Pineville City Court, Et Al. v. City Of Pineville, Et Al.

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #005
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 27th day of January, 2023 are as follows:
BY McCallum, J.:
2022-C-00336 PINEVILLE CITY COURT, ET AL. VS. CITY OF PINEVILLE, ET AL.
(Parish of Rapides)
REVERSED. TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED. SEE
OPINION.
Hughes, J., dissents and would affirm the court of appeal.
Genovese, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2022-C-00336
P
INEVILLE CITY COURT, ET AL.
VS.
CITY OF PINEVILLE, ET AL.
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides
Mc
Callum, J.
In this mandamus action we determine whether the court of appeal erred in
reversing the trial court’s judgment that granted the City of Pineville’s exception of
no cause of action. The plain language of La. R.S. 13:1888 A mandates only a
minimum salary amount that must be paid to the city court clerk and deputy clerks.
The governing authorities have discretion to pay more than the mandated minimum
salary. A mandamus action is an incorrect vehicle for the demand asserted by
Pineville City Court because the underlying duty is not purely ministerial in nature.
We find that the trial court correctly granted the exception of no cause of action.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Previously, the Pineville City Court was fully funded by the City of Pineville.
This funding included amounts for the salar ies of three clerk positions and
accompanying human resources services. In turn, the City Court reimbursed the
City for forty-percent of those expenses. In November of 2020, the Pineville City
Court informed the City of Pineville that it would no longer reimburse the forty -
percent as it had done in the past. Thereafter, the City of Pineville sent notice that it
would reduce payments of the clerks’ salaries by forty -percent, cease providing
payroll and human resources services, pay only sixty -percent of the clerks’
retirement contributions, and discontinue the clerks’ participation in the city’s Blue
Cross health plan.

2

On March 22, 2021, Pineville City Court and the Honorable Gary K. Hayes,
in his capacity as judge of the Pineville City Court (collectively referred to as “City
Court”), filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus against the City of Pineville and
Clarence R. Fields, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Pineville (collectively
referred to as “Pineville”). City Court sought an order that would require Pineville
to fully fund City Court at the previously requested amounts. City Court alleged
these amounts were reasonable and necessary for its operation. City Court further
alleged such funding was mandatory pursuant to La. R.S. 13:1888 A, La. R.S.
13:1889, and the doctrine of inherent powers.1 There was no allegation that Pineville
was funding City Court at amounts below the required minimum set forth in the
revised statutes.
Pineville responded by filing an exception of no ca use of action. It asserted
that under La. R.S. 13:1888 A, it was not required to fund City Court in any amounts
higher than the statutory minimum , and that City Court f ailed to include any

1 Titled “Salary of clerk and deputy clerk,” La. R.S. 13:1888 A provides:

The salary of the clerks and of the deputy clerks, if any, may be fixed and paid in
equal proportions by the respective governing authorities of the city and parish
where the court is located; or it may be fixed and paid by either of them, or in such
proportions as they may determine; except that the salary payable to the clerk shall
not be less than $150 per month where the population of the territorial jurisdiction
of the court is less than 10,000 and not less than $250 per month where the
population of the territorial jurisdiction of the court is 10,000 or more; and except
that the salary payable to the deputy clerk shall in no case be less than $150 per
month.

Titled “Court room and offices,” La. R.S. 13:1889 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The city where the court is situated shall furnish a suitable city court room and
suitable offices for the judge, clerk, and marshal. It shall also furnish adequate
fireproof vaults or other filing equipment for the preservation of the records of the
court.

B. The expenses of operation and maintenance of the court room and offices shall
be borne by the city, or may be apportioned between the city and parish as the
respective governing authorities may determine.

“Under the doctrine of inherent powers, courts have the power (other than those powers expressly
enumerated in the constitution and the statutes) to do all things reasonably necessary for the
exercise of their functions as courts.” Konrad v. Jefferson Par. Council, 520 So. 2d 393, 397 (La.
1988).

