In Re: Christopher Alexander Gross

Supreme Court of Louisiana
March 14, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER GROSS
No. 2022-B-01471
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
March 14, 2023
Disbarment imposed. See per curiam.
Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
JDH
JLW
JTG
WJC
JBM
PDG
03/14/2023 "See News Release 013 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
022-B-1471
I
N RE: CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER GROSS
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
Th
is disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Christopher Alexander Gross, an
attorney license d to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension
for threat of harm to the public. In re: Gross, 19-2084 (La. 1/8/20), 286 So. 3d 1035.
FO
RMAL CHARGES
Count I – The Unauthorized Practice of Law Matter
On May 31, 2019, respondent was declared ineligible to practice law for
failing to comply with mandatory continuing legal education requirements. On June
19, 2019, during the period of his ineligibility, respondent represented a client in the
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th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson.
Respondent’s opposing counsel then filed a disciplinary complaint against
him. In August and September 2019, the ODC sent respondent notice of the
complaint at three separate addresses. Respondent received at least one of the
notices but failed to respond to the complaint.
Co
unt II – The Cao Matter
Attorney Anh Cao of the Cao Law Firm is respondent’s former employer. On
October 1, 2018, the Cao Law Firm hired respondent as a full- time associate. He
03/14/23

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was paid an annual salary of $58,500, plus 6% of the attorney’s fees for cases he
brought to the firm.
In May 2019, Quang Le contacted the Cao Law Firm and requested
representation for his nephew Quoc Ta Nguyen, who was being detained at an
immigration detention center in Jena, Louisiana. Mr. Cao quoted Mr. Le a flat fee
of $5,000 for the representation and requested a retainer of $2,500. Mr. Cao directed
respondent to attend Mr. Nguyen’s May 13, 2019 hearing, at which time he was to
collect the retainer fee. Three weeks later, Mr. Le contacted Mr. Cao to inquire
about the status of his nephew’s immigration matter. Mr. Cao reminded Mr. Le that
he required a retainer of $2,500. Mr. Le then communicated to Mr. Cao that he had
paid respondent $2,500 in cash. When Mr. Cao confronted respondent about Mr.
Le’s payment, respondent stated that he only received $2,000 from Mr. Le and that
he had deposited the money into his Apple Pay account.
In August 2019, Paul Schillesi contacted the Cao Law Firm and complained
that respondent had not filed the documents he promised to file on behalf of D Jay’s
Cosmetology School against the Louisiana State Board of Cosmetology (“LSBC”).
During a subsequent meeting with Mr. Cao, Mr. Schillesi indicated that he had called
the Cao Law Firm in December 2018 about the problems he was having with the
LSBC. Thereafter, respondent traveled to Baton Rouge and met with Mr. Schillesi
at his cosmetology school. Respondent communicated to Mr. Schillesi that Mr. Cao
was not interested in the case, which was untrue. Instead, respondent told Mr.
Schillesi that he would handle the case and that the retainer should be paid directly
to him. Mr. Schillesi wrote a check to the Gross-Tillero Law Firm in the amount of
$2,500. Respondent cashed the check the next day but did nothing for Mr. Schillesi
for the next eight months. When Mr. Cao learned in August 2019 what had
transpired, he contacted respondent, demanded that he return the money to Mr.
Schillesi, and terminated his employment with the Cao Law Firm.

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Further, while employed with the Cao Law Firm, respondent communicated
to client Martha Menjivar that he had taken care of her traffic tickets and that she
had nothing to worry about. However, respondent did not handle Ms. Menjivar’s
traffic tickets, resulting in the court issuing attachments against Ms. Menjivar and
the suspension of her driver’s license.
In January 2019, Thu Pham contacted the Cao Law Firm to handle a DWI
matter in Avoyelles Parish. Mr. Cao instructed respondent to tell Mr. Pham that it
would be less expensive to hire a criminal attorney in that area. Mr. Cao was not
sure what respondent told Mr. Pham, but thereafter, Mr. Pham wrote respondent two
checks totaling $3,000. Mr. Pham contacted the Cao Law Firm on several occasions,
and respondent communicated to him that “everything was done.” In fact, nothing
was done. Respondent failed to appear in court on behalf of Mr. Pham, which
resulted in the issuance of an attachment for Mr. Pham’s arrest. Consequently, Mr.
Cao was compelled to enroll as counsel of record in order to assist Mr. Pham. Mr.
Cao then had the bench warrant recalled and a trial date set.
On October 1, 2019, the ODC sent notice of Mr. Cao’s disciplinary complaint
to respondent at his primary bar registration address. The notice was returned to the
ODC unclaimed.

