Jill Stauder and Shelly Stauder, Individually and on Behalf of the David Stauder, Jr. v. Shell Oil Company, Avondale Shipyards, Inc., Anco Insulations, Inc., Lou-Con, Inc., the McCarty Corporation and Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc.
Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 4th Cir., February 15, 2023
Jill Stauder and Shelly Stauder, Individually and on Behalf of the David Stauder, Jr. v. Shell Oil Company, Avondale Shipyards, Inc., Anco Insulations, Inc., Lou-Con, Inc., the McCarty Corporation and Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc., No. 2022-CA-0593 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. June 3, 2024).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 376 So. 3d 837 not in our corpus
- 382 So. 3d 138 not in our corpus
- 379 So. 3d 636 not in our corpus
- 374 So. 3d 135 not in our corpus
- Turner v. Lyons 867 So. 2d 13
- Quinn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 774 So. 2d 1093
- Norfleet v. LIFEGUARD TRANSP. SERVICE, INC. 934 So. 2d 846
- Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp. 623 So. 2d 1257
- Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc. 341 So. 2d 332
- Dixon v. Travelers Ins. Co. 842 So. 2d 478
- 375 So. 3d 479 not in our corpus
- 376 So. 3d 130 not in our corpus
- 376 So. 3d 134 not in our corpus
- 376 So. 3d 136 not in our corpus
- Williams v. Placid Oil Co. 224 So. 3d 1101
- 365 So. 3d 617 not in our corpus
- 366 So. 3d 75 not in our corpus
- 324 So. 3d 1054 not in our corpus
- 324 So. 3d 1059 not in our corpus
- Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. 947 So. 2d 171
- Mathieu v. STATE, DOTD 598 So. 2d 676
Opinion text
JILL STAUDER AND SHELLY * NO. 2022-CA-0593
STAUDER, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF THE *
DECEASED, DAVID COURT OF APPEAL
STAUDER, JR. *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
VERSUS *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
SHELL OIL COMPANY, *******
AVONDALE SHIPYARDS,
INC., ANCO INSULATIONS,
INC., LOU-CON, INC., THE
MCCARTY CORPORATION
AND TAYLOR-SEIDENBACH,
INC.
APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2016-02190, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M. Medley
******
Judge Rachael D. Johnson
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)
ON REMAND FROM THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
Calvin Clifford Fayard, Jr.
D. Blayne Honeycutt
FAYARD & HONEYCUTT
519 Florida Avenue Southwest
Denham Springs, LA 70726
Lewis Owens Unglesby
Lance C. Unglesby
Jamie F. Gontarek
Adrian M. Simm, Jr.
UNGLESBY LAW FIRM
112 Founders Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
Lindsey A. Cheek
THE CHEEK LAW FIRM
650 Poydras Street
Suite 2310
New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
McGready Lewis Richeson
Ernest George Foundas
Milele N. St. Julien
Francis Xavier deBlanc, III
PUGH ACCARDO HAAS RADECKER & CAREY, LLC
1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3600
New Orleans, LA 70163
Kelly Brechtel Becker
Erin E. Bambrick
Trinity A. Morale
LISKOW & LEWIS
701 Poydras Street, Suite 5000
New Orleans, LA 70139-5099
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
AFFIRMED
June 3, 2024
RDJ
TFL
DNA
This matter is before the Court on remand from the Louisiana Supreme
Court. In Stauder v. Shell Oil Co., 23-00619 (La. 1/17/24), 376 So.3d 837, the
Louisiana Supreme Court vacated Stauder v. Shell Oil Co., 22-0593 (La. App. 4
Cir. 2/15/23), 382 So.3d 138 (hereinafter “Stauder I”), and ordered this Court to
reconsider our prior ruling in light of Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., LLC, 23-
00170 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So.3d 636, 640, reh'g denied, 23-00170 (La. 12/7/23),
374 So.3d 135. In compliance with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s order and for
the reasons assigned below, we affirm the April 14, 2022 district court judgment
awarding $2,750,000 in wrongful death damages to each of the Appellees—sisters
Jill and Shelley Stauder (“the Stauders”)— for the death of their father, David
Stauder, Jr., due to mesothelioma.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
The facts of this matter were recounted in Stauder I, wherein Appellant,
Union Carbide Corporation (“UCC”), sought review of the district court’s April
14, 2022 judgment, which was rendered in conformity with a jury verdict,
awarding the Stauders a total of $5,500,000 in wrongful death damages. Stauder I
included the following summation of the testimony adduced at trial regarding the
Stauders’ respective damages:
1
We note that at the beginning of the trial, counsel
for the Stauders explained to the jury that Shelley would
not be present at trial because she suffers from a “mental
disability” and that there was a doctor’s report which
explained her absence. The jury was instructed to listen
to what witnesses said about Shelley’s relationship with
her father. Both Jill Stauder and Mr. Stauder’s girlfriend,
Anna Bordelon, testified about the Stauders’ relationship
with their father. Ms. Bordelon’s testimony expounded
on Shelley’s relationship with her father, while Jill
principally testified about her personal relationship with
her father.
