State Of Louisiana v. Qwandarious Rowe

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #053
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 9th day of December, 2022 are as follows:
BY Genovese, J.:
2022-K-00206 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. QWANDARIOUS ROWE (Parish of Washington)
REVERSED. SEE OPINION.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Crain, J.

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SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2022-K-00206
S
TATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
QWANDARIOUS ROWE
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Washington
G
enovese, J.
W
e granted this writ application to clarify the application of La.R.S.
14:403.10(B),1 which shields a person from prosecution of possession of a controlled
dangerous substance if it is discovered while that person is receiving needed medical
assistance as a result of a “drug-related overdose.” Specifically, for the reasons
outlined below, we find that for the purpose of applying La.R.S. 14:403.10 ,
“overdose” means an acute medical condition, including, but not limited to, extreme
physical illness, decreased level of consciousness, respiratory depression, coma,
mania, hysteria, or death that is the result of consumption or use of a controlled
dangerous substance, or a condition a lay person would reasonably believe was a
drug-related overdose.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
De
fendant, Qwandarious Rowe, was charged by bill of information with
possession of methamphetamine (less than two grams), a violation of La. R.S.
40:967(C)(1). The incident giving rise to defendant’s arrest occurred at a
Washington Parish fair . Specifically, a fair attendee alerted a sheri ff’s deputy,
Sergeant Michael Thomas, that a man in a public bathroom was sitting on the floor
1 In pertinent part, La.R.S. 14:403.10(B) reads as follows:
B. A
person who experiences a drug -related overdose and is in need of medical
assistance shall not be charged, prosecuted, or penalized for possession of a controlled
dangerous substance under the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law if the
evidence for possession of a controlled dangerous substance was obtained as a result
of the overdose and the need for medical assistance
.

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with his pants around his ankles. When he entered the bathroom, Sergeant Thomas
recognized defendant from previous encounters.
According to Sergeant Thomas, defendant had difficulty staying awake and
speaking coherently. As the deputy pulled up defendant’s pants and assisted him out
of the bathroom, he felt a syringe in defendant’s pocket, which he seized. Sergeant
Thomas felt defendant required medical evalua tion, and the fair’s emergency
medical service (EMS) team was summoned. Defendant was placed on the back of
a golf cart driven by Northshore Hospital EMS personnel for observation. Before
the golf cart transported defendant to a different location, Sergeant Thomas noticed
something sticking out of defendant’s sock. After unrolling the sock, Sergeant
Thomas discovered what he believed to be methamphetamine wrapped in a five
dollar bill. Ultimately, EMS transported defendant by ambulance to a hospital where
he was admitted with an altered mental status (confused, drowsy, and had an
irregular heartbeat) and was diagnosed with psychoactive substance abuse and an
unspecified psychoactive substance abuse disorder. He was discharged about two-
and-one-half hours later.
Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information, arguing he qualified
for immunity under La.R.S. 14:403.10(B) pursuant to the three-pronged test set out
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in State v. Jago, 16-346, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/28/16), 209 So.3d 1078, 1082 (Jago I):
As written, La. R.S. 14:403.10B establishes a three -prong test for
determining whether the immunity it establishes applies. The person in
possession of the controlled dangerous substance must be experiencing
an “overdose”; the person must be in need of medical assistance; and[,]
the evidence of the controlled dangerous substance must have been
obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance.
This statute does not define “overdose,” and there is no jurisprudence
interpreting this statute.

The state agreed defendant satisfied one prong of the test from Jago I (the
discovery of contraband as a result of the medical assistance), but denied that

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defendant had established the second and third prong s of the test : that he was
experiencing an overdose , and that he was in need of the medical assistance he
received. At the hearing on the motion, Sergeant Thomas testified that while he did
not believe defendant had overdosed, he described the state in which he found
defendant as follows:
[H]e was just sitting there. Not making any sense. And I’ve dealt with
Qwandarious before. And I just wanted to [have him checked out], see
what was wrong with him, what’s going on. Because it’s not normal to
be sitting in the bathroom stall with your pants around your ankles.

