Supreme Court Of Louisiana

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
IN RE: JUSTICE JEFFERSON D. HUGHES III
No. 2021-O-00771
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN
RE: Judiciary Commission of Louisiana - Applicant Other; Justice Jefferson D.
Hug
hes III - Applicant Other; Joint Petition for Consent Discipline;
_ _ _ _ _ _
Jun
e 30, 2021
Jo
int petition for consent discipline accepted. See Ruling of the Court.
SJC
JTG
JBM
PDG
Weimer,
C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Hug
hes, J., recused.
Crain, J., recused.
Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 30, 2021
06/30/2021 "See News Release 030 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2021-O-0771
IN RE: JUSTICE JEFFERSON D. HUGHES III
JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
CRICHTON, J., joined by GENOVESE, J., MCCALLUM, J., AND
GRIFFIN, J.*
This matter arises from a Joint Motion for Consent Discipline filed by
respondent, Justice Jefferson D. Hughes III, an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, and the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”).
For the reasons that follow, we accept the Motion for Consent Discipline, publicly
censure respondent, and order him to reimburse costs to the Commission.
JOINT PETITION FOR DISCIPLINE BY CONSENT
Respondent has been a judicial officer since 1991. He first assumed office as
an Associate Justice of this Court on February 1, 2013, and currently holds this
position. Before the institution of formal proceedings, the Commission and
respondent filed a joint petition for discipline by consent, including a joint
memorandum and joint stipulation of facts, pursuant to the requirements of Supreme
Court Rule XXIII, § 30.1
The events at issue arise from the fall 2019 run-off election for Louisiana
Supreme Court District 1, between candidates then-Judge William Crain and Judge
Hans Liljeberg. Leading up to the election, respondent received telephone calls from
individuals regarding the amounts being paid to campaign workers on the Crain
campaign. Respondent thereafter reviewed campaign finance reports filed on behalf
* Hughes, J. and Crain, J., recused.
1 On November 4, 2019, the Office of Special Counsel received a complaint from attorney Richard
Ducote regarding the general facts set forth herein. On December 26, 2019, the Commission
authorized an investigation concerning respondent and these allegations.
06/30/2021

2

of Crain’s campaign. Though he recognized some of the names on the reports, he
knew Johnny Blount, a former Hammond city councilman, better than the others.
Though respondent had not seen Mr. Blount for several years, on October 30,
2019, respondent went to the home of Mr. Blount to discuss the Supreme Court race,
and specifically discussed the amounts of money being paid to campaign workers
for the Crain campaign.2 During their conversation, respondent communicated to
Mr. Blount that he believed Mr. Blount could receive more money for his services
from the Liljeberg campaign. Respondent thereafter left his card, which included an
updated telephone number, with Mr. Blount.
Respondent and the Commission stipulate that this discussion left Mr. Blount
with the impression that respondent was attempting to change Mr. Blount’s support
from Judge Crain to Judge Liljeberg. Further, this meeting and discussion
constituted interference with and/or had the potential to interfere with the working
relationship between a judicial candidate and one of his campaign workers during a
highly contested campaign for a seat on the same Court on which respondent serves.
After his conversation with respondent, Mr. Blount signed an affidavit
attesting that respondent offered him $5,000 to support the Liljeberg campaign.3
Several news articles concerning their October 30 meeting, including a photograph
of Mr. Blount’s affidavit regarding this “offer,” were published on November 1, 3,
and 7, 2019 in THE TIMES-PICAYUNE | THE NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE. The news
articles reported negatively on respondent’s conversation with Mr. Blount and
portrayed the judiciary in a negative light.

2 Respondent first went to the home of Henry Jackson, whom he has known for many years. Mr.
Jackson is related to Mr. Blount by marriage. When speaking to Mr. Jackson about the Supreme
Court race, Mr. Jackson informed respondent that he had changed his support from Judge Crain to
Judge Liljeberg. Before leaving, respondent asked Mr. Jackson how to get in touch with Mr.
Blount; Mr. Jackson contacted Mr. Blount by phone, and respondent thereafter went to see Mr.
Blount at his home.
3 The parties’ joint submission states that this allegation is “unsubstantiated.”

