In Re: Judge Jerry L. Denton, Jr.

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #013
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 25th day of March, 2022 are as follows:
BY Weimer, C.J.:
2021-O-01801 IN RE: JUDGE JERRY L. DENTON, JR.
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE OPINION
Crichton, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., dissents and assigns reasons

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2021-O-01801
I
N RE: JUDGE JERRY L. DENTON, JR.
J
udiciary Commission of Louisiana
WEI
MER, C.J.
This matter arises from a recommen dation of the Judiciary Commission of
Louisiana (“the Commission”), pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974), to
discipline Judge Jerry L. Denton, Jr. , City Court Judge of Denham Springs,
Louisiana.1 For the reasons discussed below, we find that Judge Denton violated
Canons 1, 2A, 3A(6), and specified portions of 3A(4) and 3C of the Louisiana Code
of Judicial Conduct (1996) , and specified portions of La. Const. art. V, §
25(C)(1974). We find a suspension from office without pay for four months and
payment of costs incurred by the Commission in the sum of $4,676.25 is an
appropriate sanction.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A c omplaint against Judge Denton was filed by Maria Finley, attorney at law,
and received by the Office of Special Counsel (the “OSC”). Ms. Finley was retained
by Stephanie Bardeau-Marse to file a petition to intervene in a Child in Need of Care
proceeding (“CINC proceeding”) in which Judge Denton presided. While the case
was pending before Judge Denton, he responded and initiated improper ex parte
communications with Ms. Bardeau-Marse. These improper ex parte
communications precipitated other misconduct, which led to the complaint, a Notice
of Hearing from the OSC to Judge Denton,2 and an investigation by OSC. The OSC
1 Judge Denton was first elected in 2016. He assumed office on January 1, 2017, and he was re-
elected in 2020.
2 The Notice of Hearing alleged that Judge Denton:
(1) violated Canons 1, 2A, 3A(4), 3A(6), and 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(1996); and/or
03/25/22

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and Judge Denton entered into a “Statement of Stipulated Uncontested Material
Facts, Stipulated Conclusions of Law, and Stipulated Recommendation of
Discipline” (“the Stipulation”).3 The matter was submitted to the Commission. On
June 28, 2021, the Commission dispensed with convening a hearing before a hearing
officer and accepted the stipulations and exhibits submitted in support, reserving the
right to make further findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon Judge
Denton’s appearance before the Commission, the briefs of the parties, and the entire
case record.
On August 20, 2021, Judge D enton appeared before the Commission and
testified. In addition, the parties introduced exhibits, including the sworn statements
of Judge Denton, Ms. Bardeau-Marse, and Ms. Finley. F ollowing the hearing, the
Commission issued “Judiciary Commission’s Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation of Discipline ” (“the Recommendation”). The Commission
determined that Judge Denton violated Canon s 1, 2A, 3A(4), 3A(6) and 3C of the
Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct (1996), and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974)
(“willful misconduct relating to his official duty,” and “persistent and public conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute”). As a sanction for the violations, the Commission recommended a six-
month suspension from office, without pay, and payment of costs in the amount of
$4,676.25.

(2) engaged in wil lful misconduct relating to [his] official duty, in violation of
Louisiana Constitution, [A]rticle V, § 25(C)(1974); and/or
(3) engaged in persistent and public conduct prejudicial t o the administration of
justice that bri ngs the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of Louisiana
Constitution, [A]rticle V, § 25(C)(1974).

3 The Stipulation was signed by Judge Denton, Judge Denton’s counsel, and the attorney for the
OSC.

3

The Commission filed the recommendation with this Court on December 3 ,
2021. The matter was set on the docket for oral argument pursuant to Louisiana
Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 14, and oral arguments were heard.
CINC PROCEEDING
The CINC proceeding 4 over which Judge Denton presided concerned the
mother, J.C., and the father, A.D., who are the unmarried biological parents of two
children, E.C. and P.C. The mother had a history of substance abuse and mental
health issues. The father was not involved in the children’s lives for the first several
years after they were born. As a result, both children were primarily cared for by
their maternal grandmother, Ms. Bardeau-Marse.
In September 2017, the Department of Children and Family Services
(“DCFS”) received a report of erratic behavior and suspected drug use by the mother
in the presence of P.C. DCFS filed a request with the Denham Springs City Court
for an instanter order, which Judge Denton granted, placing E.C. and P.C. in the
temporary custody of DCFS. In October 2017, the State filed a petition to adjudicate
the children in need of care. State in the Interest of E.C. and P.C. , No. 11998, on
the docket of the Denham Springs City Court.
In December 2017, Ms. Bardeau -Marse filed in the Denham Springs City
Court a petition that sought to intervene in the CINC proceeding and requested
custody of E.C. and P.C. On January 11, 2018, Judge Denton denied the petition.
Following a dispositional hearing on the custody issue, Judge Denton granted
custody of the children to the father with monitoring by DCFS; ordered visitation
for the mother and the grandparents to be facilitated by a relative; and, set a case
review hearing for April 12, 2018.

4 The initials of the parents and children will be used to protect and maintain the privacy of the
minor children involved in this proceeding.

4

STIPULATIONS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On March 18, 2018, approximately three weeks before the case review
hearing, Ms. Bardeau -Marse sent a private message to Judge Denton t hrough
Facebook Instant Messenger (“Messenger”). Ms. Bardeau -Marse mentioned a
“small circle of friends that we share and both consider friends. . . . I’m begging for
someone to listen to me . . . since my attorney was pretty much thrown out of the
courtroom and my pleading petition was not heard. . . . I’m asking to please let me
have a heart to heart conversation with you, again on a personal level, I want to
explain my situation/self how those babies are lo ved how they are our heart . . . .”
Ms. Bardeau-Marse also said that “anyone who knows me and my family know [s]
what kind of people we are and how we live . . . including Ex-mayor Jimmy Durbin.
. . . May I please have an hour of your private time at your convenience on that
personal level?”
Judge Denton did not know Ms. Bardeau-Marse and did not respond to her
March 18, 2018 message. However, he testified in his sworn statement that “when
she mentioned Jimmy Durbin, well, certainly . . . . I would take a call from someone
that Jimmy told to . . . or take a text message or communication from Jimmy, saying
to call because, obviously, if he thought enough that they should call me, I feel close
enough to Jimmy that he would only have my best interest and it was something he
thought I should do or someone I should speak to. And by her using Jimmy Durbin,
that was a connection.”
The case review hearing in the CINC proceeding was conducted on April 12,
2018. At the outset, Judge Denton heard Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s second petition that
sought to intervene and wherein she requested custody of E.C. and P.C.; Judge
Denton denied the petition. Judge Denton then granted sole custody of the children
to the father, with superv ised visitation to the mother, and DCFS close d its file.
Judge Denton’s order provided no specific visitation rights for Ms. Bardeau-Marse.

5

At the urging of the attorneys for the children and DCFS, Judge Denton retained
jurisdiction over the case. See La. Ch.C. art. 309(A)(1).5
Later that same day, Judge Denton receive d a message reflecting that Ms.
Bardeau-Marse “added” him on Messenger. At 7:49 p.m. on April 12, 2018, Judge
Denton’s Messenger call log reflected that he called Ms. Bardeau-Marse and that the
call lasted for 100 minutes. In Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s sworn statement, she stated
that Judge Denton gave her the name and number of a private investigator and told
her he would keep his eyes on the father.
Judge Denton continued engaging in frequent ex parte communications with
Ms. Bardeau-Marse by Messenger for a total of six months (March 2018 to August
2018).
On April 30, 2018, at 6:05 a.m., Ms. Bardeau-Marse sent a message to Judge
Denton in which s he again discussed her difficulty in being able to see her
grandchildren. Judge Denton replied at 6:32 a.m.: “I am so sorry for your continued
pain. I don’t have the answer, but I am working on the entire situation. I assure you
because I am not happy with the current exigencies as currently exist. Keep praying
and I will do the same.”
At 11:43 p.m., on May 11, 2018, Mother’s Day weekend, Ms. Bardeau-Marse
sent Judge Denton a lengthy message about her grandchildren, her daughter, and
their conflict with the father over visitation/custody , the father’s al leged drinking
and drug abuse, and his alleged mental and emotional abuse of the mother and her
side of the family. Judge D enton responded with a “thumbs- up” emoji. Ms.
Bardeau-Marse sent a second message at 11:53 p.m. with additional details and
asking, “[What can [she] do[?]” At 11:55 p.m., she wrote: “I didn’t realize you were

5 La. Ch.C. art. 309(A)(1) provides in part: “Except as provided in Article 313, a court exercising
juvenile jurisdiction shall have continuing jurisdiction over the following proceedings and the
exclusive authority to modify any custody determination rendered, including the consideration of
visitation rights: (1) Child in need of care proceedings pursuant to Title VI.”

