In Re: Carl Joseph Rachal

Supreme Court of Louisiana
February 14, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: CARL JOSEPH RACHAL
No. 2022-B-01636
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
February 14, 2023
Suspension imposed. See per curiam.
Genovese, J., dissents and would reject the disciplinary board's recommendation.
JBM
JLW
JDH
SJC
WJC
PDG
02/14/2023 "See News Release 007 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 202
2-B-1636
I
N RE: CARL JOSEPH RACHAL
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Carl Joseph Rachel, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
By way of background, in August 2016, Donna Turner underwent a hair
transplant procedure performed by Dr. Frank Campisi at Bosley Medical Institute,
Inc. (“Bosley”). Following the procedure, Ms. Turner developed an open wound on
the back of her head.
Dissatisfied with the results of the procedure, in September 2016, Ms. Turner
hired respondent to represent her with respect to a medical malpractice claim against
Dr. Campisi and Bosley. On July 27, 2017, respondent fax -filed a petition for
damages against Dr. Campisi and Bosley on Ms. Turner’s behalf. He then physically
filed the petition into the court record on August 1, 2017.
Thereafter, respondent failed to conduct any discovery. On August 23, 2018,
Dr. Campisi and Bosley filed a motion for summary judgment. In an October 3,
2018 email to respondent, Ms. Turner asked him about the status of the motion,
indicating he had informed her of same. Ultimately, though, respondent failed to
file an opposition to the motion and failed to attend the October 9, 2018 hearing on
the motion. As a result of respondent’s failures, on October 18, 2018, the judge
02/14/23

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signed a judgment granting the motion and dismissing Ms. Turner’s lawsuit with
prejudice.
On December 18, 2018, respondent filed a motion and order to appeal the
judgment. In April 2019, respondent filed his appellate brief. He then attended oral
argument, which was scheduled for September 11, 2019. On October 16, 2019, the
court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of Ms. Turner’s lawsuit.
Meanwhile, on February 21, 2019, respondent met with Ms. Turner for the
first time since the motion for summary judgment was granted. Although respondent
indicated he discussed with Ms. Turner the granting of the motion, he admitted that
he did not tell her why the motion had been granted and did not disclose his failures
to her either prior to this meeting or during the meeting.
On March 7, 2019, Ms. Turner sent respondent a n email, in which she
requested a copy of her file. Respondent mailed Ms. Turner a copy of the file
sometime between April 8, 2019 and April 12, 2019.
On March 30, 2019, the ODC received a disciplinary complaint against
respondent from Ms. Turner. In her complaint, Ms. Turner alleged that respondent
did not inform her of the appeal he had filed until their meeting on February 21,
2019, at which time he did not explain why the appeal was necessary. She also
alleged that, during the representation, he ignored her repeated requests for a status
update and missed three scheduled appointments with her.
The ODC received a supplemental complaint from Ms. Turner on April 17,
2019. In the supplement, Ms. Turner indicated that she had received a copy of her
file from respondent on April 15, 2019. In reading over the file materials, Ms. Turner
learned for the first time that respondent did not appear at the hearing on the motion
for summary judgment.
On April 25, 2019, the ODC received respondent’s response to Ms. Turner’s
complaint. In his response, respondent admitted that he failed to show up for one