Count III – The Foucher Matter
In January 2019, Charissa Foucher retained respondent to handle an
immigration matter on behalf of her husband. At that time, respondent quoted Ms.
Foucher a $1,600 fee for the representation. On March 18, 2019, Ms. Foucher paid
respondent $800 in cash. On April 12, 2019, respondent told Ms. Foucher that the
fee for the representation had increased to $3,170, and she paid him another $800 in
cash that day. Thereafter, respondent ceased communicating with Ms. Foucher.

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In September 2019, Ms. Foucher contacted what she believed to be
respondent’s law firm. Ms. Foucher was told that respondent no longer worked there
and that there was no record of respondent handling an immigration matter on behalf
of her husband.
On October 7, 2019, the ODC sent notice of Ms. Foucher’s disciplinary
complaint to respondent at his primary bar registration address. The notice was
returned to the ODC unclaimed, and respondent has never responded to the
complaint.

Count IV – The Tran Matter
Evon Tran retained respondent to prepare a power of attorney and to handle
litigation regarding a life insurance matter, paying respondent $350 in cash for the
preparation of the power of attorney. After respondent prepared the power of
attorney, he delivered same to Ms. Tran, who then paid respondent $2,600 in cash
to begin litigating the life insurance matter. After receiving payment, respondent
failed to communicate or meet w ith Ms. Tran. When Ms. Tran was finally able to
schedule a meeting with respondent for September 11, 2019, respondent failed to
show up for the meeting. The next day, Ms. Tran texted respondent about the missed
meeting, but respondent did not respond. M s. Tran has not heard from respondent
since.
On October 21, 2019, the ODC sent notice of Ms. Tran’s disciplinary
complaint to respondent at his primary bar registration address. The notice was
returned to the ODC unclaimed.

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Count V – The Chapman Matter
Ronald Chapman hired respondent to handle a claim for damages against the
Department of Veterans Affairs. According to Mr. Chapman, respondent failed to
keep him informed of the status of the matter and was hostile toward him.
On June 5, 2020, th e ODC sent notice of Mr. Chapman’s disciplinary
complaint to respondent. On July 13, 2020, the ODC sent a second notice of the
complaint to respondent at his primary and secondary bar registration addresses. On
July 23, 2020, respondent emailed the ODC to request additional time to respond,
and the ODC gave him an extension of fifteen days. Respondent had no further
contact with the ODC.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In February 2022, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct: Rules 1.1
(failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3
(failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4
(failure to communicate with a client), 1.5(e) (division of fees), 1.15(a) (safekeeping
property of clients or third persons), 5.5 (engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law), 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a
disciplinary authority ), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its
investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b)
(commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Respondent failed to answer the
formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed
admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an

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opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary
evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the committee’s
consideration.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing
committee determined that the factual allegations set forth in the formal charges are
proven. Based on those facts, the committee determined respondent violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients,
the Cao Law Firm, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. He acted
knowingly and in tentionally, causing actual and potential harm to his clients, the
Cao Law Firm, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Citing the
ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the
baseline sanction is disbarment.
The committee found the following aggravating factors present: a dishonest
or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction
of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or
orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of the victims, substantial experience
in the practice of law (admitted 2008), and indifference to making restitution. The
committee determined the sole mitigating factor present is the absence of a prior
disciplinary record.
Considering these findings, and the prior jurisprudence considering similar
misconduct, the committee recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.
The committee also recommended that respondent be required to make full
restitution to all harmed parties, including his clients, the Cao Law firm, and the

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Louisiana State Bar Association’s Client Assistance Fund, for all funds and unearned
fees he improperly converted to his own use.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s
report. Therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G), the disciplinary
board submitted the committee’s report to the court for review.
After considering the matter, th e court issued an order directing respondent
and the ODC to submit written briefs addressing whether the sanction recommended
by the committee is appropriate. The ODC submitted a brief in response to the
court’s order, but respondent did not.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93 -2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.
The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent
neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients, failed to refund
unearned fees, practiced law while ineligible to do so, engaged in deceitful conduct,
and failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigations. More specifically,
respondent represented a client in court during a period of ineligibility, in violation
of Rules 1.1 and 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. He collected attorney’s
fees from clients and never turned them over to the Cao Law Firm, in violation of