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active . . . do you sleep lol . . . I hardly ever . . . the older I get the less sleep . . . . ”
Early the next morning, May 12, 2018, at 5:30 a.m., Judge Denton messaged Ms.
Bardeau-Marse: “Sleep is difficult when you care. And I do care and I worry and I
am going to catch him when he messes up and he will and justice will prevail. But
I have to work within the constraints of the law. You continue to pray and be patient
and remember right win[s] in the end.”
On May 23, 2018, Judge Denton messaged Ms. Bardeau-Marse at 8:40 a.m.:
“I can issue a special order for this one occasion if you would like.” In his sworn
statement, Judge Denton admitted that the special order he was proposing to issue
was for extra visitation for Ms. Bardeau -Marse to possibly take E.C. and P.C. to
Disney World. At 8:49 a.m., Ms. Bardeau -Marse responded: “I have been blessed
by you as my friend. . . . I don’t want them to know we have been communicating.”
At 8:58 a.m., she messaged: “Now I am worried how we are going to get around
this. I personally think you have a leak in your office direct to this attorney. Weird
how things have happened. My heart is pounding with excitement, however!” At
9:10 a.m., Judge Denton called Ms. Bardeau-Marse and ta lked to her for five
minutes.
Subsequently, Judge Denton (either directly or through his clerk) contacted
the father’s attorney, Rebecca Lee, about the plan to give Ms. Bardeau-Marse extra
visitation. Ms. Lee strongly opposed this plan.
On May 24, 2018, Ms. Bardeau-Marse sent Judge Denton two messages,
inquiring whether the special order was granted. At 7:16 p.m., Judge Denton
responded to Ms. Bardeau-Marse: “I am having issues with the state and it’s [] more
difficult because of his attorney fightin g us badly.” At 9:14 p.m., Ms. Bardeau-
Marse expressed her confusi on and frustration, messaging: “Him or the states
attorney? Rebecca Lee . . . [s]he’s dismissed . . . so he’s not paying for an attorney[;]
he’s using the free service of the state . . . how does the state’s attorneys have control

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over the kids while he has the full custody/power of them . . . I’m very confused,
how can that be? . . . Seriously Judge I’m totally confused as to what is going on. Is
there something I’m missing? Please tell me . . . what I have to do to get my rights
as a grandparent . . . what do you suggest I do?” At 10:36 p.m., Judge Denton
replied: “This is a very very difficult case and I [am] consulting with some other
family court judges[6] to try and come up with some resolve [sic] to get you all some
rights without having to hire lawyers [to] [f]ight in court etc. but it is just [n]o[t] an
easy task to fix. It is complex[,] and the law is not always favorable. But you mustn’t
give up or cause yourself to have a mental collapse because that won’t help our
position. You have to stay strong for the children.” No special order was issued.
On June 5, 2018, at 11:17 p.m., Ms. Bardeau-Marse messaged Judge Denton,
in part: “Hi Judge, Hope all is well . . . I was just checking in to see if you were able
to gather any helpful information. . . . I am very impatient, and we are loosing [sic]
precious time with our babies . . . .” Judge Denton responded to this message with
a “thumbs-up” emoji.
On June 23, 2018, at 10:14 p.m., Ms. Bardeau-Marse wrote: “Hi Judge hope
all is fine . . . . I am still waiting patiently as I haven’t heard anything . . . . please
I’m begging for help . . . guidance somethin g for the concern of the babies. . . . I
truly worry these babies are not in a good place . . . again please hear my cry for help
. . . this situation is horrible. I know the power you have over this situation . . . please
again help me/us get our rights back to those babies . . . please I beg[,] hear my cry.”
She ended this message with a “prayer hands” emoji followed by two “sad face”
emojis.

6 In Judge Denton’s sworn statement, he identified retired Judge Anthony Graphia as one of the
judges with whom he discussed Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s case, and explained that in his conversation
with Judge Graphia, he presented the question as a hypothetical.

8

A few days later on June 27, 2018, at 5:29 a.m., Ms. Bardeau-Marse messaged
what she said would be “my last text. I apologize for pouring my feelings out to
you. I love those babies more than anything. I feel like I have lost. . . . Not to
mention my last few text, you have not responded . . . . if I may ask one more thing,
please don’t let them lie in your courtroom anymore, hear all sides, allow the other
family members to speak, there are three sides to every story. Please, don’t let them
control you as a person, use your power . . . Again, I appreciate your communication
with me . . . Forever, my friend.” Thirty minutes later, Judge Denton responded: “I
never give up and I never stop thinking. I have to navigate a system fraught with
failure. I don’t think you are crazy. Far from it. You must have faith. Right wins
in the end. Sometimes justice just takes a little longer.” At 11:55 a.m., Ms. Bardeau-
Marse replied: “Thank you so much . . . for putting the positive thoughts once again.”
Two weeks later, on July 12, 2018, at 7:15 p.m., Ms . Bardeau -Marse
messaged: “Hi, Judge, hope all is well . . . well thought I’d share the latest, Mr.
Daddy of the year has pushed buttons again . . . he tells [J.C.] that he has spoken to
you . . . yes . . . . and you have assured him that [J.C.] nor we will ever get those
babies, that you told him you have so much on her to not worry about anything. . . .
I don’t believe this to be true.” Judge Denton responded at 8:13 p.m.: “[A.D.] is a
liar if he said he spoke to me that did not, would not occur. I nee d to do some
thinking and some praying. I will be in touch.” At 8:16 p.m., Judge Denton
messaged: “Before this is going to go on much longer [,] we will be back [i]n court
[I] am almost sure of it.”
The following day, July 13, 2018, at 5:33 p.m., Ms. Bardeau-Marse messaged:
“[J.C.] received this letter today . . . does this mean [A.D.] has full custody now?
And the case is over? The letter is incorrect . . . these kids were NEVER neglected
or abused NEVER . . . . ” At 6:31 p.m., Judge Denton advised her: “No it does not
necessarily mean that it’s over . . . . I do strenuously suggest you go hire the best

9

lawyer you can afford[,] get legal advice and go to court where jurisdiction over
custody can be fought over. I wish I could do more but I have a cour t of limited
jurisdiction.” A few minutes later Judge Denton messaged: “I wish I could do more
to help[.] But as it currently sits my hands are tied. I wish you the very best! I will
continue to pray for you and your family.” The n, Ms. Bardeau-Marse replied: “I
understand . . . I just appreciate you listening . . . .”
In conformity with Judge Denton’s legal advice, Ms. Bardeau -Marse
consulted with her attorney, Ms. Finley. Ms. Bardeau-Marse informed Ms. Finley
that she had been communicating with Judge Denton by Messenger texts and
telephone calls. She showed Ms. Finley the messages, including Judge Denton’s
July 13, 2018 message to file suit in another court with jurisdiction over custody.
On August 10, 2018, Ms. Finley filed suit against the fa ther on behalf of Ms.
Bardeau-Marse, seeking custody or visitation. The suit was filed in the Family Court
of East Baton Rouge Parish 7 (“Family Court”) and was allotted to Judge Lisa
Woodruff-White.
Judge Denton stipulated that when he learned of the suit filed in Family Court,
he called and spoke to Ms. Finley, and told her that “he had retained Jurisdiction of
the DCFS (Child In Need of Care) case in Denham Springs City Court and that her
suit in . . . Family Court should be dismissed.” In Ms. Finley’s sworn statement, she
described the call from Judge Denton as follows:
[I told him] Judge, I did hear you say that you retained
jurisdiction of the case. And I said but the case that I filed in East Baton
Rouge Parish isn’t the same case. It’s [A.D.] versus Stephanie . . .
Bardeau-Marse. The case you retained jurisdiction of was a Child in
Need of Care case, the State versus [J.C.] . . . . all of a sudden, his
attitude changed and he became very threatening, very menacing. And
he said, well, I . . . think Judge Woodruff -White would disagree with
that. And . . . he said that he was going to call her and have it put back
in his courtroom.

