Shantell Jenkins, Individually And On Behalf Of Minor Child, Aston Jenkins v. Arbors On The Lake Apartments, Providence Investments, L.L.C., And Abc Insurance Company

Supreme Court of Louisiana
March 22, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
SHANTELL JENKINS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD,
ASTON
JENKINS
VS.
ARBORS ON THE LAKE APARTMENTS,
PROVIDENCE INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., AND
ABC INSURANCE
COMPANY
No. 2021-CC-01662
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN RE: Ar
bors on the Lake, 2018, LLC - Applicant Defendant; Providence
Investments, LLC - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Supervisory Writ, Parish of
Orleans Civil, Orleans Civil District Court Number(s) 2019-12458, Court of Appeal,
Fourth Circuit, Number(s) 2021-C-0568;
_ _ _ _ _ _
March 22, 2022
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Griffin, J., would grant and docket.
SJC
JLW
JDH
JTG
WJC
JBM
03/22/2022 "See News Release 012 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2021-CC-01662
S
HANTELL JENKINS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF MINOR
CHILD, ASTON JENKINS
VS.
ARBORS ON THE LAKE APARTMENTS, PROVIDENCE
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., AND ABC INSURANCE COMPANY
O
n Supervisory Writ to the Orleans Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans
PE
R CURIAM
T
he issue presented in this case is whether t he owner s of an apartment
building are entitled to summary judgment on the ground plaintiff has failed to
produce evidence that her fall in the building resulted in complications in her
pregnancy. For the reasons that follow, we conclude summary judgment is
appropriate.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This litigation arises from an accident which occurred at the Arbors on the
Lake Apartments. Plaintiff, Shantell Jenkins, was on the premises for the purpose
of conducting a final inspection of the apartment that she had previously occupied.
As she did so, plaintiff alleges she slipped and fell over parts of a door lock which
had been improperly left on the floor of the apartment by maintenance personnel.
At the time of her fall, plaintiff was twenty-four weeks pregnant with her third child.
One week after her fall, plaintiff presented to her obstetrician/gynecologist,
Dr. Sheena Pullman, complaining of increased vaginal leaking. Dr. Pullman
diagnosed plaintiff with premature preterm rupture of the membrane (“PPROM”).
Eighteen days later, plaintiff’s son was prematurely born.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed the instant suit against the owners of the
apartment complex, Arbors on the Lake, 2018, LLC and Providence Investments,
03/22/22

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LCC (collectively referred to hereinafter as “defendants”). Plaintiff alleged her fall
caused her PPROM and son’s premature birth.
During discovery, the parties took the deposition of Dr. Pullman. Dr. Pullman
testified she has been plaintiff’s treating physician for many years and had delivered
plaintiff’s previous children without incident.
Dr. Pullman testified plaintiff’s fall could have been a risk factor for her
PPROM a nd premature delivery. However, she admitted plaintiff had other
conditions which also could have been risk factors, including uterine fibroids,
bacterial vaginosis, and plaintiff’s job as a “pole-dancing instructor.” When asked
whether she was able to say which of these risk factors caused the PPROM , Dr.
Pullman replied, “I can’ t say which one [may ] have been linked to it, no.”
Additionally, Dr. Pullman agreed that she was unable to say it was more probable
than not that the trauma from the fall led to plaintiff’s PPROM.
Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing
plaintiff cannot sustain her burden of proof at trial. In support, they relied on Dr.
Pullman’s deposition in which she admitted she could not relate plaintiff’s PPROM
or the premature birth of her son to the fall.
Plaintiff opposed the motion. Although she did not cite any direct evidence
linking her injuries to the fall, she asserted she could rely on circumstantial evidence,
such as the fact that Dr. Pullman stated she did not diagnose plaintiff with PPROM
until after the fall, to carry her burden of proof at trial.
After a hearing, the district court denied defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Defendants applied for supervisory review, which the court of appeal
denied.

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Upon de fendants’ application to this court, we ordered written briefing
pursuant to the provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(H).1 Having received briefs
from both parties, we now review the district court’s ruling on the motion for
summary judgment on the merits.

