In Re: Jason Bruzik

Supreme Court of Louisiana
February 07, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: JASON BRUZIK
No. 2022-B-01576
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
February 07, 2023
Suspension imposed. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., dissents and would reject the disciplinary board's recommendation.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
PDG
JDH
SJC
JBM
02/07/2023 "See News Release 006 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
22-B-1576
I
N RE: JASON BRUZIK
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
T his disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Jason Bruzik, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Underlying Facts
Respondent structured his written fee agreement as an hourly-fee arrangement
(“the fee agreement”) but routinely treated the fee agreement as a flat-fee
arrangement. Because the fee agreement was structured as an hourly -fee
arrangement, respondent was required to place client funds paid as advanced fees
into his client trust account and keep accurate records of the account for
reconciliation purposes. Nevertheless, respondent routinely deposited these
advanced fees into his operating account, using these funds for operating costs and
for the payment of attorney’s fees that were not yet earned.
Specifically regarding the advanced fee, the fee agreement stated that this fee
was non-refundable. The fee agreement also stated that work would not commence
until the entire advanced fee was paid. Notwithstanding this provision, the fee
agreement further stated that, if the client did not pay the entire advanced fee within
thirty days of signing the fee agreement, respondent had the right to cancel the fee
agreement without refunding any portion of the advanced fee already paid.
02/07/23

2

Specifically regarding the hourly rates charged, the fee agreement stated that
“secretarial services will be billed at $50 per hour.” The fee agreement also included
a provision for after hours and rush work, stating, “Any legal services perf ormed
between 5:30 p.m. and 7:30 a.m. or on weekends, holidays, or on a rush basis will
be charged at the rate of $400 per hour.”
At some point in 2013, the ODC received information about respondent’s fee
agreement during its investigation of alleged misconduct by another attorney. In
September 2013, respondent provided a response to the ODC’s inquiries regarding
the fee agreement.
In November 2013, respondent provided the ODC with a sworn statement,
during which he revealed the following:
1. Respondent set up his law firm as an LLC called Civil Law Center, LLC
(“CLC”) and hired attorneys to work for CLC as independent contractors. He
provided these attorney with free office space and use of a conference room.
He also paid their bar dues and disciplinar y assessment and maintained
malpractice insurance for them;
2. Respondent admitted that he was wrongly treating the advanced fees as flat
fees despite the language of the fee agreement, but he claimed he never
enforced any part of the fee agreement;
3. Because r espondent considered the advanced fee to be a flat fee, he
immediately paid a portion of the fee to the attorney assigned to the case and
deposited the remainder into his operating account;
4. Despite the fee agreement’s language, respondent claimed he never billed his
clients by the hour, never charged for secretarial work, and never charged any
client $400 per hour for after hours or rush work. He stated that he included
the $400 per hour fee to discourage clients from calling him on the weekends.

3

In December 2013, respondent sent letters to all of his current clients, advising
them that he had revised the fee agreement to ensure compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and inviting them to sign a revised fee agreement. Between
2014 and 2021, respo ndent provided the ODC with documentation in an effort to
prove he did not convert client funds.
The ODC’s forensic auditor, Angelina Marcellino, conducted multiple audits
of respondent’s financial records and ultimately determined in December 2021 that
respondent failed to refund a total of $3,524.50 in unearned fees as follows:
1. $468.25 to William Tholborn;
2. $737.50 to Pearline Foley;
3. $1,531.25 to Ryan Fletcher; and
4. $787.50 to Keandra Augustine.
The record reflects that respondent has not yet provided these clients with refunds.

