State Of Louisiana v. Rudolph Lurding

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2021 KA 0430

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

61 RUDOLPH LURDING

N
C
Judgment Rendered:
DEC 2 2 2021

Appealed from the
Twenty-first Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Tangipahoa
State of Louisiana
Docket Number 1802624

Honorable Erika Sledge, Judge Presiding1

Scott M. Perilloux Counsel for Appellee,
Brett Sommer State of Louisiana
Amite, LA

Bertha M. Hillman Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
Covington, LA Rudolph Lurding

BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., PENZATO, AND HESTER, JJ.

While Judge Sledge is currently the trial court judge presiding over this matter, Judge
Robert H. Morrison, III presided over the suppression hearing, and Judge Don Fendlason
presided ad hoc over the trial court sentencing of the defendant.

WHIPPLE, C.J.

The defendant, Rudolph Lurding, was charged by bill of information with

three counts of promotion, advertisement, or production of pornography involving

juveniles under the age of thirteen ( counts I — III), violations of LSA-R.S.

14: 81. 1( A)( 1) and ( E)( 5)( b); molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen

C. M.') ( count IV), a violation of LSA-R.S. 14: 81. 2( A)( 1) and ( D)( 1); and two

counts of sexual battery of a juvenile under the age of thirteen ( C.M.) (counts V

and VI), violations of LSA-R.S. 14: 43. 1( A)(2) and ( C)( 2). He pled not guilty on

all counts. He moved to suppress the evidence. Following a hearing, the motion

was denied. The defendant applied to this court for supervisory relief from the

ruling, but his writ application was denied. See State v. Lurdin , 2020- 0178 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 5/ 12/ 20), 2020 WL 2461528 ( unpublished writ action).'

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged by

unanimous verdicts on all counts. On counts I —VI, he was sentenced on each count

to thirty years at hard labor, with twenty-five years without probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence, and the sentences to be served consecutively. He now

appeals, assigning error to the denial of his motion to suppress. For the following

reasons, we affirm the defendant' s convictions and sentences.

In October of 2017, following an investigation by the Mississippi Attorney

General' s Office ( MAG), Anika Moore Bruner confessed to the manufacture and

distribution of child pornography. She identified the defendant as " a recipient and a

requester of these images." Bruner indicated she had been in an intimate

2This victim is referenced herein only by her initials. See LSA-R.S. 46: 1844( W).
3Although a pretrial determination does not absolutely preclude a different decision on
appeal, judicial efficiency demands that this court accord great deference to its pretrial decisions
on admissibility unless it is apparent, in light of a subsequent trial record, that the determination
was patently erroneous and produced an unjust result. State v. Burgess, 2019- 1603 ( La. App. 1st
Cir. 9/ 22/ 20), 315 So. 3d 279, 282 n. 1, writ denied, 2020- 01189 ( La. 2/ 17/ 21), 310 So. 3d 1148.

relationship with the defendant, and during that relationship, he had confided his

affinity for child pornography. She indicated the defendant had child pornography

in his possession. She also alleged she and the defendant shared child pornography.

MAG used information from Bruner to locate the defendant and obtain a

search warrant for his cabin. The defendant' s Whone was recovered pursuant to the

search warrant. Forensic analysis of the Whone identified a forensic artifact to a

Dropbox account on which Bruner possessed child exploitation images. Pursuant to

another search warrant, approximately eleven images and three videos of the

defendant sexually abusing C.M., the eight-year-old daughter of his present

girlfriend, were recovered.

C.M. testified at trial that the defendant used to date her mother. C.M

identified herself as the naked person depicted in five photographs collected

pursuant to the Dropbox search warrant. According to C.M., the defendant took the

pictures in the living room of their house in Ponchatoula. She indicated she was

s] even, probably just turning eight" when the pictures were taken. She claimed

the defendant would " sometimes make [ C.M.] take [ her] clothes off after taking a

shower so he could take pictures."

