Charlie A. Campbell Kelly v. Louisiana Department of Veterans Affairs and David Lacrete, in his capacity as Secretary

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2021 CW 1605

CHARLIE A. CAMPBELL KELLY

VERSUS

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND
DAVID LACERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY

Judgment Rendered: SEP 1 4 2022

On Application for Supervisory Writs from the 19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 63 2, 03 1
Honorable Donald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding

Douglas A. Littlejohn Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Charlie A. Campbell Kelly

Jeff Landry Attorneys for Defendants/ Relators,

Attorney General State of Louisiana, through the
Jeannie C. Prudhomme Department of Veterans Affairs, and
Matthew Roth David LaCerte
Assistant Attorneys General
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, CJ., CHUTZ, AND PENZATO, JJ.

PENZATO, J.

In this supervisory writ application, defendants, the State of Louisiana,

through the Department of Veterans Affairs, and David LaCerte ( collectively,

defendants"), seek review of the trial court' s denial of their Motion for Summary

Judgment concerning a claim asserted by plaintiff, Charlie A. Campbell Kelly

plaintiff'), under the Louisiana Whistleblower Act (" LWA") - La. R.S. 23: 967 -

as well as a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the following

reasons, we reverse the trial court' s October 22, 2021 judgment, render summary

judgment in defendants' favor, and dismiss plaintiff' s claims against defendants

with prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2011, plaintiff was hired by the Louisiana Department of

Veterans Affairs (" LDVA") as the Long Term Health Care Administrator for the

Southeast Louisiana War Veterans Home (" LDVH" or " the Home"), a long-term

care nursing facility in Reserve, Louisiana. At the time, plaintiff' s supervisors

were David LaCerte (" LaCerte"), LDVA Secretary, and Kevin Butler (" Butler"),

LDVA Deputy Assistant Secretary. As administrator of the facility, plaintiff had

general "
administrative authority and responsibility for the direction, control, and

management of all activities within [ the Home]."

In an April 9, 2013 " Improvement Letter," Butler noted to plaintiff that "[ i] t

is apparent that you have dysfunctional and counterproductive relationships with a

number of key members of your staff[,]" that due to plaintiff' s inability to

communicate with her human resources staff, the Home had " the largest number of

vacant positions of all the LDVA facilities[,]" that plaintiff did not have proper

authorization for various travel expenditures, that she has failed to complete the

required annual ethics training, and that she, generally, is not properly using the

resources available to her to successfully manage the Home. Butler specifically
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stated he " expect[ ed] to see a marked improvement in your job performance and

professional relationships as noted in this letter[,]" but further stated such a letter

was not to be considered disciplinary action.

Despite the expectations noted in the April 9, 2013 " Improvement Letter,"

plaintiff was terminated from her position with LDVA on July 19, 2013.

According to a letter signed by LaCerte and hand delivered to plaintiff, she was

terminated due to her poor performance, including but not limited to failing to

improve staffing levels at the Home, improper activity related to patient safety,

lack of communication with residents, their family members, and community

stakeholders, implementing unnecessary restraints on patients' access to hygiene

supplies, poor supervision of subordinates, lack of professional decision making,

using LDVA funds on expenditures for which she had no approval, and an

apparent ethics violation of La. R.S. 42: 1113 by granting LDVA hospice contracts

to a service in which plaintiff' s mother held a substantial interest.

On July 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a Petition for Damages (" Petition") against

defendants, claiming that she was terminated in violation of " Louisiana' s anti -

reprisal law, [ La. R.S.] 23: 967." Plaintiff further contended that the defendants'

conduct " was extreme, outrageous, sudden, and unexpected, and constituted the

tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress[.]"

On July 22, 2021, defendants filed the underlying Motion for Summary

Judgment arguing, in general, that "[ p] laintiff' s claims of whistleblower retaliation

and intentional infliction of emotional distress fall far short of establishing a prima

facie case." Defendants contended plaintiff could not show actual violations of

state law or that she " ever even blew a whistle." Further, defendants argued

plaintiff' s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress lacked support, and

were " easily refuted by a breadth of Louisiana [j]urisprudence." In support of their

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motion, defendants submitted plaintiff' s deposition and the affidavit of Dustin

Guy, Deputy Chief of Staff of LDVA, to which was attached contents of plaintiff's

personnel file.

Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that there existed genuine issues of

material fact in dispute, precluding summary disposition of this matter. She further

argued that " the totality of plaintiffs testimony, pleadings, responses to

discovery[,] and exhibits all show that she can meet her jurisprudential burden at

trial by establishing the prima facie elements of [La. R.S.] 23: 967." ( Emphasis

added.) In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted her deposition; her

Responses to Defendants' Interrogatories, Request for Admission of Facts and

Request for Production of Documents; and a July 3, 2013 e- mail from plaintiff to

Butler. LaCerte was copied on the e- mail, and forwarded it to Robert Hayes and

Guy.

The matter came for hearing on October 4, 2021 and, after taking the matter

under advisement, on October 22, 2021, the trial court issued Written Reasons for

Judgment and a judgment denying defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Following timely Notice of Intent to Apply for Supervisory Writs, as well as the

setting of a return date by the trial court, defendants timely sought supervisory

review of the trial court' s October 22, 2021 judgment.'

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendants contend the trial court committed error:

1. By denying their Motion for Summary Judgment regarding
plaintiffs LWA claim;

2. By denying their Motion for Summary Judgment regarding
plaintiff s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and

3. By relying on and adopting verbatim plaintiffs Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which included " facts" that were not

Pursuant to the requirements of La. C. C. P. art. 966( H), a Notice of Briefing Schedule was
issued to the parties on April 25, 2022.
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established in plaintiff' s Opposition, and by relying on plaintiff' s
Exhibit D," which was also not submitted with her Opposition.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Motions for Summary Judgment
After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents

show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3). The summary judgment

procedure is favored and designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(2).

The burden of proof is on the mover. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1).

Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that

is before the court on the motion, the mover' s burden does not require him to

negate all essential elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense.

Rather, the mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual

support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party' s claim, action, or

defense. Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual support sufficient to

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1). If, however, the

mover fails in his burden to show an absence of factual support for one or more of

the elements of the adverse party' s claim, the burden never shifts to the adverse

party, and the mover is not entitled to summary judgment. Durand v. Graham,

2019- 1312 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 12/ 20), 306 So. 3d 437, 440.

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts

review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court' s

determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Bordelon,

2014- 2371 ( La. 6/ 30/ 15), 172 So. 3d 607, 610. Because it is the applicable

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substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is

material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case.

Durand, 306 So. 3d at 440.

Improper Consideration ofSummary Judgment Evidence

In their third assignment of error, defendants argue the trial court

impermissibly relied on and adopted verbatim plaintiff' s proposed Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, which included " facts" that were not established in

plaintiff's Opposition, and by relying on " Exhibit D," a document not submitted

with her Opposition, prohibiting defendants the opportunity to object. Though

identified last, we will address this assignment of error first, as it relates to the

evidence presented on motions for summary judgment.

Following the October 4, 2021 hearing on defendants' motion, the trial court

instructed both defendants and plaintiff to submit proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Plaintiff' s submission included the following sentence: " The

Office of Inspector General did conduct an investigation of LDVA and issued a

finding of fact to the public [ o] n January 29, 2016 stating that then Secretary David

LaCerte `... engaged in questionable organizational, hiring, and pay practices that

appear to have contributed to an environment of little accountability."' In support

of this statement, plaintiff cited " Exhibit D," Report Highlights, Department of

Veterans Affairs, Joint Investigation issued by the Louisiana Legislative Auditor

and the Office of the Inspector General, dated January 27, 2016. This document

was attached to plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact, yet was not submitted with

plaintiff' s opposition memorandum to defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The report' s notation and inclusion in plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and

attachment thereto was its first appearance as a supporting attachment.

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The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the

motion for summary judgment are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and

admissions. La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4). Comment ( C) to Article 966( A)(4)

specifically notes the list of documents that may be filed in support of or in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment is " exclusive." Additionally, Article

966( D)( 2) states the trial court " may consider only those documents filed in

support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall consider

any documents to which no objection is made. Any objection to a document shall

be raised in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum. The court shall

consider all objections prior to rendering judgment. The court shall specifically

state on the record or in writing which documents, if any, it held to be inadmissible

or declined to consider." By considering " Exhibit D," the trial court deprived

defendants the opportunity to object in a reply memorandum, as required by

Article 966( D)( 2), to an exhibit that is not within the exclusive list of documents

which may be filed in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(4).

Although the trial court erred in considering and noting Exhibit D in its

Conclusions of Law, given the de novo standard of review used by appellate courts

in reviewing motions for summary judgment, in our review, this court will only

consider the documents actually filed in support of or in opposition to defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment. See Alvin Fairburn & Associates, LLC v. Harris,

2020- 1290, 2020- 1291 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 18/ 21), 2021 WL 4843584, at * 4.