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scheduled meeting with Ms. Turner. He also claimed that, during the February 21,
2019 meeting, he informed Ms. Turner of the granting of the motion for summary
judgment and his appeal of same.
Although respondent answered the complaint, the ODC took his sworn
statement on July 15, 2019. During the sworn statement, respondent provided the
following relevant testimony:
1. With respect to his failure to perform discove ry, respondent stated, “I guess,
in retrospect, I can’t tell you a reason why or not.”
2. Regarding his failure to file an opposition to the motion for summary
judgment or appear for the hearing, respondent stated, “[I]t was an error in
scheduling… I got ser ved with the motion at my home… I don’t know what
happened at that time as to why that was missed… I didn’t calendar the
deadlines, nor did I calendar the hearing date.”
3. Regarding the alleged missed appointments with Ms. Turner, respondent
again admitted missing only one meeting, stating, “There was one that I
missed that I had scheduled… I just missed the meeting.” He also admitted
canceling one meeting shortly before it was scheduled to take place.
4. Respondent admitted that, as of the date of the sworn statement, he had not
yet informed Ms. Turner of the reason why the motion for summary judgment
was granted and had not yet disclosed to her his failures regarding the motion.
On July 23, 2019, respondent finally sent Ms. Turner a letter, in which he
disclosed that he had failed to file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment
and had failed to attend the hearing on the motion. In the letter, respondent also
informed Ms. Turner of the potential malpractice claim she had against him,
provided her with the contact information for his malpractice insurer, and advised
her to consult another attorney regarding the malpractice claim.

4

Ms. Turner subsequently filed a malpractice lawsuit against respondent. On
September 28, 2020, Ms. Turner and respondent’s malpractice insurer settled the
lawsuit.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In February 2020, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent alleging
that his conduct violated Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client), 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), and
8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent filed an
answer to the formal charges, denying that he violate d the Rules of Professional
Conduct and requesting that the charges be dismissed. Accordingly, the matter
proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee made the following factual findings:
1. Respondent represented Ms. Turner under a contingency fee agreement in
connection with a personal injury lawsuit involving allegations of medical
malpractice;
2. During the representation, respondent fail ed to communicate to Ms. Turner
that the defendants had filed a motion for summary judgment on August 23,
2018;
3. Respondent failed to file any pleadings in response to the motion for summary
judgment;
4. Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment on October 9, 2018;

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5. Because respondent failed to oppose the motion for summary judgment and
failed to appear at the hearing, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed
Ms. Turner’s lawsuit;
6. During the representation, respondent appealed the judgment of the trial court,
and oral argument on the appeal was set for September 11, 2019;
7. During the representation, respondent met with Ms. Turner on February 21,
2019 to discuss, among other things, the pending appeal;
8. During the February 21, 2019 meeting to discuss the pending appeal,
respondent failed to disclose to Ms. Turner that her lawsuit was dismissed on
summary judgment because he failed to oppose the motion and failed to
appear at the hearing;
9. Ms. Turner first learned of responde nt’s failure to oppose the motion for
summary judgment when she received a copy of her file from him during the
disciplinary process;
10. July 23, 2019 was the first time respondent disclosed to Ms. Turner that he
had failed to oppose the motion for summary judgment;
11. July 23, 2019 was the first time respondent acknowledged his failure to
disclose to Ms. Turner that he had not opposed the motion for summary
judgment;
12. July 23, 2019 was the first time respondent acknowledged he should have
disclosed his failure to oppose the motion for summary judgment earlier;
13. On appeal, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting
the motion for summary judgment; and
14. Between the time of the dismissal of Ms. Turner’s lawsuit via summary
judgment and respondent’s first disclosure to her of his failure to oppose the
motion for summary judgment on July 23, 2019, he repeatedly and
intentionally failed to inform her that the reason for the dismissal was his

