State Of Louisiana v. Kyran Javon Vaughn

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #023
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 5th day of May, 2023 are as follows:
BY McCallum, J.:
2022-K-00214 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. KYRAN JAVON VAUGHN (Parish of St.
Tammany)
REVERSED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION.
Crichton, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Genovese and
assigns additional reasons.
Genovese, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Genovese.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-K-00214
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
KYRAN JAVON VAUGHN
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany
McCALLUM, J.
The United States Supreme Court, in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ––––, 140
S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), “held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a
unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense and this requirement
applies equally to state and federal criminal trials. ” State v. Reddick, 2021-01893,
p. 2 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So. 3d 273, 274 -75. As we noted in Reddick, Ramos only
applies “to cases on direct review, pursuant to Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,
328, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987)” and State v. Cole, 19-1733 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So. 3d 524.
Id., 2021-01893, 351 So. 3d at 275. We found in Cole that, because the defendant’s
convictions were not final when Ramos was decided, the holding of Ramos applied.
Cole, 19 -1733, p. 1, 302 at 524. The implication of these cases is that , where a
conviction is final, Ramos does not apply. Consistent with this principle, in Reddick,
we declined to apply Ramos retroactively to the defendant as his case was on
collateral, not direct review. We held that the new rule of criminal procedure
announced in Ramos, requiring unanimity in jury verdicts, is not retroactive on state
collateral review in Louisiana. Reddick, 2021-01893, p. 16, 351 So. 3d at 283.
The writ application in this case was granted to address a purely legal issue:
where a defendant’s conviction s by a non -unanimous jury were final, but his

2

sentences were still under review at the time Ramos was decided, is the defendant
entitled to a new tr ial? The answer to this question is determined by whether the
matter would be considered to be on “direct review” as contemplated by Reddick.
After carefully reviewing this matter , we find that only the direct review of
the non-unanimous jury conviction entitles a defendant to a new trial. Once that
review is final, the defendant is not entitled to any further relief under Ramos,
irrespective of whether his sentence or resentence is still on appeal. We explain our
decision below.
In 2017, a St. Tammany Parish jury convicted the defendant of first degree
robbery and obstruction of justice by 10-2 verdicts. The defendant was adjudicated
a second-felony offender on the robbery charge and was sentenced to concurrent
terms of 20 years imprisonment at hard labor and 10 years on obstruction of justice.1
On appeal, the defendant raised numerous issues, including the sufficiency of the
evidence and excessiveness of the sentence. All of these claims were rejected and
the defendant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. State v. Vaughn, 18-0344
(La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So. 3d 1048. This Court too affirmed the convictions,
but vacated the habitual offender sentence and remanded the case to the trial court
for resentencing in light of State v. Lyles, 19-0203 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So. 3d 407.2
See State v. Vaughn , 2018-1750 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 494. On August 31,
2020, the trial court resentenced defendant to an enhanced sentence of 18 years
imprisonment at hard labor on the armed robbery charge.
The defendant then appealed from the newly imposed sentence , raising t wo
assignments of error, only one of which was addressed by the court of appeal. In

1 Defendant had a previous conviction of simple kidnapping.

2 Lyles held that amendments contained in 2017 La. Acts No. 282, § 2 (the Habitual Offender Law)
apply to those defendants whose habitual offender bills were filed before November 1, 2017, and
whose convictions became final after that date. The amendments reduced the sentencing range for
habitual offenders.

3

that assigned error, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial under
Ramos because his case was pending on direct review as his resentencing was not
final. In an unpublished opinion, the First C ircuit agreed with the defendant and
vacated both convictions, the habitual offender adjudication, and the sentences. State
v. Vaughn, 2021-0521 (La. A pp. 1 Cir. 12/30/21) (unpub’d), --- So. 3d ----, 2021
WL 63116618. 3 Citing Griffith, the First Circuit reasoned that, because only the
conviction was final, the defendant’s case was still under direct review . From this
ruling, the State filed a writ application seeking review with this Court.4
There can be no dispute that the defendant’s convictions in this matter are
final. We are guided by our decision in State v. Lewis, 350 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1977).
There, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed but his sentence was vacated, and
the matter remanded for resentencing. After he was resentenced, the defendant
appealed, raising issues concerning his conviction. While we observed that the
defendant had a “ right to appeal from the imposition of the new sentence ,” w e
refused to address any issue concerning his conviction. Id., 350 So. 2d at 1198. We
found that the “defendant’s conviction had already been affirmed and the judgment
therein was final fourteen days after its rendition upon the failure of defendant to file
an application for a rehearing.” Id.
Our long -standing analysis in Lewis is consistent with the Griffith Court’s
later pronouncement regarding the finality of a defendant’s conviction. The Griffith
Court explained: “[b]y ‘final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction
has been rendered, the availability of appeal exh austed, and the time for a petition
for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.” Griffith, 479 U.S. at
321 n.6, 107 S.Ct. at 712.