Accordingly, consideration will not be given to plaintiff's Exhibit D referenced

above.

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L WA Claim

Defendants' first assignment of error challenges the trial court' s denial of

their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing plaintiff has not submitted any

evidence showing she can carry her burden of establishing a prima facie case under

the LWA.

The LWA, La. R.S. 23: 967, provides in pertinent part:

A. An employer shall not take reprisal against an employee who in
good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation of law:

1) Discloses or threatens to disclose a workplace act or
practice that is in violation of state law.

2) Provides information to or testifies before any public
body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into
any violation of law.

3) Objects to or refuses to participate in an employment
act or practice that is in violation of law.

B. An employee may commence a civil action in a district court where
the violation occurred against any employer who engages in a practice
prohibited by Subsection A of this Section. If the court finds the
provisions of Subsection A of this Section have been violated, the
plaintiff may recover from the employer damages, reasonable attorney
fees, and court costs.

The LWA protects employees against reprisal from employers for reporting or

refusing to participate in illegal work practices. Derbonne v. State Police

Commission, 2019- 1455 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 14/ 20), 314 So. 3d 861, 870, writ

denied, 2020- 01323 ( La. 2/ 17/ 21), 310 So. 3d 1152. The statute targets serious

employer conduct that violates the law. Causey v. Winn- Dixie Logistics, Inc.,

2015- 0813 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 23/ 15), 186 So. 3d 185, 187, writ not considered,

2016- 0167 ( La. 3/ 24/ 16), 190 So. 3d 1187. To prevail under the statute, the

plaintiff must establish an actual violation of state law; a good faith belief that a

violation occurred is insufficient. Id; see also Hale v. Touro Infirmary, 2004- 0003

La. App. 4th Cir. 11/ 3/ 04), 886 So.2d 1210, 1215 ( the LWA provides a remedy to

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employees for employers whose practices are in actual violation of the law, " and

not simply practices disagreed with or found distasteful by the employee.").

In addition, the plaintiff must establish that the employer, not simply its

employees, violated state law. See Richardson v. Axion Logistics, L.L. C., 780 F. 3d

304, 306 ( 5th Cir. 2015); see also Dillon v. Lakeview Regional Medical Center

Auxiliary, Inc., 2011- 1878 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 13/ 12), 2012 WL 2154346, at * 5 &

n. 8 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2012- 1618 ( La. 10/ 26/ 12), 99 So. 3d 651 ( observing

that " it could be concluded that the employer must be the actor who violated the

law, in order for there to be a cause of action under" La. R.S. 23: 967, and that

there is no indication in the provisions of [La.] R.S. 23: 967, in referencing an ` act

or practice' of the employer, that such would encompass unauthorized acts of its

employees").

Thus, to defeat defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to her LWA

claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists that:

1) defendants violated Louisiana law through a prohibited workplace practice; ( 2)

she advised defendants of the violation; ( 3) she then disclosed or threatened to

disclose the prohibited practice or objected to or refused to participate in the

prohibited practice; and ( 4) she was terminated as a result of the threat to disclose

or because of the disclosure of the prohibited practice or her objection to or refusal

to participate in the prohibited practice. See Melancon v. Town of Amite City,

2018- 0442, 2018- 0443 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 24/ 18), 261 So. 3d 7, 10.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants cite the

following portions of plaintiff' s deposition:

Q: Was it your understanding at that time that all or some of these
discrepancies were a violation of State law?

A: I don' t know the law, so I assume some of them had to have
been, but I' m not a lawyer, so that' s why I reported it to my
supervisor.

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Q: At any point did you ever provide information to or testify
before any public body conducting an investigation, hearing[,] or
inquiry into any violation of State law?

A: Not that I recall....

Q: Did you ever send a report or complaint to any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing[,] or inquiry?

A: No, not that I recall.

Q: Did you ever report any of these perceived violations to any
media outlets?

Defendants contend this testimony establishes an absence of factual support

that plaintiff will be able to prove that defendants violated Louisiana law, she

advised defendants of an actual state law violation, and she made an actual

disclosure to any outside entity, agency, or public body. Defendants further

contend that it is not possible that LDVA retaliated against plaintiff for a

disclosure, or threatened disclosure, it had no knowledge or awareness of.