7 The father resided in Baton Rouge with E.C. and P.C.

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Ms. Finley stated that she told Judge Denton that she was not having an ex parte
conversation with him because she did not think it was appropriate. Ms. Finley also
told Judge Denton that her client had informed her of the ex parte communications
between them and that he should recuse himself from the CINC proceeding.
Subsequently, Judge Denton messaged Ms. Bardeau-Marse:
Please don’t think me rude but you are now a party litigant in a custody
matter and have retained legal counsel and it would be inappropriate to
have contact with anyone other than your legal team and we have
spoken and agree it is both of our responsibility to keep in mind our
obligation of the best interest of the children. In light of that[,] I feel
compelled to discontinue our friendly discourse. Please don’t take it
personally but I must maintain my ethical a nd professional
responsibility. I hope you understand!

Ms. Bardeau-Marse responded: “Judge . . . . I totally agree . . . my heart broke . . .
all I wanted was for my visitation with my grandbabies . . . . ”
Judge Denton also spoke with Ms. Lee, the attorney for the father in the CINC
proceeding, and informed her of Ms. Finley’s filing in Family Court.
During the first week of September 2018, Judge Denton called Judge
Woodruff-White and told her he had retained jurisdiction of the case. Judge Denton
testified that this call was not an attempt to influence Judge Woodruff -White to
dismiss Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s case in her court but to tell her, as a courtesy from one
judge to another, that he really wanted to retain jurisdiction. On September 6, 2018,
Judge Denton sent Judge Woodruff-White a letter to follow-up on his phone call that
stated:
It was a pleasure speaking with you the other day. I wanted to remind
you about the conversation we discussed, the . . . children, [E.C.] and
[P.C.]. The dad . . . . whom I gave custody to, with supervi sed visits
with the mother . . . . Attorney Maria Finley has filed a case in your
court for [ Ms. Bardeau-Marse] even though both were present in my
courtroom and knew I had retained jurisdiction. It is my contention that
Ms. Finley is forum shopping knowing full well the order of my court
that is in place. Judge, I would appreciate the professional courtesy to
allow me to continue to retain jurisdiction as per the Louisiana
Children’s Code 309. . . .

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Neither in the telephone call or letter did Judge Denton tell Judge Woodruff-White
that he had “strenuously suggest[ed]” to Ms. Bardeau-Marse that she “go hire th e
best lawyer” she could afford and to “go to court where jurisdiction over custody
can be fought over.”
On September 18, 2018, Judge Woodruff-White ordered the parties to submit
memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction in light of the proceedings in Denham
Springs City Court. In October 2018, the parties submitted memoranda, and the
father also filed a motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings in Family Court. On
November 5, 2018, Judge Woodruff -White signed an order declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the case and stayed the proceedings. Judge Woodruff -White also
issued written reasons for j udgment, stating “the Honorable Jerry Denton
communicated with this Court and advised of the proceeding there,” and
“[l]egitimate jurisdictional issues and concerns were expressed.” She concluded that
“the Juvenile Court is a more appropriate forum to decide the pending pleading.”8
The following are additional stipulations by Judge Denton and OSC which
were accepted by the Commission and set forth in the Recommendation (references
to the exhibits are omitted):9
A. General Material Facts
. . . .
2. Judge Denton has cooperated with the Offic e of Special Counsel
during the investigation of this matter and following issuance of the
Notice of Hearing.
3. Judge Denton has no prior private counseling or public discipline for
judicial ethical misconduct by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana
or the Louisiana Supreme Court.
. . . .
C. Stipulated Material Facts Relative to Notice of Hearing No. 0381
. . . .

8 Ms. Bardeau-Marse sought review of this ruling. Her writ application to the court of appeal was
denied, with one judge dissenting. Bardeau-Marse v. Delatorre, 19-1157 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/6/20)
(unpublished). Her writ application to this C ourt was not considered on timeliness grounds.
Bardeau-Marse v. Delatorre, 20-0403 (La. 5/7/20), 296 So.3d 609.
9 The Recommendation indicates that the stipulations were reproduced in the Recommendation in
“their entirety with minor technical changes that do not affect substance.”

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F20. Judge Denton acknowledges that his message [regarding catching
the father if he “ messes up” discussed supra] to Ms. Bardeau- Marse
could be reasonably interpreted as having suggested that he was
working privately on her behalf to get her more time or possibly,
custody of her grandchildren. Judge Denton takes total responsibility
for this occurrence and recognizes the patently imprope r aspects of
these communications and the manifest resulting violations of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
. . . .
F27. Judge Denton acknowledges that his actions and words, such as
“fighting us badly” and “our position,” could have reasonably given
Ms. Bardeau-Marse the impression that he was acting as her advocate.
He recognizes that his words led Ms. Bardeau-Marse to believe that he
was on her side and in this fight together, while his contradictory failure
to issue the visitation order after Ms. Lee opposed it greatly confused
Ms. Bardeau-Marse. Judge Denton acknowledges his untoward actions
were regrettable, improper, and in violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

F28. Judge Denton further recognizes that his words and actions at this
point in time could reasonably lead others to question his impartiality;
Judge Denton admits that he was not acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary; and he should have recused himself from any and al l future
proceedings involving the parties . . . .
. . . .
F36. In his sworn statement, Judge Denton testified that he acknowledged to
Ms. Finley that his ex parte communications with her client were
inappropriate and would cease immediately. . . .
. . . .
F42. Even if his conversations with Judge Woodruff -White and his letter
to her . . . would fall within an exception to the rules governing ex parte
conversations. . . an d might have been necessary under the law to prevent
their respective Courts from rendering conflicting custody judgments, Judge
Denton acknowledges that his statements to Ms. Bardeau-Marse to fight for
custody in another court in another jurisdiction and his failure to advise Judge
Woodruff-White of said statements, made his argument of forum shopping
null and void of reason, in addition to creating a negative impression of Ms.
Finley to Judge Woodruff -White. Judge Denton understands the
significance of his actions and statements and recognizes that he should have
and was required by law to recuse himself, instead of seeking and getting
Judge Woodruff-White to di smiss or stay Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s petition for
custody or visitation in her court. His failure to recuse was a violation of both
Canon 3C of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct and Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure Article 151, as his words and actions had resulted in the
reasonable conclusion by others that he had become “biased, prejudiced, or
interested in the cause or its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward or against
the parties or the parties’ attorneys or any witness to such an extent that [he
was or] would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.”

