Succession of Ernest E. Dopp

STATE OF L+
O UISIAANA

441, COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT
Co A
NUMBER 2021 CA 0193

THETHE SUCCESSION SUCCESSION OFOF ERNESTERNEST E.E. DOPPDOPP

JudgmentJudgment Rendered:Rendered: OCTOCT 11 88 20112011

AppealedAppealed fromfrom thethe
TwentyTwenty
- - SecondSecond JudicialJudicial DistrictDistrict CourtCourt
InIn andand forfor thethe ParishParish ofof St.St. TammanyTammany
StateState ofof LouisianaLouisiana
DocketDocket NumberNumber 2019-2019- 311.311. 2323 clwclw 2019-2019- 3i3i 125,125, DivisionDivision
" " A"A"

HonorableHonorable RaymondRaymond S.S. Childress,Childress, JudgeJudge PresidingPresiding

AnthonyAnthony V.V. Ligi,Ligi, Jr.Jr. CounselCounsel forfor Appellant,Appellant,
Metairie,Metairie, LALA NoraNora FrisciaFriscia

ChristieChristie L.L. TournetTournet CounselCounsel forfor Appellee,Appellee,
Mandeville,Mandeville, LALA JoleneJolene DoppDopp Garcia,Garcia, daughterdaughter ofof
Decedent,Decedent, ErnestErnest E.E. DoppDopp

BEFORE:BEFORE: WHIP'WHIP' PLE,PLE, C.C. J.,J., PENZATO,PENZATO, ANDAND HESTER,HESTER, JJ..JJ..

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WHIPPLE, C.J.

This succession matter is before us on appeal by Nora Friscia, the ex-wife of

the decedent, challenging the trial court' s judgment removing her as Executrix of

the decedent' s estate, vacating the order of probate of a purported olographic will,

nullifying a purported donation inter vivos, and naming the decedent' s daughter,

Jolene Dopp Garcia, as Administratrix. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Ernest E. Dopp died on November 22, 2019. Although he was not

married at the time of his death, Mr. Dopp was previously married to Nora Friscia,

from whom he was divorced in 1997. Mr. Dopp and Nora had four children:

Ernest Dopp, Jr., who predeceased him; Jolene Dopp Garcia; Colinda Dopp Burke;

and Addie Dopp Evans. It is undisputed that Nora and Mr. Dopp did not stay in

contact with each other after their divorce.

Mr. Dopp lived with his daughter, Addie, from March 2017 until August 10,

2018, when he was asked to leave her house to go and stay with a different

daughter, Colinda. However, when Colinda appeared to pick up her father from

Addie' s home, Nora was with her. Three days later, on August 13, 2018, Mr.

Dopp executed a purported olographic will and Act of Donation and Lease, leaving

the entirety of his estate to Nora, to the exclusion of his daughters.

By order of the court on December 3, 2019, the purported olographic will

was probated and Nora was appointed as the Executrix of Mr. Dopp' s estate.

Thereafter, Jolene filed a petition to oppose the probate of the will, to vacate

Nora' s appointment as Executrix of the estate, to nullify the purported donation to

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Nora, and to request that she be appointed Administratrix of the estate.' The

matter proceeded to trial on March 12, 2020. At the trial, various documents were

admitted into evidence, including the purported olographic will and Act of

Donation, as well as some of Mr. Dopp' s medical records. The trial court also

heard testimony from several witnesses.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under

advisement, and invited the parties to submit post -trial memoranda on the issues.

Thereafter, the trial court issued reasons for judgment on May 21, 2020,

concluding that the olographic will was invalid, due to both issues of form and a

lack of capacity based on Mr. Dopp' s dementia and lack of medication. The trial

court similarly found that the Act of Donation was also invalid, due to lack of

capacity, undue influence, and lack of gratitude by Nora. On June 18, 2020, the

trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its reasons, declaring the Act of

Donation and olographic will null; vacating the Letters of Administration issued to

Nora, the Order of Probate of Olographic Will, and Nora' s appointment as

Executrix; and appointing Jolene as Administratrix of Mr. Dopp' s estate.