C.M. also identified herself as the person depicted in three videos presented

to the jury. According to C.M., the defendant filmed the videos. She indicated that

in the first two videos, the defendant was telling her to do the "[ d]oggie style"

position correctly so he could "[ try] to make it feel good for [C.M.]". According to

C.M., the third video depicted the defendant' s hand " rubbing ... on [ C.M.' s] private

parts." C.M. indicated she was " seven, probably just turning eight" when the videos

were filmed. C.M. testified the defendant also forced her to watch videos of her

mother in "those same positions."

The defendant denied any involvement in the production of the pictures or the

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videos presented to the jury. In regard to videos, the defendant agreed he was in the

videos, but denied that they depicted an eight-year-old girl. According to the

defendant, the videos depicted " Cassandra East or Eastwood or Eastman," an

eighteen to nineteen -year-old, and her boyfriend, B.C. The defendant claimed he

was training Cassandra and B.C. in the " fetish" lifestyle. The defendant denied ever

touching C.M. sexually or doing anything sexual to her.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress evidence. He argues that under the totality of the

circumstances, Bruner was not a reliable informant and there was insufficient

corroborating information to provide probable cause for a search warrant. He

claims Bruner provided information that gave her a " good bargaining tool" on her

life sentence. He further claims Bruner " did not implicate herself in criminal

activity that would expose her to more jail time, rather by implicating [ the

defendant] she saw an opportunity to decrease her jail time."

When a search and seizure of evidence is conducted pursuant to a search

warrant, the defendant has the burden to prove the grounds of his motion to

suppress. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 703( D). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress,

factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of an

abuse of the trial court' s discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the

evidence. However, a trial court' s legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of

review.
State v. Friday, 2010- 2309 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 17/ 11), 73 So. 3d 913, 919,

writ denied, 2011- 1456 (La. 4/ 20/ 12), 85 So. 3d 1258.

Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution requires that a search warrant

issue only upon an affidavit establishing probable cause to the satisfaction of an

impartial magistrate. See also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 162. Probable cause exists when

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the facts and circumstances within the affiant' s knowledge and of which he has

reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that

an offense has been committed and that evidence or contraband may be found at the

place to be searched. The facts establishing the existence of probable cause for the

warrant must be contained within the four corners of the affidavit. Friday, 73 So. 3d

at 920.

An issuing magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision

whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a " fair

probability" that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 ( 1983); State v.

Byrd, 568 So. 2d 554, 559 ( La. 1990). The process of determining probable cause

for the issuance of a search warrant does not involve certainties or proof beyond a

reasonable doubt, or even a prima facie showing, but rather involves probabilities of

human behavior, as understood by persons trained in law enforcement and as based

on the totality of circumstances. The process simply requires that enough

information be presented to the issuing magistrate to enable him to determine that

the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into

play the further steps of the criminal justice system. Friday, 73 So. 3d at 920.

The review of a magistrate' s determination of probable cause prior to issuing

a warrant is entitled to significant deference by reviewing courts. "[ A]fter-the- fact

scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de

novo review." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331. Further, because of the

preference to be accorded to warrants, marginal cases should be resolved in favor of

a finding that the issuing magistrate' s judgment was reasonable. Friday, 73 So. 3d

at 920.

It is well settled that even when a search warrant is found to be deficient, the

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seized evidence may nevertheless be admissible under the good -faith exception of

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919- 20, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3418- 19, 82 L. Ed. 2d

677 ( 1984), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule

should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution' s case -in -chief of

evidence obtained by officers acting in an objectively reasonable good -faith reliance

on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found

to be invalid. Friday, 73 So. 3d at 923.

Under Leon, 468 U.S. at 9231 104 S. Ct. at 3421, four instances in which

suppression remains an appropriate remedy are: ( 1) where the issuing magistrate

was misled by information the affiant knew was false or would have known was

false except for a reckless disregard for the truth; ( 2) where the issuing magistrate

wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role; ( 3) where the warrant was

based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and ( 4) where the warrant is so facially

deficient— in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be

seizedthat the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Friday,

73 So. 3d at 923.

The instances in which suppression remains an appropriate
remedy

enunciated in Leon clearly reflect that suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an

invalid warrant is not a remedy to be lightly considered. Furthermore, the

jurisprudence presumes good faith on the part of the executing officer, and the

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the necessity for suppression of

evidence by establishing a lack of good faith. Friday, 73 So. 3d at 923.