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The Stipulation between the OSC and Judge Denton reflected that the parties agreed
that Judge Denton violated the following Canons and portions of La. Const. art. 5, §
25(C) (1974):
a. Canon 1 because he “failed to observe high standards of
conduct so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved”; [10]

b. Canon 2A because he “failed to ‘respect and comply
with the law and [to] act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary’” by engaging in improper ex
parte communications and failing to recuse himself;[11]

c. Canon 3(A)(4) because he . . .“in the performance of
judicial duties by words or conduct manifest[ed] bias or
prejudice”;[12]

d. Canon 3A(6) because he engaged in “private or ex parte
interviews, arguments or communications designed to
influence his . . . judicial action”;
[13]

e. Canon 3C because he failed to “disqualify himself . . .
in a proceeding in which [his] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned”;
[14] and,

d. La. Const. art. V, §25(C)(1974) because he engaged in
persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute.

10 Canon 1 provides , in part : “A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing, and shall personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved.”

11 Canon 2A states: “A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”

12 Canon 3A(4) provides , in part: “A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice.”

13 Canon 3A(6) provides, in part: “Except as permitted by law a judge shall not permit private or
ex parte interviews, arguments or communications designed to influence his or her judicial action
in any case, either civil or criminal.”

14 Canon 3C provides, in part: “A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be ques tioned and shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which disqualification is required by law or applicable Supreme Court
rule. . . .”

14

The parties stipulated that the only issue remaining for determination was
whether Judge Denton engaged in “willful misconduct relating to his official duty,”
in violation of La. Const. art. V, §25(C) (1974).
The OSC and Judge Denton agreed to a sanction of suspension from office for
sixty days, without pay, and payment of costs. The matter was submitted to the
Commission.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION
On August 20, 2021, Judge D enton appeared before the Commission and
testified. In addition, the parties introduced exhibits including the sworn statements
of Judge Denton, Ms. Bardeau-Marse, and Ms. Finley.
In Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s sworn statement, she stated that she had trusted Judge
Denton and followed his advice by having her attorney file for custody in the Family
Court, only to feel “betrayed” upon learning of his letter to Judge Woodruff-White.
She further testified that she was “hurt” because she “thought he was being sincere”
and acting in her “best interest” and that “[y]ou can[’t] trust the system at all.”
In Ms. Finley’s sworn statement, she stated that after she was made aware of
Judge Denton’s communications with Ms. Bardeau -Marse, she did not want to be
further involved in the matter but agreed to represent Ms. Bardeau-Marse because
Ms. Bardeau-Marse was “devastated,” and she was afraid Ms. Bardeau-Marse would
be “emotionally affected, detrimentally[,] by it.” Ms. Finley indicated that following
Judge Woodruff -White’s declination of jurisdiction, she entered into what she
described as an “extremely contentio us” process of filing writs on Ms. Bardeau-
Marse’s behalf, during which she was placed in a “very uncomfortable position” of
having to “point out inaccuracies” regarding the proceeding s. Ms. Finley further
stated: “And I really am extremely upset that a judge would do this and put my client
in a situation like that. It makes me not trust what we do.”

15

After hearing Judge Denton’s testimony (wherein each member of the
Commission had the option to question Judge Denton) and reviewing the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Commission made the following findings.
Judge Denton acknowledge d the inappropriate nature of his actions and
expressed remorse. H owever, the Commission was concerned that Judge Denton
offered no satisfactory explanation for why he engaged in the conduct. For example,
when asked why he continued his conversations with Ms. Bardeau-Marse despite
the fact that they were highly improper, Judge Denton stated that he had only been
on the bench for fourteen months at the time, had never practiced any kind of family
law, and was not familiar with the handling of DCFS matters. Upon further
questioning, he acknowledged that he did not need family law experience to know
that certain c onversations between a judge and an interested party were improper.
He admitted that he did not engage in ex parte communications with judges as an
attorney because he knew they were impermissible. He agreed that the training he
underwent as a new judge reaffirmed the inappropriateness of these types of ex parte
communications.
Judge Denton offered that he was “sympathetic to the plight of the
grandmother,” which may have “impacted and overshadowed some of [his]
judgment [and] that normally [he] would not have ever made that mistake in just a
normal setting.” He explained that he was receptive to the initial communication
from Ms. Bardeau-Marse because of their common connection to the former mayor
of Denham Springs and agreed that “despite the fact that [he] knew ex parte
communication[s] w[ere] inappropriate . . . [he] ventured down a path of repeated
communications with a person [he] knew nothing about, simply because the mayor
suggested it.”
Judge Denton explained that he did not recuse himself af ter his
communications with Ms. Bardeau -Marse because the DCFS file was closed, and

16

there were no open matters being brought before him. However, he acknowledged
that he knew the case continued to be open and “unresolved” even thoug h the file
may have bee n closed. The Commission noted that in one of his early
communications with Ms. Bardeau-Marse, Judge Denton told her he was “working
on the entire situation,” and after he attempted to figure out how to issue a special
order or otherwise assist her, he told Ms. Bardeau-Marse, “[b]efore this is going to
go on much longer[,] we will be back [i]n court [I] am almost sure of it.”
The Commission opined that Judge Denton offered no compelling reason why
he “strenuously” advised Ms. Bardeau-Marse to have her attorney file for custody
in a separate court but then insisted upon retaining jurisdi ction over the matter. It
noted that Judge Denton attempted to explain that he reached out to Judge Woodruff-
White “out of courtesy” and “full disclosure” so she would k now that he was
retaining jurisdiction; he, however, acknowledged that he did not disclose to Judge
Woodruff-White that he had engaged in lengthy ex parte discussions with Ms.
Bardeau-Marse, including advising her to file the matter in another court. Judge
Denton stated that he chose not to mention his ex parte communications with Ms.
Bardeau-Marse because he “assumed” that Ms. Finley had made Judge Woodruff-
White aware of his conduct. The Commission was of the opinion that “[i]t appeared
that Judge Woodr uff-White relied at least in part upon Judge Denton’s
communications to her, including his misleading statement that Ms. Finley was
‘forum shopping,’ in declining to exercise juri sdiction.” The Commission
emphasized Judge Woodruff-White noted, in her reasons for judgment, that “the
Honorable Jerry Denton communicated with this Court and advised of the
proceeding there,” and “[l]egitimate jurisdictional issues and concerns were
expressed.”
Although Judge Denton acknowledge d that his actions may have g iven the
appearance of bias or prejudice, he denied that he was actually biased or prejudiced

17

towards or against any party or interested person. When questioned about texting to
Ms. Bardeau -Marse that the father’s attorney was “fighting us badly” about the
special order he was trying to issue in her favor, he attempted to explain that the “us”
to whom he was referring was his “Court, [his] staff, and the Department of Children
and Family Services.” The Commission found this explanation to not be credible.
It noted that on the same night that he told Ms. Bardeau-Marse that the father’s
attorney was “fighting us badly,” Judge Denton texted her that he was “consulting
with some other family court judges to try and come up with some resolve [sic] to
get you all some rights without having to hire lawyers” and “you mustn’t give up or
cause yourself to have a mental collapse because that won’t help our position.”
Moreover, a month later, in response to Ms. Bardeau -Marse “begging for help,”
Judge Denton told her that he “never give[s] up,” and he had to “navigate a system
fraught with failure ,” but she should “have faith. ” The Commission opined these
words indicated he was aligned with Ms. Bardeau -Marse and taking steps to be an
advocate for her.
The Commission concluded, in addition to the stipulated violations by the
parties, that Judge Denton violated Canon s 3A(4) (a judge “shall perform judicial
duties without bias or prejudice”) and 3C (“A judge . . . shall disqualify himself or
herself in a proceeding in which disqualification is required by law or applicable
Supreme Court rule. . . .”) , and he engaged in “willful misconduct relating to his
official duties,” in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974). The Commission
recommended a six -month suspension from office , without pay, and payment of
costs.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Louisiana Constitution Article V, § 25(C)(1974) provides:

(C) Powers. On recommendation of the judiciary commission,
the supreme court may censure, suspend with or without salary, remove
from office, or retire involuntarily a judge for willful misconduct

18

relating to his official duty, willful and persistent failure to perform his
duty, persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, conduct while in
office which would constitute a felony, or conviction of a felony. On
recommendation of the judiciary commission, the supreme court may
disqualify a judge from exercising any judicial function, without loss
of salary, during pendency of proceedings in the supreme court. On
recommendation of the judiciary commission, the supreme court may
retire involuntarily a judge for disability that seriously interferes with
the performance of his duties and that is or is likely to become
permanent. The supreme court shall make rules implementing this
Section and providing for confidentiality and privilege of commission
proceedings.