Ms. Bordelon, who was in a twenty-six year
relationship with Mr. Stauder, testified that the Stauders
were both extremely close to their father, including prior
to Mr. Stauder’s illness. Shelley, Ms. Bordelon related,
lived in a separate house on the same property with Ms.
Bordelon and Mr. Stauder for approximately five to six
years. She further testified that Shelley visited her father
daily and would have dinner with him. Ms. Bordelon
further explained that it was Shelley who took her father
to the emergency room the first time he passed out at
home because he was unable to breathe.
Ms. Bordelon further attested to the Stauders being
extremely upset when their father was diagnosed with
mesothelioma. She testified that while she took care of
Mr. Stauder, the Stauders also helped take care of him,
including caring for him on the weekends. Ms. Bordelon
explained that Shelley was currently still grieving her
father and that she did not believe Shelley’s emotional
state would ever be the same following his passing. She
further testified that Jill also took her father’s death hard.
She related that both sisters were “really close to their
dad” and were continuing to have “a very hard time.”
Jill testified that she is a registered nurse and at the
time of her father’s illness and passing she was a
traveling nurse. She related that before her father
became sick, they spent time together daily and their
relationship morphed into more of a friendship. They ate
Sunday dinner together every weekend and talked all the
time, she explained. According to her testimony, she and
her father enjoyed playing and watching golf games, as
well as watching Saints games together.
She testified that both she and Shelley lived close
to their father and spent a lot of time with him. She
2
related that her father loved his kids. She further
explained that she and her father had a stronger bond
because of the loss of their brother, who was close to
both her and her father.
Jill testified that prior to placing Mr. Stauder in
hospice she was taking care of him with the assistance, at
times, from Ms. Bordelon and Shelley. She explained
that she decided to place him in hospice after he fell and
broke some of his ribs. He was in hospice for two weeks
before he passed. Jill testified that Shelley was with their
father when he passed.
Following Mr. Stauder’s death, Jill testified that
she later met and married a man from New Zealand,
where she eventually relocated. She related being
unhappy at her wedding because of the void she felt from
her father’s absence. She also testified that she daily
laments that her two-year old son did not get to meet her
father. It was hard to remain in New Orleans after her
brother and father’s deaths, so she relocated to New
Zealand, she explained.
Stauder I, 22-0593, pp. 7-9, 382 So.3d at 144-45.
In consideration of the foregoing testimony under the abuse of discretion
review, this Court affirmed the aforementioned district court judgment. Id., 22-
0593, p. 10, 382 So.3d at 145-46. The Louisiana Supreme Court later granted
UCC’s writ of certiorari, vacating Stauder I, and remanded this matter “for
reconsideration of the jury’s award of wrongful death damages in light of the
standards of review enunciated by this Court” in Pete. Stauder, 23-00619, p. 1,
376 So.3d at 837. Below, we apply the Pete Court’s holdings.
Standard of Review
We previously set forth in Stauder I the underlying meaning of wrongful
death damages and the pre-Pete abuse of discretion standard:
“Damages for wrongful death are intended to
compensate the victim’s beneficiaries for their loss,
following the victim's death.” Turner v. Lyons, 03-0186,
p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/28/04), 867 So.2d 13, 21; La.
3
Civ. Code art. 2324.1. “Elements of damages
for wrongful death include loss of love and affection, loss
of services, loss of support, medical expenses and funeral
expenses.” Id., 03-0186, pp. 11-12, 867 So.2d at 21. The
plaintiff has the burden of proving definite loss. Id., 03-
0186, p. 13, 867 So.2d at 22 (citing Quinn v. Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc., 34,280 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So.2d
1093).
