State of Louisiana in the Interest of S.C..

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2021-CA-0468
THE INTEREST OF S.C.
*
COURT OF APPEAL
*
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
JUVENILE COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2021-011-09-DQ-F, SECTION “F”
Honorable Ranord J. Darensburg
******
Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Regina Bartholomew-
Woods, Judge Dale N. Atkins)

G. Benjamin Cohen
Assistant District Attorney
Jason Rogers Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ORLEANS PARISH
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE/STATE OF LOUISIANA

Katherine M. Franks
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 220
Madisonville, LA 70447

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/S.C.

AFFIRMED
NOVEMBER 29, 2021

RBW

JCL

DNA

In this juvenile delinquency matter, S.C.1 seeks appellate review of his

delinquency adjudication and his disposition imposed for committing the offense

of armed robbery with the use of a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3. For

the reasons that follow, we find the evidence sufficient to adjudicate S.C.

delinquent. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication and

corresponding disposition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2021, at approximately 10:30 p.m., the victim, A.L., was

returning home from work when she drove her red 2015 Nissan Altima into the

parking lot of her apartment complex on Crowder Boulevard. In the car with her

was her three and one-half month old daughter. Upon entering the complex, she

1
Pursuant to the confidentiality records requirements set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 412 for juvenile
proceedings, we refer to the juvenile and the victim by their initials.

1

observed two males walk past her. After she exited her vehicle, she went to the

back seat to retrieve her diaper bag, and the two males she observed earlier walked

up behind her. She testified that she heard a gun cock and slowly turned around to

face the two males, one of whom was holding a handgun. A.L. observed the taller

perpetrator, who was holding the handgun, wearing a dark green sweater with a

hood. He had a surgical mask on and had a darker complexion. A.L. described the

perpetrator’s sweater as an “army-colored green,” and the weapon he was holding

was a black or dark gray “regular” handgun. The two males demanded A.L.’s

money and keys, and A.L. complied. The two males allowed A.L. to remove her

child from the car seat before driving away in A.L.’s car. A.L. then went to her

apartment and called the police.

Officer Jacob Mitchell (“Officer Mitchell”) of the New Orleans Police

Department (“NOPD”) testified that he was dispatched to investigate a carjacking

on January 6, 2021. He interviewed A.L. and relayed the information he obtained

to dispatch. Officer Mitchell stated that he did not see anyone when he arrived at

the crime scene; in particular, he neither saw a red Nissan Altima fleeing the scene,

nor anyone at the crime scene in a dark hoodie or with a firearm. He also did not

see S.C. at the crime scene.

Detective Jameson Diesburg (“Detective Diesburg”) testified that he was

part of an investigation of an armed robbery on Crowder Boulevard on the night of

January 6, 2021, and the early morning hours of the following day. He explained

that initially he was investigating another armed robbery when the armed robbery

2

on Crowder Boulevard was broadcast over the radio. Approximately an hour after

the initial radio broadcast, Detective Diesburg observed a red Nissan Altima travel

past him on Morrison Road. Detective Diesburg heard what he believed to be a

tire popping on the Altima. He found it odd that the Altima continued to travel on

the flat tire. Consequently, Detective Diesburg decided to follow the Altima and

found the car on a side street with two subjects trying to change the tire. Detective

Diesburg called for backup. When additional police units arrived, the Altima had

moved further down the street. As the police units approached the Altima, the two

subjects Detective Diesburg witnessed changing the tire, fled from the vehicle.

The police set up a perimeter and the subjects were subsequently apprehended.

Detective Sasha Tousant (“Detective Tousant”) testified that she

investigated the incident that led to S.C.’s arrest. Following the report of an armed

robbery with a firearm, Detective Tousant relocated to A.L.’s apartment to obtain

general information. About an hour after the incident, Detective Tousant learned

that police units spotted A.L.’s vehicle and observed subjects run from the vehicle.

