State Of Louisiana v. Vincent Simmons
State Of Louisiana v. Vincent Simmons, No. 2021-OK-01362 (La. Dec. 21, 2021).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Ortiz 110 So. 3d 1029
- State v. Tate 185 La. 1006
- State v. Edwards 420 So. 2d 663
- State v. Tuesno 408 So. 2d 1269
Opinion text
Supreme Court of Louisiana
December 21, 2021
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
VINCENT SIMMONS
No. 2021-OK-01362
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN R
E: State of Louisiana - Applicant Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Number(s) 1977-CR-037596, Court
of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number(s) 21-562;
_ _ _ _ _ _
December 21, 2021
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Griffin, J., would deny.
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
WJC
JBM
12/21/2021 "See News Release 051 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2021-OK-01362
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
VINCENT SIMMONS
On Supervisory Writ to the 12th Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles
PER CURIAM
The Louisiana Constitution gives the District Attorney “charge of every
criminal prosecution by the state in his district, ....” La. Const. Art. 5, § 26. Code of
Criminal Procedure art. 680 provides mandatory grounds for recusal of the District
Attorney.11 The trial court found that the first ground provided in Article 680 is
implicated because the District Attorney indicated that he intends to assert
procedural objections rather than waive them and agree to set the application for
post-conviction relief for an evidentiary hearing, which exercise of prosecutorial
discretion the trial court found to reveal a personal interest in the cause. The trial
court erred.
Prosecutors “need not be entirely neutral and detached.” State v. Ortiz ,
2011–2799, p. 6 (La.1/29/13), 110 So.3d 1029, 1033 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248–49, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980)). Rather, they
are “necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law.” Id. Of
course, this zealousness is not without limits, because prosecutors are public
officials who must “serve the public interest.” Id. With respect to the prosecutor’s
public duty, this court previously explained that a prosecutor “represents the State,
and the State demands no victims. It seeks justice only, equal and impartial justice,
and it is as much the duty of the district attorney to see that no innocent man
12/21/21
suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes.” State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 1020,
171 So. 108, 112 (1936).
We note that any consideration of the merits of the underlying claims for
post-conviction relief would be premature at this stage and those claims are not
before the court. The circumstances presented here do not suggest that the district
attorney has any personal interest in the cause that would impair his ability to act
fairly and impartially. See generally State v. Edwards, 420 So.2d 663, 673 (La.
1982). Instead, the circumstances reflect only zealous enforcement of the law in
pursuit of justice. Furthermore, it is not clear at this time that the District Attorney
will be called to testify as a witness in these post-conviction proceedings. The
constitutional violations alleged preceded the District Attorney’s election, and no
evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to recuse suggests that the District
Attorney has any direct or independent knowledge pertinent to the claims for
post-conviction relief other than as the custodian of the file. See generally State v.
Tuesno, 408 So.2d 1269, 1272–73 (La. 1982) (collecting annotations).
Accordingly, we grant the State’s application. We vacate the district court’s
ruling, which recused the District Attorney and his entire office and appointed the
Attorney General to represent the State in this matter. We remand for further
proceedings consistent with the views expressed here.
REVERSED AND REMANDED