Belinda Lassalle v. Honorable Chelsey R. Napoleon, in Her Official Capacity as Clerk of Court for the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans

BELINDA LASSALLE * NO. 2022-CA-0460

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
HONORABLE CHELSEY R. *
NAPOLEON, IN HER FOURTH CIRCUIT
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS *
CLERK OF COURT FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT FOR *******
THE PARISH OF ORLEANS

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2021-08871, DIVISION “D”
Honorable Nakisha Ervin-Knott, Judge
******
Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,
Judge Rachael D. Johnson)

Gary John Giepert
THE GIEPERT LAW FIRM, LLC
4603 South Carrollton Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Geraldine Broussard Baloney
Abril B. Sutherland
BROUSSARD BALONEY LAW FIRM
3852 Napoleon Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70125

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

REVERSED AND REMANDED

DECEMBER 20, 2022

JCL This is a detrimental reliance case. Plaintiff-Appellant, Belinda Lassalle

SCJ (“Appellant”), seeks review of the district court’s judgment sustaining the

RDJ exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendant-appellee, the

Honorable Chelsey R. Napoleon, in her official capacity as Clerk of Court for the

Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans (“the Clerk’s Office”), and the

subsequent judgment denying the motion for new trial filed by Appellant. For the

reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the district court sustaining the

exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand the matter to the district

court for further proceedings.

The Appellant alleges in her Petition that she retired from the Clerk’s Office

as chief deputy clerk on December 31, 2005. At the time of her retirement,

Appellant was fully vested in the Clerk’s Office retirement program. Appellant

returned to work as a deputy clerk in August 2006. In order to maintain her

retirement benefits, Appellee could not work more than a certain number of hours

each year. See La. R.S. 11:1513.1 Appellant meticulously kept track of her hours

to be certain she did not go over the maximum allowed.

1 In 2006, La. R.S. 11:1513 provided as follows:

Reemployment of a retiree

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Appellant stopped working for the Clerk’s Office some time in 2015 when

the number of hours she worked that year approached the maximum number of

hours allowed under La. R.S. 11:1513. Appellant told the then Clerk of Court (“the

Former Clerk”) that she would be willing to return to work if there was any way

for her to work without her losing retirement benefits. In November of 2015, the

Former Clerk informed Appellant that she could work as an independent contractor

and as such, would not be considered “reemployed” by the Clerk’s Office and

would not be subject to the reduction of benefits provided for in La. R.S. 11:1513.

On November 2, 2015, Appellant entered into a written agreement

(“Agreement”) with the Former Clerk to return to work as an independent

contractor. After entering into the Agreement, the Clerk’s Office did not report

Appellant’s hours to the Louisiana Clerks of Court Retirement and Relief Fund

(“LCCR”), and Appellant continued to receive retirement benefits.

By letter dated November 9, 2020, the LCCR informed Appellant that she

had worked in excess of the allowable hours in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and

2020 and thus had been overpaid in retirement benefits during these years. The

A retiree receiving retirement benefits from the system may be
temporarily reemployed by a clerk but the retiree shall not be or
become a member of the system during such reemployment. If the
retiree is reemployed in any capacity for more than sixty working
days, or the equivalent thereof, during any calendar year, the
benefits payable to the retiree shall be reduced by the amount he
earned after sixty working days, or the equivalent thereof. The
retiree and the clerk shall immediately notify the board of the date
of reemployment, the amount of salary paid, any changes in salary,
the number of hours employed per week, the estimated duration of
reemployment, and the date of the termination of the
reemployment. If the retiree dies during reemployment, benefits
shall be paid to any other person as if death occurred regardless of
reemployment pursuant to any option which may have been
selected by the retiree at the time of retirement.

La. R.S. 11:1513 was amended in 2018 to increase the number of allowable hours to six hundred
thirty. See Acts 2018, No. 108, § 1.

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letter further informed Appellant that LCCR would proceed to collect the

overpayments by reducing Appellant’s future benefit payments until fully

recovered. Appellant contested the overpayment assessment.

A formal administrative hearing was held before the Board of Trustees for

the Louisiana Clerks of Court Retirement and Relief Fund (the “Board”) on March

8, 2021. The Board issued its written opinion on March 22, 2021. The Board found

that Appellant was an “employee” of the Clerk’s Office for purposes of La. R.S.