Pursuant to La. Const. a rt. V , § 25(C) (1974), this Court has original
jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary proceedings. Under its supervisory authority
over all lower courts, this Court adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, effective
January 1, 1976, which is binding on all judges. Violations of the Canons of the
Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct may serve as the basis for the disciplinary action
provided for by La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974). In re Quirk, 97-1143, p. 4 (La.
12/12/97), 705 So.2d 172, 176.
STIPULATED VIOLATIONS
The parties stipulated that Judge Denton’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, and
3A(6) and specified portions of 3A(4) and 3C of the Louisiana Code of Judicial
Conduct (1996). Based on these violations, the parties agreed that Judge Denton
engaged in “persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice” that brought the judicial office into disrepute, pursuant to La. Const. art. V,
§ 25(C) (1974). Because Judge Denton stipulated to relevant facts and admitted
facts that establish violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, this Court is “left only
with the task of deciding the appropriate measure of discipline” as to these stipulated
violations. See In re Decuir, 95-0056, p. 8 (La. 5/22/95), 654 So.2d 687, 692.
ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS
As discussed above, the Commission found that Judge Denton violated
specified portions of Canons 3A(4) and 3C and that Judge Denton’s actions were

19

“willful misconduct relating to his official duties, ” pursuant to La. Const. art. V, §
25(C) (1974).
The standard of proof in judicial discipline cases is the clear and convincing
standard. Quirk, 97-1143, p. 4, 705 So.2d at 176. “This standard requires that the
level of proof supporting the Commission’s factual findings must be more than a
mere preponderance of the evidence but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. ” Id.
Once the violations of the judge have been established by clear and convincing
proof, La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974) sets forth the disciplinary options available
to this Court: “On recommendation of the judiciary commission, the supreme court
may censure, suspend with or without salary, remove from office , or retire
involuntarily a judge . . . .” Because this Court has original jurisdiction, it has the
power to make original determinations of fact based upon the evidence in the record
and is not bound by, nor required, to give any weight to the findings a nd
recommendations of the Commission. Quirk, 97-1143, pp. 3-4, 705 So.2d at 176.
However, “no new evidence is presented to [the Supreme Court] and only that
evidence adduced at the hearing before the Commission is considered.” In re
Decuir, 95-0056, p. 7, 654 So.2d at 692 (citing In Re Whitaker, 463 So.2d 1291,
1298 (La. 1985)).
Canon 3A(4)
The Commission found Judge Denton also violated the portion of Canon
3A(4) that provides a judge “shall perform judicial duties without bias or
prejudice.”15 In support, in the Recommendation, the Commission pointed out that
Judge Denton gave Ms. Bardeau- Marse the name and number of a private
investigator; he told her he would keep his eyes on A.D.; he told her he would “catch
[A.D.] when he messes up and he will. . . .”; and, he referred to A.D. as a “liar.” In

15 Of the nine members on the Commissio n, two voted against a conclusi on that Judge Denton
was actually biased or prejudiced.

20

addition, the Commission cited Judge Denton’s action in advising Ms. Bardeau -
Marse to file for custody in another jurisdiction. Furthermore, regarding Judge
Denton’s attempt to issue a special order for visitation, the Commission determined
that Judge Denton’s words such as “fighting us badly” and “our position,” suggested
that he had become emotionally involved with Ms. Bardeau- Marse and her legal
conflict with A.D. and that he was acting as her advocate. The Commission
espoused that the fact Judge Denton was unsuccessful in issuing a special order did
not negate the fact that he attempted to do so on behalf of Ms. Bardeau-Marse after
engaging in ex parte communications.
At the hearing presided over by the Commission, Judge Denton testified
regarding his reference to “we” and “us” in his messages to Ms. Bardeau-Marse as
follows:
I would like to clarify that. And I do understand how that could be taken
as such. When I use the term “we” and “us,” I, in my mind, I was
referring to my Court, my staff, and the Department of Children and
Family Services; that was the “us” and the “we” that I was referring to;
not parties. But I could see how it could be taken the other way.

In the Recommendation, the Commission found Judge Denton’s explanation of “we”
and “us” not credible. It concluded that “[w]hile Judge Denton may have genuinely
believed that he was not biased and could remain impartial, it simply strains
credibility to conclude that he was actually unbiased or uninterested in [the] matter.”
The Commission continued:
An unbiased and impartial Judge does not engage in extensive ex parte
communications about the case and the parties with a person interested
in the case, does not attempt to take Judicial action based on such
communications, does not identify himself and align himself with that
person’s position, does not give that person legal advice, and does not
seek to maintain control of the case by making misrepresentations to
another judicial officer.

During his testimony, Judge Denton admitted that the “wording of certain
things to [Ms. Bardeau-Marse] could have been taken as having given legal advice

21

. . . .” and that communicating with Ms. Bardeau-Marse about issuing a special order
for visitation “was not the wisest choice” and that it was wrong. Judge Denton ,
however, responded that his actions were not the result of any bias or prejudice
towards any party.16
In his brief to this Court, Judge Denton explained that he struggled to do the
right thing under the law “in the best interest of the children while showing
compassion for a grieving grandmother.” Judge Denton emphasized that he denied
Ms. Bardeau -Marse’s petition for intervention twice. In addition, Judge Denton
denied he acted against Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s interest when he informed Judge
Woodruff-White that he retained jurisdiction of the custody matter. Judge Dent on
challenged the Commission’s finding, arguing in part:
When viewed in isolation of all of the facts, as stipulated, Judge
Denton’s actions could be perceived by others as “bias or prejudice;”
however, when all of the facts and testimony have been considered, as
set out in the Stipulations and upon reviewing Judge Denton’s
testimony at his personal appearance, there is no support for the
Commission’s conclusion of law that Judge Denton was biased or
prejudiced in his conduct of the proceedings.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence support s that, by
clear and convincing proof under the unusual circumstances of this case , Judge
Denton violated Canon 3(A)(4). I n the performance of his judicial duties, Judge
Denton’s words and conduct manifested at the very least bias when he gave Ms.
Bardeau-Marse the name and number of a private investigator and told her he would
keep his eyes on the father; attempted to issue a special order for extra-visitation;
and, advised Ms. Bardeau-Marse to file for custody in another jurisdiction.
Canon 3C
The Commission argued that Judge Denton was “so personally involved and
interested” in the custody/visitation fight, he was required by Can on 3C and La.

16 At the hearing, Judge Denton responded that he was not taking the position that the ex parte
conversations with Ms. Bardeau-Marse were appropriate because she was not a “party.”

