.” D.M.G., 1990-1080, 579

So.2d at 528.

18
See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(A)(1) which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he restitution
payment shall be made, in discretion, of the court, either in a lump sum or in monthly
installments based on the earning capacity and assets of the defendant.”

15

District courts have broad discretion in sentencing decisions, including the

ordering of restitution. See Walker, 2015-1026, p. 8, 192 So.3d at 818 (citations

omitted). Accordingly, appellate courts will not set aside a district court’s

judgment on restitution absent an abuse of discretion. Id. In this case, the victim

sustained severe injuries. We cannot say that the restitution amount ordered was

unreasonable so as to constitute an abuse of the district court’s discretion. This

error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we amend the disposition to impose a one-

year active probation term, terminate the probation, and remove C.R.’s mother

from the order to pay restitution. In all other respects, the judgment fixing the

restitution amount is affirmed.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED

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