James Bartholomae v. Valero Refining Meraux, LLC

JAMES BARTHOLOMAE * NO. 2022-C-0437

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
VALERO REFINING *
MERAUX, LLC FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
ST. BERNARD 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NO. 21-0482, DIVISION “B”
Honorable Jeanne Nunez Juneau, Judge
******
Judge Rosemary Ledet
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Karen
K. Herman)

Raymond P. Ward
Roland M. Vandenweghe, Jr.,
Taylor E. Brett
ADAMS AND REESE LLP
701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500
New Orleans, LA 70139-4596

Jacque R. Touzet
900 Camp Street, Floor 3
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR

Lance v. Licciardi
LICCIARDI LAW OFFICE, L.L.C.
1019 W. Judge Perez Dr.
Chalmette, LA 70043

Michael C. Ginart, Jr.
2114 Paris Rd.
Chalmette, LA 70043

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND RENDERED
February 1, 2023

RML
This is a negligence action arising out of an accident, fire, and explosion in
PAB
the hydrocracker unit at the Valero refinery in Meraux, Louisiana that occurred on
KKH
April 10, 2020, at 12:46 a.m. (the “Explosion”). Relator—Valero Refining-

Meraux, L.L.C. (“Valero”)—seeks review of the trial court’s May 26, 2022

judgment awarding emotional damages to Respondent, James Bartholomae. In

light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spencer v. Valero

Refining Meraux, L.L.C., 22-00469, 22-00539, 22-00730, ___ So.3d ___ (La.

1/27/23), 2023 WL 533268 (“Spencer 2”),1 we grant Valero’s writ, reverse the trial

court’s judgment, and render judgment dismissing Mr. Bartholomae’s claims

against Valero.

Factual and Procedural Background

On January 14, 2021, Mr. Bartholomae filed a petition for damages in the

justice of the peace court. He claimed “emotional damages” stemming from the

Explosion, including fear, fright, anxiety, inconvenience, and frustration. Valero

1 This court, at Valero’s request, held this writ application pending the Louisiana Supreme

Court’s decision in Spencer 2 case, which was pending when this writ was filed.

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filed exceptions, an answer, and affirmative defenses. The justice of the peace

issued a judgment granting Valero’s motion to dismiss. In response, Mr.

Bartholomae filed a petition for appeal with the trial court pursuant to La. C.C.P.

art. 4924(A).2 Valero again filed exceptions, an answer, and affirmative defenses.

Thereafter, the matter proceeded to trial de novo.3

At trial, Mr. Bartholomae testified that, on the date of the Explosion, he

resided four blocks from Valero’s refinery. He had resided at that location for over

fifteen years. He had been a St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s office employee for thirty

years. He was employed by the St. Bernard Parish District Attorney’s office as an

investigator.

According to Mr. Bartholomae, either his house shaking or the sound of the

Explosion caused him to wake up on the night of the Explosion. After waking up,

he looked out the bathroom window and could see the refinery was on fire. He

described it as a giant fireball. Although Mr. Bartholomae acknowledged that fire

from the refinery’s flares was common, he described the fire from the flares on the

night of the Explosion as larger than the normal flares and more concerning. He

explained that he was concerned because he lacked knowledge of what was in the

air and whether another explosion would occur. He testified that he was anxious

and concerned for his safety and that of his family.

2 La. C.C.P. art. 4924(A) provides that “[a]ppeal from a judgment rendered by a justice of the

peace court or a clerk of court shall be taken to the parish court or, if there is no parish court, to
the district court of the parish in which the justice of the peace court is situated.”
3 La. C.C.P. art. 4924(B) provides that “[t]he case is tried de novo on appeal.”

2

Mr. Bartholomae further testified that he, his wife, and his mother-in-law—

who were together in his house that night—stayed awake for a few hours following

the Explosion watching the news and listening to the radio for any alerts. The next

morning, there was soot covering the family’s vehicles that were parked outside his

house. On cross-examination, Mr. Bartholomae acknowledged that the soot on the

vehicles washed away. On cross-examination, Mr. Bartholomae also

acknowledged that his job required him to deal with life-threatening situations;

however, he explained that, in his job, he possessed knowledge and a certain

amount of control, which he lacked regarding the Explosion.

