In Re: W. Glenn Soileau

Supreme Court of Louisiana
March 07, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: W. GLENN SOILEAU
No. 2022-B-01764
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Office of Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and
Recommendations (Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
March 07, 2023
Permanent disbarment imposed. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Hughes, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
PDG
SJC
JTG
WJC
JBM
03/07/2023 "See News Release 012 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

03/07/2023
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 2022-B-1764

IN RE: W. GLENN SOILEAU

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, W. Glenn Soileau, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently on interim suspension for threat
of harm to the public. In re: Soileau, 18-0394 (La. 3/23/18), 238 So. 3d 972.

PRIOR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of
law in Louisiana in 1972. He received a formal private reprimand (with notice) in
1985.
In 1987, while serving as a judge of the Breaux Bridge City Court, respondent
was charged with the following judicial misconduct: (1) during the 1986 Breaux
Bridge Crawfish Festival, respondent committed a battery upon a law enforcement
official and directed verbal abuse and obscenities towards numerous individuals at
the Crawfish Festival Headquarters and grounds, including stating that he “owned
the goddam town,” resulting in his plea of no contest to simple battery and disturbing
the peace; (2) engaging in an altercation during a game of pool at a bar in Breaux
Bridge which necessitated the response of police, during which respondent informed
the police officer that he had no authority to i ntervene because respondent “ran the
town.” Subsequent to the incident, the victim pressed charges of simple battery

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against respondent before a St. Martinville justice of the peace, resulting in
respondent’s arrest. After being released on a personal re cognizance bond,
respondent then pressed charges of simple battery against the victim in his own court
and fixed bond at $1,000. (3) in his capacity as judge of the Breaux Bridge City
Court, respondent issued an arrest warrant for an individual whom he was opposing
in civil litigation for criminal charges instituted by his client in the civil litigation;
and (4) respondent filed a suit on open account in his own court in an attempt to
collect attorney’s fees due him for legal services rendered. For this misconduct, the
court suspended respondent from judicial office for six months without pay. In re:
Soileau, 502 So. 2d 1083 (La. 1987).
In 1997, respondent pleaded guilty in federal court to three Class B
misdemeanor hunting violations under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §
703. Respondent was sentenced to serve six months in prison, followed by a five -
year probationary period with conditions, the maximum penalty for a Class B
misdemeanor. In imposing the sentence, the federal judge considered, among other
things, the severity of the charges and respondent’s four prior convictions of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act. She also concluded that respondent had intentionally
attempted to mislead the court concerning the relevant facts of the prior convictions.
Respondent served six and a half months on interim suspension based on his criminal
conviction. On June 18, 1999, this court suspended respondent from the practice of
law for two years, with one year deferred, and with credit for the period of his interim
suspension, for his criminal conviction and his misrepresentations to the federal
court. Following the active portion of his suspension, the court ordered that
respondent be placed on supervised probation for two years, with the special
condition that he enroll in the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. In re:
Soileau, 99-0441 (La. 6/18/99), 737 So. 2d 23.

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In 2013, respondent was admonished by the disciplinary board for a violation
of Rule 1.16(d) (declining or terminating representation) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the instant proceeding.

FORMAL CHARGES
Count I
On August 7, 2017, respondent was arrested in Lafayette and charged with
DWI following a traffic accident. 1 According to the police report, respondent’s
speech was slurred and he was physically unsteady. He was placed under arrest for
suspicion of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating substance and
taken to the police department, where his name was entered into the NCIC computer.
This search revealed that respondent had previously been arrested for DWI on
February 28, 2013 and August 1, 2015.
2 After his arrest in the instant matter,
respondent refused to provide a br eath sample; however, he did agree to submit a
urine sample, which was positive for alprazolam, amphetamine, methamphetamine,
and Tramadol.
Respondent was booked on charges of DWI third offense. The criminal
charge was ultimately resolved via a pre-trial diversion program.

Count II
On December 28, 2017, the Louisiana State Police and members of the
Lafayette Metro Narcotics Task Force made contact with Idalia Hotz, whom they

1 Respondent disregarded a red light and was struck by another vehicle.
2 The ODC did not learn of the 2013 and 2015 DWI arrests until 2017. The charges were
apparently dismissed.