From this judgment, Nora appeals, contending that the trial court committed

manifest error by:

1) finding that she failed to prove the olographic will was entirely written,

dated, and signed by Mr. Dopp;

2) finding that the appellee met her burden of proof and showed that Mr. Dopp

lacked capacity to comprehend generally the nature and consequences of the

dispositions in the olographic will;

On December 3, 2019, Jolene also filed a " Petition and Request for Notice of
Application for Appointment of Succession Administrator," which she stated she attempted to
file on December 2, 2019, but was unable to do so due to an issue with the trial court' s e -file
website. Because the two petitions were submitted on the same day, but sent to different judges
of the 22nd Judicial District Court, Jolene requested that the two proceedings be consolidated, and
the trial court signed an order to consolidate the proceedings on December 23, 2019.

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3) finding that the appellee met her burden of proof and showed that Mr. Dopp

lacked capacity to comprehend generally the nature and consequences of the

dispositions in the Act of Donation; and

4) finding that the Act of Donation was null and void due to undue influence

and/ or lack of gratitude by Nora.

DISCUSSION

Form of Olographic Will
Assignment of Error No. 1)

On appeal, Nora first contends that the trial court committed manifest error

when it found that she failed to prove the olographic will was entirely written,

dated, and signed by Mr. Dopp.

There are two forms of testaments: olographic and notarial. LSA-C. C. art.

1574. An olographic testament is one entirely written, dated, and signed in the

handwriting of the testator. LSA- C. C. art. 1575. In addition to the form

requirements, an olographic testament must contain testamentary intent, which is

to say, " it must, by its own language, show on its face that it purports to dispose of

the property of the testator on his death." In re Succession of White, 2006- 1002

La. App. 1' Cir. 5/ 4/ 07), 961 So. 2d 439, 441, quoting Succession of Shows, 158

So. 2d 2939 295 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 1963), affirmed, 166 So. 2d 261 ( La. 1964). A

valid olographic testament must do more than express or explain the wishes or

desires of a decedent; the document must show intent to convey the decedent' s

property by the instrument itself. In re Succession of Cannon, 2014- 0059 ( La.

App. 1St Cir. 3/ 25/ 15), 166 So. 3d 1097, 1102, writ denied, 2015- 0816 ( La. 6/ 5/ 15),

171 So. 3d 948. The olographic testament must be proved by the testimony of two

credible witnesses, and the court must satisfy itself, through interrogation or from

the written affidavits or the depositions of the witnesses, that the handwriting and

signature are those of the testator. LSA-C. C. P. art 2883( A).

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The proponent of an olographic will has the burden of proving its

authenticity and its compliance with all of the formal requirements of law. LSA-

C. C. P. art. 2903. In will contest cases, absent a finding of manifest error, the

factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and will not be

disturbed on appeal. In re Succession of Caillouet, 2005- 0957 ( La. App. 4' Cir.

6/ 14/ 06), 935 So. 2d 713, 715, writ denied, 2006- 1732 ( La. 10/ 6/ 06), 938 So. 2d

The plaintiff in an action to annul a probated testament has the burden of

proving the invalidity thereof, unless the action was instituted within three months

of the date the testament was probated. In the latter event, the defendants have the

burden of proving the authenticity of the testament, and its compliance with all of

the formal requirements of the law. LSA- C. C. P. art. 2932. In the instant case,

because Jolene filed her petition to annul the probated olographic testament within

three months of the date that the testament was probated, Nora bore the burden of

establishing the authenticity of the testament and its compliance with all of the

formal requirements of law. See Succession of Achee, 2016- 0716 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

8/ 16/ 17), 229 So. 3d 5, 8. In reviewing a trial court' s factual findings when ruling

on a petition to annul a testament, an appellate court applies the manifest error

standard of review. Id.

In the instant case, the trial court stated in its written reasons for judgment

that the will was invalid, in part, because "[ t]wo daughters testified that they did

not recognize their father' s signature, and there is no consistent testimony

regarding the presence of the witnesses to the signing of the document." After

careful review of the record, we find no manifest error in the trial court' s

conclusion that the will was invalid and that Nora, as the proponent of the

olographic will, failed to meet her burden of proving its authenticity.

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Nora argues on appeal that the fact that Mr. Dopp " hand wrote out the

detailed dispositions" of his alleged will was not challenged, nor was the dating of

the will. Instead, only the signature was challenged. She maintains that where it is

undisputed that the dispositions were clearly in Mr. Dopp' s handwriting, a witness

actually saw him sign the will, and three other witnesses attested to the fact that it

was his signature at the bottom of the will, the evidence presented at trial " clearly

reflects" that she met her burden of proving the validity of the will under LSA-

C. C.P. art. 2883. Thus, she contends the trial court' s conclusion that the will was

invalid was manifestly erroneous and clearly wrong.