Following the Explosion, Mr. Bartholomae admitted that he did not smell

any odors, seek counseling, or seek medical attention from a doctor. He defined

“severe emotional distress” to mean that “a person would have trouble

functioning,” and he admitted that he had no trouble functioning. The day after the

Explosion, Mr. Bartholomae returned to his ordinary routine, including work.4

Following trial, the trial court issued written reasons for judgment. In its

reasons, the trial court cited to this court’s decision in Spencer v. Valero Ref.

Meraux, LLC, 21-0383, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/2/22), ___ So.3d ___, 2022 WL

305319 (“Spencer 1”), in support of its finding that Valero was negligent for the

Explosion. In addressing Mr. Bartholomae’s damage claim, the trial court made the

following observations regarding Mr. Bartholomae:

• He observed a “fireball,” which he described as a “scary thing”;

4 Although other witnesses were called to testify, the testimony of the other witnesses related to

Valero’s fault, which is not relevant here.

3

• He expressed concerns about a release of chemicals that could affect his
health and the health of his family, which made him anxious; and

• He remained awake after the Explosion and attempted to obtain information.

Quoting Spencer 1, the trial court observed:

Although Valero's incident report indicates that it monitored
SO2 levels in the air of the neighborhoods surrounding the refinery
and found no significant results, we find that provided little to no
solace to residents, as Valero did not contemporaneously
communicate the results to the public. . . . Proximity to the event,
witnessing injury to others, and contemporaneous reports from
reliable sources that danger is real are indicia of the reliability of
claims of emotional distress. . . . Legitimate concern about one's
health is compensable.

Comparing Mr. Bartholomae’s circumstances to that of the two plaintiffs in

Spencer 1,5 the trial court observed:

Like Spencer, Mr. Bartholomae was in close proximity to the
area of the refinery where the explosion occurred, within four blocks.

5 Spencer 1 involved two plaintiffs—Brittany Spencer and Chloe LaFrance. In Spencer 1, we

outline the pertinent facts as follows:

[T]he explosion occurred 2,000 feet away from Ms. Spencer’s townhouse
apartment and that a huge fire ball or flame appeared above the refinery, lighting
up the night sky. The explosion also caused a shock wave that shook the
apartment and windows and woke Ms. Spencer and Chloe in the middle of the
night. Further, the court described video evidence of emergency vehicles entering
the refinery and neighbors exiting their homes. Eight-year-old Chloe was
frightened and anxious as a result. . . . Ms. Spencer, who was four months
pregnant, was afraid for her family’s safety and specifically about whether
harmful chemicals were released into the air. Her concern led to the family’s
departure from their apartment between April 10 and 13, 2020, and after their
return, Ms. Spencer refused to allow her children to play outside. . . . Although
she and her family moved out of St. Bernard Parish in June 2020, Ms. Spencer
remained anxious about possible adverse health effects from the explosion. . .
.[T]hese circumstances caused compensable emotional distress to Ms. Spencer
and, more minimally, to Chloe.

Spencer 1, 21-0383, pp. 6-7, ___ So.3d at ___, 2022 WL 305319, *3. The Supreme Court
consolidated its review of this court’s decision in Spencer 1 with two other cases, each involving
a single plaintiff. The plaintiffs in each of the other cases were Rosemary Gaglian and Kevreion
Raines. Thus, as the Supreme Court noted in Spencer 2, its review involved the claims of four
plaintiffs seeking to recover emotional distress damages arising out of the Explosion (the
“Plaintiffs”).

4

Through his bathroom window, he observed the refinery on fire.
Additionally, he observed a fireball that he described as “scary.”
Though he did not directly witness injury to others, these observations
indicate to a reasonable person that both injury and real danger were
present. The major concern for Mr. Bartholomae was the release of
chemicals in the air caused by the explosion. While Valero found no
dangerous chemical levels in the air in the community, they failed to
contemporaneously communicate this to the public. Mr.
Bartholomae’s concern for his health and the health of his family from
the chemical release is genuine, serious and reasonable under these
circumstances.

For these reasons, the trial court awarded Mr. Bartholomae $1,250 in damages.

This writ followed.