Detective Tousant went to the area where the subjects and vehicle were seen. She

arrived after the subjects were apprehended. Detective Tousant testified that at the

time of the apprehension, S.C. wore a camouflage green hoodie, a white colored

belt, and a light blue “Corona” mask. Detective Tousant recognized the hoodie at

trial as the one S.C. was wearing when he was apprehended. She also stated that

she noticed during her investigation a black small caliber firearm with blue tape on

the driver’s seat floor inside the Altima. Detective Tousant identified the gun—a

3

black Beretta—as the gun that was found inside A.L.’s red Nissan Altima.

After the victim’s car was found, A.L. was asked to do a show-up

identification to identify the perpetrators. Detective Tousant supervised the show-

up identification, which Detective Tousant testified took place around 1:00 a.m. on

January 7, 2021. Handcuffs were removed from the apprehended subjects and two

marked NOPD police units turned on their overhead lights. Additionally,

Detective Tousant directed the officers flanking the subjects to shine their

flashlights on the subjects’ bodies. Detective Tousant testified that she was not in

the police unit with A.L. during the show-up identification process.

A.L. stated that the officer explained the procedure to her and that if she did

not recognize the subjects to “be honest.” A.L. testified that she was 90 percent

sure that the “first one with the green jacket” was the person who robbed her. A.L.

placed her positive identification level at 90 percent because she did not see the

perpetrator’s pants and shoes at the time of the robbery. A.L. identified the person

who wore the green jacket as the one who robbed her of her vehicle at gunpoint.

A.L. recalled that the identification of the person, later determined to be S.C., took

place around 12:00 a.m. She verified that she never gave S.C. permission to

operate her vehicle. She further indicated that the parking lot of the apartment

complex where the robbery took place was poorly lit. A.L. said she could not see

the hair of the male in the green sweater because his hoodie was pulled up. A.L.

stated that she did not see his face, only his eyes, and that she did not observe any

markings or tattoos.

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For the identification, A.L. sat in the front passenger seat of the police car as

it slowly drove past the two males. She testified that the two males wore masks

and were not handcuffed. A.L. acknowledged that although the colors were the

same, she did not identify the green sweater as camouflage or see that the sweater

had lettering on the front until the show-up identification.

Ariana Sparacino (“Ms. Sparacino”), a police technical specialist who works

in the crime lab, took photographs at the crime scene in the early morning hours of

January 7, 2021, and processed the physical evidence for DNA. Ms. Sparacino

identified photographs, which were admitted into evidence, including photographs

of the red Nissan Altima, the gun located on the interior front driver’s side, the

subjects who were apprehended, and street signs that verified their locale. Ms.

Sparacino stated the photographs depicted the license plate of the Nissan Altima,

as well as identified the gun the State showed her in court as the same gun depicted

in her photographs. She additionally confirmed that the serial number shown in

court matched the serial number of the gun she photographed. Ms. Sparacino

testified that her photographs of S.C. showed him wearing a camouflage sweater,

jeans, and black shoes and that close-ups of his face revealed he had tattoos on his

face and a nose ring.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 11, 2021, the State filed a delinquency petition against S.C. and

another juvenile2 for armed robbery with a firearm relative to the taking of a

2
The juvenile court conducted separate adjudication proceedings for S.C. and the other juvenile
identified as the other perpetrator in connection with the armed robbery.

5

Nissan Altima belonging to A.L. S.C. entered a general denial to the allegations

raised in the petition. An adjudication hearing took place on May 26, 2021, at the

conclusion of which the juvenile court adjudicated S.C. delinquent. On July 6,

2021, the juvenile court imposed a disposition of one year, granting S.C. credit for

six months already served. S.C. timely filed the present appeal.

ERRORS PATENT

“[A] juvenile delinquency adjudication warrants an errors patent review.”

State in Interest of A.P., 20-0623, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/21/21), 317 So.3d 887,

890 (citing State ex. rel. A.H., 10-1673, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/11), 65 So.3d

679, 685). A review of the record reveals no errors patent.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:64(A) provides that “[a]rmed robbery is the

taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that

is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed

with a dangerous weapon.” S.C. does not contest that the elements of the offense

of armed robbery were met. Rather, S.C. avers that A.L.’s identification of him

was insufficient evidence to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt. S.C.

contends that the show-up identification procedure was unduly suggestive, and

A.L.’s identification was unreliable.

