In Re: Paul A. Lapeyrouse

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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #046
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
T
he Opinions handed down on the 21st day of October, 2022 are as follows:
P
ER CURIAM:
2022-B-00571 IN RE: PAUL A. LAPEYROUSE
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Retired Judge Freddie Pitcher, Jr., assigned Justice ad hoc, sitting for
Weimer, C.J., recused.
Hughes, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J., dissents in part for the reasons assigned by Hughes, J.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 2022-B-0571

IN RE: PAUL A. LAPEYROUSE

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM
*
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Paul A. Lapeyrouse, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS
18-DB-081
In March 2017, Glynn Trahan hired respondent to handle his divorce from his
wife, Pamela Trahan. On March 20, 2017, respondent filed a petition for divorce on
Mr. Trahan’s behalf in the 32 nd JDC for the Parish of Terrebonne. The petition
alleged that the parties had lived separate and apart for more than six months and
sought a no fault divorce under La. Civ. Code art. 103.
On March 23, 2017, Mrs. Trahan was personally served with a copy of the
petition. She was not represented by counsel in the divorce proceeding, and she
subsequently filed a pro se answer to the petition.
On multiple occasions, both while respondent repre sented Mr. Trahan in the
divorce proceeding, as well as after that representation was terminated by Mr.
Trahan, respondent and Mrs. Trahan discussed a rumor that Mr. Trahan was having
an affair with respondent’s long- time secretary, Nedra Porche. Responde nt also

* Retired Judge Freddie Pitcher, Jr. assigned as Justice Ad Hoc, sitting for Weimer, C.J., recused.

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revealed to Mrs. Trahan other confidential information relating to his representation
of Mr. Trahan in the divorce proceeding, and he provided legal advice to Mrs. Trahan
regarding actions that she could take in the divorce proceeding. Mr. Trahan did not
give informed consent for respondent to discuss these matters with Mrs. Trahan. In
May 2017, Mr. Trahan terminated respondent’s representation. Mr. Trahan then
retained new counsel and obtained a divorce on June 23, 2017.
On June 29, 2017, Mr. Trahan filed a disciplinary complaint against
respondent. In September 2017, the ODC took respondent’s sworn statement, during
which he acknowledged that he and Mrs. Trahan had discussed Mr. Trahan’s alleged
affair on “five or so” occasions.
More than six months later, on April 19, 2018, respondent filed into the
divorce proceeding a motion and order to remove his name as Mr. Trahan’s counsel
of record. The motion stated:
Movant herein represents to the court that:

He prepared the above captioned Petition for Divorce in
the capacity of a Notary only.

The agreement with [Mr. Trahan] was that movant would
prepare the document and see that it was filed but was not
representing [Mr. Trahan] in any capacity, because doing
so would result in a conflict of inte rest between movant,
[Mr. Trahan], movant’s secretary, and [Mr. Trahan’s]
wife.

Movant performed in no further function in this matter as
[Mr. Trahan] engaged the services of another attorney who
obtained the divorce.

The judge signed the order on April 23, 2018.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.6 (a lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent) and 1.7(a)(2) (a lawyer shall not represent a client if there is a
significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s

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responsibilities to a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct.

19-DB-080
In June 2019, the hearing committee conducted a disciplinary hearing on the
formal charges filed against respondent in 18 -DB-081. During the hearing, Mr.
Trahan and Ms. Porche testified on the ODC’s behalf. In September 2019, less than
three months after the hearing but before the committee issued its report, respondent
filed a “Petition for Defamation by Libel and Slander” against Mr. Trahan and Ms.
Porche. The defamation petition was based, at least in part, on Mr. Trahan’s and
Ms. Porche’s communications to the ODC and their testimony at the hearing.
Through counsel, Mr. Trahan filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of
action based on privilege/immunity and prescription. Through counsel, Ms. Porche
filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action, prescription, and absolute
immunity. Re spondent failed to appear at the hearing on the exceptions.
1 On
December 23, 2019, the judge signed an order granting the exceptions and
dismissing respondent’s defamation petition against Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 3.1 (meritorious
claims and contentions), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and
8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct. The ODC also alleged that respondent violated Supreme
Court Rule XIX, §§ 9(a) (it shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct) and 12A (communications to
the board, hearing committees, or disciplinary counsel relating to lawyer misconduct
or disability and testimony given in the proceedings shall be absolutely privileged,

1 Respondent indicated that he did not learn exceptions had been filed or that an exception hearing
was scheduled until he received the judgment granting the exceptions.

