In Re: Alton Bates, II

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #005
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 27th day of January, 2023 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2022-B-01357 IN RE: ALTON BATES, II
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Weimer, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned by
Chief Justice Weimer.
Crain, J., concurs.

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
22-B-1357
I
N RE: ALTON BATES, II
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
T his disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Alton Bates, II, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of
law in Louisiana in 2001.
On November 11, 2015, respondent and the ODC filed with this court a joint
petition for consent discipline, wherein respondent admitted to neglecting a legal
matter, failing to communicate with a client, mishandling his client trust account,
which resulted in commingling and conversion of client funds, and notarizing an
affidavit outside the presence of the signatory. Respondent’s admitted misconduct
occurred between 2011 and late 2014. For this misconduct, the parties proposed that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully
deferred, subject to a two-year period of supervised probation with conditions. On
January 15, 2016, we accepted the petition for consent discipline and imposed upon
respondent the parties’ proposed sanction. In re: Bates, 15-2102 (La. 1/15/16), 184
So. 3d 670 (“Bates I”).

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Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the instant proceeding.

UNDERLYING FACTS
In September 2011, Aljilia Prelow was involved in a three -car accident. In
January 2012, Ms. Prelow hired respondent to represent her in a personal injury
matter stemming from the accident.1 In September 2012, respondent filed a petition
for damages on Ms. Prelow’s behalf. In February 2014, respondent settled Ms.
Prelow’s claim for $300.
The record contains no evidence that respondent consulted Ms. Prelow about
the settlement, and she denie d agreeing to the settlement. When he received the
settlement check, respondent deposited the check into his operating account instead
of his client trust account. Ms. Prelow also confirmed that the endorsement on the
settlement check is not hers. Moreover, respondent did not prepare a written
disbursement statement, and Ms. Prelow did not receive any of the proceeds from
the settlement.
On March 26, 2014, the judge signed an order dismissing Ms. Prelow’s case.
Nevertheless, for several years thereafter , respondent continued to communicate
with Ms. Prelow without disclosing to her that the case had settled and was
dismissed. For example, on March 14, 2019, Ms. Prelow and respondent engaged
in the following text message exchange:
Ms. Prelow: Is my accident case still pending???

Respondent: Sorry, I can’t talk right now.
I’m still in with client

Ms. Prelow: I just need to know if my case still pending I know if it is not
messed with after three years they close it. The accident was in
2011

1 Respondent was the third attorney Ms. Prelow hired to handle the matter.

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Respondent: It’s three years from the last time something transpired.... will
explain when I’m free

Ms. Prelow: Yall really messed over me and someone is going to pay. I will
not let yall get away with this

Respondent: What are you talking about I have been paying you because she
messed up the case.... haven’t I been paying you
And your insurance company settled with the other people

Ms. Prelow: My insurance company paid the lady I got ran into because
Chenetra [respondent’s secretary] signed the letter to okay it.
You knew when you was trying to so call settle it with me you
didn’t have enough funds to pay me. That money you have paid
me didn’t even pay for my car. I waited 5 years before I bought
another car

Four days later, on March 18, 2019, the ODC rece ived a disciplinary
complaint against respondent from Ms. Prelow. In the complaint, Ms. Prelow
alleged that respondent did not work her case and that respondent’s secretary forged
her signature on documents. She also indicated that she did not know if he r case
was still open. In response to the complaint, respondent provided the ODC with
documentary evidence proving he worked extensively on Ms. Prelow’s case,
including documentation of the $300 settlement. He also denied that his secretary
forged Ms. Prelow’s signature on any documents.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In July 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
his misconduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct: Rules 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(c) (contingency fee
agreements), 1.15(a) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 1.15(d)
(failure to timely remit funds to a client or third person), and 8.4(c) (engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, admitting to negligently
failing to deposit the settlement check into his client trust account and negligently

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failing to prepare a written disbursement statement. He also admitted that he did not
pay Ms. Prelow any money from the settlement. However, he denied the remainder
of the alleged misconduct and asserted the existence of factors that would mitigate
his actual misconduct.
In light of respondent’s answer, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on
the merits.

Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted the hearing on November 5, 2021. The
ODC introduced documentary evidence and called Ms. Prelow to testify before the
committee. Respondent did not introduce any documentary evidence or call any
witnesses,2 but he did testify on his own behalf and on cross-examination by the
ODC.

RESPONDENT’S TESTIMONY
Respondent testified that Ms. Prelow’s accident involved three vehicles, and
her insurance company ultimately admitted liability and settled with the other two
drivers. At that point, respondent believed Ms. Prelow’s lawsuit would not go
anywhere. Theref ore, he claimed he accepted $300 from the defendant insurance
company to pay the cost of filing a motion to dismiss Ms. Prelow’s lawsuit.
However, he acknowledged a letter from opposing counsel indicated that the $300
was to settle Ms. Prelow’s claim and that the defendant insurance company would
pay the cost of filing the motion to dismiss. Respondent further acknowledged that

2 Respondent’s secretary, Chenetra Hall, appeared at the hearing because respondent’s counsel
intended to call her as a witness. Ultimately, respondent’s counsel decided not to have her testify
and “cut her loose” without informing the ODC or the committee . The ODC relied upon
respondent’s counsel’s indication that he would call Ms. Hall as a witness and did not subpoena
her. Therefore, the ODC did not have an opportunity to question Ms. Hall.

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he should have withdrawn from the representation when he determined Ms. Prelow’s
lawsuit was fruitless.
Respondent recalled telling Ms. Prelow there was a problem with her case due
to the fact that her insurance company settled with the other two drivers. However,
he did not recall asking Ms. Prelow if he could settle her case for $300 and could not
locate a disbursement statement in Ms. Prelow’s file. He also could not recall if Ms.
Prelow endorsed the back of the settlement check. While he acknowledged it was
possible that his secretary, Chenetra Hall, forged Ms. Prelow’s endorsement without
his knowledge, he indicated he has n ever questioned her about it. Additionally, he
acknowledged that he did not deposit the $300 into his client trust account but,
instead, deposited it into his operating account. He further acknowledged that he did
not disburse any of the $300 to Ms. Prelow because it all went to pay the costs of
her lawsuit.
Respondent could not recall ever telling Ms. Prelow that her case had settled
for $300. He also could not remember if he ever told Ms. Prelow her case had been
dismissed. Nevertheless, despite his inability to remember what occurred, petitioner
acknowledged there was a lack of communication.
Finally, respondent indicated that he represented Ms. Prelow in multiple
criminal matters on a pro bono basis. After Ms. Prelow filed her disciplinary
complaint against him, she asked him to represent her in an additional criminal
matter, but he did not respond to her request.

A
LJILIA PRELOW’S TESTIMONY
Ms. Prelow testified that she did not authorize respondent to settle her case
for $300. She also did not endorse the settlement check and did not authorize anyone
else to endorse it on her behalf. Respondent never told her that her case had settled
and never provided her with a disbursement statement. Ms. Prelow indicated that

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she learned her case had settled after she filed her disciplinary complaint against
respondent and the ODC conducted an investigation.
Ms. Prelow claimed that respondent’s secretary signed a letter authorizing Ms.
Prelow’s insurance company to accept liability and settle with the other two drivers
involved in the accident. She further claimed that respondent’s secretary forged her
endorsement on the $300 settlement check. According to Ms. Prelow, respondent
admitted his secretary messed up her case, and he was paying her to make up for it.
She claimed that, beginning in 2016 or 2017, he paid her a total of approximately
$1,000, which payments she believed were advances on any settlement amount she
received in the future.
Ms. Prelow also confirmed that respondent handled multiple criminal matters
for her and did not require her to pay him for those cases. She further indicated that,
even though they were communicating about her criminal cases after the February
2014 settlement of her accident case, he never told her the case had settled.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee found that respondent was the third attorney retained by Ms.
Prelow, and he ultimately filed a petition for damages in 2012, which included a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Three months later, respondent filed a second
petition, this time requesting service. In 2014, respondent settled Ms. Prelow’s claim
for $300 without any evidence that he consulted with her about same. The
committee further found that there are questions related to the actual endorser of the
settlement check. Moreover, the settlement funds were not deposited into
respondent’s trust account. The evidence additionally shows that respondent
continued to communicate with Ms. Prelow for several years without disclosing the
settlement.

