Steve Crooks, Et Al. v. State Of Louisiana Through The Department Of Natural Resources

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #005
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 27th day of January, 2023 are as follows:
BY Griffin, J.:
2022-C-00625 STEVE CROOKS, ET AL. VS. STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES (Parish of Rapides)
COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED . TRIA L COUR T JUDGMENT
REINSTATED. SEE OPINION.
Hughes, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

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S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2022-C-00625
STEVE CROOKS, ET AL.
VS.
STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides
G
RIFFIN, J.
We
granted this writ to address whether mandamus may lie to compel the
State to pay a judgment rendered against it for mineral royalty payments. Finding
that the payment of a judgment concerning the return of mineral royalties received
by the State requires legislative appropriation, an act that is discretionary in nature ,
we hold that the appellate court erred in issuing the writ of mandamus.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter arises out of a 2006 class action suit instit uted by Steve Crooks
and Era Lee Crooks ( “Class Plaintiffs”) against the State through the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) concerning the ownership of
riverbanks in the Catahoula Basin and subsequent mineral royalty payments. The
underlying facts of this case and its extensive litigation history are set forth in detail
in the court of appeal opinion. Crooks v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 21-0633 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 3/16/22), ___ So.3d ___, 2022 WL 794167.
In 2015, the trial court recognized Class Plaintiffs as owners of the riverbanks
and ordered LDNR to pay damages for expropriation and mineral royalties received
from the riverbank leases. This Court affirmed the trial court’s award for mineral
royalties but vacated the expropriation award after finding the claim for inverse
condemnation was prescribed. Crooks v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 19 -0160, p.

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20 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So.3d 574, 587. After all legal delays expired, the judgment
became final (“the Royalties Judgment”).
When LDNR failed to satisfy the Royalties Judgment, Class Plaintiffs sought
a mandamus to enforce its payment arguing that depositing funds into the registry of
the court to comply with a final judgment is a ministerial act. LDNR opposed
arguing that mandamus violates La. Const. art. XII, §1 0(C) and La. R.S.
13:5109(B)(2) and that the funds sought were unavailable. The trial court denied the
writ of mandamus. The court of appeal reversed, finding that mandamus is an
appropriate remedy as the funds sought were not public funds and the judgment
could not be enforced by ordinary means. Crooks, 21-0663, pp. 10-11, 2022 WL
794167 at *5-6.
LDNR’s writ application to this Court followed, which we granted. Crooks
v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 22-0625 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 621.
DISCUSSION
The issue before this Court is whether mandamus may lie to satisfy the
payment of the Royalties Judgment. The interpretation of constitutional articles and
statutes is necessarily a question of law to which the de novo standard of review is
applied. Newman v. Marchive Partnership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 07-1890, p. 3
(La. 4/8/08), 979 So.2d 1262, 1265.
The Louisiana Constitution divides governmental pow er among separate
legislative, executive, and judicial branches and provides that no one branch shall
exercise powers belonging to the others. Hoag v. State, 04-0857, p. 4 (La. 12/1/04),
889 So.2d 1019, 1022 (citing La. Const. art. II, §§ 1 and 2). The judicial branch is
prohibited from infringing upon the inherent powers of the legislative and executive
branches. Id. When litigants seek to invoke the power of the judiciary to compel
another branch of government to perform or act, we must closely and ca refully
examine whether the action is within the confines of our constitutional authority. Id.

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A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is directed at a public
officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law. Jazz Casino
Company, L.L.C. v. Bridges, 16-1663 (La. 5/3/17), 223 So.3d 488, 492 (citing La.
C.C.P. arts. 3861 and 3863). “A ‘ministerial duty’ is one ‘in which no element of
discretion is left to the public officer,’ in other words, ‘a simple, definite duty, arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law. ’” Id. (quoting
Hoag, 04-0957, p. 7, 889 So.2d at 1024). “If a public officer is vested with any
element of discretion, mandamus will not lie.” Id.
The Louisiana Constitution expressly waives immunity from suits in contract
or injury to person or property. La. Const. art. XII, § 10(A). However, the Louisiana
Constitution also provides for limitations on this liability and specifies that “[n]o
judgment against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision shall be exigible,
payable, or paid except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the
political subdivision against which the judgment is entered.” La. Const. art. XII, §
10(C). The legislature ena cted La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2) which further emphasizes
any such judgment is only payable by funds appropriated by the legislature for that
specific purpose. These provisions vest sole authority with the legislature to
appropriate the funds necessary to sati sfy a judgment against the state or state
agency. See Hoag, p. 04-0857, pp. 6-7, 889 So.2d at 1023-24.
Class Plaintiffs maintain that the Royalties Judgment does not require
legislative appropriation because the funds sought are not public funds as LDNR
was without legal authority to collect royalties from riverbanks it did not own. They
contend that mandamus is proper because this matter is indistinguishable from Jazz
Casino and Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 20-1231 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 369.
Class Plaintiffs further argue that LDNR’s arguments are barred by res judicata
because the judgment against the department ordering the money into the registry of
the court was final. See Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., v. Weaver, 16-1008 (La. App.