DISCUSSION

The instant writ application, as noted elsewhere in this writ opinion, is

before this court as an application for review of a trial court’s decision following a

trial de novo conducted pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 4924(C). The applicable

standard of review is the same as in civil cases in general—the manifest error or

clearly wrong standard. Spencer 2, 22-00469, 22-00539, 22-00730, p. 8, ___ So.3d

at ___, 2023 WL 533268, *4 (citing Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 03-1734, p. 9 (La.

4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 98; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989)).

In its writ, Valero contends that the trial court erred in awarding damages for

emotional distress absent physical injury or property damage. Valero further

contends that Mr. Bartholomae’s distress was not severe. Although Valero makes

numerous arguments in its writ regarding what the legal standard should be for

awarding emotional distress damages without physical injury, the Louisiana

Supreme Court in Spencer 2 addressed those arguments and definitely decided this

issue. Because we find Spencer 2 dispositive of this writ, we find it necessary to

provide a summary of that case before reaching the merits of this writ.

Spencer 2 Case

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At the outset, the Supreme Court in Spencer 2 noted the similarities shared

by the four Plaintiffs in the trio of consolidated cases before it. The Supreme Court

observed that “[n]one of the Plaintiffs experienced any physical symptoms, nor

received any medical treatment” and all of the Plaintiffs seek damages “for general

fear and anxiety resulting from the [E]xplosion.” Spencer 2, 22-00469, 22-00539,

22-00730, p. 11, ___ So.3d at ___, 2023 WL 533268, *6.

Next, the Supreme Court addressed the Plaintiffs’ general negligence claim

for emotional distress absent physical damage or injury, observing:

Valero owed a duty to protect those in the surrounding
community. . . . Plaintiffs fall within the broad class of plaintiffs to
whom a duty is owed. In this case, Valero breached the duty it owed,
which was a cause-in-fact of Plaintiffs’ generalized fear and anxiety.
[But,] . . . the element of damages within the parameters of claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress absent physical
damage/injury were not proven. Stringently applying the rule of
Moresi [v. State Through Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries,] 567 So.2d
[1081,] 1096 [(La.1990)], Plaintiffs failed to prove “the “especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the
special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is
not spurious.” No Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence that the
mental disturbance suffered was “serious.” Moresi, 567 So.2d at 1096.
Viewing the record in its entirety, we find that a reasonable factual
basis does not exist to support the awards for negligent infliction of
emotional distress; thus, we find the lower courts manifestly erred.

Spencer 2, 22-00469, 22-00539, 22-00730, pp. 17-18, ___ So.3d at ___, 2023 WL

533268, *9. The Supreme Court added that “recovery for negligent infliction of

emotional distress absent physical damage/injury is not precluded; however, given

the nature of such claims, a trier of fact must be heedful of the goal of preventing

spurious claims, and that not every occasion that causes some harm yields

concomitant liability and compensatory damages.” Spencer 2, 22-00469, 22-

00539, 22-00730, p. 15, ___ So.3d at ___, 2023 WL 533268, *8.

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Lastly, the Supreme Court addressed the Plaintiffs’ codal nuisance claim,

observing:

A landowner's right of ownership does “require that he tolerate
some inconvenience from the lawful use of a neighbor's land.” Based
upon the facts of the cases before us, Plaintiffs have failed to prove
that Valero “interfered substantially” with their enjoyment of their
property. Proof of mere inconvenience is insufficient, and the codal
doctrine of nuisance may not be used as a grounds to provide
remedies for claims which would otherwise fail under the guidelines
set forth herein relative to negligent infliction of emotional distress
absent physical damage/injury. Additionally, in order to recover, a
plaintiff asserting claims under La. Civ. Code arts. 667-669 must
prove damages. . . . Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of
proving damages.

Spencer 2, 22-00469, 22-00539, 22-00730, p. 20, ___ So.3d at ___, 2023

WL 533268, *11.

Summarizing, the Supreme Court acknowledges that the facts regarding

each of the Plaintiffs in the trio of consolidated cases before were different and

commented that “some approach the brink of that Plaintiff having made the

requisite showing.” Id. But, the Supreme Court found that none of the Plaintiffs

satisfied the burden of proving an entitlement to an emotional damages award. Id.

Stated otherwise, the Supreme Court found that none of the Plaintiffs established

the mental disturbance that Plaintiff suffered was “serious.”