The standard of review in a juvenile delinquency case was explained in State

in the Interest of S.J., 13-1025, p. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/6/13), 129 So.3d 676,

678-79, as follows:

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In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to support a
conviction, an appellate court must determine whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979). The Jackson standard of review is applicable in
juvenile delinquency cases. State in the Interest of
T.E., 00-1810, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/01), 787 So.2d
414, 417.

In addition, La. Const. art. V, § 10(B) mandates that an
appellate court review both law and facts when reviewing
juvenile adjudications. “While delinquency proceedings
may in many ways implicate criminal proceedings,
sometimes even mimicking them, they are
nonetheless civil in nature.” State in the Interest of
D.R., 10–0405, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/13/10), 50 So.3d
927, 930. (Emphasis supplied). Therefore, as in the
review of civil cases, a factual finding made by a trial
court in a juvenile adjudication may not be disturbed by
an appellate court unless the record evidence as a whole
does not furnish a basis for it, or it is clearly wrong. State
in Interest of K.G.,11–1559, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir.
3/21/12), 88 So.3d 1205, 1207, citing State in the Interest
of Batiste, 367 So.2d 784 La.1979); State in the Interest
of S.S., 557 So.2d 407 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); State ex
rel. E.D.C., 39,892 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/11/05), 903 So.2d
571. In sum, we apply the “clearly wrong-manifest error”
standard of review to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to satisfy the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.

DISCUSSION

Show-up Identification Procedure

S.C. avers the evidence was insufficient to adjudicate him delinquent based

on an unduly suggestive show-up identification procedure. At the outset, we note

that S.C. failed to properly preserve this issue for appellate review. S.C. filed an

omnibus motion for discovery and motion to preserve evidence, which the juvenile

court granted. However, the pleadings did not include a motion to suppress

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identification; and moreover, the record shows that S.C. did not object to the show-

up identification process at the adjudication hearing.

In State ex rel. J.F., 03-0321 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/6/03), 851 So.2d 1282, the

juvenile J.F. failed to file a motion to suppress statement and failed to make a

contemporaneous objection. The Third Circuit explained:

The Louisiana Children’s Code does not contain a
provision regarding a juvenile’s failure to make a
contemporaneous objection. However, “[w]here
procedures are not provided in [the Children’s] Code, or
otherwise by law, the court shall proceed in accordance
with. . . [t]he Code of Criminal Procedure in a
delinquency proceeding. . . .” La. Ch.Code art. 104(1).
Applying La.Ch.Code art. 104(1), we find that La.Code
Crim.P. art. 841(A) provides:

An irregularity or error cannot
be availed of after verdict
unless it was objected to at the
time of occurrence. A bill of
exceptions to rulings or orders
is unnecessary. It is sufficient
that a party, at the time the
ruling or order of the court is
made or sought, makes known
to the court the action which he
desires the court to take, or of
his objections to the action of
the court, and the grounds
therefor.

Id., 03-0321, p. 4, 851 So.2d at 1285.

Similarly, La. Ch.C. art. 872, which allows for the filing of a motion to

suppress evidence, does not delineate the procedural steps in considering the

motion at a delinquency proceeding. Therefore, we look to the Louisiana Code of

Criminal Procedure for the proper procedure to consider S.C.’s motion to suppress.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 703(F) provides, in part, that

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“[f]ailure to file a motion to suppress evidence in accordance with this Article

prevents the defendant from objecting to its admissibility at the trial on the merits

on a ground assertable by a motion to suppress.” Because S.C. failed to file a

motion to suppress his identification or object to the legality of the show-up

identification process at his delinquency hearing, the issue was not preserved for

appellate review. Notwithstanding S.C.’s failure to preserve this issue, we find

S.C.’s claim that the show-up identification was unduly suggestive so as to offend

due process lacks substantive merit.

“An identification procedure is [unduly] suggestive, if during the procedure,

the witness’ attention is unduly focused on the defendant.” State v. Newsome, 18-

1075, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/19), 265 So.3d 1223, 1228 (citation omitted).

