Stephanie Woodside Jennings v. Quincy Maurice Jennings

STEPHANIE WOODSIDE * NO. 2021-CA-0386
JENNINGS
*
VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL
*
QUINCY MAURICE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JENNINGS *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2020-07432, DIVISION “I-14”
Honorable Lori Jupiter, Judge
******
Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge
Regina Bartholomew-Woods)

Michael J. Hall
Jonique Martin Hall
Law Office of Michael J. Hall, L.L.C.
2401 Westbend Pkwy., Suite 2102
New Orleans, LA 70114

Cherrell S. Taplin
LISKOW & LEWIS, APLC
701 Poydras Street, Suite 5000
New Orleans, LA 70139

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

Edwin Mark Shorty, Jr.
Nathan M. Chiantella
EDWIN M. SHORTY, JR. & ASSOCIATES, APLC
650 Poydras Street, Suite 2515
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED
DECEMBER 1, 2021

RBW

RML

SCJ

This matter stems from a divorce petition where one spouse sought a fault-

based divorce, and the other spouse reconvened seeking a divorce based on living

separate and apart. This Court is tasked with determining whether the trial court is

obligated to forgo considering a fault-based divorce when a divorce based on

living separate and apart is also prayed for in a reconventional demand, as well as

what is the necessary the burden of proof for a fault based divorce pursuant to

adultery, physical abuse, and the existence of a protective order.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2009, Defendant-Appellant, Quincy Jennings (“Mr.

Jennings”), and Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephanie Woodside-Jennings (“Ms.

1

Woodside”1) married. Both parties considered a divorce near the end of 2009, but

they ultimately sought counseling and reconciled.

On June 26, 2020, the parties began living separate and apart.

On September 3, 2020, Ms. Woodside filed a petition for divorce

(hereinafter “Woodside Petition”) pursuant to La. Civ. Code arts. 103(2)

(adultery), 103(4) (physical abuse), and 103(5) (existence of a protective order).

On October 19, 2020, Mr. Jennings filed an answer denying the allegations

in the Woodside Petition.

On January 8, 2021, Ms. Woodside filed a motion to fix a rule to show cause

why an art. 103 divorce should not be granted. A hearing in the matter was set for

March 16, 2021.

On January 19, 2021, Mr. Jennings filed a reconventional demand seeking a

full and final divorce in his favor pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 103(1), asserting

the parties have voluntarily lived separate and apart, without reconciliation, for a

period in excess of 180 days.

On February 18, 2021, Ms. Woodside filed an answer to the reconventional

demand reiterating her demand for divorce under arts. 103(2, 4-5).

On April 7, 2021, Mr. Jennings’s reconventional demand for a no-fault

divorce, as well as Ms. Woodside’s fault-based divorce, came for hearing before

the trial court.

1
Ms. Woodside has returned to using her maiden name and refers to herself by this name in the
court records.

2

The trial court rendered a judgment of divorce in favor of Ms. Woodside

granting the divorce pursuant to arts. 103(2, 4-5); and denied Mr. Jennings’s

reconventional demand for divorce pursuant to art. 103(1).

On April 30, 2021, Mr. Jennings timely filed, and was granted, a motion and

order for a devolutive appeal.

This appeal timely followed.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error and Issues for Review

Mr. Jennings asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied

his reconventional demand for an art. 103(1) divorce and instead granted Ms.

Woodside’s petition for divorce under La. Civ. Code arts. 103(2), 103(4), and

103(5).

Mr. Jennings presents the following issues for review:

 Whether the trial court erred in granting an article 103(2, 4, 5) divorce
when a 103(1) divorce had been prayed for and was pending prior to
the filing of the 103 divorce;

 Whether the trial court erred in finding that adultery was a cause in
the breakup of the marriage;

 Whether the trial court erred in finding that there had been domestic
abuse in the relationship; and

 Whether the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony at the trial
of the matter.

Analysis

Standard of Review

A trial court’s finding of fault in a divorce is a factual determination subject

to the manifest error standard of review. Thomas v. Thomas, 2017-0760, p. 2 (La.