22

C.C.P. art. 151 to recuse himself from the CINC proceeding , but failed to do so.
During the Commission proceedings, Judge Denton did not stipulate that he violated
the portion of Canon 3C that requires a judge to recuse himself “in a proceeding in
which disqualification is required by law.” He disagreed that recusal was compelled
under La. C.C.P. art. 151 (4), which requires recusal if “[t]he judge is biased,
prejudiced, or interested in the cause or its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward
or against the parties or the parties’ attorneys or any witness to such an extent that
the judge would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.” In his brief
to this Court, Judge Denton did not address recusal pursuant to Article 151.
Notwithstanding, in July 2021, Judge Denton filed a motion to recuse himself from
the CINC proceeding, including all future motions and filings. During his testimony
before the Commission, Judge Denton testified he recused himself from the CINC
proceeding, explaining that “[a]fter consulting counsel and making a determination
. . . it would probably be appropriate and in order for me to put in an official recusal
in that file for the future should that matter come up again.” In addition, the joint
stipulation between OSC and Judge Denton provided:
F28. Judge Denton further recognizes that his words and actions at this
point in time could reasonably lead others to question his impartiality;
Judge Denton admits that he was not acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
Judiciary; and he should have recused himself from any and all future
proceedings involving the parties. . . .
. . . .
F42. . . . . Judge Denton understands the significance of his actions and
statements and recognizes that he should have and was required by law
to recuse himself, instead of seeking and getting Judge Woodruff-White
to dismiss or stay Ms. Bardeau-Marse’s petition for custody or
visitation in her court. His failure to recuse was a violation of both
Canon 3C of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct and Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure Article 151, as his words and actions had
resulted in the reasonable conclusion by others that he had become
“biased, prejudiced, or interested in the cause or its outcome or biased
or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties’ attorneys or
any witness to such an extent that [he was or] would be unable to
conduct fair and impartial proceedings.”

23

Considering Judge Denton’s stipulations and his recusal from the CINC
proceeding in July 2021, whether the evidence supported a finding that Judge
Denton violated that disputed portion of Canon 3C and whether recusa l was
mandated under Article 151 need not be determined.
“Willful” misconduct
The Commission unanimously determined that Judge Denton engaged in
“willful misconduct relating to his official duty,” pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 25
(C) (1974). In support, the Commission pointed out in its brief to this Court that
Judge Denton stipulated that he “willingly permitted and participated in the private
communications related to an unresolved and contentious custody c ase.” At the
hearing, Judge Denton testified he knew the ex parte communications were
improper. In addition, as discussed supra, Judge Denton, ex parte, attempted to issue
a special order for extra visitation for Ms. Bardeau-Marse. Moreover, the
Commission emphasized that Judge Denton advised Ms. Bardeau-Marse to hire the
best lawyer she could afford and to file her case in a court where jurisdiction ov er
custody could be fought, and, when she did, he actively sought to retain jurisdiction.
The Commission argued:
This was not a careless oversight. Judge Denton severely contradicted
his advice to Ms. Bardeau-Marse to pursue her case in another forum;
he deliberately impugned the character and actions of a member of the
bar, and willfully mislead Judge Woodruff -White, which led to
contentious proceedings in her court and the Court of Appeal.

The C ommission asserted that Judge Denton’s misconduct was “the result of
deliberate conscious actions, not inadvertence or negligence.”
At the hearing, co unsel for OSC argued that “[t] he word ‘willfully’ means
done with intention or deliberately, as defined by Merriam-Webster,” and “[t]here is
no element of bad faith involved in the definition of willful.”
In his brief to this Court, Judge Denton responded that there is no evidence to
support his actions were “willful,” as “willful” is “an active and intentional desire to

24

bring about an un toward consequence,” and that he never intent ionally set out to
harm anyone. Judge Denton argued that “willful” “means something more than
voluntary or w illingly but also indicates the presence of some malice or desire to
achieve an untoward result.” Judge Denton urged that “[i]f this Court were to accept
the Commission’s reasoning that intentional s imply means a person intends to
perform an action, then all conduct would be ‘willful,’” and “[i]t is the substance of
an action and not the physical act itself that makes conduct willful.”
At the hearing presided over by the Commission, counsel for Judge Denton
argued that “willful” connotes when a person sets out to achieve a desired result, and
here, there were no facts to support that he set out to achieve a desired result.
Counsel for Judge Denton continued:
Willful is an active and, intentional desire to bring about an untoward
consequence. Of course it was intentional that [Judge Denton’s] hands
hit the keyboard and that these messages were transmitted, but there is
not one scintilla of evidence, not even a suggestion, that he intended to
bring about some untoward occurrence or action. . . . It was certainly
willful conduct, but it wasn’ t willful misconduct in the sense that he
sought to bring about some salacious or dilatory or untoward actions.

Judge Denton asserted that “[a]ll of his actions were motivated by his belief that he
was acting within the best interest of the children involved.” In his brief filed in this
Court, Judge Denton emphasized that “[n]o one . . . achieved any advantage, suffered
any adverse consequences, or otherwise benefited from or sustained a disadvantage”
from his words and actions.
Turning to the constitutional article, “willful” is not expressly defined in La.
Const. art. V, § 25(C); thus, we must consult our jurisprudential and statutory rules
on interpretation of statutes. In Gregor v. Argenot Great Central Insurance
Company, 02-1138, pp. 6 -7 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 959, 964 (footnote omitted),
this Court explained in pertinent part:
The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the
language of the law itself. Ginn v. Woman’s Hospital Foundation, Inc.,
02-1913, p. 9 (La. 4/9/03), 842 So.2d 338, 344; Rougeau v. Hyundai

25

Motor America, 01-1182, p. 5 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d 147, 151.
Special rules for interpreting a statute . . . have been enacted by the
legislative branc h and are found in La. R.S. 1:1 et seq. Louisiana
Revised Statute 1:3 provides, in pertinent part, tha t “[w]ords and
phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed
according to the common and approved usage of the language” and the
“word ‘shall’ is mandatory.” (Emphasis added.) Louisiana Revised
Statute 1:4 provided that “[w]hen the wording of a Section [of a statute]
is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” The legislative branch also has
provided general rules for interpreting laws in La. C.C. art. 9 et seq.
See, in particular, La. C.C. arts. 9 and 11. We are bound by the language
of a relevant law. Allen v. State, through the Ernest N. Morial-New
Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 02-1072, p. 12 (La. 4/9/03), 842
So.2d 373, 381.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 11 provides: “The words of a law must be given their
generally prevailing meaning. Words of art and technical terms must be given their
technical meaning when the law involves a technical matter.” In Gregor, this Court
explained that “[d]ictionaries are a valuable source for determining the common and
approved usage of words.” Gregor, 02-1138, p. 7, 851 So.2d at 964 (quoting
Louisiana Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Assoc.1993, Inc. v. Fair Grounds
Corp., 02-1928, p. 5 (La. 4/9/03), 845 So.2d 1039, 1042).
“Willful,” which is an adjective, is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (11 th
ed. 2019) as “[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious,” and “[a]
voluntary act becomes willful, in law, only when it involves conscious wrong or evil
purpose on the part of the actor, or at least inexcusable carelessness, whether the act
is right or wrong (emphasis added).” “The term willful is stronger than voluntary or
intentional.” Id. In addition, “ willfulness” is defined as “[t]he quality, state, or
condition of acting purposely or by design; deliberateness; intention;” “[it] does not
necessarily imply malice, but it in volves more than just knowledge;” and, “[t]he
voluntary, intentional violation or disregard of a known legal duty. ” Id. The
Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “willful” as “obstinately and often perversely
self-willed” and “done deliberately.”

26

In In re Elloie, 05-1499, p. 30 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 882 , 902, this Court
held that “[t]here is no subjective intent requirement for judicial misconduct.”17 The
Elloie Court explained, in pertinent part:
An act does not have to be intentional to support judicial discipline. In
re: Hunter, 2002-1875 p. 16 (La. 8/19/02), 823 So.2d 325, 336 (“[A]
judge may also, through negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad
faith, behave in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice so
as to bring the judicial office into disrepute.”). Moreover . . . the fact
that other judges or other circ umstances may correct the erroneous or
legally unsupportable judicial action does not absolve the respondent
judge from the consequences of his wrongful acts.