When asked if he was conscious, Sergeant Thomas responded, “He said nothing.
And then he’d moan and grunt.” He also said defendant “kept trying to fall back
asleep.” When asked why Sergeant Thomas called EMS, he responded that he
thought defendant should be “treated and evaluated.”
The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s motion to quash, finding that
defendant had only satisfied two out of the three prongs of the Jago I test (the need
for medical assistance and the discovery of the contraband as a result of the medical
assistance), but had not established that he was experiencing an overdose. The trial
court noted that “overdose” is not defined in La.R.S. 14:403.10 and acknow ledged
the difficulty of determining whether defendant “overdosed” (within the meaning of
the statute) without medical testimony . In reaching its decision, the trial court
referred to the dictionary definition of overdose—“an excessive dose, especially of
a narcotic”—and patient educational materials admitted into evidence, which listed
chest pain, confusion, sleepiness and difficulty staying awake, slowed breathing,
nausea or vomiting, and seizures as signs of an overdose . Defendant’s medical
records, which were also introduced, indicated that he experienced confusion,
sleepiness or difficulty staying awake at the hospital. Thus, the trial court concluded
that while defendant exhibited some symptoms of an overdose, he was ultimately
only experiencing a drug-related high and, therefore, did not qualify for immunity

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under the statute.2 The trial court also determined that defendant failed to meet his
evidentiary burden in proving that he was “overdosing” pursuant to the statute .3
Following the denial of his motion to quash the bill of information, defendant entered
a guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to quash pursuant
to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584, 588 (La. 1976). Defendant was sentenced to two
years at hard labor, suspended, and was placed on three years of probation.
A split panel in the First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s
ruling. State v. Rowe, 21-0626 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/21), 340 So.3d 1052 (Guidry,
J., dissenting) (Holdridge, J., concurring) .4 The court of appeal first acknowledged

2 Specifically, the trial court explained as follows:
So[,] there’s two out of the six symptoms. I’m not a doctor. I don’t know if that’s
an overdose. But I do tend to agree with argument from counsel from the State
saying that any narcotic drug, the symptoms are going to be some degree of
confusion and sleepiness. And just because there’s a use does not mean that it’s an
overuse, or that he was in risk of or potentially having an overdose.

Rowe, 21-0626, p. 7, 340 So.3d at 1056.

3 The trial court found defendant failed to meet his evidentiary burden due to a lack of testimony
from medical personnel confirming that he was indeed experiencing an overdose:

[T]his comes right down to an evidentiary burden. This motion was filed by [the]
defense, who was tasked with proving to me that the defendant was, indeed,
experiencing a drug related overdose.

There has been no testimony from any medical personnel or anything indicating to
me that he was having an overdose. It seems to me, in a nonmedical way, that he
was experiencing a drug related high. I mean, he was bein g affected by the drugs.
But I’ve seen nothing to indicate to me that he was having an overdose.

So it’s a failure to meet the burden of proof to prove to me that Mr. Rowe was
experiencing an overdose.

Id., 21-0626, p. 7, 340 So.3d at 1056.
4 Judge Holdridge’s concurrence reads as follows:

I respectfully concur in this case. The Louisiana Supreme Court s tated in the per
curiam opinion [in] State v. Jago, 2017-0183 (La. 11/17/17), 228 So.3d 1218, 1219,
that “requiring a lay person [,] before seeking help[,] to determine whether a drug
user has experienced a life- threatening overdose—would frustrate the purpose of
the statute, which is to encourage persons to seek help for those they reasonably
believe have overdosed.” However, the language of the Supre me Court in Jago
gives the impression that we should encourage law enforcement to only assist and
seek medical assistance for individuals who have overdosed. As stated by the trial
judge in this case, sometimes it is the “best practice ... to get them checked out[.]”
Therefore, I find that La. R.S. 14:403.10(B) should be read to encourage law
enforcement in all cases to seek medical assistance for individuals who they are

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that this Court, while ultimately denying writs in Jago I, issued a per curiam finding
that defendant does not have to prove he or she ingested a lethal amount of a
controlled dangerous substance to avail themselves of statutory immunity, stating as
follows:
The court of appeal erred in finding that defendant must have injected
a lethal quantity of heroin before he can be shielded from prosecution
by operation of La. R.S. 14:403.10(B). Requiring a drug u ser to have
experienced a life -threatening overdose — and requiring a lay person
before seeking help to determine whether a drug user has experienced
a life-threatening overdose—would frustrate the purpose of the statute,
which is to encourage persons to see k help for those they reasonably
believe have overdosed.

