In Re: William A. Roe

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #023
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 5th day of May, 2023 are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2022-B-01803 IN RE: WILLIAM A. ROE
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 202
2-B-1803
I
N RE: WILLIAM A. ROE
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, William A. Roe, an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Before we address the current charges, we find it helpful to review
respondent’s prior disciplinary history. Respondent was admitted to the practice of
law in Louisiana in 1980.
In 1990, respondent was elected as a judge of the 25 th Judicial District Court
for the Parish of Plaquemines. In 2006, we imposed judicial discipline of a public
censure upon respondent for giving a newspaper interview about a pending case and
for publicly criticizing one of the attorneys involved in the case. In re: Roe, 06-1243
(La. 6/23/06), 931 So. 2d 1076.
On July 11, 2008, a grand jury indicted respondent on three counts of felony
theft and three counts of malfeasance in office, all arising out of allegations that he
had “double-dipped” on expense reimbursements relating to the 2005, 2006, and
2007 Summer Sc hool for Judges in San Destin, Florida. On July 31, 2008, we
disqualified respondent from exercising any judicial function, pending subsequent
proceedings before the Judiciary Commission. In re: Roe , 08-1641 (La. 7/31/08),
987 So. 2d 250. No proceedings occurred in the Commission before respondent’s

2

term of judicial office ended on December 31, 2008, and thus jurisdiction of the
matter passed to the ODC under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 6.
Following a bench trial in September 2009, respondent was convicted of three
misdemeanor counts of unauthorized use of a movable valued under $1,000. On
October 14, 2009, we placed respondent on interim suspension based upon his
conviction of a serious crime. In re: Roe , 09-2117 (La. 10/14/09), 22 So . 3d 867.
On January 6, 2010, respondent was sentenced to serve six months in jail with three
months suspended, followed by eighteen months of active probation. He was also
fined $1,500 and ordered to perform 240 hours of community service.
On January 22, 2010, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent arising
out of his conviction. The disciplinary proceedings were then stayed pending the
finality of the conviction. On November 10, 2010, the court of appeal affirmed
respondent’s conviction and sentence in an unpub lished opinion . We denied
respondent’s writ application on November 14, 2011. State v. Roe , 10-2731 (La.
11/14/11), 75 So. 3d 935. On March 2, 2012, respondent consented to the imposition
of disbarment, retroactive to the effective date of his interim suspension. In re: Roe,
12-0264 (La. 3/2/12), 82 So. 3d 266.
On August 24, 2016, respondent filed a petition seeking readmission to the
practice of law. The ODC took no position on respondent’s readmission. Following
a hearing in the matter , the hearing committee recommended that readmission be
denied. Respondent objected to this recommendation, and the matter was reviewed
by the disciplinary board. The board recommended that r espondent be readmitted
to the practice of law. On December 15 , 2017, we accepted the board’s
recommendation and readmitted respondent to the practice of law in Louisiana. In
re: Roe, 17-1862 (La. 12/15/17), 231 So. 3d 604.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the instant proceeding.

3

UNDERLYING FACTS
In October 2019, Anna Stevenson Dobard (“Anna”) consulted respondent
because she was concerned that her elderly widowed mother, Mrs. Mattie Stevenson,
could no longer care for herself. Furthermore, according to Anna, two of her sisters,
Dorothy Stevenson Exler (“Dorothy”) and Stephanie Stevenson (“Stephanie”), had
gained access to their mother’s bank accounts and had expended her funds in ways
that were inconsistent with her best interests. Respondent agreed to accept Anna’s
representation on a pro bono basis.
After reviewing the matter, respondent decided to seek the interdiction of Mrs.
Stevenson and file for injunctive relief against Dorothy and Stephanie. In
connection with that effort, respondent drafted affidavits that were to be executed by
Mack Stevenson, Jr. (“Mack”), Lois Stevenson (“Lois”), and Richard Stevenson
(“Richard”), three of Anna’s other siblings. Respondent had never met these
siblings, and he did not interview them before he drafted the affidavits. Instead, the
content of the affidavits was based solely upon the information Anna had provided
to respondent.
1
Respondent then gave the affidavits to Anna, ostensibly so that she could take
them to Mack, Lois, and Richard to see if they agreed with the content of the
affidavits. Respondent purportedly intended that if the siblings agreed with the
content, they would execute the affidavits in the presence of a notary. However,
Anna returned the affidavits to respondent allegedly signed by Mack, Lois, an d
Richard but not notarized.

