Ali Kazan And Ebony Medlin Individually And On Behalf Red Lion Rapides)

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #031
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 29th day of June, 2022 are as follows:
BY Griffin, J.:
2021-CC-01820 ALI KAZAN AND EBONY MEDLIN INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
RED LION
Rapides)
OF THEIR DAUGHTER LIA KAZAN, DECEASED VS.
HOTELS CORPORATION, ET AL. (Parish of
REVERSED AND RENDERED. SEE OPINION.
Retired Judge Robe rt L . Lobra no appointed Justice a d hoc, sitting for
Crichton, J., recused in case number 2021-CC-01820 only.
Weimer, C.J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2021-CC-01820
ALI KAZAN AND EBONY MEDLIN INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF THEIR DAUGHTER LIA KAZAN, DECEASED
VS.
RED LION HOTELS CORPORATION, ET AL.
On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides
GRIFFIN, J.
We granted this writ to determine whether an insurance policy, by its own
terms, excludes coverage for damages arising from a kidnapping resulting in death.
Adhering to the provisions of our Civil Code for the interpretation of contracts, we
find the clear and unambiguous language of the relevant policy exclusion bars
coverage.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lia Kazan (“Lia”) visited an Alexandria motel to meet some friends. During
the course of her visit, she went went to the motel parking lot to retrieve something
from her vehicle . Anthony Mur ray, another m otel guest, exited his r oom and
approached the vehicle with Lia inside. Given the positioning of the motel’s video
surveillance system, the e ntirety of subsequent events is not visible on camera.
Audio from the camera footage records Lia screaming “stop,” “no,” and calling for
help accompanied by repeated honking of the vehicle’s horn. Murray then starts the
ignition and, with Lia in the passenger seat, reverses out of the parking lot onto the
service road. The vehicle was later found submerged in Lake Dubuisson – the bodies
 Retired Judge Robert L. Lobrano, appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting for Justice Scott J. Crichton.

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of Murray and Lia were recovered in the water . Lia’s death was classified as a
homicidal drowning.
Ali Kazan and Ebony Medlin filed suit, individually, and on beh alf of their
daughter, Lia (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against several parties, including the motel’s
owner, Vitthal, LLC, and its insurer, Great Lakes Insurance Company SE (“Great
Lakes”), seeking damages for Lia’s kidnapping and death. In response, Great Lakes
filed a petition for declaratory judgment averring it has no obligation under the
operable commercial general liability policy (“ the CGL P olicy”) to defend or
indemnify the other defendants.1
Great Lakes moved for summary judgment on its petition arguing the CGL
Policy contains an exclusion – specifically defining “assault,” “battery,” and
“physical altercation” – which bars coverage for Lia’s kidnapping and death .
Plaintiffs opposed arguing Great Lakes failed to meet its evidentiary burden to show
that Murray’s conduct fell within the definitions of the exclusion. Plaintiffs further
argued that, pursuant to this Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp.,
95-0809 (La. 1/6/96), 66 5 So.2d 1166, the language of the CGL Policy exclusion
should not bar coverage because it does not unambiguously exclude kidnapping .
The trial court denied Great Lakes’ motion and the court of appeal denied writs.
Great Lakes’ writ application to this Court followed, w hich we granted.
Kazan v. Red Lion Hotels Corporation, 21-1820 (La. 2/22/22), 333 So.3d 440.
DISCUSSION
The issue before this Court is whether Great Lakes is entitled to summary
judgment based on the language of the CGL Policy exclusion. Appellate courts
review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo using the same
criteria as trial courts. Bernard v. Ellis, 11-2377, p. 10 (La. 7/2/12), 111 So.3d 995,