State v. Jago , 17-0183, p. 1 (La. 11/17/17) 228 So.3d 1218, 1219 (Johnson, C.J.,
dissenting) (Jago II). In response to Jago II, the court of appeal opined, “While the
supreme court found that a drug user did not have to experience a life -threatening
overdose in order for the definition of ‘overdose’ to be satisfied under R.S.
14:403.10(B), the court left little guidance as to what constitutes a drug-related
overdose.” Rowe, 21-0626, p. 8, 340 So.3d at 1057. Thereafter, the court held that
“an ‘overdose’ is a medical and factual term that requires a witness with a medical
background (or a medical expert) to testify as to the medical factors involved in
diagnosing whether there has been an overdose.” Id. In the absence of expert medical
testimony or evidence of what substance caused defendant’s intoxication, the court
of appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
to quash the bill of information. Id., 21-0626, pp. 8–9, 340 So.3d at 1057–58. Judge
Guidry dissented, finding that this case “represents the exact type of case envisioned
by the legislature in passing this immunity statute [,] one in which someone

concerned may be in medical distress for any reason. However, in order for the
immunity provided by La. R.S. 14:403.10(B) to apply, the defendant would have
to prove the elements of the three -prong test and establish that medical assistance
was provided because he was experiencing an overdose. In this case, the defendant
did not meet his burden that he overdosed. Therefore, he is not immune from
prosecution for his drug offense.

Rowe, 21-0626, p. 1, 340 So.3d at 1058 (Holdridge, J., concurring).

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reasonably believes a person is experiencing a drug-related overdose and the person
receives medical assistance as a result of the overdose.” Id., 21-0626, p. 1, 340 So.3d
at 1058 (Guidry, J., dissenting). Judge Guidry also expressed concern that the
majority’s holding would perpetuate the problem the statute sought to alleviate.5
Defendant thereafter filed a writ application with this Court, which this Court
granted. In his brief to this Court, defendant argues that the court abused its
discretion in finding that defendant did not qualify for immunity under La.R.S.
14:403.10 based on the previously -discussed testimony and evidence admitted.
Contained within the hospital records admitted as evidence was a notation from
defendant’s doctor stating, “risk factors consist of overdose.” He argues this Court
should adopt the reasoning in Judge Guidry’s dissent.
The state reiterates its a rguments that defendant should not qualify for
immunity under La.R.S. 14:403.10(B) because he failed to prove that he was in need
of medical assistance and, in fact, was experiencing an overdose. The state agrees
with the court of appeal’s conclusion that “to define ‘overdose’ merely as one which
is dangerous or is ‘too great a dose’ would lead to the absurd result of allowing any
amount of a [controlled dangerous substance] to satisfy this prong of the test for
immunity granted by La. R.S. 14:403.10 B,” quoting State v. Brooks, 16-0345, pp.
7–8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/16), 210 So.3d 514, 520. (Emphasis in original).
6 The
state argues the term “overdose” must be defined with reference to what is apparent

5 Specifically, Judge Guidry found as follows:
The statute’s purpose is to save lives [,] and these critical split- second decisions
have to be made based upon what is happening in real time. The majority’s opinion
would have a chilling effect on a person responding to what reasonably appears to
be a drug -related overdose and frustrates the leg islative intent to save lives. A
witness to a drug-related overdose may hesitate or fail to get medical assistance for
the drug user rather than exposing the person to criminal prosecution, which is
exactly the scenario that the statute seeks to avoid.

Id., 21-0626, p. 2, 340 So.3d at 1059 (Guidry, J., dissenting).

6 Brooks is the companion case to Jago I. Brooks and Jago were co-defendants.

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because “ [La.]R.S. 14:403.10 is target ed towards situations involving a person
responding to what reasonably appears to be a drug-related overdose.” The state
notes “that other states with similar overdose immunity statutes define ‘overdose’ to
mean a condition a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug overdose
requiring immediate medical assistance.”7 The state also underscores that in order
to distinguish between mere intoxication and a more serious condition, other states
include in their statute’s definition of “overdose” that it is an “acute condition.”
In this case, the state contends, the court of appeal came to the correct
conclusion, albeit for the wrong reason. The state asserts that defendant did not
establish that he was experiencing an overdose, not because he failed to present
medical expert testimony, but r ather because the evidence presented at the motion
hearing did not give rise to a reasonable belief that the defendant was experiencing
an overdose. First, the state avers that the individual who alerted the sheriff’s deputy
about defendant in the bathroom did not indicate the situation was a medical
emergency. Next, the state points to Sergeant Thomas’s testimony that he did not
believe the defendant was experiencing an overdose . Finally, the state argues the
hospital records indicate that defendant was not distressed , but instead was
experiencing the desired effects of the drugs he consumed.
8 In short, the state
contends the evidence shows defendant was not, in fact, experiencing an overdose.