1 The affidavits stated that (1) Mrs. Stevenson was incapable of providing for her own care; (2)
Mrs. Stevenson had begun to exhibit dementia; (3) Dorothy and Stephanie had appeared at their
mother’s residence and demanded that she turn over funds to them, causing Mrs. Stevenson great
distress and anguish; and (4) immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage would result to
Mrs. Stevenson’s person and property before she or her appointed attorney could be heard.

4

Although the affidavits were not executed in respondent’s presence, he
nonetheless notarized the signatures of Mack, Lois, and Richard. He then attached
the three affidavits to a “Petition for Interdiction and Injunctive Rel ief” which he
filed with the court on October 10, 2019. Interdiction of Mattie Mason Stevenson ,
No. 65-606 on the docket of the 25 th JDC for the Parish of Plaquemines, Division
“A,” Judge Kevin D. Conner presiding. Paragraph XIX of the petition filed by
respondent specifically referenced the three affidavits, stating:
As evidenced by the attached affidavits, other adult
children of the proposed interdict concur with these
interdiction proceedings and the appointment of Anna
Stevenson Dobard as the curator for the proposed interdict,
including the other two adult children with whom the
proposed interdict resides.

In July 2020, Judge Conner conducted a hearing in the matter. During the
hearing, Stephanie (who was not then represented by counsel) attempted to question
Dorothy about whether the affidavits had been executed in respondent’s presence.
Respondent objected to Stephanie’s questions on hearsay grounds, and Judge
Conner sustained the objections. Respondent never informed Judge Conner that he
had not properly notarized the affidavits or that he had drafted the affidavits without
the input of the affiants. Moreover, Dorothy testified that the affidavit purportedly
signed by Mack could not have been signed by him in the fashion reflected on the
affidavit because Mack is sight impaired. Once again, respondent did not disclose
to Judge Conner the issues surrounding the creation and notarizing of the affidavits.
2
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Conner ordered Mrs. Stevenson
interdicted; appointed Anna as Mrs. Stevenson’s curator; appointed Dorothy and
Lois as co- undercurators to provide daily physical care for Mrs. Stevenson; and
ordered a permanent injunction prohibiting Dorothy and Lois from taking any funds
or property of Mrs. Stevenson.

2 Respondent also has not sought leave of court to withdraw the affidavits from the record.

5

In June 2020, Dorothy and Stephanie filed complaints against respondent with
the ODC. During its investigation of the complaints, the ODC requested the trial
transcript from Judge Conner in an effort to determine what representations
respondent made to the c ourt regarding the affidavits in question. Judge Conner
provided the trial transcript by letter dated March 5, 2021. Although he expressed
concern about the affidavits, Judge Conner concluded that “because of other
testimony and evidence provided,” they did not affect the outcome of the case.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In April 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that
his conduct as set forth above violated Rules 3.3(a)(3) (a lawyer shall not knowingly
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false; if a lawyer has offered material
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal), 8.4(a) (violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any intentional
misconduct. Respondent admitted that he did not personally witness the signatures
on the affidavits. Nevertheless, he maintained that he notarized the affidavits in an
effort to appease Anna, whom he described as “frantic and desperate to redress the
misappropriation of funds from her now-destitute mother.” He indicated that he had
no intention of using the affidavits because he had decided not to move forward with
his original plan to seek ex parte relief in the interdiction proceeding, but
nonetheless, the affidavits were inadvertently attached to the petition for interdiction.
Respondent further noted that at the hearing on the interdiction, he did not refer to

6

the affidavits, offer them into evidence, or call the affiants as witnesses. Therefore,
he suggested the affidavits were irrelevant and without legal effect.
In light of respondent’s answer, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on
the merits.

Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted a formal hearing on August 9, 2021. Both
respondent and the ODC introduced documentary evidence. The ODC called the
following witnesses to testify before the hearing committee: Stephanie; Dorothy;
Lois (by telephone); Jessica Seale, the court-appointed curator for Mrs. Stevenson;
and 25
th JDC Judge Kevin Conner. Respondent called Richard to testify; he also
testified on his own behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC.3
Stephanie and Dorothy both testified that the circumstances surrounding the
execution of their siblings’ affidavits triggered their complaints to the ODC. Lois
testified that she signed a document her sister Anna gave to her but she did not know
what she was signing and did not read it beforehand; once she did read the affidavit,
Lois did not agree with its contents. Richard admitted signing the affidavit but
likewise did not read it, relying instead on Anna to explain it to him. Ms. Seale
agreed with respondent’s assertion that the affidavits were not used in any way other
than being attached to the petition for interdiction.
Judge Conner testified that he was never informed during the interdiction
hearing that respondent had notarized affidavits of witnesses who had not executed
the documents in his presence. He noted that while he was required to sustain
respondent’s hearsay objections, he nonetheless labored under the belief based on

3 Anna was present at the hearing, and respondent called her into the hearing room to testify.
However, before she could be sworn, respondent apparently had a change of heart and declined to
offer Anna’s testimony.

7

their affidavits that several of Anna’s siblings shared her concerns regarding the
handling of their mother’s funds by Stephanie and Dorothy.
Judge Conner was not aware that the content of the affidavits was not supplied
by the affiants but rather supplied by Anna herself, nor was he aware that respondent
had never spoken to the affiants or verified the allegations contained in the affidavits.
When questioned by respondent, Judge Conner explained that he considered that a
fraud had been committed upon the court and that the fraud was perpetrated by Anna
when she supplied affidavit content that was not consistent with the beliefs of the
affiants. On redirect, Judge Conner explained that when affidavits contain
information that favors one party, it lends support to that party’s position. When
asked whether the affidavits had a substantive effect on the proceedings, Judge
Conner said “yes” and then added:
… it’s a little bit more to me than just a matter of whether
or not the information is correct or not correct. The
information is that when somebody supplies an affidavit
in favor of somebody, then to me, it lends support to that
person, if you have two other people that are behind you.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee made findings of fact, including the following:
1. There are three facts that establish the seriousness of respondent’s
misconduct: (a) the falsity of the jurats in t he affidavits that said that the
affiants swore to and signed them in respondent’s presence; (b) the allegation
in Paragraph XIX of the interdiction petition that three other siblings,
including the two who lived with Mrs. Stevenson, concurred in the relief Anna
sought; and (c) Judge Conner’s testimony that the supporting affidavits of
other family members lend weight to the petition and factor into his decision.

8

2. The jurat is the notary’s statement that the formalities identified therein were
followed – that the affiant swore to the truthfulness of the contents of the
affidavit and that the affiant signed the affidavit in the notary’s presence. That
did not occur here. The committee’s recommendation does not turn on the
truthfulness of the affidavits, but on the truthfulness of the jurats on the
affidavits. They were respondent’s statements, and they were false.
3. Respondent seeks to minimize his misconduct by claiming that the affidavits
were not used as evidence. This disregards Paragraph XIX of the petition
which states that three of the siblings concurred in the relief sought by his
client. It also fails to counter Judge Conner’s testimony that such
concurrences carry weight in his decision. Having both practiced in and
served as a judge in the 25 th JDC, respondent would likely be aware of this
practice, placing into question his claim that the attachment of the affidavits
to the petition was inadvertent.
4. Much of the trial concerned the truthfulness of the affidavits and the
authenticity of the affiants’ signatures. For the foregoing reasons, these issues
are secondary. Furthermore, respondent’s hearsay objection to the affidavits
was proper and was not an attempt to mislead the court as claimed by the
ODC. However, that is little credit to respo ndent since the affidavits never
should have been in the record at all.
Based on these facts, the committee determined that respondent violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. Respondent violated
Rules 3.3(a)(3) and 8.4(c) by knowingly offering false evidence – his statement that
the affidavits were sworn to and signed in his presence. Although not admitted into
evidence in the formal sense, the allegations in Paragraph XIX of the petition, along
with Judge Conner’s testimony, establish that the affidavits had evidentiary value in
the proceeding. Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(d). Judge Conner testified that