3

App. 4 Cir. 2/21/18), 238 So. 3d 515, 518; Noto v. Noto, 09-1100, p. 6 (La. App. 5

Cir. 5/11/10), 41 So. 3d 1175, 1179. When findings are determined based on

witness credibility, the trier of fact is granted “great deference.” Thomas, 2017-

0760, p. 2, 238 So. 3d at 518. To reverse the trial court’s finding of fact, the

appellate court must find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the

verdict, and that the record establishes the verdict as manifestly wrong. Id.

I. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Granting an Article 103(2, 4, 5) Divorce
When a 103(1) Divorce Had Been Prayed For and Was Pending Prior to the
Filing of the 103 Divorce

Mr. Jennings first asserts his reconventional demand seeking a divorce based

on La. Civ. Code art. 103(1) should have taken precedence over Ms. Woodside’s

petition seeking a fault-based divorce. In support of his position, Mr. Jennings

relies on Watters v. Watters: wherein this Court reasoned that when a divorce is

based on living separate and apart there is no reason to address issues of fault in a

divorce. 607 So. 2d 948, 949 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992). In Watters, the plaintiff-

husband initially filed for a La. Civ. Code art. 102 divorce pursuant to living

separate and apart. Id. The defendant-wife filed a reconventional demand

requesting a fault based divorce because of adultery. Id. This Court reasoned the

legislature intended for art. 102 to provide “an expeditious method of granting a

divorce” and litigating fault added delays to what was intended as a streamlined

process. Id. at 950. This Court further stated the defendant-wife would still have

the opportunity to litigate fault after the divorce was granted. Id.

4

The current case is distinguishable from Watters because both parties are

seeking an art. 103 divorce which allows for the possibility of fault. The primary

demand seeks a fault-based divorce. When both parties are seeking a divorce

through art. 103, the trial court should allow for both assertions to be tried. Yates v.

Yates, 355 So. 2d 573, 574–75 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (Wherein the court

reasoned that because the primary cause of action, adultery, was pending when the

reconventional demand based on living separate and apart was filed, the trial court

should have considered both the principal and reconventional demands); Ogea v.

Ogea, 378 So. 2d 984, 991 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (wherein the court reasoned the

trial court properly considered both the main and the reconventional demand where

both parties sought a divorce based on art. 103). After hearing both demands, the

trial court would have discretion to grant the divorce on either ground “depending

upon the evidence adduced.” Yates, 355 So. 2d at 575. Mr. Jennings’s reliance on

Watters is misplaced because both divorce demands are based on art. 103. Thus we

find that the trial court did not err in hearing both art. 103 petitions before deciding

upon which grounds to grant the divorce.

II. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Finding That Adultery Was a Cause in the
Breakup of the Marriage and Whether the Trial Court Erred In Allowing
Hearsay Testimony at the Trial of the Matter

Because Mr. Jennings’s second and fourth assignments of error are related,

this Court shall examine them together. Mr. Jennings asserts the trial court erred in

finding that adultery had occurred during the marriage and, in allowing hearsay

testimony to prove the adultery. Mr. Jennings contends the adultery complained of

5

occurred early in the marriage, and the couple reconciled; therefore, adultery can

no longer be used as a basis for divorce. Ms. Woodside counters that there were

further acts of adultery after the couple’s reconciliation which were a cause of the

divorce.

The petitioner claiming adultery bears the burden of proof by preponderance

of the evidence. Tidwell v. Tidwell, 49,512, p. 2 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152 So.

3d 1045, 1047. Adultery may be established by direct, indirect, or circumstantial

evidence. Id. “If circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon, then the proof must

be so convincing as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt of

adultery.” Id. Reconciliation can be used to extinguish a cause of action for a

divorce. La. Civ. C. art. 104; Miller v. Miller, 2013-1043, p. 9 (La. App. 3 Cir.

4/2/14), 161 So. 3d 690, 696. Ms. Woodside, as the party claiming adultery, has

the burden of proof. In the present case, the evidence supporting the adultery claim

came solely from testimony and is therefore circumstantial.