3

allegation that Pineville was viola ting the statutory mandate . Pineville further
asserted that mandamus was not appropriate because the statute does not mandate a
purely ministerial duty. Pineville argued that the statute affords discretion to the
governing authorities as to the fixing and paying of salaries above the statutory
minimum and as to the proportion ing of responsib ility between the applicable
governing authorities as to the payment of such salaries. Thus, Pineville asserted
that mandamus would only be appropriate in requiring the City to fund the Court at
the statutory minimum and would not be appropriate as a means to order the City to
pay discretionary amounts exceeding the statutory minimum.
The trial court agreed with Pineville. In granting Pineville’s exception, the
trial court found that mandamus, as an extraordinary remedy, should be sparingly
used to compel only ministerial duties that are clearly defined by law. The trial court
found City Court’s alleged “reasonable and necessary” funding was not clearly
defined, and therefore, mandamus was not a remedy available for City Court. The
trial court further concluded that City Court’s mandamus petition could not be cured
by amendment, as it was an improper vehicle for the demand in the first place , and
dismissed the suit.2
City Court appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, which
reversed the trial court’s judgment and reinstated the City Court’s petition. The court
of appeal found that La. R.S. 13:1888 A mandates a ministerial duty, and does not
provide for a discretionary action. Pineville City Ct. v. City of Pineville, 2021-415
(La. App. 3 Cir. 2/2/22), 333 So. 3d 1256, writ granted, 2022-00336 (La. 5/10/22),
338 So. 3d 1169. The court of appeal reasoned that, by setting only a statutory

2 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 934 provides that a court sustaining a peremptory
exception, such as an exception of no cause of action, should permit the petitioner to amend their
petition when the ground thereof for the exception can be removed by amendment. However,
amendment is not permitted when such would constitute a vain and useless act. See Antonio Le
Mon v. Nat.l Football League , 2019-1264, p. 4 (La. 9/6/19), 277 So. 3d 1166, 1169; Alexander
and Alexander, Inc. v. State, Div. of Administration, 486 So. 2d 95, 100 (La. 1986).

4

minimum, the statute recognized that clerk salaries above the minimum may be
reasonable and necessary, depending on the situation of the court. Id., p.6, 333 So.
3d at 1261. It further found such reasonable and necessary funding was mandatory
under the inherent powers allotted to courts pursuant to La. Const. art. 5, §§ 1 and
15(A) in order to allow them to operate. Id., pp. 6-7, 333 So. 3d at 1261. Observing
that courts are constitutional ly established and have a right to exist, the court of
appeal found that “the judicial branch possesses the inherent power to compel
reasonable and necessary appropriations to serve the public as the state constitution
mandates.” Id. Based on that reasoning, the court of appeal held that Judge Hayes
was charged as the administrator of the City Court to ensure it could properly provide
its services to the public, which inherently include s an obligation to determine the
reasonable and necess ary funding required to sufficiently operate the court . Id.
Thus, the court of appeal found that City Court stated a cause of action because the
duty of Pineville to provide reasonable and necessary funding, regardless of the
statutory minimum, was ministerial in nature and did not provide any discretion to
the governing authority.
Thereafter, Pineville sought a writ of certiorari with this Court. We granted
writ to determine whether the implementation of La. R.S. 13:1888 A is a ministerial
duty and whether an action in mandamus is the appropriate vehicle by which City
Court may see k alleged reasonable and necessary funding above the statutory
minimum from Pineville.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Article 3862 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure governs mandamus
and provides the following:
A writ of mandamus may be issued in all cases where the law provides
no relief by ordinary means or where the delay involved in obtaining
relief may cause injustice; provided, however, that no court shall issue
or cause to be issued a writ of mandamus to compel the expenditure of
state funds by any state department, board or agency, or any officer,

5

administrator or head thereof, or any officer of the state of Louisiana,
in any suit or action involving the expenditure of public funds under
any statute or law of this state, when the director of such department,
board or agency or the governor shall certify that the expenditure of
such funds would have the effect of creating a deficit in the funds of
said agency or be in violation of the requirements placed upon the
expenditure of such funds by the legislature.