On July 16, 2018, Jack Lilley,' MAG, Division of Cyber Crime, Assistant

4The record contains different spellings of Agent Lilley' s name. We use the spelling set
forth in Agent Lilley' s affidavit for search warrant.

Director of Investigations, applied for and obtained a search warrant for computers,

cellular devices, and other related media located in Cabin 145 at 1400 Audubon

Point Drive, Horn Lake, Mississippi. He listed the following facts and

circumstances in support of the warrant:

On July 12, 2018, during an investigation into the transmission
of child pornographic imagery discovered to have been created during
the course of a sexual assault of a three year old female child, a
confession letter and follow-up statement was made to investigators by
Anika Bruner. Anika Bruner stated the assault and subsequent images

detailing it had been made at the request of a person known to her as
Rudolph Lurding, also known as Rudy or Mojo. The letter consisted of
a handwritten statement detailing a relationship with Lurding,
including her allegation of him confiding in her his sexual attraction to
children. She stated that she sent him images of her abuse of two
different children on multiple occasions via electronic means,

e] specially Kik messenger, a mobile device based chat application.

Anika stated that Lurding currently was in a dating relationship
with a girlfriend named Amber who had an 8 year old daughter named
C[ remainder of name redacted]. Anika stated that Lurding had shared
with her that he was sexually abusing C[ remainder of name redacted]
and has shared pictures of the abuse. She stated that he currently
resides around Southaven, MS. Anika provided a former home
address, work location, social media identifiers, and a vehicle

description for Lurding.

Public records searches and examination of publically available
social media information revealed Lurding to be in
dating a
PI
relationship with Amber.. Public posts showed Lurding and
Amber] to currently be at Yogi Bear' s Jellystone Park in Horn Lake.
Photographs posted by [ Amber] show a young female child named
C[ remainder of name redacted]. Photographs posted by Lurding show

a vehicle matching the description provided by Bruner, a white
Chevrolet Camaro.

151[,]
On July at approximately 9: OOpm, I conducted
surveillance of the parking areas of Yogi Bear' s Jellystone Park and
located a white Chevrolet Camaro registered to Rudolph Lurding
parked outside of Cabin 145. On July 16%] at approximately 2: 00 pm,
I observed a white female matching the social media photographs of
Amber enter Cabin 145.

On September 3, 2019, the defendant moved to suppress evidence recovered

5W have omitted Amber' s surname to protect the privacy of C.M. See LSA-R.S.
46: 1844( W).

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pursuant to the July 16, 2018 warrant and subsequent warrants involving a Google

account, the defendant' s car, and the defendant' s cell phone.

Agent Lilley testified at the suppression hearing. In October of 2017, MAG

received information from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children

that child exploitation images had been shared in and around Gulfport, Mississippi.

Following an investigation, Bruner confessed to the manufacture and distribution of

the child pornography. She confessed to two productions of child pornography and

to molesting three children. She confessed to being an accomplice in the

distribution of child pornography with the defendant. Additionally, she confessed to

an offense " separate and apart" from the charges against the defendant.

In a letter and in interviews, Bruner identified the defendant as " a recipient

and a requester of these images." Bruner stated she had shared the images with the

defendant. She provided information identifying the defendant and had knowledge

of his recent move to the Southaven area of Mississippi. Bruner also gave MAG the

defendant' s social media identifiers.

In Bruner' s letter, she stated, "[ b] y the time you get this, I' ll be long gone."

She identified the defendant as her former boyfriend and sexual partner. During

their relationship, the defendant confided to Bruner that he had an affinity for child

pornography and showed her images of child exploitation. Specifically, Bruner

stated after giving her " a pill, Ecstasy, Molly," the defendant showed her a picture of

a skinny, white girl[,) no tits." He told her " this is what I like." Bruner told the

defendant " yeah, I know, skinny white girls." The defendant said " no" and showed

Bruner a picture of "a child." Bruner alleged she and the defendant shared child

exploitation images with each other.

According to Bruner, the defendant was " in the process of molestation of

and had " already touched" the eight-year old daughter of Amber, his present

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girlfriend. Bruner claimed Amber was aware of the abuse, but the defendant " keeps

her drugged and blindfolded and is working his way to controlling her 100%."