6

failures to oppose the motion and appear at the hearing. Respondent also
failed, without excuse, to appear for at least one scheduled meeting with Ms.
Turner. After he received Ms. Turner’s disciplinary complaint, he spoke to
her via telephone on more than one occasion but still did not disclose his
failures with respect to the motion for summary judgment, testifying that the
disciplinary complaint did not address these failures. The committee found
this explanation not credible and unreasonable because respondent did not
explain how Ms. Turner’s disciplinar y complaint could have included
mention of his failures when she did not have any knowledge of them when
she filed the complaint. Respondent used the same justification to explain
why he did not inform Ms. Turner of his failures prior to her disciplinary
complaint against him, which the committee likewise found not credible
because respondent admitted he had a duty to disclose his failures to Ms.
Turner. Therefore, respondent clearly, repeatedly, and intentionally decided
not to fulfill his duty to disclose his failures during numerous communications
with Ms. Turner. His further justification that he would have disclosed his
failures only if Ms. Turner specifically asked or complained indicated an
adversarial relationship with her instead of a fiduciary one.
Based on these factual findings, the committee determined respondent
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. Specifically, the committee
determined respondent violated Rule 1.3 by negligently failing to file an opposition
to the motion for summary judgment and appear at the hearing. The committee
determined respondent violated Rule 1.4 by knowingly failing to promptly notify
Ms. Turner of the granting of the motion for summary judgment. He also violated
Rule 1.4 by intentionally failing to promptly disclose to Ms. Turner his failures with
respect to the motion for summary judgment. Finally, the committee determined
respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) by repeatedly engaging in communications with Ms.

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Turner about her case while intentionally withholding critical information from her
about his own professional negligence.
The committee then determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed
to Ms. Turner as his client. His conduct caused Ms. Turner actual harm, in that she
was deprived of the opportunity to confront her alleged tortfeasor. The committee
specifically disagreed with respondent’s argument that Ms. Turner’s settlement with
his malpractice insurer has made her whole because no evidence exists to show the
settlement amount equates to the amount Ms. Turner could have received had
respondent not failed to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore,
the real harm to Ms. Turner of not being able to confront her surgeon was not and
could not have been addressed by the settlement. After considering the ABA’s
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the baseline
sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found a dishonest or selfish motive, substantial
experience in the practice of law (admitted 1996), and “his lack of candor during the
disciplinary process when he represented to the ODC that he had done his best to be
truthful with his client during the handling of her case.” In mitigation, the committee
found the absence of a prior disciplinary record and remorse. The committee also
considered the deaths of respondent’s mother -in-law and father at the time of the
misconduct but ultimately determined there was no evidence presented as to how
those events directly affected his performance of his duties in Ms. Turner’s case.
After further considering this court’s prior case law addressing similar
misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for sixty days.
Respondent filed an objection to the committee’s report and recommendation.

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Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board adopted the hearing committee’s factual
findings, with two exceptions. First, the board determined the record does not
support the committee’s finding no. 2, in which it concluded that respondent had
failed to notify Ms. Turner of the filing of the motion for summary judgment.
Instead, the board found that respondent did, in fact, inform Ms. Turner of the filing
of the motion prior to the heari ng date because she referenced said motion in her
October 3, 2018 email to respondent. Second, the board determined the record does
not support the committee’s finding no. 11, in which it found respondent did not
acknowledge his failure to inform Ms. Turner that he did not oppose the motion for
summary judgment until July 23, 2019. Instead, the board found that respondent, in
fact, acknowledged this failure during his sworn statement, which took place several
days earlier on July 15, 2019.
Based on these facts, the board determined respondent violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as charged. Specifically, the board found that respondent
violated Rule 1.3 by failing to file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment
and failing to appear at the hearing. The board also determined respondent violated
Rules 1.4 and 8.4(c) by failing to inform Ms. Turner that the motion for summary
judgment was granted because of these failures. The board also noted that, in his
pre-argument brief, respondent admitted to violating these three rules.
The board then determined respondent negligently and knowingly violated
duties owed to his client. Regarding the harm caused by respondent’s misconduct,
the board stated,
Respondent’s negligence in failing to oppose t he motion
resulted in the underlying lawsuit being dismissed, which
caused worry to his client over the dismissal of the case,
caused the loss of his client’s cause of action directly
against the defendants in the underlying lawsuit, and
caused delay in he r pursuit of compensation for the
damages caused by those defendants, which she then had

9

to seek from Respondent and his insurer in the legal
malpractice lawsuit. However, in the legal malpractice
action, the client was still able to pursue from Respondent
and his insurer compensation for the same damages caused
by the original defendants in the underlying lawsuit, and
the client ultimately received a settlement in the
malpractice lawsuit.