This Court has routinely held that the only circumstances under which courts
may cause writs of mandamus to issue are where the actions sought to be performed
are imposed by law and are purely ministerial in nature. See Hoag v. State, 2004-
0857, p. 6 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1023. “ ‘Mandamus is a writ directing a
public officer ... to perform’ ‘ a ministerial duty required by law. ’” Jazz Casino
Company, L.L.C. v. Bridges, 2016-1663, p. 5 (La. 5/3/17), 223 So.3d 488, 492 (citing
La. C.C.P. arts. 3861 and 3863).
3 “A ‘ministerial duty’ is one ‘in which no element
of discretion is left to the public officer,’ in other words, ‘a simple, definite duty,
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.’” Id.
(citing Hoag, 2004-0857, p. 7, 889 So.2d at 1024). “If a public officer is vested with
any element of discretion, mandamus will not lie.” Id . (citing Landry v. City of
Erath, 628 So.2d 1178, 1180 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993 ), writ denied, 1994-0275 (La.
3/25/94), 635 So. 2d 235).
We are called upon to determine whether City Court has stated a cause of
action for the issuance of a writ of mandamus based on the applicable law. “T he
exception of no cause of action tests the leg al sufficiency of the petition by
determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading.”

3 Titled “Definition,” La. C.C.P. art. 3861 provides:

Mandamus is a writ directing a public officer, a corporation or an officer thereof,
or a limited liability company or a member or manager hereof, to perform any of
the duties set forth in Articles 3863 and 3864.

Titled “Person against whom writ directed,” La. C.C.P. art. 3863 provides:

A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance
of a ministerial duty required by law, or to a former officer or his heirs to compel
the delivery of the papers and effects of the office to his successor.

6

State ex rel. Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 2021-0856, p. 17, (La. 10/1/22), --- So. 3d ---,
2022 WL 12338524. “The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a
cause of action is on the mover, and a petition should be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action only when it appe ars beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id.
Our Civil Code gives clear directions in our endeavor. Legislation is a solemn
expression of legislative will. La. C.C. art. 2. When a law is clear and unambiguous
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislation. La. C.C. art. 9. When the language of the law is susceptible of different
meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the
purpose of the law. La. C.C. art. 10. The words of a law must be given their
generally prevailing meaning. La. C.C. art. 11.
Louisiana Revised Statute 13:1888 A provides discretion to the governmental
authorities.4 The statute provides that “[t]he salary of the clerks and of the deputy
clerks, if any, may be fixed and paid in equal proportions by the respective governing
authorities of the city and parish where the court is located; or it may be fixed and
paid by either of them, or in such proportions as they may determine.” (Emphasis
added). Louisiana Revised Statute 1:3 instructs that “[t]he word ‘shall’ is mandatory
and the word ‘may’ is permissive.” Louisiana Revised Statute 13:1888 A provides
discretion to the governmental authorities by allowing them to proportion the
responsibility for paying the salar ies between the city and pa rish as these entities

4 City Court cited La. R.S. 13:1889 in its petition. However, the record, arguments before this
Court and the lower courts, and the brief s filed with this Court show that La. R.S. 13:1889 is not
truly at issue. In fact, City Court only mentions La. R.S. 13:1889 once, in passing, on page 19 of
its brief submitted to this Court. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the pertinent La. R.S. 13:1888
A, which both parties consistently cited and argued. Nevertheless, La. R.S. 13:1889 deals with
expenses attendant to the operation and maintenance of the courtroom and offices; i.e., the physical
plant.