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Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rule 1.4
by not informing his client of his intentions to settle her claim. He did not consult
with her regarding the settlement, and it is somewhat baffling why he would settle
the claim for $300. Respondent could not provide the committee with any reason
why he would settle the case for such a small amount. The committee also
determined respondent violated Rule 1.5(c) by not having a written contingency fee
agreement for this case. With respect to Rule 1.15(a), the committee determined
respondent violated this rule when he deposited the settlement funds into his
operating account and not into his trust account. Even though $300 may seem lik e
a paltry amount, respondent had a duty to deposit the funds into his trust account,
which did not happen. When respondent received the settlement funds, he also had
a duty to promptly notify his client, which he did not do. The committee found no
evidence to show that respondent provided any information to his client regarding
the settlement. Accordingly, the committee determined respondent violated Rule
1.15(d). The committee then noted that one of the most perplexing things about this
matter relates to the endorsement on the settlement check. The committee
determined that Ms. Prelow did not endorse the settlement check. Therefore, a
question remains as to who actually endorsed the settlement check before it was
deposited into respondent’s operating account. Because respondent is responsible
for the actions of his office and staff, the committee determined this conduct violated
Rule 8.4(c).
The committee then determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed
to his client and the legal profession, causing actual harm to Ms. Prelow. Citing the
ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the
baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee cited only respondent’s prior disciplinary
record. In mitigation, the committee cited only respondent’s personal or emotional

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problems, specifically noting that respondent’s father, who was also his law partner,
was disbarred in 2010, which led to serious financial issues for respondent.
After also considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and one day. The committee further recommended that
respondent be ordered to repay Ms. Prelow for any expenses she may have incurred
during these proceedings and make restitution to Ms. Prelow in the amount of $300.
Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board adopted the hearing committee’s factual
findings. Based on those facts, the board agreed with the committee’s findings
regarding rule violations with two exceptions. First, while the board agreed with the
committee that respondent violated Rule 1.5(c), it disagreed w ith the committee’s
reason for finding this rule violation. Instead of finding this rule violation based
upon respondent’s failure to have a written contingency fee agreement with Ms.
Prelow, the board determined respondent violated Rule 1.5(c) by failing to provide
Ms. Prelow with a written disbursement statement concerning the outcome of her
case. Second, while the board agreed with the committee that respondent violated
Rule 8.4(c), it disagreed with the committee’s reason for finding this rule violation.
Instead of finding this rule violation based upon respondent’s failure to supervise his
staff with respect to the endorsement of the settlement check, the board determined
respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) by settling Ms. Prelow’s lawsuit without informing
her and then depositing the settlement funds into his operating account. The board
further determined that, since respondent did not tell Ms. Prelow about the
settlement, he knew someone other than Ms. Prelow endorsed the settlement check.

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The board then determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his
client and the legal profession, causing actual harm to Ms. Prelow. The board agreed
with the committee that the baseline sanction is suspension. In aggravation, the
board noted only that re spondent has substantial experience in the practice of law.
The board agreed with the committee that the sole mitigating factor is respondent’s
personal or emotional problems.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board determined
respondent’s instant misconduct should be considered together with his misconduct
that was the subject of Bates I using the analysis established in Louisiana State Bar
Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So. 2d 470 (1991). In Chatelain, the court determined that
it is generally inappropriate to impose additional discipline upon an attorney for
misconduct that occurred before or concurrently with violations that resulted in a
prior disciplinary sanction; rather, the overall discipline to be imposed should be
determined as if both proceedings were before the court simultaneously. Using the
Chatelain approach, the board determined that the misconduct in Bates I occurred
between 2011 through late 2014, while the instant misconduct occurred from
February 2014 until Ms. Prelow filed a disciplinary complaint against him in March
2019. Although respondent’s instant misconduct extends beyond the misconduct in
Bates I, the board determined there is some overlap in the misconduct. Therefore,
the board concluded that, had the 2014 misconduct in the instant matter been
considered together with the misconduct in Bates I , it is likely that a more severe
sanction, including an active period of suspension, would have been imposed.
Considering the combined misconduct and the court’s prior juris prudence
addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year and one day. The board further recommended
that respondent be ordered to make restitution to Ms. Prelow in the amount of $300.