11:1513 during the time she worked after her retirement and that she was overpaid

$89,661.43 by the retirement system.

Appellant appealed the Board’s decision to the Nineteenth Judicial District

Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge in accordance with La. R.S. 49:964.2 By

judgment rendered on September 29, 2021, the district court denied the appeal. The

record does not indicate that an appeal of the district court judgment was taken.

Appellant filed the present action against the Clerk’s Office on October 29,

2021. The Petition alleges that “[t]he statements of [the Former Clerk] . . . induced

[Appellant] to modify her work schedule to assist the clerk’s office with its staffing

issues. Unfortunately, this modification worked to [Appellant’s] extreme

detriment[.]” The Petition further alleges that “[Appellant] reasonably relied on

[the Former Clerk] and changed her behavior to her detriment. She has now

suffered injuries because of that reasonable reliance[.]”

The Clerk’s Office filed several exceptions, including an exception of lack

of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. The Clerk’s Office

alleges that the Louisiana Constitution “does not permit suits in quasi-contract,”

2 La. R.S. 49:964 was redesignated as La. R.S. 49:978.1 by Acts 2022, No. 663, § 1.

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including “suits for detrimental reliance,” against the state, a state agency, or a

political subdivision.

A hearing was held on March 17, 2022. By judgment rendered on March 30,

2022, the district court sustained the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction

filed by the Clerk’s Office. Appellant filed a motion for new trial wherein she

alleged that the judgment sustaining the exception of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction was “clearly contrary to the law.” The matter came for hearing on

April 22, 2022, and by judgment signed on May 4, 2022, the district court denied

the motion for new trial. This appeal follows.

Appellant’s sole assignment of error is that the district court erred in finding

that the Clerk’s Office was immune from claims based upon detrimental reliance

and that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear this dispute.

Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear

and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of

the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art.

2. Subject matter jurisdiction is created by the constitution or by legislative

enactment; the parties cannot confer or waive it. See La. C.C.P. art. 3; McCann v.

McCann, 11-2434, p. 4 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 544, 547. The defense of sovereign

immunity is a challenge to the exercise of a state court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. State v. Murphy Cormier Gen. Contractors, Inc., 15-111, p. 6 (La.

App. 3 Cir. 6/3/15), 170 So.3d 370, 375. Whether a court has subject matter

jurisdiction is reviewed on appeal under the de novo standard of review. Banerjee

v. Banerjee, 17-245, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/13/17), 258 So.3d 699, 701.

“Sovereign immunity bars a court from exercising jurisdiction in suits

against the state unless the state has elected to waive its immunity.” Mid-City

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Auto., L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., Off. of State Police, 21-1024, p. 5

(La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 50, 54, reh’g denied (5/12/2022), writ denied,

22-00918 (La. 10/4/22), 347 So.3d 889 (citing Coleman v. Court of Appeals of

Maryland, 566 U.S. 30, 35, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1333, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012)).

Article XII, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 19743 contains an

unequivocal, self-executing waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity as to suit and

liability in contract and tort cases. Fulmer v. State, Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries,

10-2779, p. 5 (La. 7/1/11), 68 So.3d 499, 503.

Appellant argues that detrimental reliance claims sound in contract and thus,

the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity applies to such claims. The

Clerk’s Office counters that claims for detrimental reliance are quasi-contractual

claims and fall outside of the waiver of sovereign immunity.

The theory of detrimental reliance is codified at La. C.C. art. 1967, which

pertinently provides, “A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or

should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to

his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying.” The doctrine of

detrimental reliance is “designed to prevent injustice by barring a party from taking

a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions, representations, or silence.”

Babkow v. Morris Bart, P.L.C., 98-0256 pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/98), 726

So.2d 423, 427 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Orr v. Bancroft Bag, Inc.,

29,046, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/22/97), 687 So.2d 1068, 1070; Andrus v. Andrus,

93-856 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/2/94), 634 So.2d 1254, 1258).

3 Article XII, Section 10(A), states: “Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision

shall be immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or property.”

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A party claiming detrimental reliance must prove three elements by a

preponderance of the evidence: “(1) a representation by conduct or word; (2)

justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one’s detriment because of the

reliance.” Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459, p. 31 (La.

4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 59. “Significantly, to prevail on a detrimental reliance

claim, Louisiana law does not require proof of a formal, valid, and enforceable

contract.” Id.