Bruner alleged Amber was raped as a child by her grandfather, and her father killed

himself "because he couldn' t handle the guilt."

Agent Lilley started to corroborate Bruner' s statements and information. He

used public records searches and Facebook and Instagram posts. He was able to

corroborate the defendant' s social media profiles, his former address, 102 South

Southgate, Ponchatoula, and identified his present location - Jellystone Park in

DeSoto County, Mississippi. Agent Lilley went to Jellystone Park and saw the

vehicle Bruner indicated the defendant owned, which was registered to the

defendant, parked outside of Cabin 145. Agent Lilley also saw the defendant' s

present girlfriend, as described by Bruner, Amber, enter Cabin 145. Amber is the

mother of victim C.M.

Agent Lilley obtained a search warrant for Cabin 145. The defendant' s

iPhone and Amber' s Samsung cell phone were recovered pursuant to the search

warrant. Forensic analysis of the iPhone identified a " Dropbox token." A Dropbox

token is a forensic artifact whereby Dropbox remembers a phone and password as

well as a Dropbox link saved in the notes section of the phone. Pursuant to a grand

jury subpoena, the Dropbox link was subsequently identified as the same account on

which Bruner possessed child exploitation images. Agent Lilley also discovered

log -on credentials to a Dropbox account associated with sluttyniggr@gmail.com

and log -on credentials for emogir167. Pursuant to another search warrant, that

Dropbox was searched and found to contain images and video of the defendant

sexually abusing C.M.

The iPhone also had Kik Messenger chat between the defendant and a profile

associated with Bruner, which, according to Agent Lilley, stated, " I got my dick in C

last night." C.M. was depicted in media posts as " C."

The Louisiana Attorney General' s Office subsequently obtained an arrest

warrant for the defendant and a search warrant for his address at 851 Accomack

Cove, Southaven, Mississippi. Sexual aids depicted in the video of the abuse of

C.M. were recovered from that location.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence. The court found the

issue was whether law enforcement had exhibited sufficient probable cause to obtain

a series of search warrants, which culminated in the seizure of video and

photographic evidence from the defendant. The court noted MAG had conducted an

investigation which led to the arrest of Bruner for sexual activity involving

juveniles. Bruner subsequently provided MAG with a written letter that implicated

the defendant. Bruner also told MAG the defendant was still engaged in activities

which included the sexual exploitation of minors and provided his contact and

internet information.

The court further noted MAG performed public records and social media

searches as to the whereabouts of the defendant. MAG located a vehicle matching

the description of the defendant' s vehicle at an RV park in Mississippi. MAG was

also able to corroborate claims made in Bruner' s letter after observing the

defendant' s present girlfriend and her minor child. MAG obtained a search warrant

and subsequently seized a cell phone from the defendant. MAG also discovered a

drop box account" linking the defendant and Bruner. Additionally, the court noted

the defendant challenged the probable cause to obtain the first warrant and

challenged the subsequent warrants as fruit of the poisonous tree. 6 The defendant

6See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487- 88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d
441 ( 1963) ("[ w]e need not hold that all evidence is ` fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because
it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt
question in such a case is ` whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence
to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint (citation omitted)."').

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argued Bruner was not a known reliable informant, that the police did not perform

sufficient follow up investigation to confirm her claims, and that the " suicidal

statement" contained in Bruner' s letter made her even less reliable.

The court applied the totality of the circumstances test under Gates. The

court noted that Gates and its progeny required that much weight be given to the

reliability of the informant and the corroborating circumstances. The court also

found, however, the reliability of a statement could be bolstered by the informant

implicating himself, such as when he indicates he is an accomplice. See State v.

Huff, 392 So. 2d 1046, 1053 ( La. 1980) ("[ b] oth informants were named, and the

reliability of their own information was clearly established by the fact that they were

participants in the alleged crime and spoke from first hand [ sic] knowledge. Also,

the fact that each defendant made statements against their interests and which

incriminated them, lends credibility to this source of information." ( citations

omitted)). The court found the letter provided by Bruner " certainly contains such

implications."