3 This ruling rendered the defendant’s second assignment of error – the excessiveness of his
sentence – moot.

4 Writ granted. See State v. Vaughn, 2022-00214, 338 So. 3d 479 (La. 6/1/22).

4

The record re flects that the defendant’s conviction s and sentence were
affirmed by the First Circuit in 2018. See Vaughn, 18-0344, 259 So. 3d 1048.
Although this Court later vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, all
other requested relief was denied. See Vaughn, 2018-1750, 283 So. 3d 494. No
rehearing was requested. Consequently, the defendant’s convictions unequivocally
became final on December 9, 2019. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 922; Lewis.
The defendant does not argue that his convictions are not final . Rather, he
maintains that his “case” was on direct review at the time that Ramos was decided
because his resentencing was pending. We disagree. The Ramos decision hinged
on the unconstitutionality of a defendant’s conviction by a non -unanimous jury .
That a defendant’s sentence is not final does not affect the finality of his conviction.
Nor does a case remain on direct review for purposes of Ramos when the only
unresolved issue is a defendant’s sentence; the lack of a final sentence does not
return a conviction to the direct review process.
Our decision is amply supported by other decisions addressing this issue,
either directly or analogously. State v. Kennon, 2019-00998, p. 7 (La. 9/1/20), 340
So. 3d 881, 886 , for example, i nvolved the finality of a conviction on subsequent
appeal of a habitual offender resentencing ; the issue focused on whether the
defendant could be resentenced under the amended habitual offender statute, which
reduced the range of penalties. The defendant maintained that he was entitled to be
sentenced under the new range because his conviction was not yet final; appellate
review of the habitual offender sentence was still pending at the time the new law
went into effect. Rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
To accept defendant’ s view that his conviction doe s not
become final until his habitual offender adjudication and
sentence become final, despite the fact that appellate
review of his conviction has been completed, would
require the court to read “offenders whose convictions
became final on or after November 1, 2017,” in Section 2
of Act 282 as “offenders whose convictions and sentences

5

became final” instead. Just as we were bound by this
unequivocal language in Lyles to find that defendant was
entitled to be sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1 as
amended by 2017 La. Acts 282, we are bound by it here to
find this defendant is not.

***

While the situation here is complicated by the bifurcated
appeals that resulted from the State’ s decision to pursue
recidivist sentence enhancement during the pendency of
the first appeal, we think it sufficient to find Lyles does not
apply here because a conviction is a conviction, while this
court has consistently found a habitual offender
proceeding is “merely part of sentencing.” State v.
Langendorfer, 389 So.2d 1271, 1276-77 (La. 1980). It is
well-settled that, “A defendant is not convicted of being a
habitual offender. Rather, a de fendant is adjudicated as a
habitual offender as a result of prior felony convictions.
The sentence to be imposed following a habitual offender
adjudication is simply an enhanced penalty for the
underlying conviction.” State v. Parker , 03 -0924, p. 15
(La. 4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 325-326. The only appellate
review ongoing here pertains to defendant’s habitual
offender sentence. Direct review of the conviction itself
ceased before November 1, 2017 [the date on which new
habitual offender statute went into effect].