In Murphy Cormier Gen. Contractors, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal

held that a manufacturer’s claim of detrimental reliance against the Department of

Health and Hospitals was a contractual claim and, thus, came within the

constitutional provision waiving sovereign immunity for contract and tort claims.

We are persuaded by the court’s reasoning as follows:

Notably, La. Civ. Code art. 1967 is under that
portion of the Louisiana Civil Code that pertains to
contracts. Scholarly interpretation of La. Civ. Code art.
1967 buttresses the argument that detrimental reliance
claims sound in contract: “the new article of the
Louisiana Civil Code subtracts induced reliance from the
quasi-delictual field and places it where it belongs, in
contract.” Saul Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48
La. L.Rev. 3, 27 (1987). . . .

The State alleges Murphy’s detrimental reliance
claim does not sound in contract, and therefore the State
is immune from suit. Even if we were to find merit in this
claim, which we do not, this court has previously held the
State is estopped from alleging Murphy’s tort claim has
prescribed and that holding is res judicata. . . .

The State made promises to Murphy which it did
not keep, and he relied on those promises to his
detriment. The State’s promise, and his reliance
thereupon, form the basis of an enforceable contract. The
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1967, Revision Comment
(D) provides that “[u]nder this Article, a promise
becomes an enforceable obligation [a contract] when it
is made in a manner that induces the other party to rely

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on it to his detriment.” A formal, written, underlying
contract is not necessary to prove the existence of a
binding contractual agreement where the plaintiff can
show a promise was made, he relied on the promise, the
promise was broken, and as a result he suffered loss. . . .

Detrimental reliance, codified in the Louisiana
Civil Code under the law of “Conventional Obligations
or Contracts” is a claim based on a contractual
obligation. This article appears in the Civil Code under
the sub-heading “Cause” as part of the law on contracts
in La. Civ.Code art.1967, (emphasis added) which
provides in pertinent part:

Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.

A party may be obligated by a promise when he
knew or should have known that the promise would
induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and
the other party was reasonable in so relying.

Following the adoption of Article 1967, there
clearly was a contract breached in this case because
post-1967 claims based on “detrimental reliance” are
contractual claims. . . . The trial court and this court had
subject matter jurisdiction to render a valid judgment . . .
. The State . . . does not enjoy sovereign immunity to
breach its contractual obligations or to engage in activity
that deliberately causes “injury to person or property.”
La. Const. art. 12, § 10(A)-(B).

Murphy Cormier Gen. Contractors, 15-111, pp. 4-16, 170 So.3d at 374-81

(emphasis and italics in original).

The Clerk’s Office cites Canal/Claiborne, Ltd. v. Stonehedge Dev., LLC, 14-

0664 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So.3d 627, and W. Jefferson Med. Ctr. Med. Staff ex rel.

Boraski v. State, unpub., 11-1718 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/13), 2013 WL 7174240, in

support of her argument that detrimental reliance claims are quasi-contractual and,

thus, fall outside the constitutional waiver of sovereign immunity for contract and

tort cases. While Canal/Claiborne and W. Jefferson Med. Ctr. held that quasi-

contractual claims fall outside of art. XII, § 10(A)’s waiver of immunity, these

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cases presented claims for unjust enrichment, not detrimental reliance, and are

therefore inapposite. We agree with the ratio decidendi as we previously noted,

detrimental reliance claims are contractual.4

Finally, the Clerk’s Office argues that, in accordance with Cott Index Co. v.

Jagneaux, 96-860 (La. App. 3 Cir 12/26/96), 685 So.2d 656, a clerk of court may

not contractually bind a successor clerk and that, accordingly, the terms of the

contract with the Former Clerk are not binding on the Clerk. The Clerk did not

raise this argument in the district court, and it is not properly before this court at

this time.

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s judgment

sustaining the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand the

matter to the district court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

4 In its appellate brief, the Clerk’s Office refers to Appellant’s claim for “unjust enrichment.”

The theory of detrimental reliance is codified at La. C.C. art. 2298, which pertinently provides,
“A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is bound to
compensate that person.” We interpret the allegations of the Petition to assert a claim for
detrimental reliance, an interpretation supported not only by Appellant but also by the Clerk’s
Office characterization of the Appellant’s claim provided in her memorandum in support of
exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed in the district court: “[The] Petition makes a
claim for detrimental reliance.”

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