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and no lawsuit predicated thereon may be instituted against any complainant,
respondent, lawyer, or witness).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In November 2018, the ODC filed the formal charges in 18 -DB-081. In
November 2019, the ODC filed the formal charges in 19 -DB-080. Respondent
answered both sets of formal charges and denied any misconduct. The matters were
considered by separate hearing committees before being consolidated by order of
the disciplinary board. The board then filed in this court a single recommendation
of discipline encompassing both sets of formal charges.

18-DB-081
Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing on June 19, 2019. The
ODC called Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche to testify before the committee. Respondent
called his wife, Linda Lapeyrouse, and Chuck Bullock as witnesses. Respondent
also testified on his own behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC.
Respondent’s third witness got lost on his way to the hearing location and did
not appear. At the end of the hearing, respondent requested that the hearing be held
open so he could take the testimony of the witness at a later date. When the ODC
objected, respondent withdrew his request before the committee chair made a ruling.

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Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee summarized the relevant testimony as follows:
Respondent – Respondent testified that he has known Glynn and Pamela
Trahan for twenty years and that he helped them with legal matters over the years.2
Respondent also testified that he agreed to facilitate the Trahans’ divorce paperwork
at the request of Ms. Porche, whom he considered to be his best friend.
According to respondent, Ms. Porche drafted Mr. Trahan’s petition for
divorce, which was based upon living separate and apart. Respondent further
claimed that Ms. Porche signed his name to the petition for divorce with his consent.
He then claimed he acted only as a notary with respect to the divorce. Respondent
denied representing Mr. Trahan and maintained throughout his testimony that he was
being erroneously referred to as “retained by” or “repr esenting” Mr. Trahan. He
claimed the petition for divorce mistakenly stated that it was being filed by
“undersigned counsel.” Later, though, respondent said he “fired” Mr. Trahan.
Respondent also asserted that the alleged affair between Mr. Trahan and Ms.
Porche was common knowledge. Thus, he claimed he did not divulge any
confidential information to Mrs. Trahan, even though he acknowledged that he never
asked Mr. Trahan for permission to discuss the alleged affair with Mrs. Trahan.
Respondent indicated he told both Ms. Porche and Mr. Trahan that he would do the
work only if the divorce was uncontested and based on living separate and apart, that
he would not take sides in the divorce, and that he would discuss the divorce with
Mrs. Trahan. Respondent claimed Mr. Trahan agreed that he could talk to Mrs.
Trahan about the divorce.

2 More specifically, respondent explained that he knew who the Trahans were but did not become
better acquainted with them until 2014.

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Glynn Trahan – Mr. Trahan verified that he has known respondent for twenty
years and that he consulted with respondent about other legal matters. He testified
that respondent signed the petition for divorce in his presence and that there was no
doubt in his mind that respondent represented him. 3 He even gave respondent
confidential information about community property issues. He denied that
respondent told him he was going to discuss the divorce with Mrs. Trahan and denied
that he agreed to same. Mr. Trahan also denied having an affair with Ms. Porche,
although he did admit to discussing the alleged affair with Mrs. Trahan. He also
indicated Mrs. Trahan allowed him to listen in on telephone calls she had with
respondent, during which respondent discussed the pending divorce and revealed
confidential information to her. Finally, Mr. Trahan testified that respondent’s
actions have had an adverse impact on his life and family.
Nedra Porche – Ms. Porche testified that respondent signed the petition for
divorce. She denied that respondent ever said he was signing as notary only and
denied that respondent told Mr. Trahan he was going to give Mrs. Trahan legal
advice about the divorce. Ms. Porche also denied that she was having an affair with
Mr. Trahan. She indicated respondent’s actions have adversely impacted her life.
Linda Lapeyrouse – Mrs. Lapeyrouse, respondent’s wife, testified that she has
known Ms. Porche for many years but never talked directly with her about an alleged
affair with Mr. Trahan. Mrs. Lapeyrouse instead indicated that she overheard
respondent’s side of many telephone conversations he had with Ms. Porche about an
affair.
Chuck Bullock – Mr. Bullock testified that he asked respondent if there was
any truth to the alleged affair between Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche, and respondent

3 Mr. Trahan first consulted another attorney who was going to charge him $5,000 for the divorce.
Respondent then told Mr. Trahan he would charge $1,200 to $1,500 to handle the divorce.
Respondent asked him to pay for the filing fee, which he did, and said they would di scuss the
payment of attorney’s fees later.