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had reason to believe was distributing crystal methamphetamine from a room at the
Staybridge Suites hotel in Lafayette. While Ms. Hotz was detained in the room,
agents noticed that she received a text message on her cell phone alerting her to the
presence of police cars in the hotel parking lot. A follow-up text directed Ms. Hotz
to “Get rid of whatever you have and hurry.” The messages were sent by a contact
named “Glenn,” whom Ms. Hotz identified to agents as respondent. A short time
later, respondent appeared at the hotel and introduced himself to agents as Ms.
Hotz’s attorney. Respondent said that he paid for the room and requested that the
agents vacate the premises. Respondent was advised by the agents of the criminal
investigation underway. Respondent then left the hotel.
Meanwhile, a judge signed a search warra nt for the hotel room, which was
then executed by agents. During the search, agents found nine grams of crystal
methamphetamine and a glass smoking pipe. After Ms. Hotz was placed under
arrest, she advised the agents that respondent often pays for rooms in different hotels
and provides her with meals while she conducts prostitution activities in the various
hotel rooms. Agents seized Ms. Hotz’s cell phone for further investigation, and text
messages found on the phone confirmed that respondent was knowin gly financing
Ms. Hotz’s illegal activities. The messages further established that respondent is
also a paying client of Ms. Hotz’s.
On March 1, 2018, a warrant was issued for respondent’s arrest on charges of
pandering, a felony, in violation of La. R.S . 14:84(A); letting premises for
prostitution, a misdemeanor, in violation of La. R.S. 14:85(A); prostitution, a
misdemeanor, in violation of La. R.S. 14:82(A); and obstruction of justice, a felony,
in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1)(a). Respondent was arrested pursuant to the
warrant on March 2, 2018. He ultimately pleaded no contest to an amended
misdemeanor charge of interfering with a law enforcement investigation; the
remaining charges were dismissed.

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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In May 2022, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct: Rules 1.2(d) (a lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent), 8.4(a)
(violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in c onduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation).
Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual
allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and
convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal
hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing
committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions.
Respondent filed nothing for the committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing
committee determined that the factual allegations set forth in the formal charges are
proven by clear and convincing evidence . Based on those facts, the committee
determined respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to the public,
the legal system, and the legal profession. He acted intentionally, causing actual
harm to the public and the reputation of the legal profession. Citing the ABA’s
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the baseline
sanction is disbarment.

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The committee found the following aggravating factors present: a prior
disciplinary record, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the
disciplinary agenc y, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct,
substantial experience in the prac tice of law, and illegal conduct . The committee
determined that no mitigating factors are present.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee found that
respondent’s misconduct is so egregious that it warrants permanent disbarment
under Guideline 2 (intentional corruption of the judicial process) of the permanent
disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix D.
Respondent financially supported a criminal enterprise and interfered with the police
investigation of that enterprise. Similarly, in In re: Lynch , 02-2275 (La. 1/24/03),
840 So. 2d 508, the respondent was permanently disbarred for engaging in a scheme
to prevent law enforcement from inves tigating a child pornography ring, which
included altering the scene of the crime, interfering with the victims, and counseling
a witness to testify falsely before a grand jury. Given the deemed admitted facts and
the aggravating factors present in this case, the committee concluded that respondent
is ethically and morally unfit for the practice of law and that there is no reasonable
expectation of significant rehabilitation in his character in the future. Accordingly,
the committee recommended respondent be permanently disbarred.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s
report. Therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G), the disciplinary
board submitted the committee’s report to the court for review.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an

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independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57.
In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual
allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations
contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted.
However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow
from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a
violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts,
additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions
that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan , 01 -3058 (La.
1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715.
The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent
counseled a client to engage in criminal conduct, committed criminal acts, and
engaged in dishonest conduct . This conduct violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct as charged.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).

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Respondent intentionally violated duties owed to his client, the public, the
legal system, and the legal profession. He caused actual harm to his client and the
public, and he damaged the reputation of the legal profession. We agree with the
hearing committee that the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment. We also
agree with the committee’s determination of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee has
recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred. On May 4, 2022, we
adopted amendments to Supreme Court Rule XIX related to permanent disbarment.
As is set forth in our order, permanent disbarment may be imposed only “upon an
express finding of the presence of the following factors: (1) the lawyer’s conduct is
so egregious as to demonstrate a convincing lack of ethical and moral fitness to
practice law; and (2) there is no reasonable expectation of significant rehabilitation
in the lawyer’s character in the future.” The committee found that both of these
criteria are satisfied. We agree.
Respondent’s misconduct was undoubtedly egregious. By interfering with a
police investigation and counseling a client to destroy evidence , respondent has
demonstrated a convincing lack of ethical and moral fitness to practice law.
Furthermore, respondent’s long prior disciplinary history, both as an attorney and a
judge, demonstrates that there is no reasonable expectation of significant
rehabilitation in his character in the future.
Based on this reasoning, we will adopt the committee’s recommendation and
permanently disbar respondent.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendation of the hearing committee ,
and considering the record, it is ordered that W. Glenn Soileau, Louisiana Bar Roll
number 12249, be and he hereby is permanently disbarred. His name shall be

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stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of
Louisiana shall be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is
further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to
the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed
against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal
interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment
until paid.