7

choose. In fact, the statute clearly contemplates that Pineville could even bear no
share of the responsibility for paying the salaries.
The only mandate found in La. R.S. 13:1888 A is “that the salar y payable to
the clerk shall not be less than $150 per month where the population of the territorial
jurisdiction of the court is less than 10,000 and not less than $250 per month where
the population of the territorial jurisdiction of the court is 10,000 or more; and except
that the salary payable to the deputy clerk shall in no case be less than $150 per
month.” The statute does not expressly provide any compulsory language for
payments exceeding the statutory minimums, nor does it clearly define any amounts
exceeding the minimum s for which the governing authorities are mandated
responsibility. We agree with Pineville that the minimum salaries for the clerk and
deputy clerks are clearly mandated; any amounts above the minimums are not
statutorily specified. Since a critical element necessary for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus is that the public official to whom the writ is directed may exercise no
element of discretion when complying with a statute, City Court cannot state a cause
of action for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
5
City Court suggests the minimum salary amounts which were set in La. R.S.
13:1888 A at the time of its enactment in 1960 are no longer reasonable. This forms
their underlying argument tha t strictly applying those amounts today leads to an
absurd result. While we recognize that those amounts may not meet the current
salary levels paid by City Court to its clerks, such is a policy concern involving
discretion exercised by the legislative branch of government. Whether requiring a
city court to bear a greater proportion of its expenses leads to absurd results is a
matter of one’s perspective. In this case, absurdity lies within the eyes of the
beholder.

5 Pineville is not only meeting the statutory minimums, but is exceeding the minimums. It is
uncontested that City Court failed to plead that Pineville was paying below the minimums
mandated in La. R.S. 13:1888 A.

8

City Court also presses arguments based on the doctrine of inherent powers,
and contends that it has inherent authority to require sufficient funding for the
expenses required for it to perform its duties. In that regard, City Court relies heavily
on our recent opinion in Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 2020-1231 (La. 5/13/21), 320
So. 3d 369. However, in Lowther, the city’s ministerial duty to pay derived from a
monetary judgment, which, in turn, was obtained based on specific statutes. 6 See
Id., pp. 6-7, 320 So. 3d at 370, 373-74. In Lowther, we simply found no merit in the
town’s argument that the nature of the matter being reduced to a monetary judgment
was determinative as to whether the action to compel the town to appropriate the
funds to pay the specific judgment is discretionary. Id. We did not provide a blanket
holding, as City Court suggests, that any implicit duty alleged to be found in the state
constitution would satisfy the requirement of a ministerial duty in order to properly
plead a mandamus action. In Lowther, we did not c onstrain our analysis solely to
consideration of the constitution. As we noted in that matter, the firefighters’ suit
against the city was to enforce statutory minimum salaries based on rank, statutorily
mandated longevity raises, and equal compensation to firefighters performing equal
work. See Id., p. 4, pp.7-8, 320 So. 3d at 371, 374 (citing La. R.S. 33:1992 A, La.
R.S. 33:1992 B, and La. R.S. 33:1969). Reinforcing our finding, we even
specifically pointed out that “ [t]he Firefighters are only requesting the courts to
enforce the positive law and not legislate a judicial solution.” Id., p. 5, 320 So. 3d
at 372.

6 In Lowther, former and current firefighter employees of the town of Bastrop filed a petition for
a writ of mandamus seeking enforcement of a judgment they had already procured against Bastrop
after alleging the town owed them statutorily mandated back pay and other wages. See Lowther ,
2020-1231, pp. 3-4, 320 So. 3d at 371-72. Bastrop argued that although the payment of the back
pay and other wages was statutorily mandated, once the firefighters had obtained a judgment
confirming and quantifying the city’s monetary obligation, then the firefighters became
indistinguishable from any other judgment creditor, and therefore the city had discretion in paying
the judgment. Id. We granted writ to determine whether the duty to pay the judgment was
ministerial. Id.