Notwithstanding, even if the defendant demonstrates that the identification is

suggestive, a defendant’s right to due process is only violated if a showing is made

of the substantial likelihood of misidentification. State v. Dove, 15-0783, p. 26

(La. App. 4 Cir. 5/4/16), 194 So.3d 92, 110. The defendant’s burden of proof is

two-fold: the defendant must show that the out-of-court identification was

suggestive and that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification. See

State v. Brown, 16-0965, p. 26 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 219 So.3d 518, 535

(citations omitted). In order to determine whether a suggestive identification

created a substantial likelihood of misidentification, a reviewing court must

consider the five factors discussed in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-15,

97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), to wit: (1) the opportunity of the

witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of

attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the assailant; (4) the

level of certainty demonstrated by the witness; and (5) the length of time between

9

the crime and the confrontation. This Court has conducted fact-intensive reviews

in determining whether show-up identifications are unduly suggestive so as to

create a substantial likelihood of misidentification.

In State v. Robinson, 09-0922, p. 11-13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/10), 50

So.3d 158, 165-66, this Court concluded that a show-up identification was not so

suggestive so as to cause a substantial likelihood of misidentification where a

victim identified the defendant after the defendant was placed in the middle of a

neutral ground, handcuffed and bleeding and surrounded by police. The Robinson

Court reached this determination by applying the Manson factors to the totality of

the circumstances, noting that the police arrived on the scene before the victim

finished talking to the 911 operator; the victim identified the defendant within 20

to 25 minutes of the robbery; the victim was certain of his identification of the

defendant because the defendant pointed a gun at him; the victim knew the

defendant’s eyes and face because the defendant had “looked dead at [him]”

throughout the robbery; and the victim’s description was consistent throughout the

process. Id.

Similarly, in State v. Briley, 13-1421 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/1/14), 151 So.3d

633, this Court found that an arguably suggestive show-up identification procedure

did not result in a likelihood of misidentification. In Briley, an armed robbery

victim was notified that the police had a subject in custody. At the show-up

identification, the victim identified the defendant who was handcuffed and had a

spotlight shone on his face. The Briley Court applied the Manson factors,

reasoning that the defendant’s show-up identification, although arguably

suggestive, did not create a substantial likelihood of misidentification upon

considering that the victim had ample lighting and an opportunity to view the

10

perpetrator at the time of the crime; the victim’s attention was focused on the

perpetrator; the victim accurately described defendant to the police; the victim was

certain of his identification; and approximately 20 hours had lapsed between the

crime and the identification. Id., 13-1421, p. 17-20, 151 So.3d at 644-46.

On the other hand, in State v. Jackson, 20-0056, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/8/20), 294 So.3d 1090, 1094, this Court found the defendant’s show-up

identification procedure was not only suggestive, but also created a likelihood of

misidentification. In Jackson, the police presented each defendant to the victim

individually, after each had been taken from the back of a police vehicle, and each

defendant had remained handcuffed with an officer standing beside him. Taken as

a whole, Jackson concluded these procedures were suggestive in that they unduly

focused the victim’s attention on the defendant. Id., 20-0056, p. 7, 294 So.3d at

1094. In applying the Manson factors to conclude that the suggestive identification

procedure presented a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, this

Court noted that the victim did not provide the officers with a description of the

perpetrators’ faces; the victim’s attention was divided between the perpetrators;

there were inaccuracies regarding the victim’s prior description of the defendant’s

clothing and his physical features; the victim expressed doubt about her ability to

identify the defendant; and the victim was about 50 feet away from the defendant

at the time of the show-up identification. Id., 20-0056, p. 7-11, 294 So.3d at 1094-

96.