Id., 2019-00998, pp. 8-9, 340 So. 3d at 887. (Emphasis added).
Other cases likewise reinforce a finding that, once a defendant’s conviction is
final, his case is no longer considered to be on direct review. See State v. Sylvester,
21-441, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/15/21), 330 So. 3d 1139, 1143-44, writ denied, 22-
104 (La. 4/26/22), 336 So. 3d 893 (“A lthough this court vacated [defendant’s]
habitual offender sentence [after his conviction was affirmed and writs were denied],
this did not change the fina lity of his affirmed conviction. . . [Defendant’s] appeal
of his new sentence following the vacated habitual offender sentence does not open
the door for relitigation of any issues regarding his initial conviction. [Defendant’s]
conviction remains final and therefore, he is not entitled to relief under Ramos.”);
See also, State v. Sewell, 53,571 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So. 3 d 362, 369,
writ denied , 2020 -01457 (La. 4/12/22), 336 So. 3d 91 (“Ramos applies only to
matters currently pending on direct review. In the instant case, Sewell’s conviction

6

became final in 2003, after the state supreme court denied his challeng e of this
Court’s 2002 opinion. . . As such, it is Sewell’ s resentencing that was pending on
direct review when Ramos was decided, not Sewell ’s conviction, which remained
final”); State v. Brown, 19-370, p. 11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 1179,
1187, writ d enied, 2020 -00276 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So. 3d 721 (Johnson, C.J.,
concurring) (“. . . [the defendant’s] convictions and sentences became final [when
this Court denied writs] . See La. C.Cr.P. art. 922(D). Although Mr. Brown was
resentenced pursuant to Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) ],
and now legitimately exercises his right to appeal that resentencing, his resentencing
does not allow him the opportunity to challenge his previously affirmed convictions
. . . .”); State v. Jarvis, 2021-1181, n.9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/25/22), 340 So. 3d 1137,
1141 (“the defendant’s convictions herein became final in 2002, long before the
United States Supreme Court ’s decision in Ramos. The defendant’s 2021 habitual
offender adjudication and resentencing entitled him to an appeal of his new habitual
offender adjudication and resentencing, not the underlying convictions.”).5
Based on the foregoing, we hold that, once a conviction has become final, a
case is no longer on direct review for purposes of Ramos and Reddick. Again, it is
the fact of a non -unanimous jury conviction that entitles a defendant to a new trial
under Ramos, not any other procedural defect . It follows, therefore, that a case is
not considered to be on direct review when the only matter remaining is an appeal
of a resentence. The finality of a defendant’s conviction forecloses any right to a
new trial under these circumstances.

5 We granted writs in Jarvis solely to vacate the habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and
remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a new habitual offender adjudication. State v.
Jarvis, 2020-00877 (La. 1/12/21), 308 So. 3d 290, 291.

7
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and vacated. The
matter is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of the defendant’ s
remaining assignment of error.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2022-K-00214
STA
TE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
KYRAN JAVON VAUGHN
O
N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
C
richton, J., dissents, for the reasons assigned by Justice Genovese, and assigns
additional reasons.
I dissent from the majority and would affirm the court of appeal, finding that
this case was pending on direct review when Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. -- (2020)
(“Ramos”) was decided, and therefore finding that defendant Kyran Javon Vaughn
is entitled to the constitutional relief granted under Ramos.
In my view, this case can be resolved by beginning at the place where our
analysis should always begin— the plain language of our code and statutes. The Code
of Criminal Procedure presents two options for the review of a criminal conviction:
direct appeal, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 911, et seq., and collateral review, i.e.,
post-conviction proceedings, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 924, et seq. Our legislature
has pronounced no other options; the Code offers no middle ground in which a case
could languish.
Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.8 provides that no application for
post-conviction relief “shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the
judgment of conviction and sentence has become final.” (Emphasis added.) This
Court vacated defendant’s sentence while it was on direct appellate review. State v.
Vaughn, 18-1750 (La. 6 11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 494. Therefore, because his sentence

was not yet final, he was not eligible—and had never become eligible 1—to apply for
post-conviction relief under article 930.8. His case, however, must have been
somewhere in the state’s procedural process. In my view, because defendant was not
eligible for post -conviction relief, his case was not on collateral review and must
have been on direct review. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed that a new ru le for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review . Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). I believe that the Griffith ruling, read in context
with the Code of Criminal Procedure created by our Legislature, suffices to answer
the question.
I would therefore affirm the court of appeal and permit defendant to be
afforded relief under Ramos.