9

City Court’s reliance on other cases in which the doctrine of inherent powers
was applied to support its argument is misplaced. In City C t. of Breaux Bridge v.
Town of Breaux Bridge , 440 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1983) , writ denied sub
nom., City of Breaux Bridge v. Town of Breaux Bridge, 444 So. 2d 1219 (La. 1984),
a local authority refused to pay certain expenses of the city court, including postage,
costs for printing forms, telephone expenses and expenses associated with the
upkeep of the library. Altho ugh the court of appeal found that “the power of the
City Court to require that all it s necessary expenses of operating the court be
provided by the legislative body of the Town lies in the inherent power of the City
Court,” Id., 440 So. 2d at 1375, a cause of action for mandamus was appropriately
allowed because the payment of those expe nses was mandated by statute. In fact,
the court of appeal even took note that La. R.S. 13:2488.76, a statute directed
specifically to the town of Breaux Bridge, provides that “[t]he expenses of operation
and maintenance of the courtroom and offices shall be paid by the town of Breaux
Bridge.” Id., 440 So. 2d at 1375 (emphasis added).
City Court also cited McCain v. Grant Par. Police Jury , 440 So. 2d 1369,
1370 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1983) . McCain involved an action for mandamus filed by a
judge of the Thirty-Fifth Judicial District Court seeking to compel the Grant Parish
Police Jury to “budget funds necessary for the effective and efficient operation of
the district court.” Id. The McCain court found that “courts have the inherent power
to compel the guar dians of the public fisc, in this case, the Police Jury of Grant
Parish, to budget adequate funds for the operations of the court to insure that the
proper independence among our three co-equal branches of government be
maintained.” Id. However, in McCain, we again note that the funding at issue was
for physical operation of the court, including telephone services, copiers, recording
equipment, office supplies, and reference materials. The payment for these expenses
was clearly required as statutorily mandated operational expenses. See Id., 440 So.

10

2d at 1371-72, n.4; La. R.S. 33:4713 (providing that “A. Each parish shall provide
and bear the expense of a suitable building and requisite furniture for the sitting of
the district and circuit courts and such offices, furniture, and equipment as may be
needed by the clerks and recorders of the parish for the proper conduct of their
offices and shall provide such other offices as may be needed by the sheriffs of these
courts and by the tax collectors and assessors of the parish and shall provide the
necessary heat and illumination therefore.”) (emphasis added).
We note that the court of appeal cited to its previous jurisprudence, notable,
the two aforementioned cases, McCain and Breaux Bridge, in stating that “‘[c]learly,
the courts of this state are established by our constitution ... and have a right to exist.’
To that end, the judicial branch possesses the inherent power to compel reasonable
and necessary appropriations to serve the public as the state constitution mandates.”
Pineville City Ct., 2021-415, p. 7, 333 So. 3d at 1261. In Konrad, we noted that in
cases before this Court, the Court applied the doctrine in specific situations: “to stop
traffic around the courthouse in Orleans Parish because the noise interrupted court
proceedings, to regulate admission to the bar and define the practice of law, to
require an attorney to represent an indigent, to establish standards governing the
conduct of lawyers and to override statutes which tend to impede or frustrate this
authority, … and to award a fee for the attorney, appointed by the court to represent
an indigent natural parent in an abandonment proceeding, against the stat e agency
which initiated the proceeding.” Konrad, 520 So. 2d at 398 (internal citations
omitted). These cases reveal that we have limited the application of the doctrine to
the specific circumstances and facts of each case presented. W e have even noted
“the inherent powers of the judiciary should be used sparingly and only to the extent
necessary to insure judicial independence and integrity.” Id. , 520 So. 2d at 397
(citing Imbornone v. Early , 401 So. 2d 953 (La. 1981) (Dennis, J. dissenting on
original hearing)). We recently stated, “Mandamus is to be used only when there is