Formal Charges
In March 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. In addition
to alleging some of the facts as set forth in the underlying facts section above, the
formal charges also alleged the following:
1. Despite claiming in his sworn statement that his clients “never ever got
actually charged $400,” respondent provided the ODC with an invoice
showing he charged his client, Michael Evans, $412.50 at the “special rate”
on March 30, 2013;
2. As part of his law practice, respondent had arrangements with several other
attorneys to whom he would refer cases. Upon receiving an advanced deposit
from a client, respondent would immediately give a portion of those funds to
one of these referral attorneys assigned to handle the client’s case. The fee
agreement provided that these funds represented an advanced deposit from

4

which respondent was to draw hourly fees, and respondent was required to
deposit these funds into his trust account. Therefore, in failing to deposit these
advanced deposits into his trust account, he immediately received a share of
the fee even though he did no work on the case. The evidence establishes that
respondent’s involvement in the individual client matters was limited to
signing the client up and referring the case to another attorney. The attorneys
to whom he referred cases were independent contractors, and the arrangement
between respondent and the independent contractors was never disclosed to
the client, in writing, as required by the Rules of Pr ofessional Conduct.
Furthermore, respondent did not render meaningful legal services to the
clients in these matters; and
3. A review of respondent’s financial records uncovered a pattern of conversion
of client funds, primarily related to his failure to dep osit advanced fees into
his trust account. Based upon the initial documentation respondent provided
to the ODC, as of June 17, 2014, respondent received a minimum of
$40,896.13 in funds attributable to advanced deposits for fees and/or costs that
he failed to deposit into his trust account. Due to respondent’s inability to
account for the time associated with all individual client matters, there were
several cases where it appeared respondent owed a refund to the client. Yet,
he could not account for those client funds. He also failed to maintain proper
documentation to account for deposits and disbursements related to those
client funds.
Based upon the entirety of the factual allegations set forth in the formal
charges, the ODC alleged that respondent violated the following provisions of the
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.5 (fee arrangements), 1.5(f)(3) (when the
client pays the lawyer an advance deposit against fees which are to accrue in the
future on an hourly or other agreed basis, the funds remain the property of the client

5

and must be placed in the lawyer’s trust account), 1.8(e) (conflict of interest), 1.15(a)
(safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation).
Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, essentially arguing that the
fee agreement was a flat -fee arrangement, in contrast to his sworn statement
testimony. Therefore, he denie d engaging in any misconduct. Accordingly, the
matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

RESPONDENT’S TESTIMONY
Respondent testified that he is not currently practicing law, with the exception
of handling speeding tickets for family and friend s. While his current consulting
work does not require him to be licensed to practice law, it does require him to be a
notary public.
Respondent indicated that the fee agreement at issue was “cobbled together”
from several other attorneys’ contracts and suggestions, and he admitted that he did
not understand what some parts of the fee agreement meant. While he acknowledged
that the fee agreement “says what it says” and was “badly written,” he claimed he
never followed or enforced the fee agreement as written. In practice, he treated the
fee agreement as a flat -fee arrangement and overworked the cases based upon the
flat fee collected. In practice, he also provided refunds despite the non-refundable
language in the fee agreement. When respondent became a ware that the ODC had
issues with the fee agreement, he revised the language to reflect a flat- fee
arrangement and requested that all of his current clients sign the revised fee
agreement.
Regarding the $412.50 charged to client Michael Evans, respondent denied
this was an attorney’s fee for rush work. Instead, he claimed the charge represented

6

the client’s need to reimburse him for the filing fee he paid to the court himself. He
acknowledged telling his clients he would charge $400 per hour if they call ed him
on weekends when he never had any intention of actually charging them said fee,
which he admitted amounted to lying to his clients. While he indicated he would
never lie to clients now, he did so then because he “really didn’t want to get called”
on weekends.
Respondent further claimed that the “Breakdown of Services to Date” letters
he sent to CLC’s clients were not bills or accountings. They were “marketing” to
show the clients, who were primarily family law clients, that CLC was working on
their cases in the hopes of encouraging them to hire CLC or refer others to CLC for
future personal injury matters. Respondent described his business model for CLC
as charging low fees for family law cases in the hopes of attracting personal injury
cases.
With respect to mitigating factors, respondent testified that there was no
personal gain for him because CLC did not charge the clients enough at the
beginning of the cases, overworked the cases, and did not request any further fee
payments from the clients. He also fully cooperated with the ODC’s investigation
and did not have much experience as a solo practitioner when the ODC brought the
issue with the fee agreement to his attention. Between the latter part of 2013, when
he answered the ODC’s notice of the initial disciplinary complaint and provided the
ODC with his sworn statement, and the ODC’s February 2017 audit report,
respondent claimed there was no communication between him and the ODC. After
he provided additional documents to the ODC in response to the audit report, he
claimed he heard nothing from the ODC until he was served with formal charges in
March 2021. Respondent also claimed he was served with the formal charges at his
job as Deputy General Counsel at the Louisiana Department of Transportation and

7

Development and was subsequently fired because he had formal charges pending
against him.