7 The state cites to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18- 1-711; Delaware Code, Title 16, § 4769; Hawaii R.S. §
329-43.6; N.C. Stat. § 90 -96.2; N.D. Code, § 19- 03.1-23.4; Pa. Stat., Title 35, § 780- 113.7; S.C.
Stat. § 44-53-1910.

8 The triage note indicates that the chief complaint was “arrived via EMS from fair.” The records
show “no actual or suspected pain” reported. The “assessment” reflects that defendant knew who
and where he was but was “disoriented to situation” and “disoriented to time.” The medical records
further reflect that less than ten minutes after admission, a nurse conducting rounds reported: “pt
standing and dancing in room, states he have [sic] called for a ride.” In addition, the state points
out that the medical records indicate the “clinical service” as “non-specified” with an ICD-10 code
of “F19.10”— meaning “other psychoactive substance abuse, uncomplicated.” The state asserts
that had the final diagnosis been that the defendant was experiencing an overdose of
methamphetamine–a psychostimulant drug–the ICD-10 code would have been under “T43.6” –
pertaining to “Poisoning by, adverse effect of and overdosing of psychostimulants.”

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Furthermore, the state argued that portions of the medical records highlighted
in defendant’s brief 9 do not indicate that the defendant actually experienced an
overdose, but rather that he was merely experiencing “ symptoms of an overdose.”
The state argues the symptoms alone do not indicate an overdose per se , because
these symptoms are also consistent with simply experiencing a high; thus, the
situation lacked the severity required to avail himself of the statutory immunity in
La.R.S. 14:403.10. The state also asserts that defendant failed to show he was “in
need of medical assistance” as required to qualify for immunity under the statute.10
DISCUSSION

We must determine whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to quash due to his failure to present medical
expert testimony as to whether he, in fact, suffered an overdose pursuant to the
statute. The central question presented by this case is one of statutory
interpretation—how “overdose” should be defined in the context of La.R.S.
14:403.10. In answering this question, we are guided by current laws and previous
jurisprudence from this Court. In State v. Oliphant, 12-1176, p. 5 (La. 3/19/13), 113
So.3d 165, 168, this Court explained:
The interpretation of any statutory provision starts with the language of
the statute itself. Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan, 11-0097, p. 11
(La. 12/16/11), 79 So.3d 987, 997. When the provision is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences,
its language must be given effect, and its provisions must be construed
so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of
the language used. La. Civ.Code art. 9; La.Rev.Stat. § 1:4; In re Clegg,
10-0323, p. 20 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1141, 1154. Unequivocal
provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied
by giving words their generally understood meaning. La. Civ.Code art.
11; La.Rev.Stat. § 1:3; see also Snowton v. Sewerage and W ater Bd.,

9 The state is referring to the notations in the medical records that indicated defendant had an
irregular heart rhythm, he was confused/disoriented and drowsy, and the doctor’s observation,
“Risk factors consist of overdose.”

10 Both the trial court and appellate court agreed that defendant was in need of medical assistance,
and defendant did not challenge that conclusion in his writ application to this Court. Accordingly,
because that issue is not formally before this Court, we do not address it in depth.

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08-399, pp. 5 –6 (La. 3/17/09), 6 So.3d 164, 168. Words and phrases
must be read with their context and construed according to the common
and approved usage of the language. La.Rev.Stat. § 1:3.

Moreover, it is well -established criminal statutes a re subject to strict
construction under the rule of lenity. State v. Carr , 99-2209, p. 4 (La.
5/26/00), 761 So.2d 1271, 1274. Criminal statutes, therefore, are given
a narrow interpretation, and any ambiguity in the substantive provisions
of a statute as written is resolved in favor of the accused and against the
State. State v. Becnel, 93-2536, p. 2 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 959, 960.