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Respondent filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly,
the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record of this matter supports a finding that respondent settled a case
without his client’s knowledge or consent, failed to deposit the settlement funds into
a client trust account, failed to prepare a disbursement statement, failed to disburse
the cl ient’s portion of the funds to her, and failed to inform the client of the
settlement for years. Based on these facts, respondent violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged. More specifically, respondent violated Rule 1.4
by settling Ms. Prelow’s case without discussing the settlement with her and then by
failing to inform her of the settlement for years. He violated Rule 1.5(c) by failing
to prepare a disbursement statement, and he violated Rule 1.15(d) by failing to
disburse Ms. Prelow’s portion of the settlement to her. He violated Rule 1.15(a) by
failing to deposit the settlement funds into his trust account. Additionally, he
violated Rule 8.4(c) by settling Ms. Prelow’s case without informing her and
depositing the settlement funds into his operating account instead of his trust

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account. He also violated Rule 8.4(c) since he knew or should have known Ms.
Prelow’s endorsement on the settlement check was forged given that he never
informed her of the settlement.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client and the legal
profession, which caused actual harm. Therefore, the baseline sanction is
suspension. The aggravating and mitigating factors found by the board are
supported by the record.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we agree with the disciplinary
board that, based upon Chatelain, the misconduct in the instant matter should be
considered along with the misconduct in B ates I. Accordingly, the appropriate
sanction in this matter would address respondent’s misconduct in allowing his trust
account to become overdrawn, paying personal bills from his trust ac count, failing
to promptly pay funds owed to a third- party medical provider, depositing funds
belonging to two clients into his operating account instead of his trust account,
neglecting one legal matter, failing to communicate with two clients, notarizing an
affidavit outside the presence of the signatory, settling a case without the client’s
knowledge or consent, and failing to disburse the client’s portion of the settlement
proceeds.

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The board determined that, had the court considered the instant misconduct
together with the misconduct in Bates I, the court would have imposed a more severe
sanction than the fully deferred suspension imposed in Bates I . We agree.
Considering the totality of respondent’s misconduct, we find a one year and one day
suspension, with all but six months deferred, is appropriate. We will also order
respondent to make restitution to Ms. Prelow in the amount of $300.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and con sidering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is
ordered that Alton Bates, II, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27372, be and he hereby is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, with all but
six months deferred. Any misconduct during the period of deferral may be grounds
for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional
discipline, as appropriate. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution
to Aljilia Prelow in the amount of $300 plus legal interest. All costs and expenses
in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule
XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of
this court’s judgment until paid.

SUP
REME COURT OF LOUISIANA
N
O. 2022-B-01357
I
N RE: ALTON BATES, II
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
W
EIMER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent regarding the sanction.
As recognized by the majority, respondent has a prior disciplinary record. He
received a one year and one day suspension, fully deferred, subject to a two year
period of supervised probation with conditions in a prior disciplinary proceeding. In
re: Bates , 15 -2102 (La. 1/15/16), 184 So.3d 670. The conduct at issue in that
proceeding overlapped with the conduct currently at issue.
Given this history and the facts of the current proceeding, I would impose a
one year and one day suspension as recommended by both the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board. The fact th at the endorsement of the settlement check
was forged establishes the recommended sanction is the appropriate sanction. See
La. R.S. 14:72.