Mr. Bartholomae’s Case

Mr. Bartholomae—similar to the Spencer 2 Plaintiffs—experienced no

physical symptoms, received no medical treatment, and seeks damages for general

fear and anxiety resulting from the Explosion. Although the facts here are different

in some respects from those of each of the Plaintiffs in the trio of cases in

Spencer 2, every fact on which a finding that Mr. Bartholomae would be entitled to

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emotional distress damages is shared by one or more of the Plaintiffs in Spencer 2.6

Those facts are as follows:

• Mr. Bartholomae’s closeness to the refinery—four blocks from it;

• Mr. Bartholomae’s feeling the vibration or seeing the fire from the
Explosion;

• Mr. Bartholomae’s losing sleep following the Explosion;

6 The facts regarding the two plaintiffs in Spencer 1 are set forth elsewhere in this opinion. The

facts as to the other two plaintiffs are as follows:

Kevreion Raines

When the explosion occurred, Plaintiff, Kevreion Raines, was at her home
helping her aunts, Robin Leflore and Lisa Leflore, change the trach tube for her
mother, Rosalind Leflore, a ventilator-dependent ALS patient. The explosion
sounded “like a bomb” to her. She felt “the vibration,” and the house shook. The
lights began to flicker, and the alarms of Ms. Rosalind’s ventilator went off. Ms.
Rosalind became distressed. Ms. Raines and her aunts attempted to settle her
down and finish the trach care. When Ms. Raines went outside, she saw “big gray
clouds of smoke[,]” which was “very scary[.]” She did not notice any unusual
odors or smoke in the house, nor in the area around the home. Ms. Raines
remained at her mother’s bedside until later that morning.

At first, Ms. Raines had trouble sleeping, but she returned to her normal
sleep schedule a couple of days after the explosion. Ms. Raines continued to feel
uncomfortable living in the house out of fear it may happen again. She was of the
belief that the explosion caused cracks in the ceiling and “little small cracks
within the floors” of the home. At the time of trial, Ms. Raines felt fear in the
back of her mind and remained uncertain about what was in the air and if it was
safe.

Rosemary Gagliano

At the time of the explosion, Plaintiff, Rosemary Gagliano, was staying at
her mother’s home. She heard a loud “boom” that shook everything in the home.
The noise woke her up and scared her. She witnessed a “glow,” and the explosion
“lit up the house through the blinds[.]” Ms. Gagliano was “shaky and very
scared.” She went outside and saw the flames. She and her mother left the home
and began driving away from the refinery; however, the roadway was blocked.
Therefore, Ms. Gagliano drove in the opposite direction and went to her sister’s
home nearby. Ms. Gagliano and family members sat outside until early morning
“nervous” and “shaking[.]” Eventually, she went inside and dozed. She returned
home the evening of April 10, 2020. Ms. Gagliano remained nervous that an
explosion was going to happen again. The explosion did not affect her daily
lifestyle, she was “just leery about it[.]”

Spencer 2, 22-00469, 22-00539, 22-00730, pp. 5-7, ___ So.3d at ___, 2023 WL 533268, *3-4.

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• Mr. Bartholomae’s worries over if something was in the air and if
another explosion might occur; and

• Mr. Bartholomae’s fear for his health and safety and that of his
family.

None of these facts, alone or taken together, was found to be sufficient to meet the

Spencer 2 Plaintiffs’ burden of proving “serious” mental distress.7

Summarizing, Mr. Bartholomae—like the Spencer 2 Plaintiffs—failed to

meet his burden of proving “serious” mental distress. Mr. Bartholomae’s

circumstances cannot be distinguished from the Spencer 2 Plaintiffs’

circumstances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s holding in Spencer 2 is

dispositive and dictates that we reverse the trial court’s award of damages to Mr.

Bartholomae.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Valero’s writ application, reverse the

trial court’s May 26, 2022 judgment awarding damages to Mr. Bartholomae, and

render judgment dismissing Mr. Bartholomae’s claims against Valero.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED AND RENDERED

7 In so finding, we note the lack of a definition of the term “serious” in Spencer 2. See Spencer 2,

22-00469, 22-00539, 22-00730, p. 20, ___ So.3d at ___, 2023 WL 533268, *16 (Crain, J.,
concurring) (observing that “[t]he problem with the majority's approach is that “serious” is not
defined; rather, it is left to be defined in an ad hoc manner”).

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