Because Mr. Jennings asserts the couple reconciled after his affair, this

Court must consider the timeline of the marriage. Mr. Jennings and Ms. Woodside

married on February 14, 2009. Shortly after marrying, still in 2009, Mr. Jennings

confessed to having an extra-marital relationship, and the couple separated at the

end of 2009. They received counseling through their church and reconciled in

2010. The couple remained married and lived together. Approximately nine (9)

years later, in 2019, Ms. Woodside learned Mr. Jennings was engaged in a new

extra-marital affair after speaking with the mistress and reviewing Mr. Jennings’s

6

phone records. In June 2020, the couple separated with the intent of dissolving the

marriage.

After separating, Ms. Woodside learned Mr. Jennings acknowledged being

engaged in an affair in 2018. Mr. Robin Richardson (“Mr. Richardson”) testified

that Mr. Jennings admitted to him that he was having an extra-marital affair.

According to Mr. Richardson, on June 9, 2018, he and Mr. Jennings were looking

at houses together and discussing plans for flipping houses. At some point, Mr.

Jennings changed the topic of conversation and showed Mr. Richardson pictures of

a woman to whom he was attracted. Mr. Jennings then told Mr. Richardson, “I’m

having a sexual relationship with another woman.” This testimony was used as

evidence showing Mr. Jennings engaged in a new, distinct extramarital affair after

the couple’s 2010 reconciliation.

We next turn to Mr. Jennings’s assertion that the testimony of Mr.

Richardson to prove the adultery allegation was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is

“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” State

v. Smith, 2011-0091, p. 12-13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/11/12), 96 So. 3d 678, 687; La.

Code Evid. art. 801(C). Generally, hearsay is excluded. Id. An exception to the

general rule is a statement against interest. Terry v. Lagasse, 266 So. 2d 231, 233

(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972). A statement against interest is defined as:

A statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him

7

against another, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 804B(3).

An adverse party is allowed to introduce statements which were made out of

court by a party-opponent. Terry, 266 So. 2d at 233 (quoting Pacholik v. Gray, 187

So. 2d 480, 483 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). Additionally, when the party against

whom the adverse statement is being used is afforded the opportunity of cross-

examination to challenge the credibility of the witness and/or provide the full

context of the statement, the statement is admissible for the trier of fact to

determine credibility. Id. Finally, failure to object at the time the testimony is

offered “constitutes a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility, and such

evidence may be considered and given probative effect.” Brown v. Chategnier,

2016-0373, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/14/16), 208 So. 3d 410, 414; Walley v. Vargas,

2012–0022, p. 15 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/12), 104 So. 3d 93, 104.

Mr. Jennings’s statement to Mr. Richardson wherein he admitted to having

an affair amounted to statement against his pecuniary interest and triggered the art.

804B(3) hearsay exception, because it subjected Mr. Jennings to civil liability in

the divorce proceedings. Moreover, Mr. Richardson was subject to cross-

examination by Mr. Jennings, further making the statement admissible. Finally,

Mr. Jennings failed to object to Mr. Richardson’s testimony at the trial and

therefore waived his right to later object to its admissibility. Thus, based on the

8

aforementioned, we find that the trial court did not err in allowing and considering

the testimony of Mr. Richardson.

Having determined the testimony of Mr. Richardson was admissible, we

next consider the trial court’s findings regarding adultery. At trial, both parties

testified regarding the alleged adultery and were cross-examined. Ms. Woodside

testified to viewing Mr. Jennings’s phone records and speaking with an individual

she believed had first-hand knowledge of the affair—the mistress. Ms. Woodside

testified that the adultery she alleged in the petition stems from a new affair that

she had learned of in 2019 and not the 2009 affair from which, she acknowledges,

the couple reconciled. In addition to her own testimony, Ms. Woodside offered the

witness, Mr. Richardson, who provided testimony that, in 2018, Mr. Jennings

confessed to him that he was having an extra-marital affair. This statement, made

in the present tense at the time it was uttered, was an admission, by Mr. Jennings,

of a new affair distinct from the 2009 affair that was the subject of the couple’s

reconciliation.