ANGELINA MARCELLINO’S TESTIMONY
Ms. Marcellino testified that she conducted her first audit of respondent’s
financial records in February 2017. Through this first audit, she determined that 52
clients were affected by the fee agreement at issue. She also determined that
respondent received a total of $130,620.95 from those clients, which funds should
have been deposited into respondent’s trust account. Of the $130,620.95, Ms.
Marcellino determined that $40,896.13 in unearned fees and/or unused costs should
be in respondent’s trust account. After receiving additional documents from
respondent, Ms. Marcellino revised her audit in March 2017 to reduce the total of
unearned fees and/or unused costs by $1,566, for a total of $39,330.13 that should
be in his trust account.
Thereafter, respondent provided the ODC with revised client ledgers or
accountings for all 52 client matters, which showed substantially different amounts
earned than respondent’s original documents showed. Ms. Marcellino had concerns
about the reliability of the new accountings because respondent created them several
years after the conclusion of the client matters. Nevertheless, she pro duced a new
audit report in November 2021 using the new accountings along with the other
documents respondent had previously produced. The November 2021 audit
ultimately revealed a total of $4,507.50 in unearned fees owed to four clients.
However, during the hearing, respondent produced additional documentation
regarding one of the clients that again reduced the amount of unearned fees. After
reviewing this additional documentation while testifying, Ms. Marcellino calculated
that respondent still owed a total of $3,524.50 to the four clients.

8

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee made factual findings consistent with the underlying facts set
forth above. The committee specifically determined that the central issue in this
matter is whether the fee agreement was an hourly -fee or a flat -fee arrangement.
Based upon the fee agreement’s language, which the committee determined was
unambiguous, the committee found the fee ag reement was an hourly -fee
arrangement. The committee then found, in a nutshell, that respondent (1)
constructed and repeatedly used an hourly fee agreement; (2) caused at least 52
clients to execute such fee agreements; (3) misrepresented to his clients t he nature
of the fee agreement and, thus, deceived each of his clients as to the nature of their
agreement and the use of their fees; (4) collected substantial advanced fees; (5) failed
to deposit the advanced fees into his trust account; (6) repeatedly tr eated the
numerous fee agreements as fixed-fee arrangements; (7) converted said advanced
fees by paying contract attorneys immediately upon receipt of client funds, prior to
the earning of such fees; (8) deposited remaining advanced fees into his law firm
operating account; (9) failed to keep complete records of client funds remitted to
him; and (10) failed to return a total of $3,524.50 in unearned fees to his clients
William Tholborn, Pearline Foley, Ryan Fletcher, and Keandra Augustine. Based
upon the above facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.5(f)(3),
1.15(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Regarding the ODC’s general allegation that respondent violated Rule 1.5, the
committee specifically focused on Rules 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee),
1.5(e)(1) (division of fees between lawyers not in the same firm), and 1.5(e)(3)
(division of fees when lawyer does not render meaningful services). Regarding the
ODC’s general allegation that respondent violated Rule 1.8(e), the committee
specifically focused on Rule 1.8(e)(3) (overhead costs of a lawyer’s practice, which