Comparing the show-up identification procedures in Robinson, Briley, and

Jackson to the case sub judice, we find S.C. cannot meet his initial burden of

proving that the show-up identification procedure was suggestive. A show-up

identification, without more, is not suggestive per se. See State v. Norah, 12-1194,

11

p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/11/13), 131 So.3d 172, 184. Here, Detective Tousant, the

supervising officer, testified that she took overt measures to ensure that the

identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. Specifically, the victim did

not see S.C. get out of a police unit, and although S.C. was initially handcuffed,

Detective Tousant had the handcuffs removed during the identification. Moreover,

A.L. testified that Detective Tousant encouraged her to be honest regarding her

ability to recognize the persons presented to her during the show-up identification.

Accordingly, we find that S.C. has not proven that the show-up identification

procedure was suggestive.

Moreover, the application of the Manson factors also establishes that the

procedure did not create a substantial likelihood of misidentification. A.L.’s

testimony established that (1) she had time to view the robbers at the time of the

offense; (2) A.L.’s attention was focused on the robbers as the gun was only a foot

away from her face; (3) her description of the robber, later identified as S.C., as

wearing a green sweater with a hood, wearing a mask, being dark-complexioned,

and being taller than the other robber remained consistent; (4) A.L. was 90 percent

certain of her identification;3 and (5) the show-up identification was close in time

after the crime—approximately one and a half to two and a half hours after the

robbery4 according to the respective testimonies of A.L. and Detective Tousant.5

3
A.L.’s only uncertainty about her identification was the fact that she was unable to identify the
robber’s pants at the show-up identification as she did not observe the pants during the robbery;
otherwise, she said the person she identified presented the same way as the person who held the
gun on her.
4
A.L. testified that she remembered identifying the suspect at 12:00 a.m. and Detective Tousant
recalled the show-up identification took place at approximately 1:00 a.m.
5
State v. Brown, 09-0884, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/10), 36 So.3d 974, 980, establishes that the
temporal element “is generally satisfied when the identification occurs within an hour of the
crime.” However, our jurisprudence has found longer delays acceptable. In Briley, 13-1421, p.

12

Thus, having failed to prove that his show-up identification created a very

substantial likelihood of misidentification, S.C.’s argument that his identification

was unduly suggestive and should have been suppressed lacks merit.

Reliability of A.L.’s Show-up Identification

S.C. also contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of

identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, S.C. notes that A.L. identified

him in a drive-by identification primarily by the color of his hoodie, and A.L. did

not make an in-court identification. S.C. contests the reliability of A.L.’s

identification because she never mentioned his prominent facial tattoos; she did not

describe the “GAP” logo on his hoodie; she only described the perpetrator as

wearing a green hoodie, as opposed to a camouflage hoodie; and she did not notice

that blue tape was wrapped around the grip of the confiscated gun. S.C. represents

that only A.L.’s unreliable identification linked him to the robbery; hence, the

juvenile court erred in adjudicating him delinquent.

In State in the Interest of K.D., 13-1274, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/14), 140

So.3d 182, 186 (quoting State in the Interest of S.L., 11-883, p. 10 (La. App. 5 Cir.

4/24/12), 94 So.3d 822, 831), this Court summarized the law as it applies to the

burden of proving identification as follows:

In addition to proving the statutory elements of the
charged offense, the State is required to prove the
identity of the perpetrator. State v. Searls, 04-790 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 1/25/05), 895 So.2d 40, 43. The State is
required to negate any reasonable probability of
misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof
when the key issue is identification. Id. Positive

20, 151 So.3d at 646, the victim’s identification of the robber more than 20 hours after the
robbery was found not to have a “corrupting effect” on the identification. See also State v.
McKinney, 455 So.2d 1235, 1238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), where a three-hour delay from the
time of crime and the out-of-court identification was deemed sufficient to uphold the
identification.

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identification by one witness is sufficient to support a
conviction. State v. Benoit, 07-35 (La. App. 5 Cir.
5/29/07), 960 So.2d 279, 282.

Analyzing whether the State has met its burden of proof, “[a] reviewing court

grants great deference to the Juvenile Court’s factual findings, credibility

determinations, and assessment of witness testimony.” State in the Interest of

K.D., 13-1274, p. 6, 140 So.3d at 186.