However, at trial, both Jolene and Addie adamantly testified that the

signature was not their father' s signature. Jolene testified that while the body of

the will was in his handwriting, the signature was not. She testified that she was

very familiar with his signature because she would forge it on report cards as a

child and that his signature was very difficult to write because " it just flowed

really, really well." She testified that the signature on the will, however, looked

like a " drawn signature where each letter seems to be drawn and not written."

Addie testified that she also knew " right away" that the signature on the will was

not her father' s signature. She pointed out that: Mr. Dopp wrote with a " slant,"

which was missing from the signature; the P' s in his last name were written

incorrectly; and the " double line in the E, R, and N" should not have been there.

Addie further noted that when comparing the signature on the will to Mr. Dopp' s

signature on the title to his car, the signature on the will looks different than his

signature on the title.

Conversely, Nora, Colinda, and Colinda' s husband, Ryan Burke, maintained

that the signature was Mr. Dopp' s signature. Ryan testified that Mr. Dopp wrote

the will at his home in Slidell and that he saw Mr. Dopp actually sign and date the

will in his presence. He stated that Mr. Dopp started to sign the will in pencil, but

Ryan thought he should sign it in pen, so he gave Mr. Dopp a pen instead.

Colinda testified that she saw her father writing the will, but did not actually see

him sign it. She further stated that her father' s handwriting was " very creative,"

and that it was his signature on the page.

Nora testified that she " would recognize" Mr. Dopp' s handwriting and that,

in fact, the signature on the will was Mr. Dopp' s. When she presented the will for

probate, Nora filed an affidavit initially stating that she " personally witnessed the

writing and execution of the olographic will by [ Mr.] Dopp." Despite these

representations in her affidavit, Nora presented conflicting testimony at trial and

her deposition. At trial, she testified that she actually saw Mr. Dopp sign the will;

however, in her earlier deposition testimony, she stated that she did not know when

he signed the will, but claimed that it was signed when they went to the attorney' s

office to execute the donation. Specifically, Nora stated " I was with him but I

don' t know when he signed this will. I was not behind him saying look, here' s a

pen, sign this will."

Considering the conflicting testimony and evidence presented at trial, we are

unable to say that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that the will

was invalid, particularly where there were conflicts in the testimony regarding the

authenticity of the signature on the will and the presence of witnesses when the

will was signed. In declaring the will invalid, the trial court clearly accepted and

credited the testimony of Mr. Dopp' s daughters, Jolene and Addie, over the

testimony of his ex-wife, Nora, Colinda, who reluctantly took in her father, and

Colinda' s husband, Ryan, finding the testimony of certain witnesses more credible

than others. Where, as here, there are two permissible views of the evidence, the

fact finder' s determinations are entitled to great deference and cannot be said to be

manifestly erroneous in the absence of objective evidence to the contrary. Rosell

v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 ( La. 1989). The trial court' s finding that the will

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was invalid was based on a credibility call between the two groups of witnesses.

Finding no manifest error herein, we decline to disturb the trial court' s findings

and conclusion that Nora failed to meet her burden of proving the olographic will

was valid.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.'

Invalidity of Act of Donation for Lack of Capacity and
Undue Influence or Lack of Gratitude
Assignments of Error Nos. 3 and 4)

Nora next contends that the trial court committed manifest error when it

found that the Act of Donation' was null and void due to Mr. Dopp' s lack of

capacity and her undue influence and/ or lack of gratitude towards Mr. Dopp.

A donation inter vivos shall be declared null upon proof that it is the product

of influence by the donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the

donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the volition of

the donor. LSA-C. C. art. 1479. A person who challenges a donation because of

fraud, duress, or undue influence must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

However, if, at the time the donation was made, a relationship of confidence

existed between the donor and the wrongdoer and the wrongdoer was not then

related to the donor by affinity, consanguinity or adoption, the person who

challenges the donation need only prove the fraud, duress, or undue influence by a

preponderance of the evidence. LSA-C. C. art. 1483.

Such undue influence can result from physical coercion and duress, or more

subtle influences such as creating resentment toward a natural object of a bounty

by false statements. Mere advice, persuasion or kindness and assistance should not

2Because we find no error by the trial court in its conclusion that the will was invalid on
this basis, we pretermit discussion of Nora' s contention in her second assignment of error that
the trial court incorrectly found the will invalid based on Mr. Dopp' s lack of capacity and
inability to understand the dispositions made in the will.
3The parties also signed a purported lease of the immovable property that was the subject
of the donation. Any issues regarding the validity of the purported lease are not before us in this
appeal.