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indicated that he doubted it. He also provided hearsay testimony to which the
committee gave no weight, as discussed in more detail below.
Based upon this testimony and the other evidence in the record, the committee
made the following findings:
The ODC’s position is that respondent engaged in a conflict of interest when
(1) he provided legal advice to both Mr. Trahan and Mrs. Trahan in connection with
their divorce, and (2) he disclosed confidential information to Mrs. Trahan, including
details of an alleged affair between Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche.
The committee noted that some of the witnesses provided hearsay testimony
about an encounter respondent apparently had with Mrs. Trahan at a local grocery
store after the petition for divorce was filed. The committee found that the hearsay
testimony could have been avoided if the ODC had called all of the witnesses it had
listed as havin g knowledge of the facts. The committee decided not to give any
credibility or any weight to the hearsay testimony about the grocery store encounter.
The committee then noted that respondent claimed Ms. Porche signed his
name on the petition for divorce w ith his consent. However, this claim was
contradicted by both Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche, who both testified that respondent
signed the petition for divorce. Respondent also maintained that he never
represented Mr. Trahan. Yet, he claimed to have fired M r. Trahan and then filed a
motion to withdraw as Mr. Trahan’s counsel, which contradicted his denial of
representation. Finally, the committee noted that a number of text messages from
respondent to Mrs. Trahan referred to financial matters and to ways the divorce
proceeding could be prolonged.
Based on these facts, the committee concluded that respondent violated Rules
1.6 and 1.7(a)(2), as charged. Specifically, the committee determined respondent
represented Mr. Trahan but gave legal advice to Mrs. Tr ahan and divulged
confidential information to her, in both telephone calls and text messages, without

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obtaining a proper waiver from Mr. Trahan. Although respondent’s conduct caused
Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche to experience anger and some emotional distress, the
committee found no significant harm.
As aggravating factors, the committee found that “[r]espondent’s conduct was
the result of his misguided feelings towards his long- time employee. His violation
of the Rules was not realized or addressed in a tim ely manner. He allowed his
emotions to guide him rather than his legal judgment.” In mitigation, the committee
found the following:
The Respondent is a mature individual. The record
reflects that the Respondent has no prior disciplinary
record. He is a solo Practitioner in a small community and
other clients have ongoing matters with him that need
continuing attention. It appears th at he has not had the
opportunity for a proper mentorship in the practice of law.
The Respondent would benefit from attending and passing
the LSBA Ethics School which would refresh him on the
Rules of Professional Conduct as well as discipline
avoidance. He seems to be very sincere in his misguided
feelings towards his ex -employee. He has belatedly
acknowledged his error at the hearing.

In light of the above, the committee recommended respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period of
probation with the condition that he attend Ethics School.
Both respondent and the ODC filed objections to the committee’s report in
18-DB-081.

19-DB-080
Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing on October 20, 2020.
The ODC called Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche to testify before the committee.
Respondent called his wife as a witness. He also testified on his own behalf and on
cross-examination by the ODC.

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Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee summarized the relevant testimony as follows:
Glynn Trahan – Mr. Trahan testified that he had to hire an attorney to defend
him against respondent’s defamation petition, and he incurred $2,000 in legal fees
plus $100 in travel expenses. He also testified that he believes respondent filed the
defamation petition in retaliation for Mr. Trahan’s June 2017 disciplinary complaint
against him.
Nedra Porche – Like Mr. Trahan, Ms. Porche testified that she had to hire an
attorney to defend her against respondent’s defamation petition. She indicated that
she incurred $2,500 in legal fees, lost $120 for missing work, and incurred $80 in
“other expenses.” Ms. Porche also testified that she believes respondent included
her as a defendant in the defamation petition because she provided information to
the ODC when Mr. Trahan filed his June 2017 disciplinary complaint against
respondent and then testified for the ODC during respondent’s first disciplinary
hearing.
Linda Lapeyrouse – Mrs. Lapeyrouse testified that respondent filed the
defamation petition because of what Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche “were saying on
the streets” about him, claiming that it destroyed respondent’s law practice. By way
of example, Mrs. Lapeyrouse explained that an officer who brings papers from the
court told her that he heard respondent was out of business and no longer an attorney.
Respondent – Respondent testified that his law practice began to decline after
Mr. Trahan filed his first disciplinary complaint against him in June 2017.
Respondent recited multiple instances of Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche saying things
about him to others that he believes were untrue and caused harm to his practice.
For example, respondent alleged that Ms. Porche said something to his abstractor,
Grant Dupre, which caused Mr. Dupre to stop working for him.