In opposition, plaintiff contends that she articulated and identified violations

of state law in her responses to defendants' formal discovery requests. She cites

her following response to defendants' interrogatory regarding her allegation of

Veteran Abuse and Neglect by LDVH employees":

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Upon information and belief, [ Kelly] noted the following conduct in
support of her allegations:

1. October 2011 — Failure to properly care Veteran 334
by Yvette Joseph;
2. October 2011 — Failureto properly care Veterans 0497
and 0441 by Bertha Joseph;
3. December 2011 — Failure to properly care of patient by
Tracey Cook.

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In other discovery responses, plaintiff identified the following conduct:

1) purchases from the Recreation Fund that were suspicious with
checks written directly to the Activity Director for large amounts
without receipts;

2) 6. 5gs given with insufficient verification of employment; an

application that the signature was completely differently than any
signature we had on file; the contact person on employee reference
checks were now current employees that did not list that place of
employment on their application; and, applications completely
missing from files. Additional findings included, but were not
limited to, nurses and/ or other staff members promoted to
administrative nurse positions or higher paid positions, but then
found to be demoted and still retain the same salary;

3) an employee who served as a direct care worker had lied on her
employment application regarding any criminal offenses or

convictions. The employee' s criminal background check reflected
that she had a charge of aggravated battery with a dangerous
weapon;

4) discrepancies between what was being reported by several

employees and the time actually worked;
5) the Activities Department was engaged in fraudulent conduct with
the respect to the utilization of vendor information in connection
with the entertainment for patients at the facility;
6) unethical
hiring practices including without limitation, the
restricted circulation of available positions at the facility and
preferential consideration and treatment for applicants of family
members.

Furthermore, citing a specific portion of her deposition testimony, plaintiff claims

she informed her supervisors of these alleged violations of state law:

Q: What discrepancies can you recall about Ms. Sonya
Aucoin' s department?

A: Ms. Aucoin' s activities, she would go into the resident
funds and get money addressed to her without receipts,
so I questioned that. Her timecard, same with the hour
calculations[,] were off. Vacation time with Sonya
Aucoin, she had exceeded the amount of days she was
allowed to take through the year and I questioned that.
That' s about all I can recall at the moment.

Q: And you brought this up with her?
A: I brought it up with her and I brought it up with my
supervisor.

Q: That being Kevin Butler?

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A: Correct, and the HR Director, Brad and DVA.

Q: Who is that?

A: Dustin Guy.
Q: What was their response?

A: It seems like as far as Sonya went with the vacation days,
Kevin told me to overlook it, basically to let her have the
days off. The calculations I was told to give to Brad
Lemoine who is the auditor, which I did, and I also let
David LaCerte know that I had given him the
calculations for payroll. And her employment file, her
pay grade, the way it increased it looked very suspicious,
so I gave it to Brad Lemoine.

Q: What do you mean it looked suspicious?

A: She went from making close to $ 10 an hour to close to
20 -something in a short period of time. I think it was 10
when she started, but don' t quote me on the 10. It was
like a big difference.
Additionally, plaintiff claims she informed the Office of the Inspector General of

the existence of workplace acts or practices at the Home allegedly in violation of

Louisiana law:

Q: Okay. Now earlier I think you had testified, if I' m not
mistaken, that you had made a report to the Office of the
Inspector General regarding the activities that you

witnessed at the facility that you believe were violations
of State law; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Were those the same activities that you listed in
your lawsuit against the department, substantially?
A: Yes.

Q: Do you know whether or not an investigation ever took
place by the Inspector General?
A: Not while I was there. I know Brad — I had also — Brad
Lemoine was our auditor and I had provided the

information to him also, but the Inspector General, no,
not since I left. Maybe it has.

Plaintiff argues that the above discovery responses and deposition testimony

create genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants violated state law

and whether she took steps to report the violations to third parties.

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Based upon our de novo review of the summary judgment evidence, we find

plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information from which we can determine

which, if any, of the above -identified conduct violated Louisiana law, rather than

company policies and/ or Civil Service guidelines. Moreover, plaintiff does not

name LaCerte, the LDVA, or defendants in general as the ones committing these

alleged violations; rather, each of her claims are pointed to co-workers and/ or her

subordinates at the Home. Thus, we find that with regard to any of the above

identified conduct, plaintiff failed to establish that she will be able to meet her

burden of proof at a trial on the merits, i.e., that defendants violated Louisiana law

through a prohibited workplace practice. Accordingly, as to the requirement that

defendants violated Louisiana law through a workplace practice and that plaintiff

advised defendants of said violation, plaintiff fails to satisfy these requirements of

her LWA claim. There is also no evidence of a threat to disclose to outside

authorities. While plaintiff contends her July 3, 2013 e- mail contains such a threat,

our review of the e- mail indicates it does not.