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constitute influence that would destroy the free agency of a donor and substitute

another' s volition for his own. See LSA-C. C. art. 1479, Revision Comments -1991,

comment ( b). Further, although generally irrevocable, see LSA-C. C. art. 1468, a

donation may be revoked on account of ingratitude if the donee has attempted to

take the life of the donor, or has been guilty towards him of cruel treatment,

crimes, or grievous injuries toward the donor. See LSA-C. C. arts. 1556 & 1557.

A trial court' s factual finding as to the issue of undue influence and

ingratitude is fact intensive and cannot be disturbed on appeal in the absence of

manifest error. Allen v. Edmond, 2018- 1151 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 14/ 19), 277 So.

3d 359, 361. Under the manifest error standard of review, a reviewing court may

not merely decide if it would have found the facts of the case differently. Hayes

Fund for First United Methodist Church of Welsh LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rock

Mountain, LLC, 2014- 2592 ( La. 12/ 8/ 15), 193 So. 3d 1110, 1115. Reversal is only

warranted if the appellate court finds that no reasonable factual basis for the trial

court' s finding exists in the record, and that the finding is clearly wrong. In re

Succession of Gilbert, 37, 047 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 6/ 5/ 03), 850 So. 2d 733, 736.

As it relates to this assignment of error, the trial court found that the

donation inter vivos was invalid due to Nora' s undue influence and lack of

gratitude, noting, inter alia, she " sent him back to his daughters after obtaining the

documents she desired" and she did not give any one " any information regarding

the [ donation], nor were copies given to [ Mr.] Dopp." Considering the record in its

entirely, we find that the court' s conclusion as to the issue of undue influence is

not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.

Nora argues on appeal that because she was not related to Mr. Dopp by

affinity, consanguinity, or adoption, Jolene' s burden of proving undue influence

was by clear and convincing evidence and that she failed to do so. Nora contends

that Jolene' s evidence fails to satisfy this standard, because she relied solely on one

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text message sent " in frustration" to show ingratitude,4 when Nora actually stayed

in contact with Mr. Dopp after the text message was sent. Relying on the

testimony of Mr. Dopp' s next door neighbor, Ms. Stacey Dumser, Nora further

contends that the evidence shows that she did not unduly influence Mr. Dopp into

leaving his property to her because he always intended to do so.

Conversely, Jolene contends that, although the evidence is sufficient to meet

the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof, because Nora was acting as a

caregiver for Mr. Dopp, only a preponderance of the evidence standard was

required under LSA-C. C. art. 1483. Jolene maintains that both undue influence

and ingratitude were clearly established herein, where the evidence reflects that

Nora, Mr. Dopp' s remarried ex-wife, with whom he had not kept in contact with

after their divorce, " entered the picture at the very moment" Mr. Dopp had to leave

his daughter' s home due to " dementia complications." Jolene further points out

that while Mr. Dopp was only supposed to go and stay with Colinda, Nora instead

took possession" of him, procured the will and act of donation, and, within two

months, dropped him back off at his own home and told him to leave her alone.

The record shows that the circumstances surrounding Nora' s reentry into

Mr. Dopp' s life were such that she involved herself in his affairs and served as a

caretaker of sorts for him, at least for a period of time. Thus, " a relationship of

confidence" existed between Nora and Mr. Dopp such that undue influence need

only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See Kinney v. Bourgeois,

2006- 2384 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 9/ 14/ 07), 2007 WL 2686113, at * 11 ( unpublished)

finding that a " relationship of confidence" existed between the decedent and her

hairdresser, who briefly assisted her by looking after her affairs and taking care of

her). See also Succession of Braud, 94- 0668 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 11/ 17/ 94), 646 So.

4 Although denied in part by Nora, the text message Nora sent to Mr. Dopp read,
They' re back at your house and don' t bother me anymore. I' m done with you, user."

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2d 1168, 1172, writ denied, 95- 0383 ( La. 3/ 30/ 95), 651 So. 2d 841 ( finding that a

preponderance of the evidence was the applicable burden of proving undue

influence when a " relationship of confidence" existed between the decedent and

her caretaker, who were not otherwise related).

While the evidence of Mr. Dopp' s mental and physical state leading up to

and after the events in question amply supports the trial court' s finding that Mr.