When the language of the law is susceptible to different meanings, it must be
interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the law’s purpose. La.C.C.
art. 10. When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by
examining the context in which they are used and the law’s text as a whole. La.C.C.
art. 12. The legislative history of an act and contemporaneous circumstances are also
helpful guides in ascertaining legislative intent. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana
Public Service Com’n, 98-1737, p. 8 (La. 3/2/99), 728 So.2d 855, 860.
Here, both lower courts in this matter expressed the difficulty of applying
La.R.S. 14:403.10(B) without a more s pecific definition of “overdose,” indicating
that “overdose,” in the context of R.S. 14:403.10, is susceptible to different
meanings. As noted by the trial and appellate courts, the dictionary definition of the
word “overdose” is “an excessive dose.” On the other hand, “overdose” is also a
medical term used for diagnosis and treatment that is defined, at least in part, by its
symptoms. Additionally, there remains the issue of what burden of proof defendants
must meet to avail themselves of this statutory immunity.
The legislature passed La.R.S. 14:403.10 (B) as part of an array of “Good
Samaritan” laws in 2014. See 2014 La. Acts 392. The purpose of La.R.S. 14:403.10
was to curb drug-related deaths of L ouisiana citizens. The sponsoring legislators
testified at committee hearings that in recognition of the fact that the fear of police
involvement often discourages bystanders from seeking medical assistance for a
person potentially overdosing, the statute grants immunity to the drug user and the

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person who calls for help. During the most recent legislative session, the statute was
amended. The bill broadened the statute’s immunity protections, but did not clarify
the definition of “overdose.” See 2022 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 225 (H.B. 601). A
representative from the Louisiana District Attorney’s Association testified at a
committee hearing that the purpose of the bill was to expand good faith immunity
and further incentivize people who might otherwise be afr aid of prosecution to
engage in life support, call 911, and seek medical assistance.
Although the appellate majority’s technical interpretation of “overdose” does
not conflict with the plain language of the statute, this narrow and highly -technical
reading subverts the purpose of the law, which is to remove the fear of prosecution
and to encourage bystanders to seek help. If a third party fears that an apparent
overdose may not be severe enough to later receive confirmation by a medical
expert, the witness might equivocate about calling 911. The chilling effect of the
application of the law endorsed by the appellate majority in this case could
counteract the very problem sought to be addressed by the provision. Indeed,
interpreting “overdose” to have a highly technical meaning that requires expert
medical testimony to evaluate runs counter to this Court’s previous statements in
Jago II where we noted that “requiring a lay person before seeking help to determine
whether a drug user has experienced a life -threatening overdose—would frustrate
the purpose of the statute[.]” Id., 17-0183, p. 1, 228 So.3d at 1219. In short, the court
of appeal’s definition is not “the meaning that best conforms to the law’s purpose.”
La.C.C. art. 10.
As of 2022, 40 states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of
a Good Samaritan or 911 drug immunity law that provide s some protection from
arrest or prosecution for individuals who report an overdose in good faith.
11 Most

11 Drug Overdose Immunity and Good Samaritan Laws, NCSL,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/drug-overdose-immunity-good-
samaritan-laws.aspx.

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states’ statutes include a reasonableness component in the definition of overdose.12
Notably, Louisiana’s companion immunity statute addressing alcohol consumption
also includes a reasonableness component. Specifically, La.R.S. 14:403.9 (emphasis