3

Respondent acknowledges that his conduct and subsequent events flowing
from it undermined the public’s confidence in the integrity, independence, and
impartiality of the judiciary and brought the judiciary into disrepute. Respondent
accordingly acknowledges the imposition of discipline is appropriate.
The parties stipulate that by his conduct as set forth above, respondent violated
Canons 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary), 2 (a
judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities),
2A (a judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary), 7B(1) (a judge or judicial candidate shall
maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner consistent with
the impartiality, integrity, and independence of the judiciary), and 7F (a judge shall
not engage in unauthorized partisan political activity) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. For this misconduct, the parties propose that respondent be publicly
censured and be required to pay $2,068.72 in costs incurred by the Commission in
investigating this matter.
The parties stipulate that in mitigation, respondent did not engage in a pattern
of misconduct; the conduct did not occur in the courtroom; and respondent was not
acting in his official capacity. In addition, respondent has been fully cooperative
throughout the duration of this matter. He is remorseful and has accepted
responsibility for the negative light his conduct brought upon the judiciary, and he
has committed to refrain from such conduct in the future. In aggravation, the ethical
violations were serious and brought the judiciary into disrepute, and respondent is
an experienced judicial officer who “should have known better.”
Based on the foregoing, and considering the applicable jurisprudence,4 the
parties urge the Court to accept the joint petition and publicly censure respondent.

4 In support of the proposed sanction, the parties cite In re: Shea, 02-0643 (La. 4/26/02), 815 So.
2d 813, in which this Court publicly censured a municipal court judge for improper political
conduct. Our review of the facts Shea indicate it is distinguishable, as Judge Shea’s misconduct

4

DISCUSSION
This Court is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in judicial
disciplinary proceedings by La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Supreme Court Rule XXIII,
§ 30 sets forth a formal procedure for the discipline of judges by consent.
The joint motion for consent discipline is filed in this Court under seal.
Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30(a). The petition must include stipulations of fact,
conditional admissions of rules violated, the mental elements involved, the harm
occasioned by the judge’s conduct, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating
factors, and an acknowledgement by the judge that he or she consents to the agreed
upon discipline. Id. The Commission may file a sealed memorandum in support of
the proposed discipline. Id., § 30(c). If the Court determines the recommended
discipline is appropriate and enters an order of discipline, all pleadings filed with the
Court, with the exception of the sealed memorandum, shall become public, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court. Id., § 30(e).5
While the parties have stipulated to respondent’s violations of Canons 1, 2,
2A, 7B(1), and 7(F) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the misconduct is centered on
Canon 7, which provides, in pertinent part:

involved making contributions from his excess campaign funds to candidates for public office
based upon a sincere belief that such donations were permissible.
The parties also note that sitting judges in other jurisdictions have been disciplined for involvement
in political campaigns. See In re Turner, 573 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990) (judge reprimanded for active
involvement in son’s judicial campaign); In re Codispoti, 438 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1993) (judge
censured for involvement in wife’s judicial campaign); Public Admonition of Minter (Texas
Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 6/2/99) (judge admonished for endorsing candidate judge favored
to replace judge in office and paying for and placing political advertisements on behalf of
candidate); In re DeFoor, 494 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1986) (judge publicly reprimanded for aiding
campaigns of two friends by developing campaign strategies, identifying campaign issues,
attempting to publicize statistics reflecting negatively on incumbent, and privately lobbying
members of legal community); In re Katic, 549 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. 1990) (judge suspended for 30
days for outwardly opposing candidate for office, influencing party’s choice of primary candidates,
leading candidate search, and personally encouraging candidacy of certain individuals).
5 The Court is not required to accept the recommended discipline, but may reject it totally or
conditionally reject it. Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30(f). If rejected, the conditional admissions
shall be considered withdrawn, and the joint motion and all other filings and materials shall remain
sealed. Id., § 30(f)(2).

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B. A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall:

(1) maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a
manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity and independence of
the judiciary;
* * *

F. Other Partisan Political Activity. A judge shall not engage in any
other partisan political activity except on behalf of measures to improve
the law, the legal system or the administration of justice, or as expressly
authorized by law or by this Code.

The obvious intent of Canon 7 is to preserve public confidence in the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary by limiting a judge’s participation in
partisan political activity. See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4, Rule
4.1, cmt. 3 (2020) (“Public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary is eroded if judges or judicial candidates are perceived to be subject to
political influence.”). Commentators, however, have suggested judges are not
prohibited from privately endorsing or opposing candidates for public office. See,
e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, The Political Activities of Judges: Historical,
Constitutional, and Self-Preservation Perspectives, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 245, 291
(2018). See also Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct 505 (Am. Bar Ass’n 3d
ed. 2016) (“The Model Code does not prohibit a judge or judicial candidate from
privately expressing his or her views on judicial candidates or other candidates for
public office.”).
The parties here have stipulated that respondent intended his conversation
with Mr. Blount to be private. Nonetheless, as respondent himself acknowledges, his
statements had the potential to interfere with the Crain campaign’s relationship with
Mr. Blount. Mr. Blount believed respondent was attempting to change his support
to Judge Liljeberg, causing him to execute an affidavit detailing respondent’s
actions, which was later reported in the media. Given the unusual nature of the
conversation, combined with respondent’s status as a member of the Court which
was the subject of the election, as well as the contentious nature of the campaign, it