9

he gives more weight to an interdiction petition filed with the written support of
other family members. Al though there was sufficient evidence for the interdiction
without the affidavits, their attachment had the potential to alter the judge’s decision,
which was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Respondent’s violation of the
foregoing rules establishes the derivative violation of Rule 8.4(a).
The committee determined respondent violated duties owed to his client, the
public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent acted knowingly in
allowing the affidavits to remain in the record once their presence was discovered.
4
He caused actual harm to Anna by causing the court to question her actions in
obtaining the affidavits, and he caused actual harm to the legal profession because
his actions reflected poorly upon the profession. Respondent caused potential harm
to the legal system because the affidavits could have affected the outcome of the
case if the other evidence was insufficient to warrant interdiction without Judge
Conner’s consideration of the affidavits. Based on the ABA’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions , the committee determined the baseline sanction is
suspension.
The committee determined the following aggravating factors are present: a
prior disciplinary record and substantial experience in the practice of law. The
committee determined the following mitigating factors are present: full and free
disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings and remorse.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the committee consid ered In
re: Porter, 05-1736 (La. 3/10/06), 930 So. 2d 875. In Porter , the respondent was
suspended for one year for abandoning his clients without notice and falsely
notarizing an affidavit verifying a petition. The affidavit – purportedly signed by

4 The committee did not find clear and convincing evidence that respondent intended to attach the
affidavits to the petition for interdiction, but allowed that may have been a possibility.

10

one of the plaintiffs – instead was signed by her husband. Mr. Porter then attached
the improperly notarized affidavit to the petition and filed it in the Baton Rouge City
Court. The court found Mr. Porter violated Rules 3.3 and 8.4(a)(c)(d), among other
provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.5 The court found three mitigating
factors (no prior disciplinary record, inexperience in the practice of law, and
remorse) and two aggravating factors (multiple offenses and vulnerability of the
victims) were present. The committee noted that respondent did not abandon his
clients like Mr. Porter did, but he does have a prior disciplinary record and
substantial experience in the practice of law.
Based on these findings, the committee recommended respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. The committee also recommended
that he be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding.
Both respondent and the ODC filed objections to the hearing committee’s
report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s
factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same. Based on these
factual findings, the board determined respondent’s conduct violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. Specifically as to the charged
violation of Rule 3.3(a)(3), the board agreed that respondent violated this rule even
though the affidavits were not formally introduced into evidence in the interdiction
proceeding, as they had evidentiary value and were material to the proceeding.
6

5 Like respondent herein, Mr. Porter admitted the notarial act was improper; however, he claimed
the verification was not “legally material” to the suit a nd containe d no material facts. We
implicitly rejected that argument by finding Mr. Porter’s conduct violated Rule 3.3.
6 The board cited In re: Lightfoot , 11-1950 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So. 3d 56, for the proposition that
“the mere submission of a false pleading or document into the record of a court can justify a finding
of a Rule 3.3(a)(3) violation.” In Lightfoot , the attorney counseled his clients to use fictitious
names on their bankruptcy petition and counseled them to secure a temporary post office box and

11

The board agreed with the committee that respondent violated duties owed to
his client, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent acted
knowingly, and his c onduct caused both actual and potential harm. Based on the
ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline
sanction is suspension. The board agreed with the aggravating and mitigating factors
found by the committee.
Considering these findings, the court’s prior jurisprudence discussing similar
misconduct, and the applicable aggravating factors,
7 the board recommended
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. The
board further recommended that respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses
of this matter.
Respondent filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly,
the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:

to list that address on the petition. For deliberately filing a false bankruptcy pleading, we found
the attorney violated several Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 3.3(a)(3). The attorney
was suspended from the practice of law for six months, with all but thirty days deferred.
7 The board placed particular emphasis on respondent’s prior disciplinary history and his
significant experience in the practice of law as both a former judge and a practitioner.