1 Great Lakes also requested reimbursement for previously advanced costs and expenses.

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1002. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material
fact that the provisions of an insurance policy do not afford coverage. Id. Whether
an insurance policy clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage is a question of
law decided from the four corners of the policy. Baack v. McIntosh, 20-1054, p. 4
(La. 6/30/21), 333 So.3d 1206, 1211.
An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed
using the general rules for the interpretation of contracts set forth in our Civil Code.
Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 07-0054, p. 7 (La. 5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583,
590. Interpretation of an insurance policy is the determination of the common intent
of the parties – this analysis starts by examining the words of the policy itself. Id.
(citing La. C.C. arts. 2045 and 2046) . Words and phrases in an insurance policy
must be given their generally prevailing meaning unless they are words of art or have
acquired a technical meaning. Id., 07-0554, p. 8, 956 So.2d at 589 (citing La. C.C.
art. 2047). When the words of an insurance policy are clear and explicit and do not
lead to absurd consequences, courts must enforce the language as written. Id., 07-
0054, p. 8, 956 So.2d at 589 (citing La. C.C. art. 2046). Courts lack the authority to
alter the terms of an insurance policy und er the guise of interpretation and should
not create an ambiguity where none exists. Id., 07-0554, pp. 8-9, 956 So.2d at 589.
An insurance policy is construed against an insurer and in favor of coverage only
when an ambiguity remains after applying the aforementioned general rules for the
interpretation of contracts. Id., 07-0054, p. 9, 956 So.2d at 590 (further observing
that for strict construction to apply, an ambiguous provision must be susceptible to
two or more reasonable alternative interpretations); Edwards v. Daugherty, 03-2103,
p. 12 (La. 10/1/04), 883 So.2d 932, 941. The language of an insurance policy may
be general without being ambiguous. Ledbetter, 95-0895, p. 6, 665 So.2d at 1170
(citing United National Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105,

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108 (2d Cir. 1993)). Against this analytical framework, we turn to the policy at
issue.
The CGL Policy exclusion, in relevant part, provides: “This insurance does
not apply to ‘bodily injury,’ property damage,’ or ‘personal and advertising injury’
arising out of an ‘assault,’ ‘battery,’ or ‘physical altercation.’” These terms are
defined as follows:
“Assault” means any attempt of [sic] threat to inflict injury on another
including any conduct that would reasonably place another in
apprehension of such injury.

“Battery” means the intentional or reckless physical contact with or any
use of force against a person without his or her consent that entails some
injury or offensive touching whether or not the actual injury inflicted is
intended or expected.

“Physical altercation” means a dispute between individual [sic] in
which one or more persons sustain bodily injury arising out of the
dispute.

Giving the words of the “physical altercation” definition their plain meaning, we
find the CGL Policy exclusion applicable to the facts at hand.
It is undisputed that Lia was taken against her will.2 Plaintiffs concede this is
proven by the audio evidence. A “dispute” is a “verbal controversy” or “quarrel.” 3
Similarly, a “quarrel” is “a usually verbal c onflict between antagonists.” See
“dispute” and “quarrel,” Merriam -Webster Online Dictionary 2022 available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com. Lia is clearly overheard to be in a “dispute” with
Murray wherein she is taken against her will and ultimately “sustain[s ] bodily
injury” in her death by drowning.4

2 Despite denying summary judgment, the trial court observed that the kidnapping “was definitely
confrontational.”

3 “Dictionaries are a valuable source for determining the common and approved usage of words.”
Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co., 02-1138, p. 7 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 959, 964 (internal
quotation omitted); Henry v. South Louisiana Sugars Co-op., Inc., 06-2764, p. 7 (La. 5/22/07), 957
So.2d 1275, 1279 (using dictionary definition for ascertaining the ordinary meaning of words in a
commercial general liability policy).