12 See Alaska Stat. §11.71.311 (“. . . who the person reasonably believed was experiencing a drug
overdose . . .”); CA Health & Safety Code § 11376.5(e) (“. . . if a reasonable person of ordinary
knowledge would believe the condition to be a drug-related overdose . . .”); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-
1-711(5)(“ . . . a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires
medical assistance.”); Conn. Gen. Stat. §21a-267(e)(“ . . . who such person reasonably believes is
experiencing an overdose . . .”); D.C. Code § 7- 403(a)(1)(A)-(C) (“[r]easonably believes that he
or she is experiencing . . . himself,” “[r]easonably believes that another person is experiencing . .
.,” “is reasonably believed to be experiencing . . .”); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16, § 4769 (“. . . if a
layperson could reasonably believe that the condition is in fact an overdose and requires medical
assistance.”); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-5(a)(1) (“. . . reasonable person would believe . . .”); Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 329-43.6 (2015) (2)(“ A condition that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a
drug or alcohol overdose . . .”); Iowa Code § 124.418 (“. . . a prudent layperson would reasonably
believe such condition to be the result of, the consumption or use of a controlled substance.”); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 218A.133 (“. . . a layperson would reasonably believe requires medical assistance;”);
Md. Code, Crim. Proc. §1- 210 (“. . . a person reasonably believed to be experiencing a medical
emergency after ingesting or using alcohol or drugs . . .”); Mich. Comp. Laws §§333.7403(7)(a)
(“. . . a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug overdose that requires medical
assistance.”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.05, Subd. 5 (“. . . that a layperson would reasonably believe
to be a drug overdose . . . .”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.205 (1) (“. . . a person would reasonably believe
to be a drug o r alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance”); Miss. Code. Ann. § 41 -29-
149.1 (“. . . a layperson would reasonably believe to be resulting from the consumption or use of
a controlled substance or dangerous drug for which medical assistance is required.”); Mont. Code.
Ann. 50-32-609 (a) (“. . . person who is experiencing an actual or reasonably perceived drug -
related overdose . . .”); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-96.2(a) (“. . . that a layperson would reasonably
believe to be a drug overdose . . .”); N.D. Cent.Code §19-03.1-23.4 (“. . . the overdosed individual
must have been in a condition a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug overdose
requiring immediate medical assistance.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28 -472 (“. . . condition a layperson
would reasonably believe requires emergency medical assistance.”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §318-
B:28-b (“. . . condition . . . which a layperson would reasonably believe requires medical
assistance.”); Nev. Rev. Stat. §453C.150 (“. . . an ordinary layperson would reasonably believe to
be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance.”); N.Y. Penal Law § 220.78 (“. . .
a patient’s condition shall be deemed to be a drug or alcohol overdose if a prudent layperson,
possessing an average knowledge of medicine a nd health, could reasonably believe that the
condition is in fact a drug or alcohol overdose . . .”); Okl. Stat. tit. 63 § 2 -413.1 (“. . . reasonably
appeared to be in need of medical assistance due to the use of a controlled dangerous substance”);
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §475.898 (“. . . a condition . . . that a person would reasonably believe to be a
condition that requires medical attention.”); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113.7 (“A patient’s condition
shall be deemed to be a drug overdose if a prudent layperson, possessing an average knowledge of
medicine and health, would reasonably believe that the condition is in fact a drug overdose and
requires immediate medical attention.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-1910 (2) (“. . . condition . . . that
a layperson would rea sonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical
assistance.”); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34- 20A-109 (“. . . condition. . . that a person would
reasonably believe to be a drug overdose that requires medical assistance.”); Tenn. Code Ann. §
63-1-156 (“. . . condition . . . that a reasonable person would believe to be resulting from the
consumption or use of a controlled substance or other substance…”); Utah Code §58- 37-8 (16)
(“. . . bystander . . . reasonably believes that the person or a nother person is experiencing an
overdose event.”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4254(a)(1) (“. . . an acute condition resulting from or
believed to be resulting from the use of a regulated drug which a layperson would reasonably
believe requires medical assi stance.”); Wis. Stat. §961.443 (1) (“. . . a reasonable person would
believe him or her to be, suffering from an overdose . . .”); W.Va. §16-47-4 (1) (“. . . a person who
reasonably appears to be experiencing an overdose . . .”).

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added), provides, in pertinent part:
A. A peace officer shall not take a person into custody based solely on
the commission of an offense involving alcohol described in Subsection
B of this Section if the peace officer, after making a reasonable
determination and considering the facts and surrounding circumstances,
reasonably believes that all of the following apply:

(1) The law enforcement officer has contact with the person because
the person acting in good faith requested emergency medical assistance
for an individual who reasonably appeared to be in need of medical
assistance due to alcohol consumption and the person did not illegally
provide alcohol to the individual.