12

Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
Respondent notarized three affidavits which were not signed by the affiants
in his presence. He then attached the improperly notarized affidavits to his petition
for interdiction and filed it with the court. Respondent has not taken any remedial
action to withdraw the affidavits from the record. Based on these facts, respondent
violated Rules 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The ODC also alleges that respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(3) by attaching the
improperly notarized affidavits to the petition for interdiction. To find a violation
of this rule, the ODC must prove that respondent acted knowingly. Knowing means
“actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred
from circumstances.” Rule 1.0(f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, to
successfully prove its allegation that resp ondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(3), the ODC
must prove more than the simple fact that respondent “attached” the improperly
notarized affidavits to the petition for interdiction. Rather, the ODC must prove that
respondent actually knew he had attached the improperly notarized affidavits to the
petition filed with the court.
Despite the hearing committee’s conclusion that respondent violated Rule
3.3(a)(3), it acknowledged in its report that “[w]hile Respondent may have intended
to attach the Affidavits, the evidence is not clear and convincing in that respect.” In
other words, the committee itself questioned whether respondent’s conduct was done
with actual knowledge. Our review of the record leads us to the same question.
Respondent testified at the hearing that the affidavits were inadvertently attached to
the petition he filed in October 2019, and that he did not realize his error until he
appeared before Judge Conner in July 2020. While there is evidence in the record
from which one might infer that res pondent intended to include the affidavits, we

13

find such evidence does not rise to the clear and convincing level required in a bar
discipline proceeding.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Loui siana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client, the public, the legal
system, and the legal profession. His conduct caused both actual and potential harm.
The applicable baseline sanction is s uspension. The following aggravating factors
are present: a prior disciplinary record and substantial experience in the practice of
law. The following mitigating factors are present: full and free disclosure to the
disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings and remorse.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find that respondent’s
conduct does not warrant the one year and one day suspension recommended by the
disciplinary board. However, we must also reject respondent’s argument that a fully
deferred suspension would suffice. R espondent’s prior disciplinary record is
significant, and he has substantial experience in the practice of law as both a former
judge and a practitioner . Under these circumstances, we find the one-year
suspension recommended by the hearing committee to be appropriate.
Based on this reasoning, we will reject the board’s recommendation and
suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year.

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DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it
is ordered that William A. Roe, Louisiana Bar Roll number 11384, be and he hereby
is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. All costs and expenses
in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule
XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of
this court’s judgment until paid.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-B-01803
IN RE: WILLIAM A. ROE
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
WEIMER, C. J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the sanction imposed in this case in light of the
conclusion, with which I concur, that a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
According the words of the rule their plain and ordinary meaning, I agree that no
violation of Rule 3.3(a)(3) was proved.
Because the rules governing the conduct of attorneys have the force and effect
of substantive law, 1 in interpreting those rules, the rules of statutory interpretation
provide guidance. Pursuant to those rules, the starting point of any analysis is the
language of the provision itself. Hartman v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Department
& Fara, 20-00693, p. 9 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So.3d 823, 829.
Rule 3.3(a)(3) states:
A lawyer shall not knowingly:
. . . .
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer,
the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered
material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer
shall take reasonable remedial measures including, if necessary,
disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other
than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false.
1 Succession of Wallace, 574 So.2d 348, 350 (La. 1991).

Under the plain language of the rule,2 the threshold requirement is knowledge:
a lawyer shall not “knowingly” offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. As
the majority notes, as defined by Rule 1.0(f), “knowingly ... denotes actual knowledge
of the fact in question.” Such knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.
Id.
At the formal hearing, Respondent explained that he prepared alternative
petitions for interdiction: one requesting an immediate, ex parte order of interdiction
and one requesting a preliminary interdiction. Although it was ultimately decided to
seek the preliminary interdiction (thereby eliminating the need for the supporting
affidavits), the affidavits in question were nevertheless inadvertently attached to the
petition for interdiction filed in October 2019. Respondent testified that he did not
realize the error until he appeared before Judge Conner in July 2020.
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Committee acknowledged in its report that
“[w]hile Respondent may have intended to attach the Affidavits, the evidence is not
clear and convincing in that respect.” (Italics supplied.) I agree with that finding.
The evidence that respondent “knowingly” attached the affidavits does not rise to the
level of clear and convincing evidence required in a bar discipline proceeding.
In addition to “knowing” conduct, Rule 3.3(a)(3) is quite specific in what it
prohibits: a lawyer shall not knowingly “offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false.” (Italics supplied.) The words “offer evidence” are key here, as the facts below
are undisputed. Respondent did not offer the improperly notarized affidavits in
evidence at the interdiction hearing. Both the Hearing Committee and the
Disciplinary Board acknowledged this fact, noting that the affidavits “were not
2 The Civil Code instructs that words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning.
La. C.C. art. 11.
2