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3 Cir. 5/10/17), 219 So.3d 442. LDNR counters that satisfaction of the Royalties
Judgment is a power that lies only with the legislature because the initial claim arose
in tort. See La. Const. art XII, §10(C); La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2). We agree.
Mandamus may lie against the state where the duty to be compelled is
ministerial and not discretionary. The relevant consideration is “whether the act of
appropriating funds to pay the judgment … is a purely ministerial duty for which
mandamus would be appropriate.” Hoag, 04-0857, p. 6, 889 So.2d at 1023. The act
of appropriating funds is, by its nature, discretionary and specifically granted to the
legislature by La. Const. art. III, § 16. Id ., 04 -0857, p. 7, 889 So.2d at 1024.
However, this Court has recognized specific limited exceptions wherein the duty to
pay a judgment is constitutionally and statutorily mandated and therefore ministerial
in nature. In Jazz Casino, we held the appropriation of funds to pay a refund
judgment for overpaid taxes is a ministerial duty as mandated by La. Const. art. VII,
§ 3(A) and La. R.S. 47:1621. 16-1663, p. 9, 223 So.3d at 495. In Lowther, we held
the clear language of La. Const. art. VI, § 14(A)(2)(e), La. R.S. 33:1992, and La.
R.S. 33:1969 reflects a mandate from the legislature that imposes a ministerial duty
on a political subdivision to pay the back wages owed to firefighters. 20-1231, p. 6,
320 So.3d at 372 -73. These constitutional and statutory provisions operate as de
facto appropriations by the legislature irrespective of the general limitations set forth
in La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2). See Lowther, 20-1231,
p. 6, 320 So.3d at 372-73 (citing Perschall v. State, 96-0322, p. 22 (La. 7/1/97), 697
So.2d 240, 255). Where such provisions exist, courts are merely enforcing the
positive law and not encroaching on functions constitutionally dedicated to the
legislative branch. Lowther, 20-1231, p. 5, 320 So.3d at 372; Hoag, 04-0857, p. 4,
889 So.2d at 1022.
We have previously reco gnized that La. Const. art. XII, §10 creates a
“frustrating dichotomy for the state’s judgment creditors.” Newman, 07-1890, p. 4,

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979 So.2d at 1266; see also Lee Hargrave, “Statutory” and “Hortatory” Provisions
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 653 (1983) (“the apparent
liberality of abolishing most immunity from suit was offset by the continuation of a
severe limitation on a private citizen’s ability to enforce a judgment against the state,
a state agency, or a local governmental entity”). However, Class Plaintiffs cite to no
controlling constitutional or statutory provisions that allocate funds for the purpose
of executing a judgment such as the one at issue here.1 Although we recognize that
Class Plaintiffs are entitled to payment of the Royalties J udgment, the critical
element necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is that a public officer is
not vested with any element of discretion. Jazz Casino, 16-1663, 223 So.3d 488 at
492. If discretion exists, mandamus will not lie. Id. In the absence of constitutional
and statutory provisions similar in effect to those in Jazz Casino and Lowther, the
Royalties Judgment is payable only when funds are appropriated by the legislature.
Thus, the court of appeal erred in issuing the writ of mandamus.
We likewise reject the court of appeal’s finding that the funds subject to the
Royalties Judgment were not public funds thus warranting mandamus. The funds
received from the mineral leases were public funds as they were deposite d into the
State’s general fund. See La. Const. art. VII, §10.16 (dedications of mineral
revenues) and La. R.S. 30:136.1 (proceeds from mineral leases granted by the State
of Louisiana shall be paid into the treasury). Public funds are not subject to seizure.
La. Const. art. XII, §10(C). The Director of LDNR certified that the expenditure of
the funds required to pay the Royalties Judgment would create a deficit in violation

1 Class Plaintiffs’ res judicata argument is similarly misplaced. An order in derogation of the
Louisiana Constitution cannot justify ignoring the very constitutional provision which it violates.
See Newman, 07-1890, p. 8, 979 So.2d at 1268 (“any judicial order compelling the City to pay
those funds would constitute an unconstitutional seizure of public funds under La. Const. art. XII,
§ 10(C)”); Riley v. Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s Office , 94- 0202 (La . 4/4/94), 537 So.2d 395
(“judgment is enforceable only to the extent that any other judgment against a public agency is
enforceable, and is subject to the bar against seizure of public funds”) (citing La. Const. art. XII,
§ 10(C)).

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of the requirements placed upon the expenditure of such funds by the legislature.
See La. C.C.P. art. 3862.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the
judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
CO
URT OF APPEAL REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
REINSTATED

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-C-00625
STEVE CROOKS, ET AL
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
THIRD CIRCUIT, PARISH OF RAPIDES
HUGHES, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent because the facts here are more analogous to an
expropriation or wrongful seizure than to a money judgment. The rightful owner of
immovable property has a security interest in that property. This is not a case where
the government is mandated to “give”, but rather a case of “give back”.