1
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2022-B-01357
I
N RE: ALTON BATES, II
At
torney Disciplinary Proceeding
CRI
CHTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons:
As indicated by my rejection of respondent’s previous discipline (a fully
deferred suspension of one year and one day) as unduly lenient in In re: Bates, 15-
2102 (La. 1/15/16), 184 So. 3d 670, in my view, respondent’s present misconduct
also warrants a period of actual suspension. However, while I agree the allegations
against respondent have been proven, I disagree with the majority’s imposition of
one year and one day suspension with all but six months deferred, as I believe the
circumstances of this case merit a one year and one day suspension with all but forty-
five days deferred.
When determining the appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary matters,
underlying misconduct that occurs within the same general time period as the
misconduct forming the basis of a previously imposed sanction should be considered
together. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Chatelain, 573 So. 2d 470 (La. 1991). In
other words, this Court will generally not impose additional discipline upon an
attorney for misconduct that occurred before or concurrently with violations that
resulted in a prior disciplinary sanction. Rather, the overall discipline to be imposed
by this Court shall be determined as if both proceedings were before the court
simultaneously. See also, In re Fazande, 20-1415 (La. 3/20/21), 312 So. 3d 571
(after respondent had been disbarred, the Court considered additional and similar
misconduct as part of a continuing series of professional breaches and permanently
disbarred respondent), citing Chatelain, supra; In re: Wilson, 18-1800 (La. 1/14/19),

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260 So. 3d 1203 (after respondent had been disbarred, this Court determined further
misconduct which occurred during the same general time period in which the first
misconduct occurred, should be considered with the original misconduct, if and
when respondent applies for readmission from her disbarment) , citing Chatelain,
supra; In re: Fradella, 15-981 (La. 8/28/15), 177 So. 3d 119 (in applying Chatelain,
this Court’s “overriding consideration has been to determine the appropriate overall
sanction for the lawyer’s misconduct, ignoring any distortions which may be caused
by the timing of the formal charges.”); In re: Hebert, 12 -2102 (La. 11/16/12), 125
So. 3d 1074 (applying Chatelain , the Court found no additional discipline was
necessary for misconduct, but additional misconduct should be considered with
underlying misconduct when respondent files an application for reinstatement); In
re: Szuba , 04 -1571 (La. 2/4/05), 896 So. 2d 976 (applying Chatelain , finding
misconduct before the Court was nearly identical to and occurred within the same
relevant time frame as previously considered misconduct, and noted the Court will
adjudge respondent guilty of additional violations which will be added to his record
for consideration in the event he applies for reinstatement). But see, In re: Tyson ,
22-1607 (La. 1/18/23), -- So. 3d -- (Crichton, J., concurring, noting the Chatelain
analysis did not apply where the respondent’s recent misconduct did not occur in the
same time frame a s the misconduct in his previous disciplinary matter). Thus,
notwithstanding respondent’s serious misconduct involved herein, the peculiar
circumstances in this matter dictate the application of the rule and spirit of Chatelain
per the above jurisprudence.
As the per curiam explains, a majority of respondent’s misconduct leading to
his 2016 fully deferred suspension occurred between 2011 and 2014. The instant
misconduct occurred from February 2014 until complainant filed a disciplinary
complaint against respondent in M arch, 2019. Although respondent’s misconduct
presently before the Court extends beyond his original misconduct, I find the overlap

3

nonetheless material . The original accident for which complainant retained
respondent to represent her occurred in 2011. Despite not receiving complainant’s
permission to settle her case, the record reveals respondent was the third attorney
complainant retained and respondent did inform complainant that her case was
problematic due to the fact her insurance com pany had settled with the other two
drivers involved. Moreover, the record also reveals that during 2016 or 2017,
complainant received a total of approximately $1,000 in advances from respondent,
which complainant believed were advances on any settlement amount she would
receive in the future. While these facts certainly do not excuse respondent’ s
behavior, they should be taken into consideration.
Finally, and most notably, the record establishes that respondent represented
complainant in multiple criminal matters on a pro bono basis both before and during
the time frame at issue herein. Even after complainant filed her disciplinary
complaint against respondent in 2019, she asked respondent to represent her in an
additional criminal matter. Thus, e ven though she felt respondent’s lack of
communication regarding the settlement of her personal injury matter warranted
filing a disciplinary complaint, she apparently believed respondent still competent
to represent her again in another case.
To be clear, I do not make light of respondent’s serious misconduct as alleged
and proven by clear and convincing evidence, but I do not agree with the majority’s
imposition of a one year and one day suspension with six months deferred. In my
view, respondent should r eceive a one year and one day suspension, with all but
forty-five days deferred. Furthermore, in addition to this period of suspension, I
would also require that respondent attend educational seminars regarding trust
accounts, ethics, and professionalism during a probationary period.