DISCUSSION
A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo
standard, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s
determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is
any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Guidry v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 19 -1999 (La. 2/26/20), 289
So.3d 1026, 1027; Murphy v. Savannah, 18 -0991 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So.3 d 1034,
1038; Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light , 06-1181 (La. 3/9/07), 951 So.2d 1058,
1070.
Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1) , the burden on the party moving
for summary judgment “does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense.” Reynolds v. Bordelon, 14-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So.3d
607, 610–11. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an
adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genu ine issue for trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967(B); Bufkin v. Felipe’ s
Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 851, 858 . Once a motion for

1 As required by the article, we permitted the parties an opportunity to request oral argument and
entertained plaintiff’s request for argument. After careful consideration, we found oral argument
was unnecessary under the facts of this case and therefore elected to exercise our discretion to
consider the matter on written briefs only.

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summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of
the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the
granting of the motion. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc ., 08-0528 (La.
12/2/08), 995 So.2d 1184, 1187 (citing Babin v. Winn– Dixie Louisiana, Inc. , 00-
0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40).
In this case, plaintiff has alleged her fall caused her PPROM and premature
delivery. The jurisprudence has generally recognized that “expert medical testimony
is required when the conclusion regarding medical causation is one that is not within
common knowledge.” Jones v. Capitol Enterprises, Inc., 11-0956 (La. App. 4 Cir.
5/9/12), 89 So.3d 474, 505, writ denied, 12-1634 (La. 10/26/12), 99 So.3d 651. We
find the complex nature of plaintiff’s injuries do not fall within the scope of common
knowledge and must be established through expert testimony.
Medical certainty is not required to establish medical causation; rather, t he
plaintiff’s burden of proving causation is satisfied if medical evidence is presented
establishing that it is more probable than not that the claimed condition was caused
by the accident. Chavers v. Travis, 04-0992 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05) , 902 So.2d
389, 400–01.
The only medical expert identified by plaintiff is Dr. Pullman. Dr. Pullman
admitted she was unable to say that it was more probable than not that plaintiff’s
injuries were caused by the fall. Therefore, we conclude defendants satisfied their
burden of showing an a bsence of factual support for an essential element of
plaintiff’s claim.
In response to defendants’ motion, plaintiff argues that even in the absence of
direct medical evidence, she can satisfy her burden at trial through the use of
circumstantial evidence. In particular, plaintiff relies on Dr. Pullman’s testimony
indicating that prior to the accident , plaintiff had a normal pregnancy, but

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approximately one week after the accident, she complained of leaking fluid, which
Dr. Pullman noted was not “normal.”
If circumstantial evidence is relied upon, that evidence, taken as a whole, must
exclude every other reasonable hypothesis with a fair amount of certainty.
Stephenson v. Bryce W. Hotard Sunbelt Rentals, Inc ., 19-0478 (La. 5/20/19), 271
So.3d 190, 192; Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc ., 08-1163 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So.3d
1065, 1090.
As we have already observed, Dr. Pullman’s testimony, when considered as a
whole, does not support the conclusion that it was more likely than not that the fall
caused plaintiff’s injuries. To the contrary, Dr. Pullman identified the fall along with
several other risk factors affecting plaintiff and admitted she could not say which of
these factors were linked to plaintiff’s PPROM and premature delivery. Therefore,
we find plaintiff has failed to exclude other reasonable explanations for her injuries
other than the fall and cannot rely on circumstantial evidence to establish that there
is a genuine issue of material fact.2
In conclusion, we find defendants satisfied their burden on summary judgment
by showing an absence of factual support for an essential element of plaintiff’s
claim. Plaintiff has failed to set forth any specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact which must be resolved at trial. Accordingly,
summary judgment in defendants’ favor is mandated.

2 Plaintiff also suggests she could benefit from the presumption set forth in Housley v. Cerise, 579
So.2d 973, 980 (La. 1991), in which we recognized a “disability is presumed to have resulted from
an accident, if before the accident the injured person was in good health, but commencing with the
accident the symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continuously manifest themselves
afterwards, providing that the medical evidence shows there to be a reasonable possibility of causal
connection between the accident and the disabling condition.” However, the presence of plaintiff’s
other preexisting risk factors indicate she was not in complete good health pri or to the accident.
Additionally, in Housley, the plaintiff’s symptoms manifested immediately after the fall. In the
instant case, plaintiff’s symptoms did not become apparent until a week later.

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DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district
court is reversed. Summary judgment is granted in fa vor of Arbors on the Lake,
2018, LLC and Providence Investments, LCC, and plaintiff ’s action against these
defendants is dismissed with prejudice.