The determination of the amount of damages is [a]
factual determination for the jury and is “entitled to great
deference on review.” Norfleet v. Lifeguard Transp.
Serv., Inc., 05-0501, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/06), 934
So.2d 846, 855 (quoting La. Civ. Code art. 2324.1).
[Internal citations omitted]. The discretion vested in the
trier of fact is “great,” and even vast, so that an appellate
court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.
Youn v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1261 (La.
1993).
Moreover, “[r]easonable persons frequently
disagree about the measure of general damages in a
particular case.” Id. “It is only when the award is, in
either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of
fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to
the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances
that the appellate court should increase or reduce the
award.” Id. “Each case is different, and the adequacy or
inadequacy of the award should be determined by the
facts or circumstances particular to the case under
consideration.” Id., 623 So.2d at 1260; see also Turner,
03-0186, p. 11, 867 So.2d at 21-22 (citing Coco v.
Winston Industries, Incorporated, 341 So.2d 332
(La.1977)).
In Dixon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 02-1364, pp. 14-15
(La.App. 4 Cir. 4/2/03), 842 So.2d 478, this Court further
explained Youn’s holding that it is only after a
determination has been made that the trier of fact abused
its discretion that it becomes appropriate for the appellate
court to review an award of damages in comparison with
prior awards . . . .
Stauder I, 22-0593, pp. 3-4, 382 So.3d at 142.
The Pete Court recently altered the well-settled abuse of discretion standard
of review in damage award cases. It determined that “some measure of objectivity”
4
needed to be “incorporated into the determination of an award’s reasonableness, so
that there is some standard for comparison” due to the “inherently subjective
nature of the abuse of discretion standard.” Pete, 23-00170, p. 2, 379 So.3d at 639.
Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that appellate courts “must consider
relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of
fact’s award is an abuse of discretion.” Id. “[R]eview of prior awards is not the
only factor to be considered in evaluating whether a general damage award is an
abuse of discretion; it is a starting point. No two cases will be identical.” Id., 23-
00170, p. 9, 379 So.3d at 643.
Deciding whether the trier of fact abused its discretion remains the initial
inquiry, but to evaluate the issue, appellate courts are “to include a consideration of
prior awards in similar cases, as well as the particular facts and circumstances of
the case under review.” Id., 23-00170, p. 10, 379 So.3d at 644. “‘It is only when
the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could
assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the
particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or reduce the
award.’” Id., 23-00170, p. 9, 379 So. 3d at 643 (quoting Youn, 623 So.2d 1257 at
1261).
Analysis
Our review of the wrongful death damage awards in similar cases reveals
recent awards ranging from $500,000 to $750,000 for adult children for the loss of
a parent. In 2023, the First Circuit held that a jury’s wrongful death award of
$10.5 million in wrongful death damages to seven adult children, amounting to
$1.5 million to each child, was excessive and reduced the award to $500,000 to
each child. Glaser v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 22-0534, pp. 21-22 (La. App. 1 Cir.
5
8/30/23), 375 So.3d 479, 495, writ denied, 23-01346 (La. 1/10/24), 376 So.3d 130,
and writ denied, 23-01314 (La. 1/10/24), 376 So.3d 134, and writ denied, 23-
01300 (La. 1/10/24), 376 So.3d 136. In Glaser, the adult children lost their father,
an 89 year-old, following a car accident and two-weeks of hospitalization. Id., 22-
0534, pp. 3-5, 375 So.3d at 484-85. The Glaser Court reasoned that “[w]hile no
one questions the love, affection, and companionship enjoyed by the Glaser family,
$1.5 million to each child is unsupportable in light of the fact that these adult
children were not members of their father’s household or dependent upon him for
support.” Id., 22-0534, pp. 21-22, 375 So.3d at 495.
Moreover, the Third Circuit upheld an award of $750,000 in wrongful death
damages to each of the adult children of a woman who died from mesothelioma,
where each child testified at trial as to the impact of their mother’s death. Williams
v. Placid Oil Co., 16-839, p. 17-21, (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So. 3d 1101,
1111-14.