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Respondent acknowledged that allegations he made in his defamation petition
matched the things Mr. Trahan wrote in his initial disciplinary complaint to the
ODC. However, respondent stated that Mr. Trahan also reported those things to
people in the community where respondent’s law practice was located. Respondent
believes that Mr. Trahan’s statements in his complaint to the ODC are proof of what
Mr. Trahan had been saying about him in the community.
Based on this testimony and the other evidence in the record, the committee
made the following findings:
Mr. Trahan filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent in 2017, whic h
complaint resulted in the ODC filing formal charges against respondent. Both Mr.
Trahan and Ms. Porche testified at the related hearing held on June 19, 2019. On
September 9, 2019, respondent filed a defamation petition against Mr. Trahan and
Ms. Porche. The committee determined that the issue presented in the second set of
formal charges is whether respondent based his defamation petition, at least in part,
on Mr. Trahan’s and Ms. Porche’s prior communications to the ODC and their
testimony at the June 19, 2019 hearing.
Based on the testimony, the committee found that a lot of animosity and hard
feelings existed and still remain between respondent, Mr. Trahan, and Ms. Porche.
Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche both believe respondent’s defamation petition was
retaliation for their participation in the initial disciplinary proceeding. Respondent
testified about multiple instances of Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche saying untrue and
harmful things about him, but he failed to produce any evidence or witnesses to
corroborate those allegations.
Noting that respondent’s defamation petition was based on both slander and
libel, the committee found that the allegations of slander were not based on Mr.
Trahan’s initial disciplinary complaint but instead on falsehoods respondent claimed
Mr. Trahan was saying about him in the community. However, the allegations of

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libel, or written defamatory statements, can only have been based on Mr. Trahan’s
initial disciplinary complaint.
Based on these findings, the committee determined respondent violated
Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 9(a) and 12A when he filed a defamation petition based
on Mr. Trahan’s initial disciplinary complaint. The committee further determined
that respondent’s cond uct violated Rules 3.1, 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to the legal
system and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual harm in the form of
attorneys’ fees and costs as well as court time to handle the defamation petition.
Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee
determined the baseline sanction is a public reprimand.
As aggravating factors, the committee found substantial expe rience in the
practice of law (admitted 1997). The committee also noted that respondent “is the
subject of prior disciplinary action, however, that matter is still pending at this time.”
Regarding mitigation, the committee stated that respondent “is pres ently 80 years
old. He served in the military and did not attend law school until he was in his 50’s.
He obtained his law degree from Southern University in 1995 and passed the bar in
1997. He has been practicing law for approximately 23 years in Terrebonne Parish,
where he was originally from.”
In light of the above findings, the committee recommended respondent be
publicly reprimanded. The committee further recommended, “if proper
documentation is presented as to attorney’s fees actually incurred, th at respondent
pay reparations of legal fees to Ms. Porche of approximately $2,500 and Mr. Trahan
of approximately $2,000.”
Both respondent and the ODC filed objections to the committee’s report in
19-DB-080.

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18-DB-081 & 19-DB-080
Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that the factual findings of
both hearing committees do not appear to be manifestly erroneous and are supported
by the record. Based on those facts, the board found that respondent violated th e
Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in both sets of formal charges and as found
by both committees. Likewise, the board found that respondent violated Supreme
Court Rule XIX, §§ 9(a) and 12(A) with respect to 19-DB-080.
The board then determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his
client, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused
potential and actual harm to Mr. Trahan and Ms. Porche. His filing of the defamation
petition caused an unnecessary burden on the court system and had the potential to
cause a chilling effect upon and undermine the proper function of the attorney
disciplinary system. Citing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ,
the board determined the baseline sanction is suspension.
According to the board, a ggravating factors include a dishonest or selfish
motive, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law. The sole mitigating factor
found by the board is the absence of a prior disciplinary record.
After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year and one day.
Respondent filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly,
the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(G)(1)(b).

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DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record in this matter supports a finding that respondent engaged in a
conflict of interest by providing legal advice to both his client and his client’s
estranged wife in connection with their divorce and by disclosing confidential
information to his c lient’s estranged wife. Respondent then filed a defamation
petition against his client and another witness based on the information they
provided to the ODC regarding his conflict of interest.
Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct as alleged in both sets of formal charges. The facts also support a finding
that respondent violated Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 9(a) and 12(A) as alleged.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating a nd

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mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client, the public, the legal
system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual and potential harm.
Under the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the baseline sanction
is suspension. The aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary
board are supported by the record.
Under the circumstances presented, we find the board’s recommended
sanction is overly harsh. Accordingly, we will suspend respondent from the practice
of law for one year, with six months deferred.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committees
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is
ordered that Paul A. Lapeyrouse , Louisiana Bar Roll number
24825, be and he
hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year , with six
months deferred. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against
respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest
to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2022-B-00571

IN RE: PAUL A. LAPEYROUSE

Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding

Hughes, J., dissents in part.
Respectfully, under these facts I would impose a lesser sanction.