9

are those not incurred by the lawyer solely for the purposes of a particular
representation, shall not be passed on to a client).
Regarding the ODC’s allegation that respondent charged client Michael Evans
an unreasonable fee of $412.50 on March 30, 2013, the committee noted that
respondent testified the charge was for a filing fee. The committee also noted that,
in a breakdown of services sent to Mr. Evans on June 17, 2014, the $412.50 charge
was for three telephone calls lasting a total of 1.5 hours and a special rate was
applied. The committee found that, had respondent actually charged $400 per hour
for these telephone calls, the charge would have been $600. Furthermore, the ODC’s
February 17, 2017 audit report showed respondent performed total services for Mr.
Evans that exceeded the fees Mr. Evans paid by $2,350. Based on these facts, the
committee determined there is not clear and convinc ing evidence that respondent
charged Mr. Evans an unreasonable fee in violation of Rule 1.5(a).
Regarding the ODC’s allegation that respondent shared fees with other
attorneys outside of his firm without disclosing the fee arrangement to clients, the
committee found respondent and the other attorneys were in the same firm even
though the other attorneys were independent contractors and not respondent’s
employees. The committee further found the fee agreement did, in fact, disclose to
the client that respo ndent would hire other attorneys to work on the client’s case.
Based on these facts, the committee determine respondent did not violate Rule
1.5(e)(1) or Rule 1.5(e)(3).
Regarding the ODC’s allegation that respondent included a provision in the
fee agree ment that secretarial services would be charged at $50 per hour, the
committee found no evidence to prove respondent ever actually levied and collected
this fee. Based on this fact, the committee determined respondent did not violate
Rule 1.8(e)(3).

10

The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients,
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. He acted knowingly and
intentionally, and he caused actual harm to his clients. Based upon the ABA’s
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline
sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern
of misconduct, and indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, the committee
found the abs ence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the
disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience
in the practice of law (admitted 2006), and a delay in the disciplinary proceedings.1
After further con sidering this court’s prior case law addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period
of supervised probation with the following conditions:
1. Respondent shall make restitution to William Tholborn, Pearline Foley, Ryan
Fletcher, and Keandra Augustine in the total amount of $3,524.50;
2. During the first year of the probationary period, respondent shall attend the
Louisiana State Bar Ass ociation’s Trust Accounting School and attend
training on office management procedures; and
3. If respondent maintains a client trust account, he shall have the account
audited quarterly and report the results to the ODC.

1 The ODC claims the delay in the disciplinary proceedings was largely attributable to respondent’s
continuous production of hundreds of pages of documents that the ODC had to review, noting that
respondent was still producing new documents weeks before the December 2021 formal hearing.
However, the committee notes:
The delay has not been exclusively attributable to Respondent . During the delay,
ODC has made multiple requests for information, ODC has taken time to carefully
examine such record productions and make forensic auditing determinations,
Respondent has supplied additional information thus causing more delay and
revisions, and, at the suggestion of the ODC, both parties have engaged in efforts
to correct the Retainer Agreement and re- contact 52 cli ents for the execution of
new contracts.

11

Both respondent and the ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report.
Respondent argued that the recommended sanction is too harsh. The ODC argued
the recommended sanction is too lenient.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s
factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same. Based on those
facts, the board determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
as follows:
Rule 1.5(a) – The board determined respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) by
including a provision in the fee agreement charging $400 per hour for after hours
and rush work, regardless of whether or not the client was actually charged this fee.
Likewise, the board determined respondent violated this rule by including a
provision charging $50 per hour for secretarial work.
Rules 1.5(e)(1) & 1.5(e)(3) – T
he board agreed with the committee that the
ODC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a violation of these rules
based upon the fact that respondent and his independently contracted attorneys were
in the same firm.
Rule 1.5(f)(3) – T
he board determined the explicit language of the fee
agreement describes an hourly fee arrangement. Therefore, respondent was required
to deposit any advanced fees collected into his client trust account, which he did not
do. Accordingly, the board determined respondent violated Rule 1.5(f)(3).
Rule 1.8(e)(3) – T
he board determined that respondent attempted to, but did
not actually, violate Rule 1.8(e)(3) by including provisions in the fee agreement
charging for secretarial work and charging a higher than standard rate for after hours
and rush work. Nevertheless, respondent’s attempt to violate this rule was a
violation of Rule 8.4(a).