Lastly, the court noted that in Friday, 73 So. 3d at 919-21, a case involving

sexual activity and child pornography, probable cause was based on the statement of

the defendant' s ex-girlfriend, whose reliability had not otherwise been established,

which gave specific details coupled with a statement " given in the other case to a

different law enforcement officer as to the defendant' s seeking treatment for

addiction to pornography."

There was no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to

suppress. The defendant fails to establish the trial court' s ruling was unsupported

by the evidence. See LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 703( D); Frida , 73 So. 3d at 919. Given all

the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there was a " fair probability" that

evidence of a crime, specifically child pornography, would be found in the

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defendant' s cabin in Mississippi.

Bruner confessed to the manufacture and distribution of child pornography.

She identified the defendant as " a recipient and a requester of these images." She

also indicated that she had been in an intimate relationship with the defendant and

that during that relationship, he had confided his affinity for child pornography. She

indicated the defendant had child pornography in his possession. She also alleged

she and the defendant shared child pornography. Bruner had detailed information

concerning the defendant' s location, his vehicle, and his social media identifiers.

She also provided detailed information concerning the defendant' s present

girlfriend, including highly personal information concerning her rape and suicide in

her family.

The trial court recognized that Bruner was not a proven informant, but

correctly noted that the reliability of a statement can be bolstered by information

which includes the informant implicating herself as an accomplice, and the

jurisprudence recognizes that statements against interest are afforded greater

credibility. See State v. Mena, 399 So. 2d 149, 152 ( La. 198 1) (" In the instant case,

Woodard stated that he was scoring his cocaine from Mena. This admission was a

declaration against penal interest because it supplied evidence against him of guilty

knowledge, an essential element of the crime of the possession of a controlled

dangerous substance. Admissions of crime carry their own indicia of credibility

sufficient at least to support a fording of probable cause to search." ( citations

omitted)).

The record fails to support the defendant' s claims that Bruner' s reliability was

compromised because she was attempting to obtain " a good bargaining tool on her

life sentence[,]" and that she " did not implicate herself in criminal activity that

would expose her to more jail time, rather by implicating [the defendant] she saw an

1?,

opportunity to decrease her jail time."

Indeed, the testimonial evidence supports the trial court' s finding that the

search warrant affidavit established probable cause. At the suppression hearing, the

defense asked Agent Lilley whether Bruner' s " providing information to [ his] agency

would] have any impact on diminishing the potential sentence that Ms. Bruner

might have[.]" He answered, "[ a]bsolutely not. We never made that available to

Bruner]." The defense also questioned whether Bruner' s claim that the defendant

had requested and directed the production of pictures of her molesting a three-year-

old child was "
merely an attempt by her to try to diminish her culpability for an

awful, terrible act by blaming it on someone else[.]" Agent Lilley rejected that

argument, noting Bruner " also confesse[ d] to the molestation of a three-year-old

child, which we [ had] no pictures o£" Lastly, when Agent Lilley was asked if

Bruner had told him that " everything she did[,] she did because of [the defendant],"

he answered " No. [ Bruner] didn' t blame it entirely on [ the defendant]. She just

state[ d] that he was knowledgeable about it, that they discussed it, they shared

images of it." See State v. Clay, 2010- 0450 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 29/ 10), 2010 WL

42729869 * 8 ( unpublished).

Even had the initial search warrant been based on less than probable cause,

under the Leon good -faith exception, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant

would not be suppressed. The defendant did not establish a lack of good faith on

the part of the executing officer. There were no misleading statements contained in

the affidavit. There was no evidence that the issuing magistrate, abandoned his

neutral role in his issuance of the search warrant, nor was there anything on the face

of the warrant that would make it so deficient that it could not be presumed valid.

Agent Lilley provided the judge with information he had gathered during the

investigation of Bruner, the defendant' s former girlfriend and sexual partner, for

1I

transmission of child pornographic imagery and molestation of a three-year-old

child. Agent Lilley was not unreasonable in believing he provided the judge with

sufficient information to issue a search warrant. Accordingly, suppression of the

evidence would be inappropriate considering the Leon good -faith exception to the

exclusionary rule. See Friday, 73 So. 3d at 923- 24.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFMMED.

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