Id.; see also, In re Gremillion, 16-0054, p. 21 (La. 6/29/16), 204 So.3d 183, 195
(wherein this Court held that the judge’s assurances that his actions were not
deliberate, intentional, or meant to hurt anyone did not preclude a finding of ethical
misconduct sufficient to warrant a recommendation of discipline ). Similarly, in
Small v. Guste, 383 So.2d 1011, 1014 (La. 1980) , this Court found a judge who
refused to perform his constitutional and ethical duty to retire upon rea ching
mandatory retirement age wa s guilty of “willful misconduct relating to his official
duty.” In In re Fuselier, 02-1661 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So. 2d 1257, the Commission
found the judge engaged in impermissible ex parte communications by accepting
requests to “fix” traffic tickets and/or other offenses, and having an employee of his
court contact the district attorney’s office or city attorney’ s office to relay the
messages. Id., 02-1661, p. 16, 837 So.2d at 1259. This Court explained that “[e]x
parte communications can suggest bias or partiality on the part of the judge ” and
“[a]t worst, ex parte communication is an invitation to improper influence if not
outright corruption.” Id., 02-1661, p. 21, 837 So.2d at 1271 (quoting Jeffrey M.

17 In In re Elloie, 05-1499 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 882, the Commission determined that Judge
Elloie violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in willful misconduct
relating to his official duty and in persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the admini stration
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, all in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25 (C).
Judge Elloie disputed the violation, arguing that he did not believe he committed judicial
misconduct for two reasons: “First, he did not intend to violate the judicial canons or the
constitution. Second, the actions he performed were not irrevocable, and were, in fact,
subsequently set aside.” Id., 05-1499, p. 30, 921 So.2d at 902.

27

Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics, Sec. 5.01 (3rd ed. 2000)). It agreed that
this misconduct by Judge Fuselier was in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). In
support of the determination that the j udge was in violation of section 25(C), the
Fuselier court cited Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 45 Cal.3d 518,
247 Cal.Rptr . 378, 754 P.2d 724, 733 (1988), wherein the Supreme Court of
California found the judge’s conduct of calling the district attorney assigned to a
criminal case docketed to his court, ex parte , and urging the district attorney to
prosecute the defendant on a felony instead of a misdemeanor c onstituted willful
misconduct, despite the fact that the district attorney did not follow the judge’ s
suggestion, and the judge had no further contact with the case. In re Fuselier, 02-
1661, pp. 21-22, 837 So.2d at 1271.
Applying jurisprudential and statutory rules on interpretation of statutes and
reviewing prior case law , we reject the contention that the term “willful, ” in the
context of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974), requires the misconduct to be done with
the intent to bring about a negative consequence or to be done in bad faith.
With the definition of “willful” misconduct in the context of Article V, §
25(C) (1974) in mind, we find there is clear and convicting proof that Judge Denton’s
misconduct, which was related to his official duty, was willful. Judge Denton
knowingly and intentionally engaged in improper ex parte communications (which
he knew from the beginning were improper) , wherein he offered to issue a special
order for Ms. Bardeau-Marse, and advised Ms. Bardeau-Marse to file for custody in
another jurisdiction. He initiated a contentious ex parte conversation with Ms.
Finley regarding retaining jurisdiction of the custody matter. He intentionally misled
Judge Woodruff-White in an effort to retain jurisdiction of the custody matter (which
was within his discretion to do pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 309), by concealing his
advice to Ms. Bardeau-Marse to file for custody in another jurisdiction and by
accusing Ms. Finely of forum shopping.

28

In conclusion, the parties stipulated that Judge Denton’s conduct violated
Canons 1, 2A, and 3A(6) and specified portions of 3A(4) and 3C of the Louisiana
Code of Judicial Conduct (1996), and that Judge Denton engaged in “persistent and
public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” that brought the judicial
office into disrepute, pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974). In addition, we
conclude the evidence supports, by clear and convincing proof , that Judge Denton
violated Canon 3(A)(4) in that in the performance of his judicial duties, his words
manifested bias, and he engage d in “willful misconduct relating to official duties”
in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974).
SANCTION
The parties ag ree that the sancti on should include a suspension. The issue
before this Court is the duration of the suspension.
The Commission recommended a six-month suspension, 18 without pay,
asserting, in pertinent part:
Although the Commission appreciated Judge Denton’s sincere remorse
for his actions, they were so obviously inappropriate that, quite simply,
he should have known better. It is the Commission’s belief that a six-
month suspension will protect the public by ensuring that Judge Denton
will be extraordinarily careful in the future not to engage in unethical
conduct, by reassuring the public— and especially Ms. Bardeau-Marse
and Ms. Finley —that judicial officers are held to proper account for
such blatantly improper actions, and by sending a clear message about
how seriously the Court views willful actions that sow public distrust
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The OSC and Judge Denton agreed to a sixty-day suspension without pay. In
support, Judge Denton argued in his brief to this Court:
No one else benefited, nor did anyone ever suffer any adverse
consequences as the result of his actions. For the Commission to infer
- although without support- that Judge Denton exercised “bias in favor
of Ms . Bardeau-Marse and against [A.D.] . . .” is absurd. He ruled
against Ms. Bardeau-Marse at every stage of the proceedings. The
orders that he rendered were favorable to [A.D.].

18 Seven members on the Commission voted for the six-month suspension, and two voted for the
sixty-day suspension.

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Judge Denton is a good person. He is respected, highly regarded
and recently re -elected without opposition. He has always tried to do
the right thing. While his comments and arguably his actions in these
proceedings were misguided, they certainly did not elevate to the level
of “willful” misconduct. Nor did they evidence any “bias ” either
toward or against the litigants [in] the underlying custody dispute.

The stipulated recommendation of Judge Denton and of the OSC
was fully supported by an analysis of the Chaisson factors. Further, as
acknowledged by the stipulated facts, Judge Denton has set in motion
a series of remedial actions in order to insure that this type of “social
media” ensnar[e]ment never again occurs.

In In re Williams, 11-2243, p. 10 (La. 1/24/12), 85 So. 3d 5, 13 (citations
omitted), this Court explained that “[i]n determining an appropriate sanction, we are
mindful that the primary purpose of the Code is the protection of the public rather
than simply to discipline judges,” and “the discipline to be imposed depends on the
facts of each case and the totality of the circumstances, and is guided by the factors
identified in [In re] Chaisson.” To determine an appropriate sanction, this Court in
In re Chaisson, 549 So.2d 259, 266 (La.1989), adopt ed the criteria (referred to as
the Chaisson factors) set forth in Matter of Deming, 108 Wash.2d 82, 736 P.2d 639,
659 (1987):
To determine the appropriate sanction, we consider the
following nonexclusive factors: (a) whether the
misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern
of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of
occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the
misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (d)
whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official
capacity or in his pri vate life; (e) whether the judge has
acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f)
whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or
modify his conduct; (g) the length of service on the bench;
(h) whether there have been prior complaints abou t this
judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the integrity
of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which
the judge exploited his position to satisfy his personal
desires.