offered into evidence in the formal sense.” Nevertheless both entities concluded that
despite not being formally introduced in evidence, the affidavits had “evidentiary
value.” With all due respect to the Hearing Committee and Disciplinary Board, I find
this conclusion legally erroneous.
First, because the affidavits were not introduced, they were not “evidence” that
could be considered by the district court. Denoux v. Vessel Management Services,
Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88 (“Evidence not properly and
officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed
in the record.”). Further, the affidavits were clearly hearsay, La. C.E. art. 801, as the
district court recognized in sustaining an objection to questioning surrounding the
execution of the affidavits at the interdiction hearing.
Moreover, the affidavits were not required, nor even necessary for the
preliminary interdiction. See, La. C.C.P. art. 4549. Because they were not necessary
to the proceeding, the affidavits could hardly be characterized as “material evidence,”
thereby triggering an obligation on respondent’s part to move to withdraw the
affidavits from the record or to disclose their falsity to the district court. See, Rule
3.3(a)(3) (“If a lawyer ... has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know
of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”) (Italics added.)
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the affidavits could not legally have carried
“evidentiary value,” as the Hearing Committee and the Disciplinary Board found.
The district court judge acknowledged as much when he testified before the Hearing
Committee that the judgment granting the interdiction was “based on the evidence
presented at the trial and nothing else,” and when he wrote in a letter addressed to
disciplinary counsel that “because of other testimony and evidence provided to this
3

Court, the final judgment and outcome in this case were not affected [by the
affidavits].”
Based on the facts and circumstances of this matter and particularly for the
reasons set forth above, I agree that the charge that respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(3)
was not proved by clear and convincing evidence.3
Respondent admits, however, that he notarized three affidavits which were not
signed by the affiants in his presence, conduct which violates the provisions of Rule
8.4(a), (c) and (d). Therefore, a sanction is appropriate for this misconduct. Because
the sanctions recommended by the Hearing Committee and Disciplinary Board were
based, in part, on a finding that a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(3) was proved, it is
appropriate, in determining the sanction here, to deviate downward from those
recommendations. Juxtaposing respondent’s prior disciplinary record and substantial
experience in the practice of law (aggravating factors) against his remorse, his
acceptance of responsibility for his acts and full cooperation with the disciplinary
proceedings, the fact that no harm resulted from the improperly notarized affidavits,
and his unselfish motive (having handled the case pro bono), all mitigating factors,
I believe a one-year suspension from the practice of law with all but 60 days deferred
is the appropriate sanction in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the
sanction imposed by the majority.
3 To the extent violations of Rule 3.3(a) were found in the cases of In re: Porter, 05-1736 (La.
3/10/06), 930 So.2d 875, and In re: Lightfoot, 11-1950 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So.3d 56, those cases are
distinguishable in that neither involved a situation in which improperly notarized affidavits were
inadvertently filed in the record. The untruthful filings in both Porter and Lightfoot were knowing
and deliberate.
4

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-B-01803
IN RE: WILLIAM A. ROE
Attorney Disciplinary Proceeding
CRAIN, J., concurs and assigns reasons:
I agree with the sanction imposed. However, I also believe a violation of Rule
3.3(a)(3) occurred. Rule 3.3(a)(3) provides a lawyer shall not knowingly offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false; if a lawyer has offered material evidence
and comes to know if its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. Here, the improperly notarized
affidavits were attached to the Petition for Interdiction and Injunctive Relief . The
affidavits were also expressly referred to in the petition as support that three other
siblings, including two who lived with Mrs. Stevenson, concurred in the relief
sought.
A lawyer owes a duty of diligence before signing a petition. See La. Code of
Civ. Proc. art. 863 (“[T]he signature of an attorney or part y shall constitute a
certification by him that he has read the pleading, and that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry . . . certifies . . .
each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has evidentiary support . . .
.”). This due diligence requires that I conclude the attachments were intentional,
even if intentions and litigation strategies may have later changed. Further,
respondent has not taken any remedial action to withdraw the affidavit s from the
record. Thus, I concur in the result, but would additionally find respondent violated
Rule 3.3(a)(3).