4 Plaintiffs argue that the descriptive “physical” preceding “altercation” necessarily implies the
“dispute” must involve contact with the body , i.e., damages arising from a “physical altercation”

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The facts of this case are undoubtedly tragic. Nonetheless, absent a conflict
with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers are entitled to limit their liability
by imposing reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations they contractually
assume. Bernard, 11-2377, pp. 9-10, 111 So.3d at 1002. That is what Great Lakes
did in the CGL Policy at issue here.
Ledbetter, aside from relying on the well-settled rules for the interpretation of
contracts, has no unique application beyond its own facts. The policy at issue therein
excluded “claims arising out of Assault and Battery” without further definition of
those terms. Ledbetter, 95-0809, p. 5, 665 So.2d at 1169. In the absence of specific
policy definitions, this Court reviewed the relevant criminal statutes and concluded
the policy was ambiguous as applied to damages arising from kidnapping thus
coverage was not barred . Id., 95 -0809, p. 7, 665 So.2d at 1170 -71. The result
reached in Ledbetter does not alter the established jurisprudence that courts must
always examine the terms of the insurance policy at issue to determine if coverage
exists. See Sims , 07-0554, pp. 7 -9, 956 So.2d at 589 -90. Nor does Ledbetter
mandate the use of a spec ific exclusion for kidnapping provided the words of a
policy – even if stated in general terms – are otherwise sufficient to unambiguously
bar coverage for such conduct. 95-0809, p. 6, 665 So.2d at 1170 (citing United
National Ins. Co., 994 F.2d at 108).
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we find that Great Lakes is entitled to summary
judgment on the basis of the clear and unambiguous language of the CGL Policy
exclusion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and summary
judgment is rendered in favor of Great Lakes. Great Lakes has no obligation under
the CGL Policy to defend or indemnify the named defendants in this lawsuit; Great

or “dispute” must a rise from some type of physical contact . We find this reading unpersuasive.
The definition does not qualify whether the “dispute” must be physical or verbal, merely that an
individual “sustain[s] bodily injury arising out of the dispute.”

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Lakes may withdraw from the defense of Vitthal, LLC; and Great Lakes shall be
reimbursed by Vitthal, LLC for all previously advanced costs and expenses in
defense of this lawsuit.

REVERSED AND RENDERED

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2021-CC-01820
ALI KAZAN AND EBONY MEDLIN, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR DAUGHTER LIA KAZAN, DECEASED
VS.
RED LION HOTELS CORPORATION, ET AL.
On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court,
Parish of Rapides
WEIMER, C.J., concurring.
I agree with the result in this case, finding the assault and battery exclusion in
Great Lakes’ CGL policy excludes coverage for the kidnapping and death. However,
I would overrule this court’s opinion in Ledbetter v. Concord General Corp.,
95-0809 (La. 1/6/96), 665 So.2d 1166, rather than factually distinguish this case.
I agree with Justice Lemmon’s dissent in Ledbetter that the insurance policy’s
assault and battery exclusion should be applied to plaintiff’s claims arising out of a
kidnapping. As Justice Lemmon aptly explained:
The “assault & battery exclusion,” added by endorsement to this
comprehensive general liability policy issued to a motel operator, was
clearly intended to exclude claims arising out of an attack on a motel
patron by the motel operator or his employees, or by other patrons. Such
an attack occurred in this case, and the motel operator was cast in
judgment for the damages arising out of the attack because of his
negligence in installing or failing to repair a defective lock. That
liability would have been covered by the insurance policy but for the
exclusion which was intended to exclude claims arising out of such an
assaultive attack. I see no reason to differentiate between the claim
for the rape in the assaultive attack and the claim for the
kidnapping in the course of the same attack, both of which were
accomplished by the intentional placing of the victim in reasonable
apprehension of offensive contact and by the non-consensual
contact. [Emphasis added.]
Ledbetter, 665 So.2d at 1172 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).

Because I agree with this reasoning, I believe allowing Ledbetter to remain
good law serves no useful purpose and continues the risk that courts will apply its
holding too restrictively. Consequently, I would over-rule Ledbetter. I respectfully
concur in the majority opinion.
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