Anthony Misita v. John Maumoulides, Lakelots, Inc., Intrepid, Inc., One Consort International, Llc; Ramsey Development And St. Tammany Parish C/w Anthony Misita And Glenn And Linda Torres Vs. The St. Tammany Parish Government

Supreme Court of Louisiana
April 26, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
ANTHONY MISITA VS. JOHN
MAUMOULIDES, LAKELOTS, INC.,
INTREPID, INC., ONE CONSORT
INTERNATIONAL, LLC; RAMSEY
DEVELOPMENT AND ST. TAMMANY PARISH
C/W
ANTHONY MISITA AND GLENN AND LINDA
TORRES VS. THE ST. TAMMANY PARISH
GOVERNMENT
No. 2022-C-00266
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN R
E: The St. Tammany Parish Government - Applicant Defendant; Kevin Davis -
Applicant Defendant; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd
Judicial District Court Number(s) 2013 -14638, Court of Appeal, First Circuit,
Number(s) 2020 CA 0952 C/W 2020 CA 0953;
_ _ _ _ _ _
April 26, 2022
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., dissents.
Griffin, J., dissents.
JBM
JLW
SJC
JTG
WJC
04/26/2022 "See News Release 019 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-C-00266
ANTHONY MISITA
VS.
JOHN MAUMOULIDES, LAKELOTS, INC., INTREPID, INC., ONE
CONSORT INTERNATIONAL, LLC; RAMSEY DEVELOPMENT AND
ST. TAMMANY PARISH
C/W
ANTHONY MISITA AND GLENN AND LINDA TORRES
VS.
THE ST. TAMMANY PARISH GOVERNMENT
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany
PER CURIAM
Writ granted. At the heart of this case is a statement former St. Tammany
Parish President Kevin Davis allegedly made to Anthony Mis ita in 2008 or 2009
that, within thirty days, the St. Tammany Parish Government (“STPG”) would return
to his property to resolve its flooding problems by extending a drainage lateral/canal.
The plaintiffs allege that they detrimentally relied on Mr. Davis’ statement.
The main issue presented by this case is whether Mr. Davis (and the STPG,
on a theory of vicarious liability) is entitled to a dismissal of the claims asserted
against him under the discretionary immunity doctrine. At the outset, we note that
the court of appeal erred in finding that Mr. Davis and the STPG did not raise the
merits of the discretionary immunity defense in their summary judgment motion. 1
Their motion sought summary judgment on several bases, including that the STPG
1 To the contrary, the court of appeal found that this issue was raised only in the context of whether
it was encompassed in a 2018 judgment, that sustained an exception of prescription, dismissing all
claims arising more than a year before suit was filed.
04/26/22

“and its employees are immune from suit for their discretionary decisions under the
unambiguous, blackletter law of La. R.S. 9:2798.1, La. R.S. 40:1730(C), La. R.S.
33:101.1, and La. R.S. 33:4771 et seq.”
The doctrine of discretionary immunity is set forth in La. R.S. 9:2798.1 B,
which provides that “[l]iability shall not be imposed on public entities or their
officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are
within the course and scope of the ir lawful powers and duties.” We explained the
application of the discretionary act doctine in Cormier v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 98-2208,
pp. 6-7 (La. 9/8/99), 745 So. 2d 1, 6-7:
. . . the court must first consider whether the government
employee had an element of choice an d his course of
action was not specifically prescribed by the statute,
regulation, or policy. Conduct cannot be discretionary
unless it involves an element of judgment or choice. Thus,
discretionary immunity will not apply when a specific
course of action is prescribed as the employee has no
rightful option but to adhere to the directive. On the other
hand, when discretion is involved, the court must then
determine whether that discretion is the kind shielded by
the exception: one grounded in social, econom ic, or
political activity. . . If it is, then the doctrine applies and
the employee or agency is insulated from liability; if it is
not, the employee or agency is liable for any negligence.

(Citations omitted).
Plaintiffs have cited no statute, ordinance, rule, regulation or other authority
by which the SPTG was required to extend the drainage lateral and thus, no specific
course of action was prescribed in this case. Even assuming Mr. Davis advised the
plaintiffs that he would have the STPG exte nd the lateral within 30 days, given the
lack of any requirement that it do so, this would amount to a discretionary act and
not an operational decision, for which discretionary immunity would not apply.2 The

2 “The immunity statute does not protect operational governmental decisions, but only confers
immunity for discretionary decisions . . . .” Aucoin v. Larpenter, 2020-0792, p. 14 (La. App. 1
Cir. 4/16/21), 324 So. 3d 626, 638, writ denied, 2021-00688 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So. 3d 87.

trial court, thus, properly granted summary judgment dismissing all claims against
Mr. Davis, including the detrimental reliance claims. Because the STPG would only
be vicariously liable for the claims arising out of Mr. Davis’ statement, the STPG is
also entitled to a dismissal of those claims, including the detrimental reliance claims,
on the basis of discretionary immunity. Based on this finding, we need not address
the remaining issues raised in this writ application.
Accordingly, it is ordered that the judgment o f the trial court be reinstated.
The motion for summary judgment filed by Mr. Davis and the STPG is granted,
dismissing all claims related to Mr. Davis’ alleged statement to Mr. Misita, including
the claims for detrimental reliance.