As explained supra, circumstantial evidence regarding adultery must be so

convincing as to exclude any other possible conclusion but that adultery occurred.

In domestic cases, the trial judge is vested with great discretion in evaluating the

credibility of witnesses. Hebert v. Hebert, 381 So. 2d 966, 968 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1980) (quoting Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75, 78 (La. 1977)). The conclusions

of the trial court are accorded substantial weight and should not be disturbed unless

there is a showing of manifest error. Id.

9

After granting the divorce in favor of Ms. Woodside, the trial court provided

written reasons for judgment.2 The trial court explained that after hearing and

considering all the testimony, it determined Ms. Woodside was more credible than

Mr. Jennings. Furthermore, the trial court reasoned Mr. Jennings alluded to an

affair even without specifically admitting that he had committed adultery. Based

on the admittedly circumstantial evidence presented at trial, the trial court found

Ms. Woodside met her burden of proving the adultery allegation.

All evidence was weighed and considered by the trial court before it made

the ruling that adultery was a cause of the divorce. Accordingly, we, therefore find

no error in the trial court’s determination that adultery occurred and was in fact a

cause of the divorce.

III. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Finding There Had Been Domestic Abuse
in the Relationship

Finally, Mr. Jennings asserts the trial court erred in finding domestic abuse

on his part as a cause of the dissolution of the marriage. Mr. Jennings contends the

trial court wrongfully allowed the admission of past protective orders and abuse

prevention orders, because no testimony had been taken, there had been no formal

findings of abuse, and Ms. Woodside withdrew her allegations.

Per art. 103(5), a divorce shall be granted upon proof that a protective order

or an injunction was issued during the marriage against the other spouse to protect

2
“Reasons for judgment serve to set forth the basis for the trial court’s holding and are not
binding; however, the appellate court may use the written reasons for judgment ‘to gain insight
into the district court's judgment.’” Bernstein v. Bernstein, 2019-1106, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir.
2/10/21), 313 So. 3d 413, 423, writ denied, 2021-00390 (La. 5/4/21), 315 So. 3d 220, and writ
denied, 2021-00380 (La. 5/4/21), 315 So. 3d 222 (quoting Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009-0571, p.
78 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So. 3d 507, 572).

10

the spouse seeking the divorce if the protective order was issued “after a

contradictory hearing or consent decree.” A protective order may be granted when

either:

1. “The parties enter into a consent agreement,” or

2. The accused party was given “[r]easonable notice and
opportunity to be heard … sufficient to protect that
person’s right to due process.”

La. Stat. Ann. § 46:2136.

In the current case, Mr. Jennings explains the protective orders considered

by the trial court had not been issued following contradictory hearings or pursuant

to any consent decrees. Specifically, Mr. Jennings points out that no testimony was

taken and no affirmative findings were made by the trial court. This contention

lacks merit. Testimony is not necessary for a contradictory hearing to have taken

place. See Barber v. Barber, 2015-1021, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/15/16), 2016 WL

1535195, at *5 (Wherein the trial court found a contradictory hearing occurred

even though no testimony was taken because the Louisiana statute does not

mandate the manner in which evidence is taken or require the hearing be

“susceptible of transcription”).

On two occasions, Mr. Jennings was issued stay away orders following

instances of alleged domestic abuse. Stay away orders instituted as a condition of

release from prison or jail are considered protective orders for the purpose of

protection from domestic violence. State v. Kumar, 46,056, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir.

3/2/11), 58 So. 3d 544, 551. Both times, Mr. Jennings signed the stay away orders

11

after stipulating he would stay away from Ms. Woodside. Mr. Jennings’s signature

indicates a hearing occurred for each of the two orders issued because his presence

would be necessary to acquire the signature; additionally, his appearance to sign

indicates he had proper notice. Mr. Jennings, during his testimony, read into the

trial court record the wording of one of the signed stay away orders acknowledging

a hearing had taken place. The trial court did not err in allowing evidence of past

stay away orders because the orders, as signed by Mr. Jennings offered proof of

protective orders that were issued following contradictory hearings as required by

art. 103(5).