6

should have been reasonably foreseeable to respondent that Mr. Blount might
publicize the conversation. Once the conversation was in fact made public, it resulted
in negative media articles and harmed the public’s confidence in and respect for the
integrity, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary. Considering all of these
factors, we conclude the stipulated facts establish the sanctionable misconduct and
establish violations of Canons 1, 2, 2A, 7B(1), and 7(F).
We now turn to a determination of whether the proposed sanction of a public
censure is appropriate.6 Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution sets forth
four punishment alternatives for disciplining a judge: (1) censure; (2) suspend with
or without salary; (3) remove from office; or (4) retire involuntarily. See In re
Lemoine, 96-2116 (La. 1/14/97), 686 So. 2d 837, 840, on reh’g, 96-2116 (La.
4/4/97), 692 So. 2d 358 (“Misconduct exposes a judge to punishment, anywhere
from public censure (which may ultimately result in ‘removal’ of the judge by the
constituency that elects him) to removal from office by the Supreme Court.”). A
“censure” is defined in the law as an “official reprimand or condemnation.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).7
Given the unique facts of this case, our prior jurisprudence provides little
guidance. See supra, n.4. However, we find persuasive the recent opinion of the

6 We note that Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 3(a)(1) provides that the Commission, upon receiving
a complaint “that is not obviously unfounded or frivolous,” shall make a preliminary inquiry to
determine whether further investigation of the allegations of judicial misconduct is warranted.
Given that the joint stipulation states that the Commission “authorized an investigation” in this
case, the Commission must have determined the allegations were not unfounded. Further, if in the
opinion of a majority of the Commission, the preliminary inquiry or investigation does not disclose
sufficient cause to warrant further proceedings, none shall be had. Id., at § 3(c). Again, this does
not appear to be the case here. Finally, the Commission had the option to “expeditiously resolve
matters” that “do not warrant further proceedings” by issuing a notice to the respondent judge with:
(i) a “reminder” concerning provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct; (ii) a “caution” that the
Commission regarded the judge’s conduct as an ethical violation but did not consider it to be
serious enough to warrant further proceedings, or (iii) an “admonishment” that the Commission
regarded the judge’s conduct as a “clear ethical violation.” Id., at § 3(d). The fact that the
Commission had options in respondent’s case that did not amount to a public censure factors into
our decision to accept this joint petition.
7 Similarly, in common usage, a “censure” is a “judgment involving condemnation,” or “the act of
blaming or condemning sternly.” Merriam-Webster.com 2021, available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/censure.

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Florida Supreme Court in In re: Howard, --- So. 3d --- (Fla. 2021), 2021 WL
2006560. The issue in Howard was whether the judge “acted inappropriately when
he attempted to dissuade a judicial candidate from running against an incumbent
judge, and attempted to persuade the candidate to either run against a different
incumbent judge, or to forgo the campaign altogether.” Id., at *1 (parentheticals
omitted). Howard, like the instant case, was decided based on stipulations, and the
judge accepted full responsibility for his conduct, cooperated throughout the
investigation, and acknowledged his actions were inappropriate and should have
never occurred. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed the judge should be publicly
reprimanded. While the facts are distinguishable, Howard provides persuasive
authority concluding that a public censure is appropriate under these facts.
In aggravation, we recognize respondent’s position as a member of this state’s
highest Court and his lengthy judicial experience. However, as described above,
these factors are mitigated by the fact respondent was not acting in his official
capacity and believed his conversation was private in nature. Respondent has also
expressed remorse for his actions. He has cooperated during the disciplinary
proceedings and accepted responsibility, as demonstrated by his willingness to enter
into this consent petition.
To be clear, we recognize the unique nature of this case. Respondent is the
second most senior justice on this Court, which is constitutionally charged with
regulating the judiciary. La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). In In re: Huckaby, 95-041 (La.
5/22/95), 656 So. 2d 292, 298, then-associate Justice Catherine D. Kimball, stated:
[T]his state’s constitution vests this court with the duty to preserve the
integrity of the bench for the benefit of that same public by ensuring
that all who don the black robe and serve as ministers of justice do not
engage in public conduct which brings the judicial office into disrepute.

95-041, p.10, 656 So. 2d at 298.

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Cognizant of our constitutional obligations to regulate the judiciary and to
ensure that all judges of this state “serve as ministers of justice,” we conclude the
proposed sanction of a public censure is appropriate to address respondent’s
misconduct. Accordingly, we will publicly censure respondent for his misconduct
and order him to reimburse all costs to the Commission. In accordance with
Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30(e), we further order the joint pleadings filed in this
matter shall become public upon the release of this opinion.
DECREE
It is ordered that the Joint Motion for Consent Discipline be accepted and that
Justice Jefferson D. Hughes III be publicly censured for violating Canons 1, 2, 2(A),
7(B)(1), and 7F of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It is further ordered that Justice
Hughes reimburse the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana $2,068.72 in costs.