1 Importantly to my conclusion, the defendant in this case never entered the collateral review
process, as without the finality of the sentence, his case remained on direct review. In contrast, and
as explained in my colleague Justice Genovese’s dissent, in the cases cited by the majority, the
defendants had already entered the collateral review track when resentencing occurred.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2022-K-00214
S
TATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
KYRAN JAVON VAUGHN
O
n Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany
G
ENOVESE, J. dissents for the following reasons:
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the appellate court’s judgment, which
held that Defendant’s case was pending on direct review at the time Ramos v.
Louisiana, 590 U.S.___, 140 S.Ct. 1390 (2020)(“Ramos”) was decided.
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716 (1987)
(emphasis added), the United State Supreme Court held: “[A] new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or
federal, pending on direct review or not yet final . . . .” In State v. Naquin, 00-0291,
p.
2 (
La. 9/29/00), 769 So.2d 1170, 1171 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323), this Court
held, in pertinent part: “New rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply
retroactively to all cases subject to direct appeal at the time the new rule i s
announced.” The narrow question, in the context of the application of Ramos , is
whether Defendant’s case was pending on direct review when Ramos was decided.1
The procedural history of this case is crucial in answering this question. As
set forth in the majority opinion, Defendant, by 10-2 verdicts, was convicted of first
degree robbery and obstruction of justice. He was adjudicated a second- felony
offender on the robbery charge and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 years
imprisonment at hard labor and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor on obstruction
1 State v. Cohen, 19-00949 (La. 1/27/21), 315 So.3d 202.

2

of justice. The appellate court in State v. Vaughn, 18-0344 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/18),
259 So.3d 1048, affirmed his convictions and sentences. On review by this Court,
Defendant’s convictions were affirmed , but his habitual offender se ntence was
vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of State v.
Lyles, 19 -0203 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So.3d 407. State v. Vaughn , 18 -1750 (La.
11/25/19), 283 So.3d 494. Ramos was decided on April 20, 2020, before Defendant
was resentenced. On August 31, 2020, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an
enhanced sentence of 18 years imprisonment at hard labor on the robbery charge.
At no time before Ramos was decided did Defendant become eligible to seek state
collateral review.
The majority agrees with the State’s argument that the finality date of a
defendant’s conviction is the only date of importance in evaluating whether a
defendant is entitled to relief under Ramos, and Defendant’s case was final before
Ramos was decided, i.e., when his conviction became final on December 9, 2019.
In opposition, Defendant argues that this Court’s affirmation of his conviction
and remand for resentencing in Vaughn, 283 So.3d 494, left his judgment
incomplete. Defendant asserts that before resentencing, he did not have a final
judgment from, which to appeal, nor could he seek post-conviction relief. Defendant
pertinently contends: “There is no break in this case. And because there is no break,
[Defendant’s] case remains in the appellate posture rather than the post-conviction
stage, which only applies to a final conviction and sentence.” Thus, his case was
still on direct review when Ramos was decided.
I find Defendant’s claim has merit and reject the majority’s pronouncement
of a new jurisprudentially-created rule that once a conviction becomes final, a case
is no longer to be considered on direct review . In my view, the implication of the
statutory authority is that a case remains on direct review until a defendant’s

3

conviction and sentence become final, and the defendant is eligible for state
collateral review.
Under Louisiana law, there are two general procedural vehicles relevant to the
present case whereby D efendant may seek relief —on direct review (appeal) and
state collateral re view (post -conviction relief). Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 912 provides, in pertinent part: “Only a final judgment or ruling
is appealable [,]” and “[t]he judgments or rulings from which the defendant may
appeal include, but are not limited to: (1) A judgment which imposes sentence. . . .”2
No appeal lies from a conviction only, as no direct review or appeal lay in criminal
cases except “when a sentence of a certain severity has been actually imposed.” State
v. Brown, 27 La. Ann. 236, 237 (La. 1875)(citing State v. Welsh, 23 La. Ann. 142
(La. 1871). In contrast, a defendant may not seek state collateral revie w or post
conviction relief if “the petitioner may appeal the conviction and sentence which he
seeks to challenge, or if an appeal is pending.” La. C.Cr. P. art. 924.1. Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8(A) provides in pertinent part: “No
application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out -of-
time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment
of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or
922 . . . .”
Additionally, the cases relied on by the State and the majority are
distinguishable. In State v. Kennon, 19-998 (La. 9/1/20), 340 So.3d 881, Ramos was
not at issue; rather , one of the issues was whether the defendant was eligible for a
lesser sentence under La. R.S. 15 :529.1 as amended by 2017 La. Acts 282. T he
defendant argued he should be sentenced under the amendment because his appeal