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Rules 1.15(a) and 8.4(c). He accepted legal fees, neglected the legal matters, either
failed to communicate with the clients or deceived them regarding the status of their
legal matters, and then failed to refund the unearned fees, in violation of Rules 1.3,
1.4, 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee),1 and 8.4(c). Respondent also failed
to cooperate with the ODC’s investigations of the numerous complaints filed against
him, in violation of Rules 8.1(b) and 8.1(c). Finally, in violating the aforementioned
rules, respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedi ngs are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
The record further supports a finding that responde nt knowingly and
intentionally violated duties owed to his clients, the Cao Law Firm, the legal system,
and the legal profession. His conduct caused both potential and actual harm. The
actual harm was significant in that at least two clients had attachme nts issued for
their arrests due to respondent’s neglect of their legal matters. Furthermore,
respondent collected at least $11,700 in attorney’s fees from several clients and then
did little to no work on their behalf. He also did not refund any of the unearned fees

1 The ODC charged respondent with a violation of Rule 1.5(e), which references the division of
fees between attorneys who are not in the same firm. Based upon the established facts, however,
Rule 1.5(e) does not apply here. Instead, the alleged facts set forth in the formal charges suggest
the ODC meant to charge respondent with a violation of Rule 1.5(f)(5) regarding an attorney’s
failure to refund unearned fees.

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to his clients or reimburse the Cao Law Firm when it stepped in to complete some
of the representations for which he had been paid. We agree with the hearing
committee’s determination of aggravating and mitigating factors. W e also agree
with the committee that the baseline sanction is disbarment.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee has
recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. However, we find recent
case law suggests a more appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct is
ordinary disbarment. For example, in In re: Dantzler, 21-1235 (La. 11/3/21), 326
So. 3d 868, an attorney neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with clients,
failed to return client files upon request, failed to refund unearned fees, allowed his
client trust account to become overdrawn on numerous occasions, converted client
funds, practiced law while ineligible to do so, practiced law after being placed on
interim suspension, illegally sold pain pills to another person, and failed to cooperate
with the ODC in numerous investigations. We determined the attorney acted
knowingly and intentionally, causing significant actual and potential harm. We
further determined that numerous aggravating factors were present, and the sole
mitigating factor was the absence of a prior disciplinary record. Unde r these
circumstances, we imposed ordinary disbarment and ordered the attorney to make
restitution totaling $9,696 to four clients, provide another client with an accounting
and payment of any funds due, and provide two other clients with their files.
We find the misconduct in Dantzler is more egregious than respondent’s
misconduct. For example, although respondent has neglected legal matters, failed
to communicate with clients, fa iled to refund unearned fees, practiced law while
ineligible to do so, engaged in deceitful conduct, and failed to cooperate with the
ODC in i ts investigations, he did not practice law after being placed on interim
suspension or illegally sell pain pills to another person. Additionally, respondent’s
misconduct did not include mismanagement of his client trust account. In light of

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Dantzler, we conclude that the imposition of permanent disbarment for respondent’s
misconduct would be overly harsh and, therefore, unwarranted.
Accordingly, we will reject the committee’s recommended sanction and,
instead, impose ordinary disbarment, retroactive to January 8, 2020, the date of
respondent’s interim suspension. We will further order respondent to mak e full
restitution to all harmed parties, including his clients, the Cao Law firm, and the
Client Assistance Fund, for all funds and unearned fees he improperly converted to
his own use.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee,
and considering the record and the brief filed by the ODC , it is ordered that
Christopher Alexander Gross, Louisiana Bar Roll number 31754, be and he hereby
is disbarred, retroactive to January 8, 2020, the date of his interim suspension. His
name shall be stricken fr om the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in
the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. It is further order that respondent shall make
full restitution to all harmed parties, including his clients, the Cao Law firm, and the
Louisiana State Bar Association’s Client Assistance Fund, for all funds and unearned
fees he improperly converted to his own use. All costs and expenses in the matter
are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1,
with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s
judgment until paid.