Moreover, there is no evidence that plaintiff was terminated as a result of the

threat to disclose or because of the disclosure of any prohibited practice. In her

deposition, plaintiff testified that she made an anonymous report to the Louisiana

Office of the Inspector General. However, she specifically testified that she did

not recall when she sent the letter, other that it was sent in 2013, as she did not

send it by certified mail because she " didn' t want to be tracked." Further, plaintiff

testified she did not keep a copy of the letter, that she did not name LaCerte or any

of her supervisors in the letter, and that it addressed the questionable transactions

and activities occurring at the Home she " felt were illegal." An essential element

of an LWA claim is disclosure to " outside authorities," Mabry v. Andrus, 45, 135

La. App. 2nd Cir. 4/ 14/ 10), 34 So. 3d 1075, 1079, writ denied, 2010- 1368 ( La.

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9/ 24/ 10), 45 So. 3d 1079, and plaintiff has produced no evidence showing that the

letter disclosed an alleged violation of state law, when it was sent to the Office of

the Inspector General, or that the alleged retaliation from defendants occurred after

she sent the letter. Further, plaintiff provided no evidence to show that defendants

knew of this alleged anonymous letter and, as argued by defendants, " since the

letter was sent anonymously, there was no reason for [ defendants] to retaliate

against [ plaintiff] because the identity of the sender would have been unknown to

everyone, including [ defendants]." Finally, plaintiff has not identified any instance

in which she was asked or instructed but refused to participate in an employment

act or practice that was in violation of state law.

For these reasons, we find the plaintiff has not identified a genuine issue of

material fact or that defendants are otherwise not entitled to judgment as a matter

of law concerning her LWA claim.

Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress Claim

In their second assignment of error, defendants contend the trial court erred

in denying their Motion for Summary Judgment concerning plaintiff' s claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress, especially as plaintiff offered no

argument or evidence in support thereof.'

In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff

must establish: ( 1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous;

2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and ( 3) that the

defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional

distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. White

v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 ( La. 1991). The conduct must be so

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible

2 We note that plaintiff presented no evidence or argument in her Opposition, either to the trial
court or with this court, to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding her claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a

civilized community. Id. Disciplinary action and conflict in a pressure -packed

workplace environment, although calculated to cause some degree of mental

anguish, is not ordinarily actionable. Id. at 1210. Recognition of a cause of action

for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a workplace environment has

usually been limited to cases involving a pattern of deliberate, repeated harassment

over a period of time. Id. The actions of the disciplinary review, the assigning of

difficult tasks, and the reassigning of employees to more stressful positions in and

of themselves do not rise to the level of outrageous conduct under White. Northern

v. State, ex rel. Louisiana Dept. ofRevenue, 2015- 0226 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 6/ 15),

2015 WL 6839998, at * 6( unpublished). Additionally, mere insults, threats,

annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities are not enough to trigger

liability; rather, persons must necessarily be expected to be hardened to a certain

amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate

and unkind. Perrone v. Rogers, 2017- 0509 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 18/ 17), 234 So. 3d

153, 158, writ denied, 2018- 0101 ( La. 3/ 2/ 18), 269 So. 3d 709.

When questioned in her deposition about her claims of intentional infliction

of emotional distress, plaintiff states defendants " fired [ her] from a job [ she] truly

loved and felt [ she] was good at[,]" though this did not cause her to visit any

therapists or counselors, seek medical treatment, or obtain any medication.

Though plaintiff states and recounts in her deposition a number of allegedly unkind

interactions and statements made to her by subordinates and co- workers, the only

stated adverse effect of her termination specifically by defendants is that she " was

up throughout the night crying, upset." In fact, when expressly asked whether

any person in a supervisory role [] directly harassed [ her]," plaintiff responded, " I

don' t know —or I really don' t recall, not that I don' t know."

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Based upon our de novo review of the writ application, and noting the lack

of any Opposition by plaintiff concerning her claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress, we find that plaintiff has not shown that defendants' conduct

was extreme or outrageous to a degree calculated to cause severe emotional

distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities, or that defendants desired to inflict

severe emotional distress or that severe emotional distress would be certain or

substantially certain to result from their conduct. See White, 585 So. 2d at 1211.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ and reverse the district court' s

October 22, 2021 judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment is entered in favor

of defendants, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Veterans Affairs,

and David LaCerte, dismissing the claims of plaintiff, Charlie A. Campbell Kelly,

against defendants with prejudice.

WRIT GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RENDERED.

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