2 The Editor’s comment (c) to La. C.Cr.P. art. 912 states in part: “The Louisiana Supreme Court
has ruled that an appeal cannot be taken by the defendant except from a conviction and sentence.
State v. Carrerot, 133 La. 487, 63 So. 599 (1913); State O’Neal, 138 La. 977, 70 So. 1011 (1916);
State v. Fried, 152 La. 710, 94 So. 327 (1922); State v. LeBlanc, 160 La. 1053, 108 So. 87 (1926).”

4

was not yet final until after November 1, 2017 (the effective date), because appellate
review of the habitual offender sentence was ongoing. This Court rejected the
argument and held the plain language of 2017 La. Acts 282 —“shall become
effective November 1, 2017, and shall have prospective application only to offenders
whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017”—to mean when the
conviction became final. Kennon, 19-998, p. 7 , 340 So.3d at 886. Such limiting
language was not used in Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 (“[A] new rule for the conduct of
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final . . . .”).
In State v. Brown, 19-370 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So.3d 1179, writ
denied, 20-276 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So.3d 721, cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 141 S.Ct.
1396 (2021), State v. Sewell, 53,571 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So.3d 362, writ
denied, 20-1457 (La. 4/12/22), 336 So.3d 91, and State v. Jarvis, 21-1181 (La. App.
1 Cir. 2/25/22), 340 So.3d 1137 3, each defendant was convicted; his sentence
imposed; the initial appellate review of the conviction and sentence was final; he
was eligible to seek state collateral review before Ramos was rendered; and, t here
was an intervening principle of law or the State was seeking enhancement, which
resulted in resentencing.4 Unlike the above cases, at the time Ramos was decided,
Defendant’s sentence from his initial appeal was not yet final, and he was not eligible
to seek state collateral review.
Although State v. Lewis, 350 So.2d 1197 (La. 1977),5 is procedurally similar,
it does not lend guidance as to the meaning of direct review as contemplated by
Griffith, 479 U.S. 314. Additionally, I submit a determination that a case remains

3 This case was reviewed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967),
which was expanded by this Court in State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241.
4 State v. Sylvester, 21-441 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/15/21), 330 So.3d 1139, writ denied , 22-104 (La.
4/26/22), 336 So.3d 893, cited by the majority, does not lend much guidance to the issue due to its
unusual procedural history.

5 Lewis, 350 So.2d 1197, was decided before Griffith, 479 U.S. 314.

5

on direct review until a defendant’s conviction and sentence becomes final, and the
defendant is eligible for state collateral review would not change this Court’s
pronouncement in Lewis that a defendant awaiting resentencing after his conviction
is final, is relegated to post conviction relief once his resentencing becomes final.6
Based on the above, I submit a case remains on direct review until a
defendant’s initial appeal of his conviction and sentence becomes final, and the
defendant is eligible for state collateral review. Applying this principle to the
particular factual and procedural history in this case, I agree with the appellate court
that Defendant’s case was pending on direct review when Ramos was rendered, and
Defendant should be afforded the constitutional relief granted under Ramos. As a
result thereby, I would affirm the appellate court’s decision.

6 In Lewis, the defendant’s conviction was affirmed, but his sentence was vacated and set aside,
and the case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Following resentencing, the
defendant appealed, and he raised assignments of error concerning both his conviction and his
sentence. This Court did not consider the assignments of error relating to his conviction. Lewis ,
350 So.2d 1197. This Court held t hat the defendant’s conviction had been affirmed, and the
judgment was final fourteen days after its rendition upon the failure of the defendant to file an
application for a rehearing, citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 922. This Court stated that any additional issues
the defendant wanted to raise in connection with his conviction, including an argument relative to
ineffective assistance of counsel, must be brought to the attention of the courts by application for
writs of habeas corpus (state collateral review). Lewis, 350 So.2d 1197.