11

a clear and specific legal right to be enforced or a duty that ought to be performed.
It never issues in doubtful cases.” Texas Brine Co., LLC v. Naquin, 2019-1503, p. 7
(La. 1/31/21), 340 So. 3d 720, 725 (per curiam) (emphasis added). The Legislature
has spoken plainly, if not recently, by enacting La. R.S. 13:1888 A, which clearly
provides for discretionary authority on the part of the governing authorities. We are
“compelled to exercise judicial restraint and refrain from encroaching upon the
constitutional delegation of power to the legislative branch. . . .” Hoag, 2004-0857,
p. 8, 889 So. 2d at 1025.7
Finally, City Court raises new arguments it did not plead and which were not
addressed by the trial court as to due process concerns that may arise if th is Court
were to rule in favor of Pineville. City Court implies that La. R.S. 13:1888 A, as
written, is unconstitutional. City Court asserts this Court must interpret the statute
in a way that updates the language and minimums of the statute to meet the current
needs of court expenses in modern times. However, as stated supra, and as we
provided in Lowther, although we will not hesitate to enforce positive law, we will
not “legislate a judicial solution” when the positive law is either otherwise clear, or
nonexistent. See Lowther, 2020-1231, p. 5, 320 So. 3d at 372. As to any implication
that La. R.S. 13:1888 A is unconstitutional, we decline to address such, as it was not
specifically pleaded, nor considered by the lower courts.8

7 In applying the doctrine of inherent powers, the court of appeal stated, “The Court is one of a
class of courts retained by La. Const. art. 5, §§ 1 and 15(A).” Pineville City Ct., 2021-415, pp. 7-
8, 333 So. 3d at 1261. The court in question, as a city court, is a court of limited jurisdiction. La.
C.C.P. art. 4832 (“Trial courts of limited jurisdiction are parish courts, city courts, and justice of
the peace courts.”). In Konrad, we addressed this very argument in dealing with a juvenile court,
which likewise is a court of limited jurisdiction. We stated, “Juvenile courts and other courts of
limited jurisdiction are given less constitutional protection than courts of general jurisdiction.
While such courts were retained by La. Const. art. V, § 15, the Legislature is authorized to abolish
or merge them.” Konrad, 520 So. 2d at 398 ; La. Const. art. V, § 15 (A). Recognizing such
authority further compels us to exercise judicial restraint, especially where the Legislature has
enacted applicable, positive law.

8 “This Court has stated that, while there is no single required procedure or type of proceeding for
attacking a statute’s constitutionality, ‘the long -standing jurisprudential rule of law is … the
unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim
particularized.’” State v. Schoening, 2000-0903, p. 3 (La. 10/17/00), 770 So. 2d 762, 763 (citing

12

Ultimately, we find City Court has failed to show that its petition for
mandamus was an appropriate vehicle for its action. The statutory language at issue,
and the nature of the demand by City Court, clearly have discretional elements left
to the governing authorities. Although City Court could properly seek a mandamus
to fund the statutory minimum, it has not pleaded, nor do the facts show, that
Pineville is funding below th e statutory minimum. I t is abundantly clear that
Pineville i s funding City Court above the minimum set out by the Legislature.
Therefore, we agree with the trial court and find merit in Pineville’s exception of no
cause of action. Because there is no possibility City Court can remove the defect by
amendment, we agree with the trial court that amendment under La. C.C.P. art. 934
was not warranted.
DECREE
In accordance with the above, we reverse the court of appeal, and reinstate the
judgment of the trial court, sustaining the exception of no cause of action and
dismissing the suit with prejudice.
REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.

Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co., Inc., 1994- 1238, p. 8 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So. 2d 859, 864- 65); State v.
Bazile, 2011-2201, p. 5 (La. 1/14/12), 85 So. 3d 1, 7.

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2022-C-00336
P
INEVILLE CITY COURT, ET AL.
VS.
CITY OF PINEVILLE, ET AL.
O
N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD
CIRCUIT, PARISH OF RAPIDES
G
ENOVESE, J., concurs in the result for the following reasons:
I co
ncur in the result reached by the majority in t his matter. I agree that the
Pineville City Court employed the wrong procedural vehicle in its pursuit of
adequate funding for its court. I write separately to opine that that does not preclude
its right to pursue, via ordinary proceedings, funding from the City of Pineville that
is reasonable and necessary for the constitutionally authorized operation of the
Pineville City Court.