We consider each Chaisson factor in turn. Judge Denton’s improper ex parte
communications with Ms. Bardeau-Marse, while he was presiding over the custody
case, were sustained over a six month period. During this six-month period, Judge

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Denton’s improper ex parte communication resulted in other ex parte misconduct,
which included: an attempt to issue a special order for visitation; and, misleading a
fellow judge by f ailing to disclose his personal involvement in the custody matter
and by disparaging an attorney. Although the improper ex parte conversations
between Judge Denton a nd Ms. Bardeau-Marse occurred in private, at all relevant
times, Judge Denton was acting in his official capacity as a judge . In mitigation,
Judge Denton cooperated with the OSC during the investigation. He also entered
into an extensive stipulation of facts and evidence regarding his actions and conduct.
He was remorseful. However, despite many admissions of wrongful conduct to the
Commission, Judge Denton persisted in his argument that his misconduct was not
“willful” or “bias” against a party or interested party. Also concerning was Judge
Denton’s position that no one suffered any adverse consequences as the result of his
actions. In mitigation, Judge Denton made efforts to change and modify his
behavior, which included recusing himself from the custody matter (but only after
counsel advised him to do so), deleting his social media accounts, and implementing
a system in his office to avoid ex parte communications. He also sought training
and education in children and family matters and re -familiarized himself with his
duties and responsibilities as a judge . Judge Denton assumed judicial office on
January 1, 2017, and he had been on the bench for eighteen months at the time of his
ethical misconduct. Although Judge Denton had not practiced in the area of family
law prior to being elected to the bench, he was an experienced attorney having served
as an assistant attorney general. As well, Judge Denton acknowledged that when he
was a practicing attorney, he was aware that ex parte conversations about a pending
matter with a judicial officer were improper. There were no prior complaints
regarding Judge Denton. Notwithstanding, Judge Denton’s misconduct adversely
affected the integrity and the respect of the judiciary. By communicating privately
with Ms. Bardeau-Marse, Judge Denton’s actions implied that he was aligned with

31

her position. In addition, by attempting to take judicial action on her behalf, Judge
Denton stepped outside of his role as a neutral arbiter and undermined the fair and
impartial administration of justice. A lthough Judge Denton may have begun the
communication with Ms. Bardeau-Marse for reasons of compassion, the evidence
indicates Judge Dento n developed a personal interest which was reflected in his
conduct of instructing Ms. Bardeau-Marse to file in another jurisdiction, then
actively seeking to prevent Judge Woodr uff-White from considering the matter,
including withholding from Judge Woodruff -White his ex parte communication
with Ms. Bardeau-Marse and disparaging Ms. Finely in the process. Numerous court
staff, attorneys, and the parties i n the custody matter became aware of Judge
Denton’s misconduct. Ms. Bardeau -Marse and Ms. Finley testified that they lost
trust in the legal system as a result of Judge Denton’s misconduct. The Commission
succinctly summed up the impact of Judge Denton’s actions: “Judge Denton ’s
actions resulted in chaotic and contentious proceedings before Judge Woodruff-
White and during the writ process that followed, which understandably caused Ms.
Finley great distress, deprived or significantly delayed Ms. Bardeau-Marse her day
in court, left her feeling confined, betrayed, and devastated.” As to the final factor,
we agree with the Commission that the evidence does not suggest that Judge Denton
exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires.
Judge Denton argued that prior cases involving similar misconduct support at
most a sixty-day suspension. Although prior case law may lend guidance, it is not
determinative of the sanction, as the proper sanction to be imposed is decided on a
case by case basis, applying the Chaisson factors. A review of cases involving
improper ex parte communication by a judge that were found in violation of La.

32

Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974), indicates a sanction range from censure to removal
from office.19
With the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings in mind and applying the Chaisson
factors to the present case, the record establishes that Judge Denton has no prior ethical lapses
and sought no personal gain. Judge Denton has expressed sincere remorse, implemented
remedial measures, fully cooperated with the Judiciary Commission, and fully stipulated to
the facts, admitting his mistakes and violations of the cannons. In light of the totality of
Judge Denton’s misconduct, and in an effort to protect the public and the public’s confidence
in the judiciary, we find the sanction in this case of a four-month suspension from office,

19 See, In re Fuselier, 837 So.2d 1257 (wherein this Court found a 120-day suspension appropriate
for a seasoned judge who: (1) held a witness in contempt for failure to appear in court pursuant to
a subpoena, even though the witness had not been properly subpoenaed; (2) contacted and met
with the witness’s employer, which ultimately led to the termination of the witness’s employment;
(3) abused his judicial authority by conducting arraignments and accepting guilty pleas in criminal
cases in the absence of a prosecutor and by dismissing misdemeanor traffic cases without involving
the prosecutor; (4) engaged in impermissible ex parte communications by “fixing” traffic tickets
and/or other offenses; and, (5) abused his constitutional judicial authority by “instituting,
authorizing, and participating i n” the worthless check program); In re Boothe,12-1821 (La.
1/29/13), 110 So.3d 1002 (wherein Judge Boothe was suspended for one year without pay for,
among other misconduct: (1) failing to recuse himself from hearing a defendant’s motion for
resentencing because the defendant was going to make allegations against another judge who
allegedly did not get along with Judge Boothe and to exonerate Judge Boothe from previous
allegations that the defendant had made against him; and (2) engaging in impermissible ex parte
communications with the defendant); In re Badeaux, 11-0214 (La. 7/1/11) 65 So.3d 1273 (wherein
this Court held that public censure was warranted for a judge who: (1) failed to recuse himself
from a custody matter in which he was friends with the mother and father; (2) had ex parte
conversations with the father; (3) took trips with the father while the case was pending before him;
and, (4) signed a legally deficient order in favor of the father); In re Benge, 09-1617 (La. 11/6/09)
24 So.3d 822 (wherein this Court held that removal from judicial office was warranted as discipline
for a judge, who, among other misconduct, engaged in impermissible ex parte conversations with
another judge designed to influence her judicial action and for awarding the plaintiff a judgment
not based on the evidence, but based on outside factors, such as, her relationships with the other
judge and the plaintiff’s attorney); In re Free, 14-1828 (La. 12/9/14), 158 So.3d 771 (wherein this
court suspended the judge from office for 30 days without pay for : (1) engaging in improper ex
parte communications with a party in an environmental contamination class action lawsuit in
response to a request for his recusal and attempting to resolve the matter during such
communications; and, (2) accepting an invitation to participate in an all- expenses-paid trip on a
private jet to a hu nting ranch in Texas, extended to him by attorneys in a personal injury case
before him at or near the time of settlement negotiations, including an attorney who regularly tried
cases in his court, which trip occurred shortly after the trial was concluded); and, In re Cresap, 06-
1242 (La. 10/17/06) 940 So.2d 624 (wherein this Court concluded a 30-day suspension without
pay and payment of costs was reasonable when the trial judge: (1) failed to act as a neutral arbiter;
(2) by allowing counsel for plaintiffs to influ ence his decision making; and, (3) engaging in
improper ex parte telephone communications with the Attorney General during proceedings held
before him).

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without pay, would serve the purposes of the disciplinary system. Additionally, we accept
the Commission’s recommendation that Judge Denton be ordered to reimburse and pay to
the Commission $4,676.25 in costs.20
CONCLUSION
The parties stipulated that Judge Denton’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, and
3A(6) and specified portions of 3A(4) and 3C of the Louisiana Code of Judicial
Conduct (1996), and that Judge Denton engaged in “persistent and public conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice” that brought the judicial office into
disrepute, pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974). In addition, we conclude
that Judge Denton violated Canon 3(A)(4) of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct
(1996) in that in the performance of his judicial duties, his words and actions
manifested bias, and he engaged in “willful misconduct relating to official duties”
in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (1974). As a sanction, Judge Denton is
suspended from office without pay for a period of four months and ordered to pay
to the Commission the sum of $4,676.25 in costs.
DECREE
It is ordered that Judge Denton be and hereby is suspended from office without
pay for a period of four months, and is furthermore ordered to pay to the Commission
the sum of $4,676.25 in costs.

20 “Pursuant to La. Sup.Ct. Rule XXIII, § 22, the Commission has the right to recover costs, subject
to this court’s review.” In re Elloie, 05-1499, p. 33, 921 So.2d at 904 (citations omitted) (footnote
omitted).

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2021-O-01801
I
N RE: JUDGE JERRY L. DENTON, JR.
Ju
diciary Commission of Louisiana
Crichton, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
I dissent and would accept the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission.
03/25/22

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2021-O-01801
I
N RE: JUDGE JERRY L. DENTON, JR.
Ju
diciary Commission of Louisiana
G
ENOVESE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
I
dissent and would accept the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission.
03/25/22

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2021-O-01801
I
N RE: JUDGE JERRY L. DENTON, JR.
Ju
diciary Commission of Louisiana
McCALLUM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
I
respectfully dissent and would accept the recommendation of the Judiciary
Commission.
03/25/22