12

Rule 1.15(a) – The board determined respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) by
depositing client funds into his operating account instead of his trust account,
thereby commingling client funds with his own. Furthermore, the board noted that
respondent still owes a total of $3,524.50 in unearned fees to four clients.
Rule 8.4(c) – T he board determined respondent misrepresented the nature of
the fee agreement to his clients by structurin g it as an hourly fee arrangement and
then treating it as a flat-fee arrangement. Consequently, he failed to keep accurate
records of his clients’ funds and is unable to account for $3,524.50 in unearned fees
owed to four clients. Therefore, the board determined respondent violated Rule
8.4(c).
Rule 8.4(a) – T
he board determined respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) by
violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct as discussed
above.
The board then determined respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his
clients by depositing advanced fees into his operating account rather than his client
trust account and then failing to refund unearned fees to four clients. Based upon
the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the board determined the
baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of
misconduct, and “no restitution provided to date.” In mitigation, the board found
the absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary
board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice
of law, and a delay in the disciplinary proceedings.
After further considering this court’s prior case law addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year, fully deferred, subject to a one-year period of supervised probation
with the conditions recommended by the committee.

13

Although neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the board’s
recommendation, we issued an order directing the parties to submit written briefs
addressing whether the sanction recommended by the board is appropriate. Both
respondent and the ODC submitted briefs in response to the court’s order.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record of this matter supports a finding that respondent structured his
written fee agreement as an hourly-fee arrangement and then routinely treated it as
a flat -fee arrangement, included provisions in the fee agreement charging
unreasonable and improper fees, included provisions in the fee agreement making
the advanced fee non -refundable, failed to deposit clients’ advanced funds into a
trust account, and failed to refund unearned fees totaling $3,524.50 to four clients.
Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as
found by the disciplinary board.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to mainta in
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,

14

and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
The record further supports a finding that respondent knowingly violated a
duty owed to his clients, causing at least four of them actual harm. We agree with
the hearing committee and the board that the baseline sanction is suspension.
Aggravating factors include a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of
misconduct, and indiff erence to making restitution (although respondent has
expressed an intention to make restitution to the four clients to whom he owes
refunds, he has failed to do so). Mitigating factors include the absence of a prior
disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or a cooperative
attitude toward the proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law, and a delay in
the disciplinary proceedings.
We considered somewhat similar misconduct in the case of In re: Webre, 17-
1861 (La. 1/12/18), 318 So. 3d 667. In Webre , an attorney was hired to defend a
client against a personal injury claim. The client paid the attorney a $2,000 advanced
fee towards an hourly rate of $150. Instead of depositing the advanced fee into his
client trust account, the attorney deposited the funds into his personal account. The
attorney then neglected the client’s legal matter, and when the client terminated the
representation and requested a refund, the attorney waited four months before
refunding $1,728 in unearned fees to the client. The ODC’s subsequent review of
the attorney’s trust account also revealed several debit card and/or ATM withdrawals
from the account. After determining that the attorney’s misconduct was negligent
and caused potential and actual harm, we suspended the attorney from the practice

15

of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to one year of supervised
probation with conditions.
While Webre involves additional misconduct not found here, we find
respondent’s failure to deposit into his trust account the advanced fees he collected
based on hourly fee agreements is much more egregious than Mr. Webre’s
considering respondent’s misconduct affected more than fifty clients. Furthermore,
respondent’s continued failure to refund unearned fees to four clients is much more
egregious than Mr. Webre’s four-month delay in refunding his client’s unearned fee.
Therefore, we find a more lenient sanction than was imposed in Webre, as has been
recommended by the board, is unwarranted here.
Accordingly, we will reject the board’s recommended sanction and suspend
respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject
to a two -year period of probation with the conditions recommended by the
committee.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record and briefs filed by the parties, it
is ordered that Jason Bruzik, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30418, be and he hereby is
suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. This suspension shall
be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a two-
year period of probation governed by the conditions recommended by the hearing
committee. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and
the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with
the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may
be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional
discipline, as appropriate.

16

All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence
thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.