Based on this Court’s opinion in Jago II, and the legislature’s choice of words in the
companion statute, and borrowing from the language in other states’ immunity
statutes, we find that for the purpose of applying La.R.S. 14:403.10, “overdose”
means an acute medical condition, including, but not limited to, extreme physical
illness, decreased leve l of consciousness, respiratory depression, coma, mania,
hysteria, or death that is the result of consumption or use of a controlled substance,
or a condition a lay person would reasonably believe was a drug-related overdose.
Having defined “overdose” above, the question then turns to whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to quash. The trial court
read into the record a disjunctive list of six signs of an overdose and noted
defendant’s medical records indicated he experienced two of the symptoms. There
is no indication that the medical records stated that a person must experience all —
or even a majority —of the enumerated symptoms in order to be deemed having
suffered an overdose. Furthermore, defendant’s medical records stated “risk factors
consist of overdose.” The trial court “interpret[ed] [that] to mean they were worried
there could have been an overdose going on.” Accordingly, even by its own
definition of overdose, the trial court’s finding that there was nothing indicating that
defendant was experiencing an overdose was not correct. Additionally, d espite
Sergeant Thomas’s belief that defendant was not experiencing an overdose, he
nevertheless concluded that defendant’s behavior was “ not normal” and sought

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medical attention. Defendant’s condition was one that a lay person would reasonably
believe was a drug- related overdose as defined above. Furthermore, there is
sufficient evidence in the record that defendant was experiencing an “acute
condition” that involved a decreased level of consciousness, disorientation as to time
and place, and an inability to stand on his own or pull his pants up by himself.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court manifestly erred in rejecting defendant’s
claim of immunity from prosecution under La.R.S. 14:403.10. Defendant presented
sufficient evidence that he was, in fact, experiencing a drug-related overdose and,
furthermore, his condition was such that a lay person would reasonably believe he
was experiencing a drug-related overdose. In addition, defendant was in need of
medical assistance and was charged with possession of a controlled dangerous
substance as a result of the medical assistance. Accordingly, the lower courts’ rulings
are reversed, and defendant’s motion to quash is granted.
REVERSED.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-K-00206
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
QWANDARIOUS ROWE
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of Washington
CRAIN, J., dissenting.
To be immune from prosecution, defendant ha s to prove he experienced “a
drug-related overdose” and the incriminating evidence “was obtained as a result of
the overdose and the need for medical assistance.” La. R.S. 14:403.10B(1). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant failed to meet this burden of
proof.
“Overdose” is a medical term requiring medical evidence to prove. Technical
terms must be given their technical meaning when the law involves a technical
matter. La. Civ. Code art. 11; see also La. R.S. 1:3 (“Technical words . . . shall be
construed and understood according to [their] peculiar and appropriate meaning.”).
The only medical evidence here is the hospital emergency room record, which does
not indicate defendant suffered an overdose. To the contrary, as recognized by the
majority, the hospital record confirms defendant was “standing and dancing” in the
emergency room. The trial court correctly surmised defendant “was experiencing a
drug related high” and “was being affected by the drugs,” but the record contains
“nothing to indicate [defendant] was having an overdose.”
Finding otherwise, the majority relie s heavily on the purpose of La. R.S.
14:403.10 to curb drug -related deaths by encouraging bystanders to seek medical
assistance for someone potentially overdosing. While that purpose is admirable, it

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is not advanced in the slightest by applying the statute in this case. The bystander
did not seek medical assistance for anyone. He reported to a sheriff’s deputy that
the defendant was sitting on the floor of a public restroom with his pants around his
ankles. There is no evidence the bystander said anything about a drug overdose. By
all indications, the bystander wanted law enforcement to be aware of a problem in a
public facility.
More importantly, e ven if the law’s purpose was implicated, I respectfully
submit the majority’s interpretation of the statute disregards its language in pursuit
of its purpose. The majority creates a definition not found in Section 403.10, then
adds a “reasonableness component” that expands the word “overdose” to include “a
condition a lay person would reasonably believe was a drug-related overdose.” This
eliminates the express statutory requirement of an actual “overdose.” Courts are not
free to rewrite laws to effect a purpose that is not otherwise expressed. Cacamo v.
Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. , 99-3479 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So. 2d 41, 44. If the
legislature wants to extend Section 403.10’s immunity to someone who only appears
to have overdosed , it can do so. We should not. As currently drafted, the statute
requires proof of an overdose. Defendan t failed to present the necessary medical
evidence to prove that element. I would affirm the lower courts.