Dopp was subject to undue influence at the time he executed the act of donation,

on the record before us, we find the evidence was sufficient to establish undue

influence under either standard. The record clearly shows that Mr. Dopp suffered

from dementia, depression, anxiety, and seizures, and that at the time the act of

donation was executed, he was prescribed the highest recommended dose of

donepezil, a dementia medication. Moreover, Nora does not dispute that she and

Mr. Dopp did not remain in contact with each other after their divorce in 1997.

She testified that she did not know he previously suffered from cancer, but

admitted that prior to seeing him in August 2018, she was told by her daughter that

Mr. Dopp suffered from dementia and seizures.

Mr. Dopp moved in with his daughter, Addie, in March 2017, and stayed

with her until August 10, 2018. Additionally, Jolene, moved back to Louisiana in

2017 to help Addie take care of him. While Mr. Dopp lived at Addie' s home,

Jolene, Addie, and Addie' s husband, Kirk, were responsible for bringing him to his

doctor' s appointments, making sure he took his medications twice a day, and

calming him down when he became " emotional." Jolene testified that over time,

Mr. Dopp became increasingly confrontational and would say inappropriate things

because his " filters started to disappear" as his dementia progressed. Due to the

increased difficulty in caring for Mr. Dopp, Addie and Jolene decided they needed

Colinda' s help, even though she was " resistant" to helping. Jolene testified that

Mr. Dopp was formally evicted from the residence in an effort to get Colinda to

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help care for him, and they were trying to " move the situation forward" because

Mr. Dopp felt entitled to stay at Addie' s and " didn' t want to compromise." Jolene

also stated that on the day he moved his belongings out of the house, tensions were

very, very high" and Mr. Dopp was being " very hostile" because he was so upset.

Mr. Dopp began staying at Colinda' s house approximately one week before

the eviction. However, Addie and Jolene were unaware that Nora was also staying

at Colinda' s house at that time. On August 6, 2018, Nora and Mr. Dopp had their

first appointment with Mathieu Daigle, the attorney who drafted the donation inter

vivos. A mere three days after his eviction and relocation to Colinda' s house, Mr.

Dopp and Nora returned to Mr. Daigle' s office on August 13, 2018, to execute the

act of donation. Nora and Mr. Daigle testified that Nora was present at both

meetings; however, Mr. Daigle testified that he spoke with Mr. Dopp alone when

they got to " more personal matters," while Nora claimed that she was present for

the entirety of both meetings.

Mr. Daigle testified that he felt Mr. Dopp was " in his right mind" at the

time, and was able to express his intent and reasons for executing the donation.

Mr. Daigle stated that he did not detect any pressure from Nora to execute the

documents. However, he also testified that he was not made aware of Mr. Dopp' s

earlier dementia diagnosis and that he has never executed a will for a client with

dementia. Mr. Daigle testified that because the donation involved Mr. Dopp and

his ex-wife, he advised Mr. Dopp to take the documents home, reflect on whether

he truly wanted to execute them, and if so, take the documents to a separate notary

to execute them. However, instead of following Mr. Daigle' s advice, Nora took

Mr. Dopp to another notary' s office immediately after leaving Mr. Daigle' s office

and executed the act of donation. Nora testified that she immediately brought him

to another notary, despite Mr. Daigle' s instructions, because she " needed witnesses

to show that [ Mr. Dopp] was in his right mind... when he did the transfer."

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In explaining the circumstances surrounding the Act of Donation and the

absence of undue influence in Mr. Dopp' s decision to give her his property, Nora

claimed that Mr. Dopp wanted her to inherit his estate and to donate his property to

her because he " did her wrong and wanted to make it right." However, she also

gave conflicting testimony as to Mr. Dopp' s state of mind when the donation was

executed. At one point, Nora testified that she did not know why he wanted to

give her his belongings, but that he was not angry when he decided to execute the

documents; later, she stated that his mind was made up " because he was so angry

at the time," likely due to the eviction. Additionally, in her deposition, Nora

testified that she did not think Mr. Dopp owed her anything, but in a different

pleading filed with the trial court, Nora set forth that the property left to her was

primarily paid for during her marriage to Mr. Dopp and there was " no evidence

that [ the parties] entered into a community property partition at the time of their

divorce."

Nora intially claimed that the community property was never partitioned.

However, when presented with evidence of the community property partition, she

testified that " it didn' t get nowhere" and that she never received the settlement,

even though she signed the consent judgment. These statements by Nora were

contradicted by Addie' s testimony that after Nora went to court the day the divorce

was finalized, she came home with the money and spent it on a camcorder.