In Lege v. Union Carbide Corp., 20-0252, pp. 29-32 (La. App. 4 Cir.
4/1/21), 365 So.3d 617, 638-640, as clarified on reh’g, 20-0252 (La. App. 4 Cir.
5/12/21), 366 So.3d 75, writ denied, 21-00792 (La. 10/1/21), 324 So.3d 1054, and
writ denied, 21-00775 (La. 10/1/21), 324 So.3d 1059, which this Court discussed
in Stauder I,1 this Court affirmed a $500,000 wrongful death damage jury awards
in a mesothelioma case to two adult children, respectively, who testified at trial,
but reduced the award to the remaining non-testifying children to $100,000 each.
1 In Stauder I, this Court reasoned that Lege’s reduction in the award to non-testifying children
was inapplicable to Shelley Stauder, who unlike the non-testifying Lege children, was unable to
testify at trial due to her mental disability and where detailed testimony was made on her behalf
as to the unique bond she lost with her father. Stauder I, 22-0593, p. 10, 382 So.3d at 145.
6
Furthermore, in Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 05-1511, p. 40-44 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06), 947 So.2d 171, 197-99, this Court upheld a wrongful death
award of $562,000 each to two adult daughters of a mesothelioma victim, where
the Appellant, the sole defendant remaining at trial, was found responsible for
42.58% of the total award.
With these cases in mind, we now turn to the facts of the instant matter. As
noted above, the jury heard testimony that the impact of Mr. Stauder’s death on his
daughters was devastating, as their close-knit family went from three persons to
two. The Stauders had already lost a brother, who predeceased their father. Both
daughters assisted in caring for their father prior to his death until he could no
longer be cared for at home. Jill left the country when she married following her
father’s death because it was hard for her to remain in the area after his passing.
Shelley, who has a mental disability, is described as having a diminished emotional
state since Mr. Stauder’s death, according to Ms. Bordelon. The testimony elicited
at trial reflects that the Stauders are now a disjointed family, with each sister still
mourning their father in their own distinct way:
The jury heard testimony about the relationship
Mr. Stauder had with each of his daughters, who were
both distraught and adversely impacted by their father’s
illness and death in distinct ways. Although generalized
testimony about the mutual love the Stauders and their
father [was] shared, specific testimony was offered
regarding the unique relationship each daughter had with
their father.
For Shelley, who visited and dined with her father
daily for six years, her mental health worsened because
of her father’s passing. Jill, who visited her father often
and bonded with him over activities after her brother’s
death, experiences guilt because Mr. Stauder missed her
wedding and meeting his grandson. The record reflects
that both sisters loved their father and spent copious
amounts of time with him in good health and in illness.
7
The testimony establishes that each sister has sustained
loss of love and affection from their father, who they
each still grieve.
Stauder I, pp. 9-10, 382 So.3d at 145.
The jury’s award to the Stauders of $2,750,000 each is substantially greater
than the range of the aforementioned jurisprudential awards. However, these cases
are distinguishable. We do not find that the wrongful death awards under the
unique facts presented at trial are beyond what a reasonable trier of fact would
award considering the testimony adduced at trial detailing the devastating effects
Mr. Stauder’s extended and debilitating illness and resulting death has had on both
of his daughters. As the Williams Court noted, large wrongful death awards have
often been upheld on appeal in Louisiana courts “‘where the decedent . . . and
minor children had extraordinarily close and loving relationships,’” but adult
children in an “extremely close and loving family” can also be deeply devastated
by the loss of a parent. Williams, 16-839, p. 21, 224 So.3d at 1114 (quoting
Mathieu v. State, Dept. of Trans. and Dev., 598 So.2d 676, 682 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1992)). The jury found that to be the case here. Jury awards are not arbitrarily
decided. The district court did not abuse its discretion in rendering its judgment in
conformity with the jury’s awards.
We disagree with Appellant’s position that the application of Pete’s holding
requires this Court to inextricably anchor current awards to past jurisprudential
awards. To find otherwise would usurp the jury’s role to determine the amount of
damages based on the particularized circumstances presented before that jury.
Moreover, such a limited application of Pete to past jurisprudential awards does
not consider other factors, such as inflation.
Decree
8
For the foregoing reasons, the April 14, 2022 district court judgment is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED
9