***

The only harm caused by Respondent’s knowing
prolonged delay in revealing to his client his negligence in
failing to oppose the motion for summary judgment was a
delay in his client’s ability to make a fully informed
decision as to how to proceed in light of the dismissal of
her underlying case by summary judgment.

The board agreed with the committee that the baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, multiple
offenses, submission of a false statement during the disciplinary process (respondent
stated that he had “done [his] best to be truthful with Ms. Turner during the handling
of her case”), and substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, the
board found the absence of a prior disciplinary record, personal or emotional
problems (only as to re spondent’s failures to oppose the motion for summary
judgment and appear at the hearing), and remorse.
After further considering this court’s prior case law addressing similar
misconduct, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for sixty days, fully deferred, subject to the condition that any misconduct by
respondent during the deferral period may be grounds for making the deferred
suspension executory or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s
recommendation.

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DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The record of this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected Ms.
Turner’s legal matter, which resulted in the dismissal of her lawsuit. He then failed
to promptly communicate to Ms. Turner that his malpractice caused the dismissal.
Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as
alleged in the formal charges.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent negligently and knowingly violated duties owed to his client,
causing her actual harm. We agree with the hearing committee and the disciplinary

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board that the baseline sanction is suspension. We also agree with the board with
respect to the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find that a short period of
suspension, fully deferred, as recommended by the board, is appropriate for
respondent’s misconduct. Respondent’s lack of diligence with respect to the motion
for summary judgment was negligent and occurred at a time of personal hardships
in his life. Had respondent notified Ms. Turner of his negligence and referred her to
his malpractice insurer immediately, then this matter would arguably not be before
us. Instead, for approximately nine months, respondent knowingly kept Ms. Turner
in the dark about his failures to oppose the motion for summary judgment and to
attend the hearing. We find this ongoing deception, even while facing a disciplinary
complaint by Ms. Turner, is the heartland of respondent’s misconduct and warrants
discipline.
We considered similar misconduct in two recent cases, In re: Claiborne, 22-
0492 (La. 10/21/22), ___ So. 3d ___, and In re: Charles, 21-1853 (La. 5/13/22), 340
So. 3d 901. In Claiborne, an attorney neglected a legal matter, resulting in the
dismissal of a client’s lawsuit due to abandonment, failed to communicate with the
client and opposing counsel, failed to advise the client of the potential malpractice
claim against him, and knowingly made a false statement of fact when responding
to the client’s disciplinary complaint. For this negligent and knowing misconduct,
we suspended the attorney from the practice of law for six months, with all but thirty
days deferred. In Charles , an attorney failed to file her state income tax return,
which resulted in her disqualification as a judicial candidate, neglected a client’s
legal matter, and then misled the client regarding the status of the client’s case. For
this negligent and knowing misconduct, we suspended the attorney from the practice
of law for nine months, with six months deferred, followed by a two-year period of
probation with conditions. Arguably, respondent’s misconduct is not as egregious

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as the misconduct in either Claiborne or Charles. Unlike in Claiborne, respondent
eventually informed his client of his malpractice and advised her to seek independent
counsel to pursue a claim against him, which she was able to do. Unlike in Charles,
respondent did not engage in the additional misconduct of failing to file his state
income tax return. Under these circumstances, we conclude a fully deferred
suspension, as recommended by the board, is reasonable in this matter.
Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend
respondent from the practice of law for sixty days, fully deferred, subject to the
condition that any misconduct by respondent during the deferral period may be
grounds for making the deferred suspension executory or imposing additional
discipline, as appropriate.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Carl Joseph
Rachal, Louisiana Bar Roll number 24731, be and he hereby is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six ty days. This suspension shall be deferred in its
entirety, with the condition that any misconduct during the deferral period may be
grounds for making the deferred suspension executory or imposing additional
discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against
respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest
to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.