Although Nora stated that Mr. Dopp wanted her " to have ownership of the

property... because she helped pay for it," she also testified at trial that she felt as

though she deserved to inherit Mr. Dopp' s estate.

After the donation was executed, Mr. Dopp lived with Nora and her new

husband for a short time. While he lived with Nora, he undisputedly was not

taking his dementia medication, and Nora candidly stated she did not help him take

the medication he had with him. Mr. Dopp' s neighbor, Ms. Dumser, testified that

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she was sure he was taking his medication when he was at Nora' s because " you

could hear it in his voice" if he was or was not taking it. Despite Ms. Dumser' s

apparently mistaken testimony regarding Mr. Dopp' s medication, Nora relies on

her testimony to show a lack of undue influence in that he " always" wanted to give

his estate and property to her.

Nora also did not give a copy of the donation or the will to Mr. Dopp, and

instead kept the only copies of the documents in her possession until after his

death. Mr. Dopp' s sister, Jan Moran, testified that Mr. Dopp would come to see

her on her birthday and if he had a problem. When he visited her for the last time

in December 2018, he told her he " did something" and needed her to fix it because

it was " bad." Ms. Moran testified that Mr. Dopp told her he signed some papers,

but he did not know what they were, and he could not give the papers to her

because Nora had them. Ms. Moran also testified that he insisted he did not sell

anything, but he was not sure if he still had a home, even though he was living at

the home. She also stated that Mr. Dopp told her Nora and her husband were

taking care of him, and he " got lucky" with Nora on his birthday, but they told him

that if he did not sign the papers, he had to leave their house.

Jolene also testified that Mr. Dopp told her about some paperwork he signed,

but that he thought he still owned all his property and also had a usufruct, but he

did not have copies of the papers and could not get any because Nora had them.

She said that Mr. Dopp was unable to even tell her where he went to get the

paperwork done. Additionally, she stated that Mr. Dopp alluded to the fact that

something sexual had happened with Nora and Mr. Dopp.

The record demonstrates that Mr. Dopp was clearly suffering from numerous

health issues, including dementia, which had progressed to the point that he was

prescribed the highest dosage of medication, and that he was very upset upon being

evicted from Addie' s house and being asked to live with Colinda. The record

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further shows that during this time, his ex-wife whom he was previously married to

for twenty years, returned to his life at a time when he was most vulnerable to

influence due to his illness and the unwelcome change in his living arrangements.

While Nora claimed that Mr. Dopp gratuitously wanted to leave her his belongings

and transfer ownership of his home to her via a donation inter vivos, other evidence

presented at trial demonstrated that Mr. Dopp was unsure of the effect of the

documents he signed, and that he felt that if he did not sign the documents, Nora

would no longer aid in his care. Additionally, shortly after coming into Nora' s

care, Nora went with him to both meetings with his attorney, yet did not follow the

advice of counsel, namely, that he should wait and think over the donation before

executing it. Instead, she took him directly to a notary' s office to immediately

complete the donation. While the rendition of these actions to a donor without

such a vulnerable disposition could be viewed purely as helpful assistance or mere

persuasion, Mr. Dopp was in a difficult situation and vulnerable to these seemingly

innocuous acts, which were accomplished in Nora' s favor due to his diminished

mental state, vulnerability, and sudden life changes. See Kinney, 2007 WL

2686113, * 15.

Considering the foregoing and the record as a whole, we cannot say that the

trial court was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in finding that the August 13,

2018 Act of Donation procured by Nora was the product of undue influence by

her; nor do we find error in the trial court' s conclusion that as such, the act of

donation was invalid and should be nullified.'

Accordingly, these assignments of error also lack merit.

Given our finding of undue influence, we pretermit consideration of whether Nora was
guilty of ingratitude, such that the donation should be revoked on this basis.
fSt

CONCLUSION

Based on the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court' s June 18, 2020

judgment removing Nora Friscia as Executrix of the Succession of Ernest E. Dopp;

vacating the order of probate of the August 13, 2018 purported olographic will and

the issuance of letters of administration to Nora Friscia; declaring the Act of

Donation inter vivos executed by Ernest E. Dopp on August 13, 2018 in favor of

Nora Friscia null and invalid; and naming Jolene Dopp Garcia, as Administratrix

of the Succession of Ernest E. Dopp is hereby affirmed in its entirety. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to the appellant, Nora Friscia.

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