The trial court also considered orders of protection issued in the past and the

credibility of both Mr. Jennings and Ms. Woodside through their respective

testimony. Based on the testimonies, the trial court reasoned both parties may have

mutually engaged in physical altercations, and it found the altercations rose to the

level of abuse. The trial court ultimately ruled Ms. Woodside provided evidence

sufficient to prove she suffered abuse at the hands of Mr. Jennings when she

included art. 103(4) as one of the grounds for her divorce filing.

Generally, in an action for divorce “mutual, equal fault operates as a bar to

relief being given to either litigant[; therefore], the courts consider in each case the

degree of guilt, and only where there is a finding of fact that the degree of guilt has

been equal is the suit dismissed.” Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 333, 59 So. 2d 409,

410 (1952) (emphasis in original); Laurent v. Laurent, 347 So. 2d 312, 313 (La.

App. 4th Cir. 1977). In the instant case, the trial court, recognized the possibility of

12

mutual fault and noted that Mr. Jennings likely also had reason to claim abuse;

however, it did not address whether there was equal fault regarding abuse because

Mr. Jennings forfeited the abuse claim when he failed to raise it in his

reconventional demand. “Procedural due process requires that a person be given a

meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Bays v. Bays, 2000-1727, p. 6 (La. 2/21/01),

779 So. 2d 754, 758 (emphasis in original). The person against whom a claim is

asserted must be given notice that sufficiently informs them of the pendency of the

action and allows for the opportunity to present their objection. Nelson v. Nelson,

42,697, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/5/07), 973 So. 2d 148, 151.

In Bays, the plaintiff-husband sought an order of protection from his ex-

wife. 2000-1727, p. 1, 779 So. 2d at 756. The defendant-wife did not file any

pleadings, or motions seeking a protective order on her own behalf. Id. at p. 2, 779

So. 2d at 756. After hearing testimony from both parties and their children

regarding past and current abuse allegations, the trial court concluded the parties

had a mutually abusive relationship and issued protective orders against both

parties. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, reasoning the

plaintiff had reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard because: 1) the

plaintiff was afforded notice via the testimony presented at the hearing, and 2) the

plaintiff had an opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at p. 4, 779 So. 2d at 757.

The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court’s conclusions and

reasoned that had the plaintiff known he would face allegations of abuse and the

possibility of a protective order against him, he would have prepared a different

13

cross-examination and defense; therefore, the plaintiff was not afforded a

“meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Id. at p. 7, 779 So. 2d at 758. The Louisiana

Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s granting of mutual protective orders to a

husband and wife. Id. at p. 7, 779 So. 2d at 759.

The current case is analogous to Bays. Ms. Woodside was the only party

asserting a fault divorce based on abuse and that a protective order had been

issued. Mr. Jennings’s reconventional demand only identified living separate and

apart as his cause for divorce. Presumably, had Ms. Woodside known she would

face accusations of abuse, she would have prepared her own defense and

presumably approached cross-examination of Mr. Jennings in a different manner.

Mr. Jennings’s claim of mutual physical violence amounted to a defense to the

allegation of abuse against him, rather than a fault claim against Ms. Woodside.

The trial court was not obligated to consider whether Ms. Woodside was at fault

for abuse when such allegation was not properly pled before the trial court, and

Ms. Woodside was not afforded the opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense to

such an allegation.

Thus the trial court did not err in finding that abuse had occurred and that a

protective had been issued during the marriage; thus, assigning fault solely to Mr.

Jennings.

14

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err in granting Ms. Woodside a fault-based divorce on

the grounds of adultery, abuse and the issuance of a protective order during the

marriage, as opposed to granting Mr. Jennings’s non-fault based divorce.

Considering the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s granting of divorce in

favor of Ms. Woodside pursuant to La. Civ. Code arts. 103(2), 103(4), and 103(5).

AFFIRMED

15