In this case, the juvenile court accredited the testimony of A.L. and found

her identification reliable. S.C.’s complaints as to the reliability of A.L.’s

identification go to a lack of specificity rather than inconsistencies in her

description of the robber. S.C. does not point out any affirmative discrepancies

between A.L.’s identification of him at the show-up identification and any prior

descriptions given to police officers. S.C.’s “camouflage” hoodie sweater is still a

green sweater as described by A.L., and A.L.’s failure to include S.C.’s facial

tattoos as part of her description was explained by the fact that the robber had a

mask on at the time of the crime and at the show-up identification. A.L.’s

testimony was consistent as to what she did see—that one of the robbers had on a

mask, was dark-complexioned, taller than the other suspect, and wore a dark army

green hoodie. She also stated that she saw his eyes as well. A.L. admitted what

she did not see, namely, she could not see her robber’s face because he wore a

mask; she did not notice the robber’s pants, and she was unable to identify the

second person at the show-up identification as one of the robbers.

Moreover, contrary to S.C.’s assertion, the juvenile court not only

considered A.L.’s testimony, but also the testimony of Officer Mitchell, Detectives

Tousant and Diesburg, and Ms. Sparacino, in identifying S.C. as one of the armed

robbers and adjudicating him delinquent. The juvenile court expressly found that

14

“the descriptions of the juvenile in this incident were all consistent. . . .”

The juvenile court adjudicated S.C. delinquent based on the totality of the

evidence and circumstances. Although the juvenile court acknowledged that the

State presented no direct evidence to place the firearm in S.C.’s possession or to

show that S.C. was inside A.L.’s vehicle, evidence may be direct or circumstantial.

La. R.S. 15:438 provides that “[t]he rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming

every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must

exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Circumstantial evidence

consists of “‘proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence

of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.’”

State v. Hankton, 12-0466, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/30/14), 140 So.3d 398, 404

(quoting State v. McNair, 12-0064, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/28/12), 107 So.3d

806, 813). This Court addressed a juvenile delinquency proceeding involving

circumstantial evidence in State in the Interest of C.R., 19-0917 (La. App. 4 Cir.

1/29/20), 290 So.3d 220. We explained:

When a case involves circumstantial evidence, the court
does not determine whether another possible hypothesis
exists which could explain the events in an exculpatory
fashion. Rather, the reviewing court evaluates the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and determines whether the alternative hypothesis
is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not
have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If
rational triers of fact could disagree as to the
interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier’s view of
all of the evidence most favorable to the prosecution
must be adopted. Thus, irrational decisions
to convict will be overturned, rational decisions
to convict will be upheld, and the actual fact finder’s
discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due
process.

Id., 19-0917, p. 6-7, 290 So.3d at 224 (internal citations omitted).

15

The collective testimony of A.L., Officer Mitchell, Detectives Tousant and

Diesburg, and Ms. Sparacino linked S.C. to the robbery, the stolen red Nissan

Altima owned by A.L., and the handgun used in the robbery. A.L. and the police

officers identified S.C. as the person wearing the camouflage green sweater, who

was identified at the show-up identification and arrested for the armed robbery of

A.L. Additionally, Officer Mitchell and Detective Diesburg identified S.C. in open

court. Detective Diesburg also identified S.C. as the person he saw fleeing from

the Nissan Altima. A.L. testified that a handgun was used in the robbery, and

Detective Tousant and Ms. Sparacino confirmed that a handgun was recovered

from the Nissan Altima and identified the handgun at the delinquency hearing. In

contrast, S.C. put forth no reasonable hypothesis of innocence to counter any of the

circumstantial evidence offered by the State; he merely proclaimed his innocence.

Therefore, we find no merit to his argument that the evidence was insufficient to

adjudicate him delinquent based on his claim that A.L.’s identification of him was

unreliable.

DECREE

Considering the record as a whole, we find a rational basis exists for the

juvenile court’s delinquency finding. We find the State provided sufficient

evidence to satisfy the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For the

reasons set forth above, we affirm S.C.’s delinquency adjudication and his

disposition imposed for committing the offense of armed robbery with the use of a

firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3.

AFFIRMED

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